California DUI news - U.S. drunk driving deaths rise

WASHINGTON – Alcohol-related deaths on U.S. roads rose to their highest level in 14 years in 2006, while the overall number of people killed in traffic crashes declined slightly but still topped 43,000, according to preliminary government estimates Friday.

The Transportation Department said that drunken driving deaths rose 2.4 percent to 17,941 after a slight decline in 2005. It was the highest level since 1992 when 18,290 deaths were reported.

Alcohol-related fatalities accounted for 41 percent of all traffic deaths, which dropped less than 1 percent last year to 43,300. Annual auto deaths have hovered around 43,000 for the past five years.

The number of fatal crashes remained virtually unchanged at just over 39,000, and most victims, 55 percent, were not wearing seat belts, the government said.

More than 2.5 million people were hurt in auto crashes.

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Getting drunk off hand sanitizers
Waterless hand sanitizers, found in hospitals, schools, day-care centers, grocery stores and health clubs, are generally considered effective germ killers if they contain more than 60 percent alcohol. But are they safe?

A colleague’s 8-year-old daughter licked 10 to 20 globs of hand sanitizer while at a supervised play center at a suburban health club, an idea that originally came from a classmate while at school. She ended up in the intensive care unit for two days.

“She was bumping into things and acting, well, drunk, but she said she had hit her head and we thought concussion,” said her father. “I took her home and she was passing out in the car. I was about to go to the emergency room when she blacked out. My wife called 911. She stopped breathing for a few seconds in the ambulance, but when they put tube in, she was breathing again on her own.”

The hand sanitizer-Purell with aloe-contained 62 percent ethyl alcohol--and the father was told if it had been isopropanol, found in other brands, the ingestion likely would have been fatal.

“As it was, her blood alcohol level at 6 p.m., less than two hours after exposure, was .218. She was going from unconscious to screaming rage to unconscious every few minutes. She awoke lucid at midnight, though her blood alcohol content was still .106. (The legal limit is .08)

“Physically she appears to be fine now,” her father said of the April incident. But “there are some emotional scars for sure."

The Illinois Poison Center has only had one similar case, involving a four-year old and say licks and tastes are not generally harmful.

But earlier this year, the New England Journal of Medicine reported two cases of people getting intoxicated after ingesting the alcohol-based hand sanitizers. One was a normally mild and calm 49-year-old prison inmate who was described as being ‘red-eyed,’ ‘loony’ and ‘combative’ and ‘lecturing everyone about life.’"

Another case involved a 43-year-old man battling alcoholism. When asked why he ingested the hand cleaner, he pointed to the label that read, “active ingredient 63 percent v/v ispropyl alcohol," which he said is higher than that in vodka, according to the report.

I use hand sanitizer all the time. Is my very calm 5-month old getting drunk when he sucks on my hand? Alarmed, I e-mailed nurse epidemiologist Ed Goodwin at Rush University Medical Center, who said, “the alcohol part evaporates in just seconds as it air dries…so your hands may still feel it but there is no alcohol touching your child’s lips.”

Still, parents should remember the sanitizers can be fatal if abused and that teenagers are already on to this dangerous high.

“Most kids might take a lick and get repulsed,” said the 8-year-old’s father. “(My daughter) said she liked the taste.”



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The convergence of epidemiological studies and controlled experimental studies demonstrate that "driving under the influence of a cell phone" is as dangerous as DUI drunk driving, resulting in a four fold increased likelihood that the driver will cause an accident.. The number of drivers actively using cell phones while driving is epidemic and continuing to rise rapidly, from 4 percent of all drivers on our American streets at any given daylight moment in time as of the year 2000, to 10 percent as of the end of 2005. The dangers posed the large and growing numbers of cell phone impaired drivers escalates muliplicatively each year as there are fewer unimpaired drivers capable of using evasive action to avoid the hazards created by those driving under the influence of their cell phones.

The mechanism of cell phone driving impairment is demonstrated in the controlled experimental literature, confirmed by neurological studies, and supported by the psycological literature to be a form of "inattentional blindness," a constriction of what cell phone users "see" deriving from the shifting of limited conscious capacity for attention to the internal-cognitive tasks associated with the give and take of the cell phone conversation away from the external-visual tasks essential for safe driving.

We suggest that the dangers posed by auto drivers who drive under the influence of cell phone conversation are even greater for the motorcyclists whom they fail to "see.". One obvious reason is that motorcyclists are more vulnerable to serious injury and death resulting from accidents generally and hence from the increased general incidence of accidents caused by the DUI level cell phone impaired. Additionally, auto drivers have a profound preexisting inattentional blindness specific for motorcyclists, as demonstrated by the pre-cell-phone-age studies demonstrating a disproportionate incidence of motorcycle accidents resulting from auto driver inattention specifically at intersections, after the auto driver enters the intersection or turns left at the intersection into the motorcyclist's right of way. The fact that the auto drivers claim that they don't "see" the motorcyclist derives from visual/visual inattentional blindness deriving from subconscious value judgments, e.g., "expectation" and "relevance" determining which visual stimulae will be permitted conscious attention. The cell phone impaired contribute an additional, different form of auditory-internal-cognitive distraction resulting in external-visual inattentional blindness. We suggest that the combination of the two forms of inattentional blindness leads at least to an additive and possibly a synergistic effect to disproportionately increase the dangers for motorcyclists..

We conclude that all cell phone use while driving should be outlawed. Thus far the states which have considered the issue have either rejected bans on cell phone use or have banned only to use of handheld cell phones while driving. It will become more and more obvious that cell phone use needs to be prohibited while driving as the broken bodies and caskets mount. Legislation banning only handheld cell phone use can be expected only to be completely ineffective in reducing the human carnage. Handheld legislation is indeed detrimental because it misinforms the public that the use of hands-free cell phones while driving is "safe."

Cell phone use while driving must be severely penalized, by lengthy drivers license suspension for first time offenders and jail time for repeat offenders, equivalent to the penalties for DUI drunk driving. Fines have proven ineffective in curtailing even handheld cell phone use where drivers had the option to use hands-free cell phones while driving. There is no economic risk/benefit analysis which recommends permitting cell phone use while driving. To the extent that employees may accomplish productive or semi-productive work while driving, the work product will not justify the "expense." Employers beware: if your employee causes an accident while engaged in business related cell phone conversation you will be held liable for the resulting injuries; the benefit will not exceed your cost. The " cost benefit" overall economic detriment is demonstrated also by the fact that the use of cell phones by the commuting work force results in an impediment to traffic flow, traffic delays and longer commutes for all workers. Cell phone users take 19 percent more time to regain flow-of-traffic speed after each braking episode. With one in ten drivers on our streets and highways actively involved in cell phone conversation at any given daylight moment, indeed the effect on traffic flow and city congestion is enormous. The societal costs of driver cell phone use is measured by broken bodies, the loss of our loved ones, medical expense, increased length of driver commutes, city congestion, increased fuel consumption, and the consequent environmental impact. No colorable "benefit" deriving from cell phone use while driving can justify the costs.

War is declared, upon the legislators whose cowardice has led them to resist cell phone bans or to promote ineffective bans on handheld cell phones only. They fear the political consequence of removing this dangerous toy from the hands of the 70 percent of their constituency who value their use. Take notice, as cell phone use continues to increase and as comprehensive bans become recognized as essential for public safety, we will count the numbers of those crippled and dead and we will remind the public of your prevarication and voting history. War is declared upon the employers who urge their employees to use cell phones to conduct business while driving: If your employee injures another, you will be held accountable to pay all recoverable damages. War is also declared upon the cell phone companies: either tell the truth and the whole truth in bold warnings attached to your cell phones, or you too will be held liable for the human carnage that results. And war is declared upon the individual driver who uses his cell phone while driving. Whether or not you have been forewarned, but in particular if you have received warnings from your cell company that driving under the influence of your cell phone results in increased danger that you will cause an accident, beware: if you then injure or kill another while driving under the influence of your cell phone, you too will pay the consequence.
1. Cell Phone Impaired Drivers Are a Menace on Our Streets, They are At Least As Impaired and Dangerous As DUI Drunk Drivers, And Significantly More Likely to Cause Accidents.
Epidemiological studies have demonstrated that motorists are 4 times as likely to cause accidents when engaged in cell phone conversation than when not engaged in cell phone conversation. The landmark epidemiological study is Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) “Association Between Cellular-Telephone Calls and Motor Vehicle Collisions.” New England Journal of Medicine, 336, 453. The study examined the telephone records of 699 auto drivers who had caused motor vehicle accidents and found that 24 percent were involved in cell phone conversations at the time of the accidents. The established four fold increased incidence of accidents in association with cell phone use is the same incidence associated with DUI drunk driving. These results were replicated in subsequent epidemiological studies, including another large case-crossover study using similar methodology, again finding a four fold increased incidence of auto accidents among drivers who were using cell phones at the time of the accident. McEvoy, Stevenson, McCartt, Woodward, Haworth, Palamara and Cercarelli, "Role of Mobile Phones in Motorvehicle Crashes Resulting in Hospital Attendance; A Case-Crossover Study,” British Medical Journal (July 12, 2005). Additional epidemiological evidence demonstrating driving impairment associated cell phone conversations is "The 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study, Phase II," DOT HS 810 593 April, 2006. In that NHTSA study it was found that "The use of handheld wireless devices (primarily cell phones) was associated with the highest frequency of secondary task distraction-related events. This was true for both events of lower severity (i.e., incident) and for events of higher severity (i.e., near crashes). Wireless devices were also among the categories associated with the highest frequencies of crashes and minor collisions." Significantly in terms of demonstrating the "attentional" rather than "manual" mechanism of cell phone driving impairment, "All of the crashes and a majority of the near crashes and incidents associated with wireless devices occurred during a cell phone conversation." Driver inattention generally was credited with the greatest contribution to overall accident rates. Significantly, NHTSA found that "Wireless devices, including primarily cell phones ... account for the highest frequency of inattention related occurrences ..."

Studies finding that cell phone driving impairment equates with DUI level alcohol intoxication are important for our present purposes because this is a level of driving impairment which has been previously judged by our state legislatures to be sufficiently dangerous to criminalize. If we accept that cell phone impaired drivers are a danger to society objectively equal to DUI level drunk drivers, then we suggest that it follows that cell phone use while driving should also be outlawed and criminalized.

In the most important series of controlled experimental studies performed on cell phone driving impairment to date, it was found again that the driving impairment associated with cell phone use was at least equal to that of DUI level alcohol intoxication. Indeed the incidence of accidents caused by cell phone users during the controlled simulations was found to be significantly greater than the incidence of accidents caused by those whose driving was impaired by DUI level alcohol intoxication. The most recent of the publications is Strayer, Drews and Crouch, “A Comparison of the Cell Phone Driver and the Drunk Driver,” Human Factors, Summer 2006. Strayer first announced his findings demonstrating DUI level impairment associated with cell phone use in 2003. Strayer, D. L. & Drews, F. A. & Crouch, D. J. (2003). “Fatal Distraction? A Comparison of the Cell-Phone Driver and the Drunk Driver.” In D. V. McGehee, J. D. Lee, & M. Rizzo (Eds.) Driving Assessment 2003: International Symposium on Human Factors in Driver Assessment, Training, and Vehicle Design. Published by the Public Policy Center, University of Iowa (pp. 25-30).

The previous cell phone impairment studies by Strayer, et al, most of which are discussed more fully infra, constitute equally important foundation for our understanding of the nature and extent of cell phone driving impairment. They establish the level of cell phone driving impairment experimentally, under controlled conditions, in a variety of simulated driving contexts, measuring, for example, cell phone impairment of driver ability to detect, recognize and act on traffic signals, and to brake and avoid accidents when a car ahead applies its brakes. The previous Strayer work is also very important to demonstrate that cell phone impairment results from an indiscriminate “inattentional blindness” resulting from diversion of attention to the internal-cognitive tasks associated with the give and take of the cell conversation, specifically not deriving from any aspect of handling, holding or dialing the device. The previous Strayer studies also establish that cell phone driving impairment cannot be modified or reduced below DUI level by multi-task “practice” or “experience” driving while talking on a cell phone. Furthermore, the earlier Strayer work is important in establishing that the driving impairment associated with cell phone conversation is much more potent than other common “old standard” driver “distractions” such as listening to the radio or listening to recorded books; indeed, significantly more potent in impairing driving than participating in conversation with vehicle passengers. See, Strayer, D. L., & Johnston, W. A. (2001). “Driven to distraction: Dual-task studies of simulated driving and conversing on a cellular phone. Psychological Science,” 12, 462-466. McCarley, J. S., Vais, M., Pringle, H., Kramer, A. F., Irwin, D. E., & Strayer, D. L. (2001). “Conversation disrupts visual scanning of traffic scenes.” Paper presented at Vision in Vehicles, Australia. Strayer, D. L., Drews, F. A., Albert, R. W., & Johnston, W. A. (2001). “Cell phone induced perceptual impairments during simulated driving.” In D. V. McGehee, J. D. Lee, & M. Rizzo (Eds.) Driving Assessment 2001: International Symposium on Human Factors in Driver Assessment, Training, and Vehicle Design. Strayer, D. L., Drews, F. A. & Johnston, W. A. (2002). “Why do cell phone conversations interfere with driving?” Proceedings of the 81st Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC. Strayer, D. L., Drews, F. A. & Johnston, W. A. (2003). “Cell phone induced failures of visual attention during simulated driving.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 9, 23-23. Strayer, D. L., Drews, F. A., & Johnston, W. A. (2003). “Are we being driven to distraction? Public Policy Perspectives,” Vol. 16, 1-2. (Published by the Center for Public Policy and Administration, University of Utah) Strayer, D. L. & Drews, F. A. (2003). “Effects of cell phone conversations on younger and older drivers.” In the Proceedings of the 47nd Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (pp.. 1860-1864). Strayer, D. L. & Drews, F. A. & Crouch, D. J. (2003). “Fatal distraction? A comparison of the cell-phone driver and the drunk driver.” In D. V. McGehee, J. D. Lee, & M. Rizzo (Eds.) Driving Assessment 2003: International Symposium on Human Factors in Driver Assessment, Training, and Vehicle Design. Published by the Public Policy Center, University of Iowa (pp. 25-30). Strayer, D. L., Cooper, J. M., & Drews, F. A. (2004). “What do drivers fail to see when conversing on a cell phone?” In the Proceedings of the 48nd Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (pp 2213-2217). McCarley, J.S., Vais, M.J., Pringle, H., Kamer, A.F., Irwin, D.E., & Strayer, D.L. (2004) “Conversation disrupts change detection in complex traffic scenes.” Human Factors, 46, 424-436. Strayer, D.L., & Drews, F. A. (2004). “Profiles in driver distraction: Effects of cell phone conversations on younger and older drivers.” Human Factors, 46, 640-649. Strayer, D. L. & Drews, F. A. Crouch, D. J., & Johnston, W. A. (2005). “Why do Cell Phone Conversations Interfere with Driving?” In W. R. Walker and D. Herrmann (Eds.) Cognitive Technology: Essays on the Transformation of Thought and Society (pp. 51-68), McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, NC.)
2. Cell Phone Impaired Drivers May Pose An Even Greater Danger To Motorcyclists Than Has Been Discovered To Be The Risk To Motorists Generally. This is Demonstrated (1) By the “Pre-Cell-Phone-Age” Statistics Which Demonstrated that Motorcyclists Are Disproportionately At Risk Resulting from Inattentive Auto Drivers; (2) By The Evidence That Motorcycle Intersection and Right of Way Violation Accidents In Particular Are the Result of Auto Driver “Inattentional Blindness” to Motorcyclists; and (3) By the Distinct Mechanism of Cell Phone Attentional Impairment Which Combined With Auto Driver “Inattentional Blindness” to Motorcycles Suggests the Likelihood of Additive or Synergistic Auto Driver Attentional Impairment Specific For Motorcyclists.
The evidence presented in the preceding section we consider sufficient to justify legislation to outlaw cell phone use while driving. To quote Professor Strayer:"Just like you put yourself and other people at risk when you drive drunk, you put yourself and others at risk when you use a cell phone and drive.” To quote study co-author, Assistant Professor Frank Drews: “If legislators really want to address driver distraction, then they should consider outlawing cell phone use while driving." Consumer Affairs, June 30, 2006.

There are additional reasons to criminalize the use of cell phones while driving, discussed below, including that the growth in numbers of cell phone users is having the effect to increase traffic congestion and the average lengths of our commutes.

But the question to be answered here is why should motorcyclists in particular want to support or even take the lead in urging our state legislatures to outlaw the use of cell phones while driving.

One answer to that question is that we are more at risk of serious injury and death at the hands of the cell phone impaired than auto drivers who are protected by their thousands of pounds of surrounding metal, interior padding, seat belts, and air bags.

But there is another good reason, and that is that cell phone impaired drivers may pose a much greater risk of causing motorcycle accidents than accidents with other types of vehicles. This has not yet been studied, but we consider that reasonable inferences can be drawn from the existing scientific data. It may be true that scientists at this stage would call it conjecture. But unlike these scientists, we as bikers don’t have the luxury of an indefinite future to determine the precise measurements of the risk, given that our lives will be put at stake perhaps this very afternoon as we ride home from work. In the absence of existing data in point, we suggest that some conclusions can be drawn, evident enough from the statistical information we have already about the most common ways in which auto drivers cause motorcycle accidents, the information yielded by the research on the mechanism of inattentional blindness, and then this most recent research by Strayer, et al., describing the mechanism by which cell phone use impairs driving.

First of all, what we know from the “pre-cell phone age” motorcycle accident studies, that is, studies conducted before cell phones were so commonly in use by the American public, is that fully 2/3 of all multi-vehicle motorcycle accidents were found to result solely from the inattention or negligence of an auto driver, without any fault on the part of the motorcyclist. Two-thirds of that number, or ½ of the total number of multi-vehicle motorcycle accidents were intersection accidents resulting from right of way violations in which an auto driver either entered the intersection or turned left at the intersection into the motorcyclist’s right of way; commonly reporting: “I didn’t see him.” See, e.g., Hurt, H.H., Ouellet, J.V. and Thom, D.R., January, 1981, "Motorcycle Accident Cause Factors and Identification of Countermeasures," Volume 1: Technical Report, Traffic Safety Center, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90007, Contract No. DOT HS-5-01160 (Final Report). These are indeed the tell tale signs and good solid evidence of “pre-cell phone age” auto driver inattentional blindness specific to motorcycles.

As discussed more fully on the other pages of this Motorcyclists-Against-Dumb-Drivers web site, these intersection right of way violation accidents are not the result of the motorcycle’s smaller size, or “lack of conspicuity,” at least as that term has been used in the lay sense to suggest that auto drivers don’t “see” motorcycles because they are smaller or less “visible.” Motorcycles are just as visible as any car at the distance at which a car can pose a threat to a motorcyclist when pulling out into an intersection or turning left at an intersection into the motorcyclist’s right of way. The reason why auto drivers so commonly pull out into intersections into the right of way of motorcyclists is described instead by the somewhat complex phenomenon of “inattentional blindness.” See, “Inattentional Blindness,” Mack & Rock, 1998, and the wealth of good experimental literature which has followed upon this important landmark work.

The scientific literature on inattentional blindness demonstrates through the results of what are truly ingenious study designs, the mechanisms by which the landscape of visual stimuli which enter our “subconscious” through our eyes is extensively processed, only after which a selected subset of the visual information is permitted through to our “conscious attention.” We may think that what we“see” is similar to what a videotape might record, but that couldn’t be further from the truth. What our eyes perceive is received, true enough, meaning received into the subconscious, but then it is processed, indeed processed extensively, and then only in very late subconscious processing is the "bottleneck" selection process accomplished by which our subconscious “decides” what small subset of the totality of visual information will be allowed to reach our conscious attention.

Many of the criteria utilized by the subconscious to select visual stimuli for conscious attention have been identified, including most important, we believe, in this context, “expectation,” the selection of those stimuli which we “expect” to see (such as cars rather than motorcycles), and “relevance,” those objects which we consider more pertinent to our immediate task objective (in this context, the preferential selection drawing attention to the multi-thousand pound car, truck or bus, which might severely injure or kill the auto driver, in contrast to the lesser “relevance” of a motorcycle, which is likely to pose a much smaller threat to the auto driver).

“Inattentional blindness” describes the phenomenon by which we fail to “see” that which is right in front of us. It is the phenomenon that results from the selection process by which that which is fully apparent, right in front of us, square at the center of our visual field, will be so processed and selected "out" by our subconscious so that it will not reach our conscious attention. And if it is processed but selected not to reach our conscious attention, our conscious experience is indeed that we don’t “see” it. It is the equivalent of the old question, “If a tree falls in a forest with no one there to hear it, does it make a sound.” Well, the answer in this context is “No.” If a visual stimulus is not permitted forward from our subconscious through the bottleneck to our conscious attention, then we don’t “see” it. In the words of Mack and Rock: “Only those objects to which attention is either voluntarily directed or that capture attention at a late stage of processing are perceived. It is as if attention provides the key that unlocks the door dividing unconscious from conscious perception. Without this key, there is no awareness of the stimulus.” Mack and Rock, supra. And this is indeed why, even prior to the advent of cell phones, the auto driver who pulled out in front of a motorcyclist at an intersection into his right of way and crippled or killed him would commonly turn to the police officer wide eyed and say “Uhh, Sorry, Man, I just didn’t see him.”

Now, what we should all be very concerned about as motorcyclists is that the most recent cell phone studies have determined that the mechanism by which cell phones result in driving impairment is by an attentional impairment, a different kind of inattentional blindness, this one resulting from the motorist's shifting attention to the "auditory" stimuli and higher level internal cognitive functions involved in the give and take of cell phone conversation, reducing our capacity to attend to the distinct external visual-spacial stimuli as is essential for safe driving.

To fully appreciate the contribution of cell phone driving impairment to degrade motorcyclist safety, either as separate source of danger or as potential synergistic factor in combination with preexisting auto driver inattentional blindness for motorcyclists, it is essential to understand the nature of cell phone driving impairment as illustrated by the available scientific literature.

We consider these Strayer, et al. studies particularly important in terms of motorcyclist safety. This is because of the earlier observations of Harry Hurt, 1981, and others that the greatest "pre-cell-phone-age" contributor to the incidence of multi-vehicle motorcycle accidents was auto driver inattention to motorcyclists; and because this preexisting auto driver inattentional blindness specific to motorcyclists is at least exacerbated linearly and possibly synergistically when the auto driver is on the phone, involved in separate pathway auditory and higher level cognitive tasks different from the pathway responsible for processing visual stimuli.

On the one hand we have the preexisting auto driver inattentional blindness which the IB literature suggests most likely results from such factors as failure to “expect” a motorcycle and internal values of reduced “relevance” attached to oncoming motorcycles, evident prior to the age of common use of cell phones, and now an entirely different mechanism of attentional impairment resulting from the use of cell phones while driving, in which conscious attention is diverted from the visual-spacial-manual tasks essential for driving to the internal cognitive give and take of the cell phone conversation. Each interfere with the auto driver's ability to "see" what is directly in front of his eyes. Referring to driving under the influence of cell phones, Strayer pointed out: “Even when participants direct their gaze at objects in the driving environment, they often fail to ‘see’ them when they are talking on a cell phone because attention has been directed away from the external environment and toward an internal, cognitive context associated with the phone conversation.” Strayer, 2006, supra.

The “multi-tasking” use of the cell phone while driving is considered by Strayer, et al. likely to be substantially more distracting because it is “cognitively engaging.” “Drivers [while using cell phones] are more likely to miss critical traffic signals (traffic lights, a vehicle breaking in front of the driver, etc.), slower to respond to signals that they do detect, and more likely to be involved in ... collisions when they are conversing on a cell phone [than baseline or drunk drivers.] ... In the case of the cell phone driver, the impairments appear to be attributable, in large part, to the diversion of attention from the processing of information necessary for the safe operation of a motor vehicle.” Strayer, et al., 2006, supra. (Please note that the above list of traffic signal and braking scenarios is not meant to be exclusive in terms of driving activities impaired by cell phone use; it just represents the driving scenarios which Strayer has chosen thus far to test. He has not yet tested, for example, auto driver impairment of recognition of visual stimuli essential to respect rights of way at intersections. Our concern indeed is that cell phone driver impairment may be even more pronounced as the emotional charge of the conversation and the difficulty of the driving tasks increase.)

In another set of experiments, Strayer et al. examined the effect of hands-free cell phone conversation to assess whether impairment of drivers reactions to traffic signals and vehicles braking in front of them might properly be attributed to withdrawal of attention from the scene “yielding a form of inattention blindness" similar but distinct from the intattentional blindness identified by Mack & Rock, given that cell phone induced inattentional blindness results from auditory-cognitive interference with visual-spacial perception rather than the selective processing of competing visual stimuli evident in Mack and Rock's research. See, e.g., Strayer, D. L., Drews, F. A. & Johnston, W. A. (2003). “Cell Phone Induced Failures of Visual Attention During Simulated Driving.” Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol 9, pp. 23-23. The authors concluded: “These data extend our earlier observations of impaired detection and reaction to traffic signals [citations omitted] and sluggish reaction to brake lights when participants are engaged in cell phone conversations. We suggest that even when participants are directing their gaze at objects in the driving environment that they may fail to 'see' them because attention is directed elsewhere. The indication of cell phone-induced inattention blindness extends laboratory-based demonstrations of apparent failures of visual attention to the driving domain. (Mack & Rock, ['Inattentional Blindness'], 1998).”

Strayer, et al. distinguished his own findings of "dual pathway" cell phone conversation inattentional blindness from the distinct single pathway inattentional blindness described by Mack & Rock resulting from the subconscious competition for attention for multiple visual stimuli. “One important difference between these earlier studies and our present work is that the former involved presentation of simultaneous (and often overlapping) visual images, whereas our research involved the combination of visual (i.e., the driving environment) and auditory (i.e., the cell phone conversation) information. This suggests that the locus of the effect is at a central attentional level and not due to structural interference or overload of a perceptual or response channel.” We consider this important to our thesis that the combination of the two distinct pathway attentional impairments likely combine to result in even more profound driving impairment of the auto driver's ability to "see" the oncoming motorcycle, indeed, possibly much more profound impairment as the interaction may produce a synergistic effect.

There is converging neurological evidence from investigators at Johns Hopkins providing additional support for Stayer’s conclusions with regard to the "attentional" interference of auditory cell phone conversation on capacity to detect visual stimuli in the driving environment. Shomstein, S., Yantis, S. “Control of Attention Shifts Between Vision and Audition in Human Cortex.” The Journal of Neuroscience, November 24, 2004, 24(47):10702-10706. Using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) Stromstein and Yantis recorded their experimental subjects’ brain activity while involved in shifts back and forth between visual and auditory activity. Significantly, they noted that when attention was shifted to one, either visual or auditory stimuli, the parts of the brain associated with the other demonstrated reduced activity. This would imply a zero sum trade off between auditory and visual attention. Suggesting that there is an additional attentional cost to "switching" between the auditory and visual, Shomstein and Yantis observed that there was an additional, separate, "transitional" brain function evident in bursts of activity in certain aspects of the brain as attention was redirected. The Shomstien and Yantis research provides neurological support now to the experimental evidence of Strayer et al. that the mechanism of cell phone driving impairment is a form of “inattentional blindness” (supporting also Strayer's persuasive anticipatory rebuttal to theoretical models of diverted attention that might be argued to suggest that cell phone conversation, “an auditory-verbal-vocal task,” can be successfully “timeshared” with driving, “a visual-spacial-manual task.”)

”Selective attention contributes to perceptual efficiency by modulating cortical activity according to task demands. Visual attention is controlled by activity in posterior parietal and superior frontal cortices, but little is known about the neural basis of attentional control within and between other sensory modalities. We examined human brain activity during attention shifts between vision and audition. Attention shifts from vision to audition caused increased activity in auditory cortex and decreased activity in visual cortex and vice versa, reflecting the effects of attention on sensory representations. Posterior parietal and superior prefrontal cortices exhibited transient increases in activity that were time locked to the initiation of voluntary attention shifts between vision and audition. These findings reveal that the attentional control functions of posterior parietal and superior prefrontal cortices are not limited to the visual domain but also include the control of crossmodal shifts of attention.” Id.

In an interview, professor Yantis made plain the significance of his findings on the specific issue of cell phone driving impairment:“Our research helps explain why talking on a cell phone can impair driving performance, even when the driver is using a hands-free device ... Directing attention to listening effectively 'turns down the volume' on input to the visual parts of the brain. The evidence we have right now strongly suggests that attention is strictly limited -- a zero-sum game. When attention is deployed to one modality -- say, in this case, talking on a cell phone -- it necessarily extracts a cost on another modality -- in this case, the visual task of driving." Consumer Affairs, June 22, 2005.

Significantly, evidence that the attentional impairment associated with cell phone use can act as an on-off switch, competent to block out even the most crucial of visual stimuli essential for safe driving, Strayer found that cell phone inattentional blindness extended even to stimuli which would otherwise be considered preferentially or automatically sufficient to elicit attention. In one study, Strayer, et al. found that “cell phone conversations interfere with the automatic attention-capturing properties of sudden onset stimuli occurring in the driving environment.” Strayer, supra, 2003. The significance of the finding is that stimuli that appear as sudden onsets are "thought to capture attention automatically,” Id., and so the fact that the cell phone impaired do not "see" sudden onset events illustrates the indiscriminate blindness of the cell phone impaired while attention is directed to internal-cognitive stimuli and away from external-visual stimuli.

Strayer et al. preemptively rebutted any potential argument that when drivers engage in cell phone conversation they may attempt to strategically reallocate attention from the processing of less relevant information in the driving scene (e.g., billboards) to the cell phone conversation while continuing to give highest priority to the processing of task-relevant information in the driving scene (e.g., the car in front of them). These experiments included eye tracking devices and, as observed by Strayer, that data “did not provide support for this [prioritization] interpretation because participants looked at billboards equally often in single and dual task conditions.” Id. Attention essential to the detection of all visual stimuli was impaired when the driver was involved in cell phone conversation, that is, stimuli meaningful to the driving task and stimuli not meaningful to the driving task alike.

Strayer et al., bolstered this conclusion by their observation that “Any reasonable account of task relevance would have to include attending to the vehicle immediately in front of the driver. Nevertheless, the car following paradigm ... found significant impairments in driving performance when participants were conversing on a hands-free cell phone. If participants were attempting to focus on more task-relevant information in the driving scene, then this strategy proved to be inadequate because dual-task interference was observed even with task-relevant information in the driving scene. We suggest that the most straightforward interpretation of the dual task deficits in explicit memory .. is that attention was diverted from the visual scene immediately associated with driving (of both higher and lower relevance) to the cell phone conversation.”

The capacity for “change detection” as applied to complex traffic scenes, and in particular the ability to notice significant changes, is extremely important for safe driving. This also was the subject of one Strayer experiment to test whether it was possible that the mind was capable of prioritizing so that it could attend to the telephone conversation and still attend to the meaningful changes in the complex visual landscape while driving. The answer was no, that there was no apparent prioritizing of attention to significant changes in the driving environment while participants were engaged in conversation on the cell phone. The drivers whose attention was impaired by cell phone conversation consistently failed to see both meaningful and less meaningful changes in the traffic scenes essentially indiscriminately. McCarley, J.S., Vais, M.J., Pringle, H., Kamer, A.F., Irwin, D.E., & Strayer, D.L. (2004) “Conversation Disrupts Change Detection in Complex Traffic Scenes.” Human Factors, 46, 424-436.

In subsequent study results Strayer, et al. found that even those objects to which the drivers affixed their eyes they often failed to “see” while conversing on the telephone. Strayer again explicitly attributed the phenomenon to cell phone induced inattentional blindness. Strayer, D. L., Cooper, J. M., & Drews, F. A. (2004). “What do Drivers Fail to See When Conversing on a Cell Phone?" In the Proceedings of the 48nd Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (pp 2213-2217).

Significantly, Strayer, et al. noted: “We found that even when participants looked directly at objects in the driving environment, they were less likely to create a durable memory of those objects if they were conversing on a cell phone. Moreover, this pattern was obtained for objects of both high and low relevance, suggesting that very little semantic analysis of the objects occurs outside the restricted focus of attention. These data support the inattention-blindness interpretation in which disruptive effects of cell phone conversations on driving are due in large part to the diversion of attention from driving to the phone conversation. We suggest that even when participants are directing their gaze at objects in the driving environment they may fail to ‘see’ them when they are on the phone because attention is directed elsewhere.” Id. See also, Strayer, D. L., Drews, F. A., & Johnston, W. A. (2003). “Are We Being Driven to Distraction?” Public Policy Perspectives, Vol. 16, 1-2. (Published by the Center for Public Policy and Administration, University of Utah) [“We found that even when drivers were directing their gaze at objects in the driving environment that they often failed to see them because attention was directed elsewhere. Thus, talking on a cell phone creates a form of inattention blindness, making drivers less aware of important information in the driving scene.”]

Applying these lessons here in attempting to sort out the effect of the convergence of preexisting auto driver inattentional blindness for motorcyclists, deriving from factors such as "expectation" and "relevance," and the attention impairment resulting from back and forth shifting from the "auditory-internal-cognitive" to "visual-spacial" and back while driving under the influence of a cell phone, these studies make clear that each exacts its own toll upon the driver's capacity to "see" the motorcyclists. It is as if before the advent of cell phones a substantial percentage of auto drivers were essentially unable to distinguish motorcycles from the visual background, while now we face the same percentage of motorists with the same general attention deficit for motorcyclists, except that now, another 10 percent of all the auto drivers are involved in cell phone driving, attention shifting, putting on and taking off and putting on again their inattentional blindfolds while they drive.

These factors combined suggest that cell phone use while driving may have an even larger, and perhaps a much larger effect on driver inattention to motorcyclists due to the additive or synergistic convergence of the preexisting auto driver attention deficit for auto drivers, now complicated by this epidemic of DUI level cell phone inattentional blindness currently affecting 10 percent of drivers on the road at any given moment. It may be worse. The experimental studies so far have focused only on relatively simple driving tasks such as recognizing traffic signals, responding to a forward braking car, recognizing sudden events and significant changes in the driving landscape. We suggest that the level of cell phone impairment, particularly when combined with the preexisting auto driver attention deficit specific for motorcyclists, may be much more potent in more complex traffic scenarios, such as when the motorist must assess whether to enter an intersection or turn left at an intersection, potentially into the right of way of another. What appears certain is that the impairment will not be less as the difficulty level rises, even if the driver subjectively considers that the visual stimuli at intersections are more "important" or "meaningful" since as Strayer made plain, cell phone induced inattentional blandness is indiscriminate and specifically not selective for the less meaningful. Instead, we suggest that the likelihood is that the impairment will be greater, given that the more complex driving task requires significantly more visual information at a time when the driver's zero-sum attention is divided. Given the preexisting auto driver attention deficit for motorcyclists, the concern is that drivers under the influence of cell phones may be selectively much more dangerous for motorcyclists than for drivers of other vehicles. Both the preexisting deficit and call phone driving impairment derive from inattentional blindness, and while moderated differently each have the same effect to lead the driver to fail to "see" the motorcycle right in front of him. If cell phone conversation results in DUI level impairment as measured for the recognition of traffic signals and braking cars, what level of impairment pertains when the auto driver is already burdened with an attention deficit for motorcycles? This is a question which can only be answered definitively by further research; but in the meantime we suggest that the attentional effect is likely either additive or synergistic. Particularly given that the numbers of those driving under the influence of cell phones are growing at epidemic rates motorcyclists must appreciate the serious and growing danger we face and consider what we can do to avert it.

3. The Use of Cell Phones While Driving Should Be Outlawed. And No Distinction Should be Made Between Handheld and Hands-Free Cell Phone Use.
As a matter of general public health and specifically here, motorcyclist safety, cell phone use while driving needs to be outlawed. Indeed, Motorcyclists Against Dumb Drivers urges that stiff penalties, such as mandatory lengthy suspensions of driving privileges, followed by jail sentences for repeat offenders should be legislated, and a strict zero tolerance enforcement policy adopted similar to the penalties and enforcement policies for DUI drunk driving. It is essential that cell phone use be banned outright, without exception, or with the sole exception being true emergency, verifiable 911 telephone calls.

Motorists who use hands-free devices are equally impaired and equally as dangerous as those who use handheld cell phones. Cell phone impairment is an attentional impairment, not an impairment associated with holding or dialing, or any other manual aspect of cell phone use. To be effective, all cell phone use while driving must be banned and criminalized.

Outlawing cell phone use while driving should not come as such a leap if we consider the implications of this converging body of epidemiological and controlled experimental research. It is established now that drivers who use cell phones are at least as driving impaired as those who the law considers criminally culpable for driving under the influence of alcohol, and indeed, according to this latest, 2006 Strayer article, supra, more likely than DUI level drunk drivers to cause accidents.

Cell phone driving impairment is indeed without question a greater public health issue than DUI drunk driving, simply because there are so many more drivers using cell phones than drunk drivers on our streets and highways. Let this not be misconstrued. Without any doubt, alcohol induced driving impairment is responsible for a horrifying incidence of death and broken lives each year, and fully deserves to be criminalized and severely punished. But the numbers of the alcohol impaired driving on our streets at any given moment in time simply pales in comparison to the numbers of equally dangerous cell phone impaired drivers. Fully ten percent of drivers on the roadway at any given daylight moment are using their cell phones, that is, actively engaged in the give and take of cell phone conversation. National Occupant Protection Use Survey (NOPUS) (a probability based observed data study on cell phone use performed by NHTSA.) And as we’ve seen, these auto drivers, currently one in every ten at any given daylight moment, are all at least as driving impaired as DUI drunk drivers, and more likely to cause accidents.

So how in the world can our legislatures countenance driving under the influence of cell phones when they criminalize drunk driving. Those who use cell phones while driving are a threat to their fellow auto drivers just as surely and to an extent fully equal to DUI level drunk drivers. This appears now an inescapable scientific fact as these epidemiological studies demonstrating a four fold increased incidence of accidents resulting from driving under the influence of a cell phone continue to be replicated. And now it is the convergence of the controlled experimental work of Strayer and others, confirming that cell phone conversations result in impairment equal to DUI drunk driving, explaining the attentional mechanism of the impairment, and scientifically rebutting every potential argument that might be made to obscure the necessity for banning all cell phone use while driving. We suggest here that cell phone impaired auto drivers are preferentially even more dangerous, and perhaps substantially more dangerous to motorcyclists, a fact that may interest our legislators little, but which should motivate all motorcyclists to want to take the lead or at least strongly support the efforts of others to criminalize cell phone use while driving.

In those few states which have restricted cell phone use, the legislatures have unfathomably banned only the use of handheld cell phones while driving, permitting drivers to use hands-free cell phones without limitation. This despite that all the scientific data demonstrate that the source of cell phone driving impairment is "attentional," associated with the conversation itself, having nothing to do with holding or otherwise manually fiddling around with the cell phone.

Laws restricting only handheld cell phone use while driving can reflect only the abject ignorance of the legislators about the “attentional” mechanism by which conversing on cell phones impairs driving, or, it demonstrates a political unwillingness to impose the “burden” even of restrictions essential to public health on the majority of their voting constituency.

This “political” approach, favoring only the banning of handheld cell phone use while driving can only be characterized as calculated to have no effect at all to ameliorate the public health consequence of now rampant cell phone use while driving. The legislation must be seen for what it is, merely a political ploy by politicians who would for appearances sake pretend to do something for the health of the citizenry while refraining from actually doing anything productive which would necessitate imposing on a majority of their constituancy.

It has been well known, at least since 1998, that cell phone use results in driving impairment equal to DUI drunk driving. It has been known, at least from 2001, that this cell phone impairment is an "attentional" impairment and that those who used handheld phones and those who used hands-free cell phones are equally driving impaired. But as recently as July 2006 the California Senate passed the same type of handheld cell phone prohibition; the State Assembly is anticipated to pass it unaltered in August, 2006; and our biker Governor Arnold Schwarzeneger is poised to sign the bill, according the Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2006. This is, unfortunately, bad politics, as usual.

These laws restricting only the use of handheld phones while driving are utterly indefensible from a scientific standpoint and indeed they can be understood only as political capitulation in the face of what these politicians apparently consider a likely public backlash if anything stronger than bills with loopholes as large as the laws themselves were to be passed.

The Strayer studies demonstrated time and time again that the driving impairment associated with cell phone use is an “attentional” impairment, not one associated with the manual operation of the cell phone, handheld or hands-free. Indeed, as Professor Strayer has pointed out, there is absolutely no legitimate scientific basis upon which to justify regulations restricting the use of handheld cell phones while permitting the use of hands-free cell phones.

“These data call into question driving regulations that prohibit handheld cell phones and permit hands-free cell phones because no significant differences were found in the impairments to driving caused by these two modes of cellular communication." Strayer, D. L., Drews, F. A., & Johnston, W. A. (2003). “Are We Being Driven to Distraction?” Public Policy Perspectives, Vol. 16, 1-2. (Published by the Center for Public Policy and Administration, University of Utah). Strayer has indeed made this clear at least since 2001:

“Our data imply that legislative initiatives that restrict handheld devices but permit hands-free devices are not likely to reduce interference from the phone conversation, because the interference is, in this case, due to central attentional processes.” Strayer, D. L., & Johnston, W. A. (2001). “Driven to Distraction: Dual-task Studies of Simulated Driving and Conversing on a Cellular Phone.” Psychological Science, 12, 462-466. See also, Strayer, D. L., Drews, F. A. & Johnston, W. A. (2002). “Why Do Cell Phone Conversations Interfere With Driving?” Proceedings of the 81st Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC.

This sentiment was echoed by Johns Hopkins Professor Yantis, based on his above described neurological studies, “Our research helps explain why talking on a cell phone can impair driving performance, even when the driver is using a hands-free device.” Stromstein & Yantis, supra.

Anything short of banning cell phone use altogether while driving can be calculated only to be completely ineffective. Drivers who previously used handheld cell phones will simply switch over to hands-free cell phones while driving. Their driving impairment will be identical, no better than a DUI drunk driver. And they will continue to be responsible for a four fold greater incidence of accidents.

Indeed, these laws restricting only the use of handheld cell phones we would characterize as detrimental to public health. This is in part because they are ill designed to effectively restrict the use of cell phones while driving, but in part also because they may contribute to the motorist’s false sense that his driving while conversing by hands-free phone is unimpaired. There exists already, even without this kind of government reinforcement, a highly detrimental “disconnect” in the cell phone driver’s mind which results in his inability to appreciate that his driving is impaired. At least some drunk drivers recognized that their driving is impaired; however, one aspect of this particular attentional impairment is that cell phone users do not. To quote Strayer: “An interesting product of this inattention blindness is that cell phone drivers are often unaware of their own impaired driving, even though this impairment is obvious to those observing their behavior from afar. In fact our data indicate that drivers are not processing the detailed information that would provide feedback that their own driving performance is impaired while using a cell phone.” Strayer, D. L., Drews, F. A., & Johnston, W. A. (2003). “Are We Being Driven to Distraction?” Public Policy Perspectives, Vol. 16, 1-2. (Published by the Center for Public Policy and Administration, University of Utah) To rephrase Strayer's observation, since auto drivers don't "see" what they don't "see," they don't realize that they don't "see" it. What handheld cell phone bans contribute is additional false assurance to the those who drive under the influence of hands-free cell phones that their conscious attentional "sight" is 20/20.

Taking us full circle, in the "The 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study, Phase II," DOT HS 810 593 April, 2006, recall that NHTSA found that “Wireless devices [primarily cell phones] were among the categories associated with the highest frequencies of crashes and minor collisions." Significantly for the purposes of this discussion, in terms of the mechanism of cell phone driving impairment, the authors stated: "All of the crashes and a majority of the near crashes and incidents associated with wireless devices occurred during a cell phone conversation, although the dialing task was also relatively high in terms of total conflicts." Please note first that all crashes and the majority of near crashes were while the drivers were actually engaged in cell conversation. The only other contributory factor noted was that “dialing” the cell phone, not holding it, was associated with some increased incidence of “conflicts.” (not crashes.) So, first, no association was reported that would suggest that the act of "holding" a handheld cell phone is associated with an increased incidence of any adverse consequence. There is the increased incidence of "conflicts" associated with "dialing," true enough, but you have to dial both handheld and hands-free cell phones.

The wonderful thing about this observation that there was an increase incidence of driving “conflicts” associated with “the dialing task” is that in a separate study NHTSA actually counted the average number of times that handheld cell phone users had to redial their cell phones compared to users of hands-free devices and found that drivers using hands-free cell phones had to redial calls 40 percent of the time, compared with 18 percent for drivers using handheld sets! Under no circumstances do we suggest that these studies recommend the banning of only hands-free cell phones. All of the science, including the above referenced 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study is in agreement that the danger of causing an accident associated with cell phone use is equivalent whether the device is handheld or hands-free. There simply is no significant manual aspect to cell phone driving impairment; the impairment is attentional. The degree of impairment associated with handheld and hands-free cell phone conversations is identical. It is equivalent to the impairment of a DUI level drunk driver. So clearly both hands-free and handheld cell phone use while driving must be outlawed.

The dangers associated with driving under the influence of cell phones is not going to abate absent strict prohibition; the dangers will only get worse over time. The dangers posed by cell phone impaired motorists will persist indeed for so long as auto drivers are permitted to use any type of cell phone device while driving.

Cell phone driving impairment will not be mitigated by “practice,” or “experience,” even as auto drivers become more and more accustomed to using cell phones while driving. In the 2006 Strayer study, practice was found not to decrease cell phone induced driving impairment. Indeed, according to Strayer, "given the attentional requirements of these two activities, it is not surprising that practice failed to moderate the dual-task interference. Because both naturalistic conversation and driving ... have task components that are variably mapped, there are likely to be few benefits from practicing these two tasks in combination.” Id.

Drivers who use cell phones are not going to get “better” at it. There is no solution to cell phone driving impairment short of outlawing the practice. The dangers, however, could very well get worse. The reason is that cell phone use while driving is increasing at an alarming rate. In the year 2000 four percent of auto drivers were using their cell phones at any given daylight moment in the United States, in 2002, the numbers grew to 6 percent, in 2004, the numbers grew to 8 percent, and as of December 2005, to 10 percent. NHTSA, National Occupant Protection Use Survey.

Worse, the numbers of accidents resulting from the increasing numbers of the cell phone impaired on our streets may not be linear. Indeed, many hazards created by the 10 percent of those currently driving cell phone impaired may be avoided by the astute maneuvering of the 90 percent who at the same moment in time are not impaired. As the percentages continue to shift so that more drivers are impaired and fewer are unimpaired, the numbers of accidents and resulting injuries and deaths are likely to grow exponentially.

All use of cell phones while driving must be outlawed, and outlawed now.
4. Additional Important Reasons to Ban Cell Phone Use While Driving Include Their Substantial Contribution to Traffic Congestion, and Effect to Increase the Length of Driver Commutes for All Drivers. These Facts Also Undermine The Argument that the Use of Cell Phones While Driving is Essential or Contributes to our Economy.
There are very important reasons to want to outlaw cell phone use while driving, entirely separate from the obscene danger the cell phone impaired pose to other motorists. Indeed, cell phone use may need to be outlawed soon as our cities become more congested and as our policy makers come to recognize that cell phone use is a profound and growing contributor to traffic congestion.

“One factor overlooked when considering the overall impact of cell phone driving is the effect these drivers have on traffic flow. In our study we found that drivers using a cell phone took 19 percent longer (than baseline) to recover the speed that was lost following a braking episode. In situations where traffic density is high, this pattern of driving behavior is likely to decrease the overall traffic flow, and as the proportion of cell phone drivers increases, these effects are likely to be multiplicative. That is, the impaired reactions of a cell phone driver make them less likely to travel with the flow of traffic, potentially increasing overall traffic congestion.” Strayer, Drews and Crouch, “A Comparison of the Cell Phone Driver and the Drunk Driver," Human Factors, Summer 2006. Strayer first announced his findings demonstrating DUI level impairment associated with cell phone use in 2003. See also, Strayer, supra, 2003

One of the arguments which is put forth by the cell phone industry, and through some “think tanks” such as the HCRA, supra (who Public Citizen, at least, considers was originally bought off by AT&T Wireless), is that unlike drunk driving, cell phone use while driving supposedly contributes to our economy.

In a revised analysis of the “cost-benefit ratio," which Harvard's HCRA took great pains to assert was, this time, not funded by AT&T Wireless but “independently funded by HCRA,” “compared the benefits of such a ban [on cell phone use while driving], measured by reduced medical costs, reduced property damage, and estimates of what people would be willing to pay to avoid pain, suffering, and death, against the benefits of cell phone use by drivers, measured by estimates of what subscribers pay to use their phones while driving. The benefits of a ban would be worth approximately $43 billion (range $9 billion to $193 billion). Those savings would be roughly offset by the economic value of the banned calls, also around $43 billion annually (range - $17 billion to $151 billion), or $340 per cell phone user per year (range - $130-$1,200.)." Cohen, J. 2002, “Updated Study Shows Higher Risk of Fatality From Cell Phones While Driving. Costs and Benefits of Ban are Roughly Equal.” News Release, HCRA.

The “benefit of the ban,” HCRA measures in terms of the dollar value it placed on the adverse consequences of cell phone use while driving, meaning the lives lost, the broken bodies and physical disability sustained, and the pain and suffering deriving from the use of cell phones while driving. If we accept just for the purpose of this discussion, HCRA’s calculations, first with regard to the numbers of deaths and injuries resulting from cell phone use, and then, their estimates with regard “what people would be willing to pay to avoid pain, suffering and death” associated with the accidents caused by the cell phone impaired, the number is still certainly staggering, $43 Billion dollars/year. The accurate number is probably 10 or 100 times that number, given HRCA's method of calculation relying on certainly grossly under-reported anecdotal NHTSA fatality and injury numbers, supplemented by some number of HRAC identified unreported accidents. But again, for the moment, lets accept, just for the purpose of this argument, that the measure of the “cost” we suffer by our lost lives, injuries, pain and suffering and medical expense is only $43 billion/year. Well then Yes, if the measure of the "cost" of cell phone ban is equal to the benefit, the we can see how, for these bean counters, the cost and benefit would be a wash. But consider how HCRA measures the offsetting “cost” associated with permitting drivers to use their cell phones while driving, because this is the rub. HRCA calculates the “cost” of a ban by running up the numbers on how many minutes American cell phone users spend driving while using their cell phones, and then estimates the charges these cell phone users pay to their wireless companies for these minutes of cell phone use while driving, and the product is what HRCA contends is the “offsetting cost.”

That is again the most blatant of cell phone industry pandering! Again what HCRA has done is compare the "benefit" of a ban, in terms of the lives, injuries, pain, suffering, and medical expense which would be saved, against the "cost" measured in the gross revenues that would be lost by the wireless industry for the minutes these drivers spend on the phone while driving! Shame on HCRA, again.

But lets not satisfy ourselves with shooting clay pigeons. Probably the “strongest” economic argument for those opposing a ban on cell phones is that as the time required for our daily commutes to work increases more and more each year as the function of traffic delays and city congestion. Americans are being encouraged to use this driving time in productive endeavor, many conducting business over the cell phone during their commutes. The argument that the "benefit" of increased worker productivity justifies the "costs" in human lives and broken bodies might also appear at first glance superficially persuasive, from the bean counting perspective, but again we would urge that this analysis is overrated as an argument against banning cell phone use while driving. First, our commutes are becoming longer in large part because 10 percent of drivers are on their cell phones taking 19 percent more time to get back to the flow of traffic following each braking episode, Strayer, 2006, supra. Furthermore, even to the extent that some percentage of this 10 percent of commuting drivers on the phone is involved in productive or semi-productive work, the increases in commute times for all workers resulting from their disruption to the flow of traffic certainly offsets the productivity of the few. As the numbers of drivers using cell phones increases, indeed the traffic flow will slow even further, and if Strayer’s predictions are correct the effect to slow traffic will increase “multiplicatively,” ever further increasing the commute time for all workers.

Unaccounted for in this cost-benefit analysis, furthermore, is the effect upon city congestion, and the expensive remedies that may be required for cities and states to deal with the increased congestion. The forgoing also doesn’t account for the increased expense for fuel, nor the impact on the environment. As will be discussed more fully infra, the “benefit” to private industry by encouraging its employee base to engage in business calls while driving, that is by encouraging their employees to drive under the influence of their cell phones, will certainly come home to roost economically for these same employers. We will suggest below that indeed, encouraging employees to use their cell phones for business purposes while driving will cost the employers more in the long run, to pay the compensatory and possibly punitive damage awards, as it becomes more common that the employers will be held vicariously liable for the cell phone induced inattention of their employees in the course and scope of their employment. Indeed, we suggest that any smart employer should immediately adopt and distribute written polices instructing their employees not to use their cell phones for business purposes while driving.

There is no economic “cost” associated with banning cell phone use which can be properly or persuasively weighed against the"benefit" of lives saved, catastrophic injuries avoided, and the other accident associated economic benefits to society which will result from the elimination of the effects of cell phone induced driving impairment.
5. Are Laws Outlawing All Cell Phone Use While Driving Practically Achievable?
During the last several years laws have been proposed in most states to ban outright the use of cell phones while driving. Debate has raged, and yet no state has met the challenge. Some states ban the use of cell phones by bus drivers, others ban cell phone use by minors, but the only general laws enacted applicable to adults so far have been laws prohibiting only the use of handheld cell phones.

Laws banning only handheld cell phones while driving are at best useless, calculated to have no impact whatsoever on this spreading epidemic of cell phone use while driving, and certainly can have no impact upon the severity of driver impairment. All that cell phone users need to do to continue to use their cell phones while driving is purchase a hands-free cell phone; and, as we've learned, hands free cell phone users are just as dangerous as those who use handheld cell phones. They are all DUI level impaired, and four times more likely to cause an accident than those who refrain from conversing over the cell phone while driving. Indeed we suggest that laws banning only handheld cell phone use while driving are worse than no law at all because they have the detrimental effect to reinforce the auto driver's "disconnected" perception that his driving while engaged in cell phone conversation is unimpaired.

Success in this war can only be measured by the achievement of complete bans on cell phone use while driving; anything short of that is defeat. Furthermore, it is essential that the legislated penalties be severe, meaning lengthy drivers license suspensions and then jail time for repeat offenders, similar to penalties for DUI drunk driving. In other states where handheld cell phone bans have been adopted with $20 fines for the first offense and $40 fines for the second offense, the measured incidence of handheld cell phone use while driving went down only for the first several months following enactment of the ban and then returned to pre-ban levels.

The legislative proponents of complete cell phone driving bans continue to fall short of the votes necessary to overcome those proposing the "alternative" of useless handheld cell phone bans. As recently as this July, 2006, the California Senate passed a handheld cell phone ban which appears likely soon to pass the Assembly and unfortunately, likely also to be signed into law by our biker Governor. Yet here at Motorcyclists-Against-Dumb Drivers we feel encouraged that we are approaching the moment when advocacy can turn the tide, when we will overcome the cell phone industry lobbying, and the failures of courage exhibited by our lawmakers, afraid to impose meaningful restrictions on the cell phone toting majority.

We are encouraged because we feel we have a powerful simple message now which we can carry to the public to effectively sway public opinion. We also have overwhelming scientific evidence now, reviewed in the preceding sections of this article, which we consider fully competent to overwhelm the sophistry which has heretofore characterized the pitch for restricting only the use of handheld cell phones while driving. In addition we perceive that there is a rapidly changing driving environment resulting from the epidemic increase in cell phone use while driving which we believe is rapidly producing a political imperative for a complete ban on cell phone use.

First, in terms of educating the public. The positive fact is that we have a simple, straightforward and powerful message, notwithstanding the breadth and complexity the converging multi-disciplinary scientific support. The message is "Driving under the influence of any cell phone is as dangerous as DUI drunk driving." We suggest that this message is "powerful" because DUI level driving impairment has already been recognized and accepted as a benchmark sufficient to require prohibition, stiff penalization and criminalization. "DUI level impairment" also has an emotional charge, a now generally accepted connotation of contemptibility upon which to build public sentiment against all cell phone use while driving. The most powerful lead message to the public must be that cell phone conversation while driving is as dangerous as DUI drunk driving. Next, as interest is captured with the initial message the public will be willing to consider additional information, including that describing the magnitude of this public health issue, to wit, that 1 in 10 motorists on the highways at any daylight moment are driving under the influence of cell phones, actively engaged in cell conversation, and that literally thousands upon thousands are being maimed and killed by the DUI cell phone impaired every year in every state in the Union. Next, or just as soon as the handheld law proponents begin interfering, the public needs to be informed that it is not "holding" the handheld phone which results in the DUI level driving impairment; rather, it is the powerful distraction of limited available driver attention to the cell phone conversation, away from the visual driving environment.

Getting through to sufficient numbers of our legislators to achieve complete bans on cell phone use while driving has been complicated heretofore both by cell phone industry lobbying and by the cowardice of legislators more concerned about a public backlash if they actually "take away" their cell phones while driving. Interestingly, the cell phone industry appears to be backing off its lobbying efforts, with only one cell phone company, Nextel, actively involved in lobbying against banning cell phone use in the California. Encouraging also is that public opinion appears to be shifting; large, some legitimate polls beginning to show that the majority of the public would favor a ban on all cell phone use while driving.

With the still increasing use of cell phones while driving, it appears now certain that laws effectively outlawing all cell phone use while driving will ultimately be essential, at least in metropolitan areas, if only to relieve city congestions, ease traffic flow and shorten worker commutes. Most cities will not have the choice. Already they have used every technology available, from subsidized mass transit to time-of-day computer fine-tuned traffic light sequencing, but with 10 percent of drivers on the road at any given daylight moment taking 19 percent more time to get back to flow of traffic speed after each braking episode, all the good work of traffic planners and engineers is quickly being overcome. As cell phone use while driving continues to increase from 10 percent driving under the influence of their cell phones this year to 11 or 12 percent next year, and with fewer and fewer unimpaired drivers on the streets capable of avoiding the increasing hazards created by the epidemic numbers of the DUI cell phone impaired, our streets will become more and more dangerous, an impending war zone. The cell phone associated injury and death are predicted to climb multiplititively, and policy-makers will find it increasingly difficult to ignore the caskets and broken bodies filling our cemeteries and nursing homes along the highways in the trail of the DUI cell phone impaired.

In terms of the present majority of the politicians who have successfully resisted effective cell phone bans in every state of the United States, expect from them nothing but continued prevarication in the short term. Advocates of effective cell phone bans will need to be prepared to call them on their dishonesty in the service of their cowardice. One concern is that the states are now in the process of "creating facts," actually non-scientific "falacies," to undermine future efforts to obtain cell phone bans, very similar to what NHTSA is doing now with its post helmet law repeal raw data comparisons. Indeed NHTSA has urged the states to instruct their law enforcement agencies collect the same kind of raw anecdotal data it has used commonly in recent years to defend its failed, paternalistic motorcycle safety policies, all without regard to the scientific method, apparently now for the purpose of rebutting the abundant, quality, epidemiological and controlled experimental cell phone study results obtained according proper scientific methodology.

Experience has demonstrated that in future efforts to obtain effective cell phone bans it will be important for us to be prepared to demonstrate persuasively the scientific invalidity of politically motivated data misrepresentation. It is utterly absurd that anecdotal data collected without regard to the scientific method should form any part of the debate given the abundance of epidemiological and controlled experimental studies both conducted according to the scientific method and published in peer reviewed scientific journals. But faced with lopsided scientific evidence contrary to their political positions these politicians will rally behind even the most patently lousy of haphazard collections of meaningless raw "data." We are all too familiar with the practice psudoscientific misrepresentation from our experience with NHTSA's strident efforts to justify its longstanding failed "motorcycle safety" agenda, historically focused so myopically on "what bikers wear." For illustrative purposes here we will take just the latest example from the most recent "cell phone ban debate" in California.

As in each of these legislative debates, there are legislators who don't want any ban on cell phone use while driving, those who want a complete ban, and those who want only to ban handheld cell phones. As has occurred in every other state, it is those who seek the "compromise" of banning only handheld cell phones who are now poised to succeed in California, possibly in the next few days, and it will be, according to the Los Angeles Times, specifically because of the "boost" to handheld law proponents delivered on eve of voting by an absurd collection of haphazardly obtained anecdotal data compiled from CHP accident reports and then blatantly misrepresented by the lead handheld cell ban proponent. We will discuss this data, and demonstrate why it is meaningless and how it was misrepresented. But first, it is indeed ironic that handheld cell phone proponents should have succeeded in every state in which legislation has been enacted. Certainly, to be fair, a legislator can arrive an honest position that we should not ban cell phones at all, e.g., based on some shortsighted economic bean counting cost-benefit analysis, and, obviously an honest position can be taken that all cell phone use while driving should be banned, as we have urged here based upon the science, but there is no honest scientific or policy rational for banning the use of only handheld cell phones. There is no difference between handheld and hands-free cell phone use in the consequent DUI level driving impairment or 4 fold likelihood of causing an accident. Yet proponents of handheld cell phone bans prevail. And one reason is that there is a majority of dishonest politicians who want desperately to "appear" to be doing "something" about the carnage resulting from epidemic driving under the influence of cell phones, but, who don't want to do anything that poses the risk of imposing on the majority of their constituency. Now, turning to this most recent prevarication use to turn the tide in California to a ban on handheld cell phones only, as reported by the Los Angeles Times, California State Senator "Simitian's efforts to focus on the hand-held cell phone received a boost from statistics that the California Highway Patrol began compiling in 2004. That year, police reported 775 accidents — including five fatalities — in which a driver at fault was using a hand-held cell phone. There were only 28 reports of accidents caused by drivers with hands-free phones." Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2006.

These "statistics" are utterly meaningless, as Mr. Simitian must surely know, unless he's a complete idiot; and shame on the Los Angeles Times for failing to point it out. Motorcyclists Against Dumb Drivers has come to the conclusion generally, in the motorcycle safety debate, in the freedom debate, and in our current effort to obtain effective bans on all cell phone use while driving, that some politicians will only stop misrepresenting the facts in the service of the politically expedient when they are confronted with anger, contempt, and persuasive rebuttal. This type of raw, anecdotal data, "775 accidents attributed to handheld cell phones, 28 to hands-free cell phones," is indeed meaningless, but unfortunately, for no good reason, it can be particularly effective in misleading the public, which is why politicians seize upon it. These anecdotal data compilations insult the intelligence of Mr. Simitian's intended audience, his fellow legislators, the public and the news media; but he gets away with it.

The data are meaningless for way too many reasons to list. First of all, to neutralize all similar data, please understand that in science anecdotal reports are useful only to raise hypotheses, never as proof. Furthermore, rather obviously, these data were neither collected nor interpreted according to the scientific method. They are misleading principally for two gross and obvious reasons. First, the data, given the method of their collection, surely grossly under-represent the number of accidents and deaths resulting from both handheld and hands-free cell phones, probably by a factor of 20 or 50 or more, which has consequences both in terms of its potential to mislead as to the magnitude of the problem and as a breading ground for spurious blips or spurious "correlations" resulting from the hapahazard method by which only this small percentage of the total data points are identified. Second, by this data Simitian makes it appear to his lay audience that the use of a handheld cell phone use is "more dangerous" than use of a hands-free cell phone, which is an utterly absurd conclusion. Indeed these data which the Los Angeles Times cited as providing a "boost" to Simitian's limited handheld cell phone ban provide absolutely no meaningful information at all to support that position.

First, and only because it is the most annoying, it is utter sophistry to suggest that a relative risk can be derived, or that somehow comparing the 775 accidents attributed to handheld cell phones with 28 accidents resulting from the use of hands-free cell phones is somehow evidence that the use handheld cell phone use while driving is any more dangerous than hands-free cell phone use while driving. At best, these are numerators without denominators! Apples and oranges. They cannot be compared. The two denominators are (1) the numbers of drivers using handheld devices at any given moment in time during 2004, and (2) the number using hands-free devices at any given moment in time during 2004. Pretending only for sake of this explanation that these raw accident data were reliably collected according to some appropriate scientific methodology, which is clearly not true, the only formula to obtain a meaningful relative risk would be to compare the 775 accidents over the total number of drivers using handheld devices controlled for time/use with the 28 accidents over the total number of drivers using hands-free cell phones controlled for time/use. Then we would at least have numerators and denominators! We can back into this gross "relative risk" again here just for the futile exercise, only to illustrate how a relative risk might be calculated, if we can all first recognize that the product yielded will still not be in the least bit scientifically valid given the lack of quality of the underlying raw data. (Just to point out perhaps the most obvious "methodological failure" in this entirely haphazard CHP "data collection process," consider how the CHP officer must have come to his conclusion that an accident was caused by cell phone distraction, when he wasn't present to observe the incident. It is highly unlikely that many of these data points resulted from a driver's admission that he was distracted by his phone, so the bulk of the data would derive presumably from reports of victims and witnesses that the driver was using his cell phone immediately prior to the accident. There is absolutely no reason to believe that victims and accident witnesses, looking in from outside the car, should be equally able or equally likely to recognize a driver using a handheld cell phone as opposed to a hands-free cell phone; indeed, we would suspect that drivers using handheld cell phones might well be significantly more obvious to potential witnesses, leading to the numbers of police reports of handheld cell phone contribution to accidents being significantly over-reported in comparison to hands-free call phone contribution to accidents).

But now turning to the reanalysis, ignoring the lousy quality of the underlying "data," just adding the denominators to the equation, lets see how far off Mr. Simitian's "statistical" misrepresentation was. According to NHTSA/NOPUS, as of 2004, the year that the CHP data Simitian cited was collected, 8 percent of auto drivers on our American streets and highways were under the influence of cell phones, but only 0.4 percent were using hands-free cell phones. The number using handheld cell phones while driving in 2004 obviously far exceeded the number of hands-free cell phone users, these being the "demominators," which as we will show, eliminates the bulk of the disparity in the gross numbers identified as having been haphazardly collected by the CHP and then serving as the apples and oranges compaired by Simitian. Specifically, 7.6 percent of drivers at any given daylight moment in 2004 were using handheld cell phones and 0.4 percent were using hands-free cell phones. Those are the denominators! (Again, not good scientific denominators, but certainly better than no denominators!) That is roughly 20 handheld cell phone users for every one hands-free cell phone user on the streets actively involved in cell phone conversation at any given moment in time, as of 2004, nationally. Inserting the denominators below the numerators to arrive at the relative risk, yields (775/20) or 38 handheld cell phone associated accidents compared to 28 hands-free cell phone related accidents, 38/28, yielding a relative risk of 1.3. This is very different from the 27.7 fold increased risk suggested by the 775/28 handheld/hands-free cell phone accident comparison. Again, while instructive on the magnitude of this legislator's prevarication and his disdain for the critical capacity of his target audiences, please understand that given the lack of quality which characterizes the underlying CHP data, the fact is that there is no meaningful information that can be derived either from the raw CHP numbers or from the comparison. This 1.3 relative risk, if one were to give it any credence at all, we might speculate reflects the greater likelihood that victims and witnesses of accidents will have observed, from outside the car, the perpetrator's use of hendheld cell phone more commonly than handsfree cell phone use; or, it might be for any of a hundred other confounding factors associated with this haphazard collection of anecdotal reports. Clearly this kind of utterly unreliable accumulation of anecdotal data should not be permitted to "boost" the prospects of handheld ban proponants, particularly when we now have the far superior results of the abundance well controlled epidemiolgical and experimental studies conducted according to the scientific method, indeed published in peer review scientific jounals, demonstrating that handheld and hands free cell phone use while driving results in identical driving impairment and the same four fold increased likelihood of causing an accident.

We have the high road and we have the quality, published, scientific evidence on our side, but politicians opposing cell phone bans and those favoring banning only handheld phone use have the initial political advantage just because it is only our most courageous and foresightful legislators who will be willing to risk the short term anger of the large number of their constituents who obviously value their ability to use their phones while driving. A good majority, seventy percent of all auto drivers use their phones while driving, at least some portion of the time, and many do so frequently, indeed so much so that the incidence of driver cell phone use on our streets and highways has risen to 10 percent. Many of those who use cell phones at least recognize that "others" who use cell phones are driving dangerously impaired. Unfortunately, because of the psychological "disconnect," they don't realize that their own driving is impaired. But perhaps fear of the dangers created by the "others" is slowly resulting in the evolving majority who will favor an effective ban. Shortsighted legislators, like Mr. Simitian, who have taken the cowardly political low road advocating what they may certainly see as currently the politically safer non-"solution," may find that soon enough their prevarication and strident efforts to sidetrack the only effective solutions will come home to roost. And they should be informed now that we are taking their names, recording their misrepresentations, and when the time comes to count the death toll resulting from their cowardice and lies, we intend to kick their cowardly political ass'es.

We also have another potentially potent public relations card to play, indeed one which might well ultimately prove the most powerful in appealing to auto driver self-interest. In most states, particularly those with crowded metropolitan areas, there is strong and growing public annoyance with increasing traffic, slowed traffic flow and city congestion. The public education message must be to inform the public accurately that the cell phone impaired are 19 percent slower to regain flow-of-traffic speed following each braking episode, and with 1 in 10 drivers currently actively engaged in cell phone conversation at any given daylight moment this is a major contributor to slowing traffic flow, increasing commute time, and contributing also to city congestion. How do we get this across? Maybe bumper stickers for use in bumper to bumper commutes: “Stuck In Traffic? Don’t Look At Me. Look At the Jerk With the Cell Phone.”

It is very important to all Americans, but motorcyclists in particular, to obtain state bans on all cell phone use while driving. The fact is that motorists who use cell phones while driving are as dangerous as DUI drunk drivers and driving under the influence of cell phones has become epidemic. We are hopeful that comprehensive cell phone bans are achievable, and will be achieved soon, notwithstanding that every state which has considered the issue thus far has opted either not to restrict cell phone use or to ban only handheld cell phone use while driving. We have a simple, clear and powerful message. We have all the quality scientific literature on our side. Political cowardice can be modified by advising the politicians that comprehensive cell phone bans will soon be essential, both to stem the growing tide of resulting human carnage and to avoid the breakdown of city and state transportation systems; informing them also that it is they who will be held accountable when the broken bodies and caskets are counted, accountable both for their prevarication and for their voting history. Please help Motorcyclists-Against-Dumb-Drivers seek a ban on all cell phone use while driving. On another page of this Motorcyclists-Against-Dumb-Drivers web site we will provide a form letter which you may use or adapt to send to your Governor and legislators. As motorcyclists, those most vulnerable to the inattention of the cell phone impaired, lets do our part to advise our state representatives that we want an end to the carnage resulting from motorists driving under the influence of cell phones, and we want it Now.

6. Additional Strategies to Curtail the Use Cell Phones While Driving. Lawsuits to Hold Cell Phone Impaired Drivers Liable For the Injuries and Deaths Resulting From Their “Driving Under the Influence of Their Cell Phones”; Lawsuits to Hold Employers Liable For Injuries/Death Resulting from Employee Business Use of Phones While Driving; And, Lawsuits to Hold the Cell Phone Industry Liable For the Injuries and Death Resulting From Their Public Misinformation Campaigns, For Their Promotion of Cell Phone Use While Riding, and For Their Failure to Warn Accurately of the Dangers of Driving Under the Influence of Cell Phone Conversation.
Outside the political arena there are a number of additional ways to influence the behavior of those responsible for the ongoing carnage resulting from this epidemic of DUI level driving under the influence of cell phones. For however-long our legislators remain unwilling to step up courageously to effectively address this public health issue, litigation is only available stop-gap tool to reign in this growing epidemic of driver cell phone attentional impairment. Litigation is appropriate generally to fairly apportion liability, and to compensate those who have been injured and the families of those who have been killed. Second, litigation can effect change, a change in public attitude as individual drivers are brought to justice for their reckless cell phone impaired driving, or a change in the behavior of employers who have heretofore considered it reasonable to benefit from employee productivity at the expense of those killed by their employees conducting their business while driving. Litigation might well also change the behavior of the cell phone companies, even if just in eliciting honesty, including honesty in the form of accurate consumer warnings of the DUI dangers of driving under the influence of their cell phones.

Where the political system fails the public, it has traditionally been through litigation that the vacuum of accountability is filled and behavioral change motivated. The efficacy of litigation to provide for consumer safety is evident in the entire body of successful mass tort litigation from pharmaceutical product liability litigation through the individual and state prosecuted tobacco litigation. Litigation is often a healthy tool for social change. So lets make it explicit:

Employers, take notice, if you encourage your employees to use the phone for business purposes while driving, and one of your employees injures or kills a motorcyclist, bicyclist, pedestrian or other motorist, while in cell phone business conversation, we will hold you liable. Indeed, if you fail to adopt and enforce written policies prohibiting employee cell phone use while driving in the course and scope of their employment, we will hold you liable. Beware: You may also be held liable for punitive damages if your conduct was malicious under state law, e.g., in reckless or conscious disregard of the lives or safety of others.

Cell phone companies, take notice, if you engage in public relations campaigns to mislead the public that cell phone use or hands-free cell phone use while driving is safe, you will be held liable for resulting consumer and third party injury and death. If you fail to warn your consumers, or fail to do so by means calculated to bring to the attention of your consumers that handheld and hands-free cell phone use while driving results in DUI level driving impairment and a 4 fold increased likelihood that the driver will cause an accident, you will be held liable. And, beware: If your conduct is determined to be malicious, in reckless or conscious disregard of the lives and safety of others, then again you may be held liable for exemplary damages.

Motorists, take notice, if you drive your vehicle while under the influence of a cell phone, and you maim or kill a motorcyclist, bicyclist, pedestrian or another auto driver, you will be held liable. If you received notice from your cell phone company of the dangers of driving under the influence of your cell phone, in the warnings accompanying your phone when you originally purchased it, or in warnings attached to bills or other communications from your cell company, then if you continue to driver impaired, in conscious disregard of the health or safety of others, you too may be liable for punitive damages.

http://www.sandiegoduihelp.com California DUI / Drunk Driving help

The California Highway Patrol is reporting 103 arrests on suspicion of driving under the influence this Memorial Day weekend, compared with 104 last year at the same time.

The reporting period began at 6 p.m. Friday and ended at 6 a.m. Sunday. The CHP has maximum enforcement in place through today, CHP Officer Rob Sanchez said.

The CHP did not report any traffic fatalities in the county through early Sunday evening, he said. Last year, there was one traffic fatality by 6 a.m. Sunday, Sanchez said.


Statewide, there have been 1,048 DUI arrests compared with 1,024 arrests last year. The CHP also reported 15 traffic fatalities statewide compared to 16 in 2006.


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Drunken driving — in a wheelchair!
German police say blood-alcohol content reached ‘life-threatening figure’

DUI & Drunk Driving news:

May 22, 2007
BERLIN - A wheelchair-bound German stunned police when they pulled him over for using the road and allegedly found he was 10 times over the legal alcohol limit for drivers.

“He was right in the middle of the road,” said a spokesman for police in the northeastern city of Schwerin on Tuesday. “The officers couldn’t quite believe it when they saw the results of the breath test. That’s a life-threatening figure.”

The 31-year-old told police he had been out drinking with a friend and was a mile from home when a police car stopped him as he passed through the village of Ventschow.

Police said that because the man was technically traveling as a pedestrian, he could not be charged with a driving offense.

“It’s not like we can impound his wheelchair,” the spokesman said. “But he is facing some sort of punishment. It’s just not clear yet what exactly that will be.”



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You are a jury member on legal case that is deciding to sustain or revoke the death certificate of John Fitzgerald Kennedy therefore declaring that he did or did not die due to gunshot wounds incurred on Elm Street in Dallas , Texas on November 22, 1963 .

The plaintiff in the case presents the following evidence and testimony that cannot be repudiated or discredited by any defendant desiring to sustain the legality and enforcement of the death certificate for John Fitzgerald Kennedy be they family members or government agencies.

1. The sworn testimonies given to the Warren Commission in 1964 by
A. Secret Service Agent Roy H. Kellerman who was sitting in the passenger seat when the Presidential Limousine rolled down Elm Street .
B. Parkland Hospital Emergency Room Attending Physician Dr. Charles R. Baxter who treated and operated on the body and coordinated all the medical personal working on the body.

2. While under oath, the questioning and testimony of past and present administrators of the Dallas Police Department regarding normal and actions and procedures their department failed to initiate and complete on Elm Street after the President of the United States limousine sped away to Parkland Hospital on November 22, 1963 .

The words “Kennedy” and “assassination” are synonymous in the late 20th and early 21st century global culture. When the word Kennedy is spoken by most humans today, the word assassination is the next word out of their mouths. These repetitive two words are entranced and brainwashed into the human experience and psyche regardless if John Fitzgerald Kennedy did or did not die due to gunshot wounds inflicted upon him on Elm Street in Dallas , Texas on November 22, 1963 . Have 44 years of droning those two words “Kennedy Assassination” created a false reality despite all the proven evidence that contradicts and negates this false reality?

However, your job, duty and responsibility as a juror is to transcend and rise above the entrainment and brainwashing and far-out “conspiracy theories” therefore you have the ability to express your unbiased and non-prejudicial decision based-upon examining the undisputable evidence and facts presented in the “court” to sustain or revoke the death certificate of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

Transcripts of the sworn testimonies of Kellerman and Baxter to the Warren Commission in 1964 are posted on the internet at
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/testimony/kellerma.htm
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/testimony/baxter.htm

The sworn statements are also attached as Word Files with this e-mail

Summary of the Kellerman Sworn Statement

During the questioning by Senator Arlen Specter and Representative Gerald Ford, Kellerman stated he heard John Fitzgerald Kennedy in his Boston accent shout “My God, I’m Hit” after Kellerman was riveted by the first sound that seem like a firecracker. Specter and Ford asked and Kellerman answered numerous related follow-up questions to his statement that he heard Kennedy shout after the first shot. There is no doubt Kellerman heard Kennedy shout “My God, I’m Hit”.

Kellerman also informed the members of the Warren Commission that he saw a bullet hole in the upper right shoulder of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

Summary of the Baxter Sworn Statement

Baxter could feel no pulse on the wrist or chest area upon his first examination of the body.

The body needed to have a tracheotomy performed so normal ventilation of the lungs could occur. With a scalpel, Baxter and the other doctors cut a vertical incision above, including and below the bullet hole in the neck of the body.

Baxter also stated that after the full examination of the body by the other attending physicians; he was informed as the coordinating head doctor that there were two wounds to the body – one to the head and one to the neck. There was no bullet wound in the upper right shoulder.

Summary of Statement by Trauma Doctors to you and the rest of the jury related to the neck and head injuries sustained to the body treated by Dr. Charles Baxter.

Expert trauma medical surgeons emphatically stated for the record and to you and other members of the jury that a human body suffering the bullet wound to the neck as detailed by Dr. Baxter in his sworn statement to the Warren Commission does not have any kind of ability to shout the words “My God, I’m Hit.”

Expert trauma medical surgeons emphatically state for the record and to you and other members of the jury that a human body suffering the bullet would to the head as detailed by Dr. Baxter in his sworn statement to the Warren Commission does not have any kind of ability to shout the words “My God, I’m Hit.

Summary of Questions To and Statements by past and current administrators of the Dallas Police Department related to their failures.

The Dallas Police Department has no physical evidence that a crime nevertheless a murder took place on Elm Street on November 22, 1963 . The forensic department and related personal did not cordon off the area and make a crime scene to collect blood, tissue, hair, clothing, bullet and other related samples for examination. Within one-hour after the crime, the Dallas Police Department opened Elm Street to normal traffic flow. Even if Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin, the Dallas Police Department had no physical evidence from the crime scene to submit to the court or jury in a trial of Oswald for murder.

There is no crime scene evidence whatsoever available today that was generated during the violent act on Elm Street to indicate or prove John Fitzgerald Kennedy was murdered on November 22, 1963.

The best evidence that a crime was committed on Elm Street on November 22, 1963 is the testimony of Kellerman who stated he heard Kennedy shout but the strenuous verbal effort could not have been accomplished by the body that was treated in Parkland Hospital . Kellerman stated he saw a bullet wound in Kennedy’s upper right shoulder therefore logically the “My God, I’m Hit” shout came after the bullet entered Kennedy’s upper right shoulder.

The only proof that a crime took place is by the best and nearest eye-witness to the incident who stated John Fitzgerald Kennedy was wounded in the shoulder and then shouted “My God, I’m Hit.”

Since there was no bullet wound in the upper right shoulder of the body that was examined by the doctors at Parkland Hospital and the body that was in Parkland Hospital had no physical means of shouting “My God, I’m Hit,” the body that shouted “My God, I’m Hit was not treated for his shoulder wound in the Emergency Room of Parkland Hospital. The body that did have the wounds to the neck and head was not the body that was shot in the shoulder and shouted “My God, I’m Hit.”

Summary of Rebuttal by Plaintiff regarding the Defendant’s submission of the Abraham Zapruder Film as evidence to the murder of John Fitzgerald Kennedy on Elm Street, November 22, 1963.

Ninety-nine percent of the human population pulls in and contracts their arms and elbows when the body experiences trauma such as a gun shot wound. But the Zapruder film supposedly depicts Kennedy expanding his elbows out when the first bullet entered his body. How can person who has been shot in the upper right shoulder immediately raise their right elbow at the same rate and height as their left elbow? That feat is physically impossible.

Kellerman stated he saw a bullet hole in the upper right shoulder so therefore Kennedy probably grabbed his right shoulder with his left hand. If the raw and non-manipulated Zapruder film were released, the celluloid frames would detail Kennedy grabbing his right shoulder with his left hand and not throwing both of his elbows up in an impossible and improbable position and both of them at the same rapid rate of ascent including the right elbow with a bullet hole in the upper left shoulder.

When attempting to manipulate the Zapruder film, the illusionists had a much easier effort drawing Kennedy’s elbows away from his body in an unnatural, improbable and impossible human position. Drawing Kennedy’s elbows close to his body was impossible for the experienced artists from Disney and/or Warner Brothers Studios in the mid to late 1960s. Detailed computer analysis of Kennedy’s arm position after being hit by the first bullet in the Zapruder film was proven to be a total fake to you and other members of the jury by expert technical witnesses.

Summary of Rebuttal by Plaintiff regarding Defendants argument that there was no possibility a body switch could have occurred.

The victim of the neck and head wound was probably pumped full adrenalin and packed in ice before and after being shot and placed into the trunk of the limousine shortly before the occupants were seated in the automobile. The seat of the limousine was moved and a door to the trunk was opened as the motorcade sped toward Parkland Hospital . The victim with the neck and head wound was moved into place while Jackie was drugged and pieces of the victim’s brain were placed into her hand and scattered in the limousine. John Fitzgerald Kennedy with his surprise shoulder wound hid in the trunk until he could be extracted with no witnesses present. This scenario is feasible and possible therefore cannot be excluded or discounted whatsoever.

Could the power’s that be lie to the public about the advancements and developments related to human cloning in 1963 therefore the victim was Kennedy’s REAL DNA double? Was secret cloning to the point in 1963 that an individual’s body could be grown and duplicated but the body had no animation or “life?” If the culprits and participants in the Kennedy abdication by fake assassination were caught, could they be tried for shooting an inanimate clone? If an inanimate clone was the victim that rolled into the Parkland Emergency Room, the lid and cover-up would be clamped, tightened and locked as severe and hard as possible to protect government, military and corporate assets and interests.

“Investigators” such as Jim Garrison, Mark Lane, Jim Marrs, Gerald Posner, James Fetzer and numerous others have been and are today fed both true and false information to create confusion so ALL paths of the inquiry are never pointed in the logical and correct directions. Kennedy’s abdication by fake assassination is never even considered or discussed by Garrison, Lane, Marrs, Posner, Fetzer and others therefore relegated to the absurd loony-bin category. Events related to the abdication by fake assassination are purposely featured in the sensational and discredited tabloid press on rare occasions to discourage any credible person from perusing ALL avenues, possibilities and probabilities no matter how compelling or convincing the evidence.

And while the confusion is fermented and boils to the surface by the “investigators”, the public consciousness is pounded and pulverized every day with the false, misleading and brainwashing term “Kennedy Assassination” so the culprits and the most important truths related to the dastardly deed remain hidden. If Marrs, Posner or Fetzer were to ever widen their investigations and writings to the reality of the Kennedy’s abdication by fake assassination, they would suffer swift and severe complications in their lives by the powers-that-be. They make a good living by voluntarily or involuntarily shoveling the false premise of the entrancing term “Kennedy Assassination” onto the world public and hacking out the party-line brainwashing techniques.

Summary of Rebuttal by Plaintiff regarding Defendants argument that a gun shot was heard by numerous witnesses as if coming from inside the limousine and also gun powder was smelled in the limousine by numerous persons including U.S. Senator Ralph Yarborough.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy had pyrotechnics planted onto him that would make him appear to have been fatally shot. However, Kennedy did not anticipate that he would be shot in the shoulder therefore he could not trip the mechanism to ignite the pyrotechnic device made from gun powder, additional incendiary materials, blood and other artifacts. Kennedy shouted “My God, I’m Hit” so limousine driver William Greer could trip the pyrotechnic device with his dash-board mounted or hand-held infrared back-up trip. When the pyrotechnics exploded, pieces of fake bone, blood, hair and cloth rained down on Kellerman (see his sworn statement) and a Dallas Police Officer on a motorcycle at the rear of the limousine…and remember, some persons still claim and contend a glass window separated Greer and Kellerman from the rear-seated passengers.

If Kennedy were shot from a gun at his front position then how did blood, bone, tissue and hair rain down on Kellerman who was in front of Kennedy? If Kennedy were shot from a gun at his rear position then how did blood, bone, tissue and hair rain down on the Dallas Motorcycle Police Officer who was at Kennedy’s rear? The 360 degree spray pattern of the bones, blood and hairs is more consistent with a omni exploding pyrotechnics device planted on Kennedy’s back or shoulder than a bullet entering his body from a specific direction that would produce a one-directional spray pattern.

Texas U.S. Senator Ralph Yarborough approached the Presidential limousine at Parkland Hospital before the body was removed from the lap of Jackie. For two days after the incident, Senator Yarborough stated he smelled a very strong and heavy scent of gun powder in the limousine. On the third day “smiling Ralph” as he was called in Texas changed his tune after conversations with Lyndon Baines Johnson and never again mentioned the gun powder smells. What is the meaning of “Smiling Ralph’s” initial statement?

Realistically three persons had the opportunity to shot a pistol in the Presidential limousine.

1. Texas Governor John Connelly who was rumored to carry a pistol on his ankle
2. Limousine Driver William Greer
3. Passenger Roy Kellerman

Connelly was probably too occupied with his own injuries and concern for his wife and the President to pull his gun and shoot. For argument’s sake let’s say Greer or Kellerman fired any kind of low or high powered pistol. The smoke of that pistol would immediately rise out of the car but a very small residue of powder would remain in the limousine. The limousine rapidly accelerated after briefly slowing therefore the convertible automobile was subject to high winds during the journey to Parkland Hospital .

The likelihood of Senator Yarborough smelling gun powder due to a pistol being fired in the open limousine that quickly reached speeds of over 100 miles per hour for several minutes is highly unlikely to impossible. However, the concentrated gun powder and additional potent incendiary materials that have a similar scent to gun powder in Kennedy’s pyrotechnic device were sprayed over, saturated and embedded into the entire limousine therefore Senator Yarborough was detecting the results of the ignited pyrotechnic device and not residue from a discharged pistol. Hence, the Texas Senator was quickly silenced by the newly sworn in President of the United States who was also from Texas .

Had the Dallas Police Department not been prevented from doing their job and they conducted a normal, thorough and methodical crime scene investigation on Elm Street, inside the limousine, on Kennedy’s clothing and body and on the clothing of Kellerman and other witnesses such as the Dallas Motorcycle Police Officer, they would have immediately discovered and proven beyond any shadow of doubt that Kennedy was wearing a pyrotechnic device and a bleeding body had been in the trunk of the limousine.

What were the motives for John Fitzgerald Kennedy to participate in an abdication by fake assassination?

4. Jackie began having an affair with Aristotle Onassis in 1958 therefore the father of her children was at the very least in doubt and at the very most Kennedy knew her pregnancies were not his doing. Onassis had a long-term relationship with the Kennedy family that started when he transported alcohol in his ships from Greece to the Kennedy family pubs and restaurants during the era of Prohibition. Onassis and Joe Kennedy’s accomplice in the illegal shipments was then Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. Does this explains why Franklin Roosevelt appointed (was blackmailed into selecting?) known bootlegger Joe Kennedy to the Ambassadorship of Great Britain?
5. John Fitzgerald Kennedy was disillusioned and disappointed by the actual power of the President of the United States
6. Two to six months after taking office, Kennedy was diagnosed with a dark and desperate physical condition and had he ran for President in 1964, Kennedy would have done so in a wheel chair and his body racked with more pain than the physical pain he was already suffering in 1961.
7. Joseph Kennedy…those who have studied his biography needs nothing more to understand John’s motivation
8. Lyndon Baines Johnson was absolutely committed to do whatever he could to assist Kennedy in pulling-off his abdication by fake assassination including his successful efforts to block any kind of post crime scene investigations. This included leaving false rabbit trails of evidence such as the partially true death bed confession of E. Howard Hunt that historians and suckers like “alternative” radio show host Alex Jones chew, digest and totally believe. Jones and others then follow and spout “the pawn’s script” by concluding LBJ was one of the key perpetrators.
9. John Fitzgerald Kennedy wanted out in the worst way by any means possible but be alive in total seclusion.

Alex Jones’s scope, understanding and attitude, like the general public is funneled into a very severe and narrow perspective that is shaped by the generational brainwashing term “Kennedy Assassination.” In 2007, 44 years after the incident in on Elm Street , Alex Jones and countless others are dupes and pawns for the cover-up of the truths related to and those who participated in “THE crime of the 20th century” -- John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s abdication of the Presidency of the United States by fake assassination.

Robert Kennedy and other relatives and friends were most likely keep out of the loop until after the violent abdication was successfully completed.

The Plaintiff rests its case.

So, you the juror, based upon the, evidence, facts and logical conclusions, decide if the death certificate of John Fitzgerald Kennedy is sustained or revoked as related to his supposed demise due to gun shot wounds incurred on Elm Street in Dallas , Texas on November 22, 1963 .

Is your vote to sustain or to revoke?



(This was prepared by Inventor/Scientist Brian Andersen of www.trivortex.com )


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San Diego California DUI :

Sheriff's Department now answering 911 wireless calls


Wireless 911 calls in the jurisdiction of the San Diego County Sheriff's Department will be answered by their dispatch center beginning this month, officials said Thursday.

Such calls were previously answered by the California Highway Patrol and were then transferred to the appropriate law enforcement agency.

The process caused delays and frustration, said Hanan Harb, emergency 911 coordinator for the Sheriff's Department and San Diego County.


"I think anytime you can eliminate any delay at all in a life or death emergency, you're serving the public better," said sheriff's Capt. Mike McNally. "It can make a difference between life and death."

Sheriff's dispatchers still urge people to use a land line -- a phone wired to a residence or business -- for a 911 call whenever possible so that emergency responders can pick up specific location information.

The change has been spreading across the state since Jan. 1, 2001, as a result of Assembly Bill 1263 that allows 911 calls to go directly to local agencies rather than the Highway Patrol.

Harb said the Highway Patrol was originally designated the 911 wireless call agency because when cell phones first became popular, they were primarily used for emergencies, many of which occurred on highways and roads.

Since then, cell phone use has exploded. Last year, there were 8 million 911 emergency wireless calls in California.

"It was overwhelming the CHP," Harb said.

She said the other law enforcement agencies in San Diego County have been answering their own 911 calls for awhile. The Carlsbad Police Department was the first law enforcement agency in San Diego County to receive 911 calls from cell phones in September 2004.

It took a $1.5 million phone system upgrade at the sheriff's communications center before those dispatchers could handle wireless 911 calls directly, because the old phone system didn't provide all the call information, Harb said.

The phone upgrade was completed in February and the Sheriff's Department started accepting wireless 911 calls on May 1, Harb said.

She said the Sheriff's Department was already handling about 50 transferred 911 calls daily from the Highway Patrol before the changeover.

"We're expecting the wireless phone calls to go up to about 150 calls daily," Harb said.

She said the Sheriff's Department doesn't think any extra dispatchers or resources will be required, because the agency already has six or seven people taking about 1,500 calls a day now.

"Five hundred of those are 911, which include wireless and (land) line calls," said Harb.

McNally said the sheriff's communications center is still connecting with all the wireless providers. Since May, they have been taking Verizon calls and a few other carriers, and the goal is to eventually connect with them all, the captain said.

When calling 911 with wireless phones, people need to stay on the line and provide an address for dispatchers, McNally said. With home and business lines, people can just call 911 and leave the phone off the hook if they aren't able to talk because dispatchers get a precise address, he said.

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Driver Charged With Driving on Insulin

A driver whose diabetic coma triggered a tragic accident killing two people in San Jose last year now faces vehicular manslaughter charges for driving while intoxicated.

But unlike run-of-the-mill DUI cases, prosecutors say this driver was intoxicated not with alcohol, but with too much insulin.

The defendant, 52-year-old John Mayfield, is pleading not guilty, according to his attorney, Allen Ruby. Mayfield will be arraigned this afternoon. If convicted, Mayfield could be sentenced to a maximum of 16 years and eight months.

"Insulin is a drug," said Deputy DA Peter Waite. "It's illegal to drive with a drug that impairs your ability to drive. If you need to take [insulin], that's fine, but you shouldn't be an impaired driver."

When Mayfield was pulled from the truck after the explosion, he had very low blood glucose, Waite said. Insulin maintains low blood glucose levels, but too much insulin can drop the blood sugar level dangerously low, which can lead to a diabetic coma. The prosecutor contends Mayfield was responsible for testing his blood glucose level before he drove.

Mayfield flipped his truck last July as he exited a freeway ramp in downtown San Jose . His truck landed sideways, slamming into another truck where a young couple was waiting for a traffic light. Both trucks exploded, and the two passengers Mayfield directly hit — Mary Bernstein and Robert Conway — were killed. Seven others were injured. In addition to the two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, Mayfield is also charged with driving under the influence while causing injury.


'However well-trained you are and however smart and conscientious you are, you’re not a computer. You’re not God. You can’t automatically perfectly take the right amount of insulin every time you take a shot.'

— Kriss Halpern
Santa Monica attorney


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Santa Monica attorney Kriss Halpern has represented nearly 100 diabetic clients fighting suspended driver's licenses for having low blood sugar levels. Halpern said he could not comment on this particular case because he didn't know all the details, but the prosecution' s general argument didn't sit well with him.

Prosecuting a case by comparing insulin to alcohol or other recreational drugs is "outrageous," he said. "You take your insulin because you need it to survive."

And preventing accidents isn't as simple as checking your blood sugar before you drive, Halpern said.

A CHP spokesman confirmed that its accident report showed that Mayfield had checked his blood sugar level before the accident, found it was too high, and gave himself a dose of insulin before heading to San Jose .

While some diabetics can sense low blood sugar coming on, others, particularly those suffering from hypoglycemic unawareness, can't, said Halpern, who has Type I diabetes. Waite said he did not know whether Mayfield suffered from this particular condition.

"However well-trained you are and however smart and conscientious you are, you're not a computer. You're not God," Halpern said. "You can't automatically perfectly take the right amount of insulin every time you take a shot."

A low blood sugar reaction can hit very suddenly, Halpern said, which is not the same as a drunk who didn't care enough to call a taxi.

In People v. Keith, 184 Cal.App.2d Supp 884, a 1960 court of appeal opinion cited by Assistant DA David Tomkins, the court stressed that the legal basis for a DUI conviction is not the drug or how "innocently a person may get 'under the influence,'" but the defendant's decision to drive.

"I don't think any driver who drives under the influence of anything . . . really means to kill anybody or hurt anybody," Tomkins said.

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BROOKSVILLE -Hernando County deputies didn't have to go far to make a drunken
driving arrest Tuesday. In this case, the suspect came to them.

Richard A. Brockman of Brooksville drove to the Sheriff's Office at 9 a.m. to
register as a felon, which is a requirement of a court-ordered probation from his May 4 conviction on fraud charges.

During the registration, deputies smelled alcohol on the 48-year-old's breath and
noted he was slurring his speech. Brockman acknowledged he was on pain medication
but denied drinking any alcohol, reports state.

He also denied driving to the Sheriff's Office even though deputies saw him pull
up in his 1999 Chevrolet Monte Carlo. Moments later he handed over his keys.

In the car deputies found four 16-ounce cans of beer in the front passenger seat,
reports state. Two of the cans were empty and two others unopened were cold to the
touch. A receipt showed the beer was purchased about 45 minutes before arriving at
the Sheriff's Office.

Brockman later registered a 0.148 percent on a blood-alcohol level test, reports
show. The level at which a person is presumed impaired in Florida is 0.08 percent.

He was charged with driving while intoxicated and taken to the Hernando County
jail.


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A man goes to a party and has too much to drink. His friends plead with him
to let them take him home. He says NO -- he only lives a mile away.

About five blocks from the party, the police pull him over. They check his
license and ask him to get out of the car and walk the line.

Just as he starts, the police radio blares out a notice of a robbery taking place in a house around the block. The police tell the party animal to stay put, they'll be right back and they run around the corner to the robbery. The guy waits and waits
and finally decides to drive home.

When he gets there, he tells his wife he is going to bed, and to tell anyone who might come looking for him that he has the flu and has been in bed all day.

A few hours later the police knock on the door. They ask if Mr. Smith is there and his wife says yes.

They ask to see him and she replies that he is in bed with the flu and has been
there all day.

The police still have his driver's license. They ask to see his car
and she asks why. They insist on seeing his car, so she takes them to the
garage.

She opens the door. There sitting in the garage is the police car,
with all its lights still flashing.

True story; told by the driver at his first AA meeting.



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DUI / Drunk Driving news:

Fla. Criminal Defense Lawyers Take Aim at Beleaguered Judiciary Via Web Log

A small band of criminal defense lawyers has shaken up the Broward County, Fla., legal community with a Web log that reports what the bloggers consider abuse and misconduct by judges.

Their controversial blog takes daily blasts at Broward judges and urges lawyers to run for election against sitting judges. Designed as the communication arm of the new criminal defense group Justice Advocacy Association of Broward, the site was started last year to provide information about case law.

The site, which averages 31,000 hits a week, has become a daily must-read for many in the legal community at a time when Broward judges are involved in a series of verbal gaffes and face allegations of misconduct.

The blog gained visibility last month when it was the first to report that Circuit Judge Charles Greene, chief administrative judge of the criminal division, used the term "NHI" -- meaning no humans involved -- to describe the minority victims and witnesses in a recent murder trial. That remark led to a firestorm of criticism. In the wake of the controversy, Greene stepped down as administrative judge and at his request was re-assigned to the civil division.

Fort Lauderdale attorney William Gelin, one of the blog's founders and a frequent writer, said the goal of the blog is to inform the public and hold court officials accountable. "We are shedding light on previously very dark places," he said, adding that so far judges have not treated him or his clients differently as a result of his blogging.

The Web site has angered many Broward judges and lawyers. Last week at a news conference, Broward Chief Judge Dale Ross blamed the blog's organizers for trying to "undermine" the judiciary. He said in an interview he would prefer that lawyers with concerns come to him directly.

"I like folks who are serious people, who come up to me face-to-face and say, 'Hey Dale, I have a problem I'd like to talk to you about,'" he said. While Ross said he doesn't read the blog, he complained that he hadn't "seen one thing yet that was factually correct."

The incoming president of the Broward County Hispanic Bar Association, Miramar attorney Jose Izquierdo, also criticized the organizers of the blog, saying they are using it "as a forum to attack and not fix the problem."

Russell Williams, vice president of Broward Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, echoed that criticism of the blog. "All they do is complain, and the complaints become a cancer that grows from the inside and spreads throughout the courthouse," he said.

LEADING VOICE OF DISCONTENT

Broward Circuit Court has not been accustomed to such noisy criticism. Since 1991, the court has been led by Ross, who recently was unanimously re-elected chief judge by his fellow judges.

Few incumbent judges have faced election opponents because Broward lawyers fear alienating them. There's no regular rotation system, so most judges remain in their assigned divisions for long periods.

In addition, under former Gov. Jeb Bush and his hand-picked Judicial Nominating Commission, there were few appointments of black or Hispanic judges despite the county's large and growing minority population.

Bush tended to appoint former prosecutors to the bench, and some of these Bush appointees, notably Circuit Judge Cheryl Aleman, have angered the defense bar with what is perceived to be their pro-prosecution bias.

All these factors, plus the recent series of embarrassing judicial comments and conduct, have led to growing frustration with the court and with Ross' leadership. The new blog has been a leading voice in expressing that discontent.

Broward County Public Defender Howard Finkelstein, a frequent critic of Broward judges who is not connected with JAABlog, lauded the Web site as one of the most important factors driving change in the court. "In Broward, judges have become way too accustomed to not being challenged in either the courtroom or at the polls," he said.

Critics, however, say the bloggers simply want to bring down Chief Judge Ross and other judges.

"I don't have an agenda against any judge, the judiciary or anything," Izquierdo said. "The situation regarding [sensitivity toward diversity] is not a springboard for attacking judges that you have a problem with."

Gelin acknowledged personal feelings of animosity toward Chief Judge Ross and his leadership. But he said the Web site was designed as a forum for criminal defense lawyers to discuss issues and gather information.

In addition to critiques of judges, the blog posts arrests sheets, links to news articles about the courthouse, announcements of upcoming meetings and events in the community, summaries of appellate court rulings and vignettes of courthouse happenings.

Gelin said Ross and his colleagues on the bench are responsible for the current problems facing the court -- not his blog. "The judiciary is doing this all by themselves," he said. Ross' "attempt to scapegoat us is a little bit ingenuous."

RICH PICKINGS

The Broward blog began as an offshoot of the Justice Advocacy Association of Broward, a criminal defense bar group created last summer. Initially, the site posted appellate decisions, court meetings, newspaper articles and an occasional rant.

But JAABlog soon eclipsed the sponsoring organization by reporting on a steady stream of controversial statements and actions by the judges. And the bloggers have had rich pickings.

In February, the state Judicial Qualifications Commission filed charges against Judge Aleman, alleging that she "engaged in a pattern of arrogant, discourteous and impatient conduct."

That same month, during a bail hearing, Judge Ross said a black defendant charged with violating a noise ordinance was "playing that atrocious rap music on a boom box."

Also in February, Circuit Judge Larry Seidlin became the object of national ridicule for his handling of the Anna Nicole Smith body-custody case. Then Circuit Judge Lawrence Korda was charged with smoking pot in a Hollywood, Fla., park and took a leave of absence.

Last year there were several other incidents of Broward judges making comments that were widely considered insensitive to minorities and poor people.

The nearly 320 members of the Justice Advocacy Association of Broward all have author keys to compose Web posts. Viewers can weigh in with comments, either signed or anonymous, without being moderated. A handful of JAAB members write and sign most of the posts.

Gelin is one of the main bloggers. "If you truly believe something, you ought to sign your name to it," he said.

Under his lead, the blog has polled readers on who they think should run against Ross for the position of chief judge. No one ran against Ross in the most recent election in February.

This week, Gelin urged readers to file to run against sitting judges.

Gelin's actions impressed a Miami-Dade courthouse blogger who has operated the popular Justice Building Blog for the past year and a half under the pseudonym "Rumpole."

"I was surprised the lawyer who started the [Broward] blog did so openly," Rumpole, who says he's a Miami-Dade criminal defense lawyer, said in an e-mail to the Daily Business Review. "He should be applauded for his bravery. I, of course, am not so brave."

At least one other lawyer who wrote a post on JAABlog has suffered consequences. Fort Lauderdale criminal defense attorney Sean Conway faces a Florida Bar complaint for a blog post about Judge Aleman that was attributed to him. The October 2006 entry that bears Conway's name referred to Aleman as "seemingly mentally ill" and accused her of illegally forcing defendants to waive their rights to a speedy trial.

Bar rules prohibit attorneys from publicly criticizing judges. Conway has not admitted writing the post.

Aleman currently is fighting JQC charges of misconduct, including allegations of abusive treatment toward criminal defendants and defense attorneys.

The March Bar complaint against Conway, which was filed five months after the Aleman post, asked Conway to comment on the blog entry. Both Conway and his attorney have filed responses.

Despite the Bar complaint, Conway recently forwarded a JQC complaint he filed against Aleman to JAABlog, and it was posted. Conway "can post all he wants," said his attorney, Fred Haddad of Fort Lauderdale. "What are we in Russia?"

Gelin also had a Bar complaint filed against him last September. The Bar closed it a few days later, finding no probable cause. The nature of the complaint was not made public.

Gelin said the complaint was made by someone who did not like a quote attributed to him in an article published by the Miami Herald. Gelin said he's proud that he's never had a dispute with a client that led to a Bar complaint.

The controversy over JAABlog has led to its sponsoring organization being excluded from Broward's growing diversity movement.

JAAB had worked with Broward's minority bar coalition to send a letter to Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice R. Fred Lewis following Chief Judge Ross' courtroom comments to minority defendants in March. Although JAAB attended the Miami meeting with Lewis, its members were excluded from subsequent meetings with Ross regarding diversity issues.

Incoming Hispanic Bar President Izquierdo said he "regrets the fact" that his organization co-authored a letter with JAAB. Izquierdo noted that the coalition of voluntary minority bar groups started working to promote diversity in the Broward courts and legal profession long before the blog was created.

As long as the blog is used to attack the judiciary, Izquierdo said he will not work with JAAB.

He said the organization's method of posting public attacks against judges instead of setting up meetings to discuss problems with them is not effective.

In response, JAAB president Craig S. Esquenazi of Fort Lauderdale said, "If we can help them with their goal of effecting change, that's great. If he doesn't want our help, that's OK, too."

Williams, of the Broward Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, also criticized JAAB and its blog. He said his organization could have handled the Judge Greene matter in a "more professional way." It would have been better, he said, to have the minority bar and the defense bar sit down with Ross and Greene to discuss the incident.

Michael Ahearn, a criminal defense attorney and former frequent contributor, said the Web site was conceived to expose misconduct but has been ruined by its nasty tone. "There's a slippery slope of negativity," Ahearn said. "The powers that be at JAAB do nothing to moderate it."

Still, Finkelstein, the public defender, credits the blog for making a positive contribution. "Regardless of the truth or falsity, the blog is part of the social conversation in the legal community, the judicial community and the journalistic community," he said.

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Attorney pleads not guilty to DUI for councilwoman

Karla Burton's case unlikely to be resolved before run-off election

In the days following her Feb. 6 drunken driving arrest, a contrite Boulder City Councilwoman Karla Burton said she was "horrified" by her actions and vowed to never drink again.

During her arraignment on Thursday, her attorney entered a not guilty plea on her behalf to a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol.

As a result, her case is unlikely to be resolved before the June 5 run-off election between Burton and challenger Travis Chandler.

Boulder City police arrested Burton at a gas station on U.S. Highway 93 after she failed a field sobriety test.

Police were directed to the location by someone who reported seeing a woman slumped over the steering wheel of her vehicle.

Boulder City Police Chief Thomas Finn said a blood test administered an hour after Burton's arrest showed her blood-alcohol level at 0.287 percent, more than 3 1/2 times the legal limit for driving.

Burton's blood sample also contained traces of a prescription muscle relaxant that is not supposed to be taken with high quantities of alcohol.

The 50-year-old attorney and retired Air Force lieutenant colonel was released into her husband's care within two hours of her arrest, Finn said.

A few days later, Burton admitted to the Review-Journal that she had been drinking that night. "I used terrible judgment, and I'm getting help," she said. "It was my last drink, basically."

A message left for Burton Thursday was not returned.

Her case is being heard in Las Vegas Justice Court, where it was transferred to avoid any potential conflicts of interest in Boulder City.

She did not attend Thursday's arraignment. Her attorney, John Howard, declined to discuss details of the case after the hearing. When asked if he planned to push for a reduced charge against his client he said, "That's what lawyers do."

The case is scheduled for trial Oct. 17.

Burton was elected to the City Council in 2003. In the April 3 primary, she finished second in a 10-candidate race for two seats on the council. First-place finisher Linda Strickland received enough votes to win a council seat outright.

Burton's general election opponent said he has no intention of making a campaign issue of her arrest.

"It's a personal problem she has to sort out. I wish her luck," Chandler said. "That's about all I can say about that."

According to a study by Brown University, a person with a blood-alcohol level of 0.2 percent will generally experience mental confusion and a loss of motor control and may need medical assistance or help moving around. At 0.3 percent, the level at which death can occur from alcohol intoxication, a person generally has "minimum conscious control of mind and body" and needs hospitalization, the study said.

In Nevada, the legal limit for driving is 0.08 percent.

There is no truth to any rumor she is friends with Elvis or Ralph, both of whom have been recently seen in Boulder City.

San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you. http://www.SanDiegoDUI.com FREE SAN DIEGO DUI "EVALUATION FORM" http://www.sandiegodui.com/survey.html


http://www.sandiegodui.com


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San Diego DUI Lawyer - San Diego Attorney Drunk Driving / San Diego DWI Lawyer can help you beat the charge: http://www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com .



San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you.


San Diego DUI Lawyer - San Diego Attorney Drunk Driving / San Diego DWI Lawyer can help you beat the San Diego drunk driving charge: http://www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com .


San Diego DUI Lawyer - San Diego Attorney Drunk Driving / San Diego DWI Lawyer can help you beat the charge:


San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller, a San Diego Drunk Driving / DWI Defense Attorney handling San Diego California DUI & DMV cases, shows how a San Diego DUI Lawyer will help you. http://www.SanDiegoDUI.com San Diego DUI Lawyer Rick Mueller is the Top-Rated San Diego County Drunk Driving, DUI & DMV Defense attorney with over 23 years of experience. Known as the "DMV Guru," Rick Mueller dedicates 100% of his law practice to aggressively defending those accused of driving under the influence of alcohol. He has successfully saved the driving privileges of many clients in the past year alone. Complete the important Free San Diego County Drunk Driving Defense Survey to find out your best strategy and to protect your driving privileges in California.

Q. What is one of the best possible things you San Diego California DUI drivers can do to help to stop San Diego California DUI Police from making so many San Diego California drunk driving arrests?

The San Diego DUI answer comes from our lucky friends across the ocean.

From the State where drink driving is considered a sport, comes a true story from Carrick-on-Suir Ireland.

Recently a routine Gardai patrol parked outside a local neighbourhood tavern. Late in the evening the Garda noticed a man leaving the bar so intoxicated that he could barely walk.

The man stumbled around the car park for a few minutes, with the Garda quietly observing.

After what seemed an eternity and trying his keys on five vehicles, the man managed to find his car which he fell into. He was there for a few minutes as a number of other patrons left the bar and drove off.

Finally he started the car, switched the wipers on and off (it was a fine dry night), flicked the indicators on, then off, tooted the horn and then switched on the lights.

He moved the vehicle forward a few cm, reversed a little and then remained stationary for a few more minutes as some more vehicles left.

At last he pulled out of the car park and started to drive slowly down the road.

The Garda, having patiently waited all this time, now started up the patrol car, put on the flashing lights, promptly pulled the man over and carried out a Breathalyzer test.

To his amazement theBreathalyzer indicated no evidence of the man having consumed alcohol at all!

Dumbfounded, the Garda said "I'll have to ask you to accompany me to the Police station this Breathalyzer equipment must be broken."

"I doubt it," said the man, "tonight I'm the designated decoy".

True story...



http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

http://www.google.com

http://www.sandiegoduihelp.com/duiblog/index.html

http://www.yahoo.com

THE DRIVER LICENSE COMPACT
(Guidelines for Motor Vehicle Administrators)
Administrative
Procedures
Manual 1994
U.S. Department of Transportation
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
in cooperation with the
Executive Committee of the Driver License Compact Commission
and
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
Original Publication Date: 1990 (Revised April, 1994)
PREFACE
The Driver License Compact (DLC) is a major step necessary to maximize law
enforcement efforts against drunk drivers and other serious traffic offenders. Serious
offenses such as drunk driving, vehicle manslaughter, reckless driving, etc., are
no less serious when committed in some other jurisdiction than when committed in
the driver’s home State.
The Driver License Compact Commission membership consists of the Compact
Administrator, or his designee, from each jurisdiction that is party to the Compact.
The Executive Committee of the Commission is charged with directing and supervising
the affairs, committees, and publications of the Commission; promoting its
objectives; and supervising disbursement of its funds. The American Association of
Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) serves as the Secretariat.
The information presented in this Administrative Procedures Manual expands upon
the previously published operations manual of the Driver License Compact.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This publication is the result of a joint effort between the Executive Committee of
the Driver License Compact Commission and staff of AAMVA and NHTSA. We wish
to express thanks to the Commission members who so generously donated their
time and efforts in their review and preparation of the revised administrative
procedures presented herein.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii
1.0. GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1. Purpose 1
1.2. The Driver License Compact 1
1.3. Definitions 4
2.0. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLIANCE
2.1. Issuance of a License
2.1.1. Application 5
2.1.2. Surrender of License 5
2.1.3. Affidavit of Non-Licensure 6
2.1.4. Verification of Status 6
2.1.5. NDR/CDLIS Check 6
2.1.6. Who Shall Not Be Licensed 7
2.2. Notification and Exchange of Records
2.2.1. Notice to Prior Jurisdiction of Residence 8
2.2.1.1. Manual Transmission
2.2.1.2. Electronic Transmission
2.2.1.3. Destruction Agreements
2.2.1.4. Affidavits
2.2.2. Action Upon Receipt of Notification 9
2.2.2.1. Determination of Prior Record
2.2.2.2. Record Entry Upon Notification
2.2.2.3. No Existing Record
2.3. Driver History Record
2.3.1. Form of Record 9
2.3.2. Data Transmitted 10
2.3.3. Length of History 10
2.3.4. Inclusions of Prior History 10
2.3.5. Timeliness 10
2.3.6. Heading 10
2.3.7. Certification 10
ii
Page
2.4 Reports of Conviction
2.4.1. Conviction Reports Required 11
2.4.2. Timeliness 11
2.4.3. Form of Report 11
2.4.4 Data Content 11
2.5 Administrative Actions
2.5.1. Adverse Actions 12
2.5.1.1. Supporting Documentation
2.5.1.2. Action Upon Receipt of Notification
2.5.2 Timeliness 12
2.6 Clearances
2.6.1. Clearance Required 12
2.6.2. When States Shall Issue Clearance 13
2.7. Withdrawals and Restorations
2.7.1. NDR Notification Required 13
2.7.2. Timeliness 13
2.7.3. Content of Notices 13
3.0. FORMS USED FOR COMPLIANCE
3.1. Formats for Manual Transmission
3.1.1. Affidavit of Non-Licensure (See 2.1.3.) 14
3.1.2. Transmittal of Licensure (See 2.2.1.1.) 14
3.1.3. Clearance Form (See 2.5.) 14
3.1.4. Conviction Report (See 2.4.) 15
3.1.5. Statement of Withdrawal/Reinstatement (See 2.7.) 15
3.2 Format for Electronic Transmission
3.2.1. Driver History Record 15
3.2.2. Conviction Report 15
3.2.3. Withdrawals/Restorations 15
4.0. BYLAWS OF THE DRIVER LICENSE COMPACT COMMISSION AND
NONRESIDENT VIOLATOR’S COMPACT 16
APPENDICES:
A. Model Legislation 22
B. Notice of Confirmation 24
C. Definitions 25
D. Formats 27
E. Compact History 30
iii
DRIVER LICENSE COMPACT
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES MANUAL
1.0. GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1. Purpose
The information presented in this Administrative Procedures Manual should provide greater
uniformity among the member jurisdictions when exchanging information with other
members on convictions, records, licenses, withdrawals, and other data pertinent to the
licensing process. Uniformity should ease administrative costs consistent with the concept
which forms the basic tenet within the agreement that each driver, nationwide, have only
one driver license and one driver record.
1.2. The Driver License Compact
ARTICLE 1
FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY-
(1) The party States find that:
(a) The safety of their streets and highways is materially affected by the degree
of compliance with state laws and local ordinances relating to the operation of
motor vehicles;
(b) Violation of such a law or ordinance is evidence that the violator engages in
conduct which is likely to endanger the safety of persons and property;
(c) The continuance in force of a license to drive is predicated upon compliance
with laws and ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles, in
whichever jurisdiction the vehicle is operated.
(2) It is the policy of each of the party states to:
(a) Promote compliance with the laws, ordinances, and administrative rules and
regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles by their operators in each of
the jurisdictions where such operators drive motor vehicles;
(b) Make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility therefore
more just and equitable by considering the overall compliance with motor vehicle
laws, ordinances, and administrative rules and regulations as condition precedent
to the continuance or issuance of any license by reason of which the licensee is
authorized or permitted to operate a motor vehicle in any of the party states.
1
ARTICLE II
DEFINITIONS—As used in this compact:
(1) “State” means a state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(2) “Home state” means the state which has issued and has the power to suspend or
revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.
(3) “Conviction” means a conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a
motor vehicle which is prohibited by state law, municipal ordinance, or administrative
rule or regulation, or a forfeiture of bail, bond, or other security deposited to
secure appearance by a person charged with having committed any such offense,
and which conviction or forfeiture is required to be reported to the licensing authority.
ARTICLE III
REPORTS OF CONVICTION—The licensing authority of a party state shall report each
conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the
licensing authority of the home state of the licensee. Such report shall clearly identify the
person convicted; describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code, or
ordinance violation; identify the court in which action was taken; indicate whether a plea
of guilty or not guilty was entered or the conviction was a result of the forfeiture of bail,
bond, or other security; and shall include any special findings made in connection therewith.
ARTICLE IV
EFFECT OF CONVICTION—
(1) The licensing authority in the home state, for the purpose of suspension, revocation,
or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to
the conduct reported, pursuant to Article III, as it would if such conduct had occurred
in the home state, in the case of convictions for:
(a) Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor
vehicle;
(b) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or a
narcotic to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor
vehicle;
(c) Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used; or
(d) Failure to stop and render aid in the event of a motor vehicle accident
resulting in the death or personal injury of another.
2
(2) As to other convictions, reported pursuant to Article III, the licensing authority in the
home state shall give such effect to the conduct as is provided by the laws of the
home state.
(3) If the laws of a party state do not provide for offenses or violations denominated or
described in precisely the words employed in subdivision (a) of this article, such
party state shall construe the denomination and description appearing in subdivision
(a) hereof as being applicable to and identifying those offenses or violations of
a substantially similar nature, and the laws of such party state shall contain such
provisions as may be necessary to ensure that full force and effect is given to this
article.
ARTICLE V
APPLICATIONS FOR NEW LICENSES—Upon application for a license to drive, the licensing
authority in a party state shall ascertain whether the applicant has ever held, or is the
holder of, a license to drive issued by any other party state. The licensing authority in the
state where application is made shall not issue a license to drive to the applicant if:
(1) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been suspended by
reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such suspension period has not
terminated.
(2) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been revoked by reason, in
whole or in part, of a violation and if such revocation has not terminated, except
that after the expiration of one year from the date the license was revoked, such
person may make application for a new license if permitted by law. The licensing
authority may refuse to issue a license to any such applicant if, after investigation,
the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to such person the
privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways.
(3) The applicant is the holder of a license to drive issued by another party state and
currently in force unless the applicant surrenders such license.
ARTICLE VI
APPLICABILITY OF OTHER LAWS—Except as expressly required by provisions of this compact,
nothing contained herein shall be construed to effect the right of any party state to
apply any of its other laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance, nor
to invalidate or prevent any driver license agreement or other cooperative arrangement
between a party state and nonparty state.
ARTICLE VII
COMPACT ADMINISTRATOR AND INTERCHANGE OF INFORMATION—
(1) The head of the licensing authority of each party state shall be the administrator of
this compact for his state. The administrators, acting jointly, shall have the power to
formulate all necessary and proper procedures for the exchange of information
under this compact.
3
(2) The administrator of each party state shall furnish to the administrator of each other
party state any information or documents reasonably necessary to facilitate the
administration of this compact.
ARTICLE VIII
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND WITHDRAWAL—
(1) This compact shall enter into force and become effective as to any state when it
has enacted the same into law.
(2) Any party state may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing
the same, but no such withdrawal shall take effect until 6 months after the executive
head of the withdrawing state has given notice of the withdrawal to the
executive heads of all other party states. No withdrawal shall affect the validity or
applicability by the licensing authorities of states remaining party to the compact of
any report of conviction occurring prior to the withdrawal.
ARTICLE IX
CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY—This compact shall be liberally construed so as to
effectuate the purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable; and if
any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to
the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any
government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder
of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or
circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the
constitution of any state party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as
to remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable
matters.
1.3. Definitions
The definitions appearing in Article II of the compact are used throughout the procedures
manual and will remain as defined in that section. In addition, the following definitions are
to be applied:
1.3.1. “Withdrawal” means that the licensee’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle
has been withdrawn from that person by a state licensing authority. The withdrawal
can be the result of a suspension, revocation, or cancellation.
1.3.2. “Commercial Driver’s License” means a license issued by a State or jurisdiction,
in accordance with the standards contained in 49 CFR Part 383, to an individual
to operate a class of a commercial vehicle.
1.3.3. “Hazardous Materials” means any substance or material which has been
determined by the secretary of the United States Department of Transportation to
be capable of imposing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property. This
term also includes hazardous waste.
4
1.3.4. “Notification” means that a document has been sent from one jurisdiction to
another notifying anyone receiving the information of the withdrawal of the driving
privilege or the restoration of the privilege.
1.3.5. “Violation,” as used in Article V of the Compact, means the commission of an
offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle, even if there has been
no conviction. A suspension by reason of a violation includes a suspension for failure
to appear in court or comply with a court order or suspension for violating an
implied consent law.
1.3.6. “Administrative Actions” means actions by an agency responsible for the
licensing of drivers which removes the driving privilege from an individual through
the issuance of either a suspension or revocation order. These actions generally are
not statutorily mandated but are discretionary with the agency. Examples of such
actions are refusals to submit to breath, blood or urine tests; suspensions for violation
of a set amount of alcoholic content in the blood; medical suspensions; suspensions
for being incapable to operate a motor vehicle and suspensions for failing to
comply with agency directives.
2.0 PROCEDURES FOR COMPLIANCE
2.1 Issuance of a License
2.1.1. Application
An application form is required of every person who requests the issuance of a
driver license in order to create a record for that individual. In order to prevent
licensure by more than one state, the application form should contain the following
or similar language.
Do you have in your possession or under your control a valid driver license issued by
this or any other state?
If “yes”, where was it issued?
Date of expiration?
Type or class of license?
Driver license number?
Have you had a driver license, permit or privilege to operate a motor vehicle
suspended, revoked or canceled or an application for a license denied in this state
or elsewhere?
If “Yes”, has your license, permit or privilege been restored or your application for a
license denied in this state or elsewhere?
2.1.2. Surrender of License
An applicant shall be required to surrender any and all valid driver licenses issued to
the applicant by any other state.
5
2.1.3. Affidavit of Non-Licensure (See Section 3.1.1.)
If an applicant has no license to surrender or states that he/she has never held a
driver license, or does not now have a license in his/her possession or under his/her
control, that applicant shall submit a notarized or certified statement attesting to
the fact that he/she has never been licensed in any jurisdiction, or otherwise does
not have a license to surrender.
This affidavit should contain language which identifies the situation, a heading
identifying the jurisdiction issuing a license, the prior jurisdiction from which the
applicant has moved, the signature of the applicant, and the signature of the
examiner attesting to the applicant’s statement and a statement of warning
concerning penalties for making false statements. It is the responsibility of the issuing
jurisdiction to conduct any further inquiry or investigation prior to the issuance of a
license. The issuing jurisdiction may deny the applicant a license based upon their
investigation. NOTE: This requirement would not be applicable to those persons
under 18 years of age whom the examiner believes would have never held a
license.
2.1.4. Verification of Status
Upon application for a driver license, the issuing jurisdiction shall check with other
jurisdictions to obtain the status of the applicant’s driving privilege. At a minimum, a
check must be done with the last jurisdiction of issuance. To the extent possible and
practical, these checks should be accomplished electronically, via a telecommunications
network; such as NLETS or AAMVAnet.
2.1.5. NDR/CDLIS Check
2.1.5.1. The issuing jurisdiction shall check the National Driver Register
(NDR) to determine if an applicant has been reported to the NDR by another
jurisdiction. Simultaneously or immediately after the NDR check, if the applicant is
applying for a commercial driver license, a further check will be made with the
Clearinghouse established to support the Commercial Driver License Issuance
System (CDLIS), to determine if the applicant has been issued a commercial driver
license by any other state. If the check is not done at the time of license application,
it shall be done within 30 days of the application. Appropriate mechanisms
shall be in place to prevent the issuance of a permanent driver license if the results
of the NDR check indicate that the applicant’s license has been suspended,
revoked, or withdrawn in another jurisdiction.
2.1.5.2. If the CDLIS check indicates a commercial license has been
issued to an applicant, appropriate actions shall be taken to secure that license,
notify the issuing state and the Clearinghouse of the new status, and issue the new
license in accordance with the former license in accordance with the former
license classification unless or until new examinations are given.
2.1.5.3. An exception to issuance of a license to an individual may take
place when the person has the commercial operating privilege withdrawn/disqualified
and applies for a license to operate non-commercial vehicles. If the commer-
6
cial privilege has been withdrawn in one jurisdiction and an individual is applying for
a driver license in another jurisdiction, that person may be issued a driver license so
long as it does not allow operation of a commercial motor vehicle. In this instance,
however, the privilege to operate non-commercial vehicles must be valid in the
prior jurisdiction.
2.1.6. Who Shall Not Be Licensed
The licensing authority in the jurisdiction where the application is made shall not
issue a license to drive to the applicant if:
2.1.6.1. The applicant’s driving privilege is suspended or revoked in
whole or in part as a result of a violation of one of the following. Such violations
are not limited to those listed.
Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor
vehicle.
Driving under the influence of Alcohol/Drugs (DUI).
Felony in which a motor vehicle is used.
Leaving the scene of an accident or failure to stop and render aid at a
personal injury accident or fatal accident.
2.1.6.2. The applicant’s license has been suspended, by reason, in
whole or in part, of a violation and such suspension period has not terminated.
2.1.6.3. The applicant’s license has been revoked, by reason, in whole
or in part, of a violation and such revocation period has not terminated,
except that after the expiration of one year from the date the license was
revoked, such person may make application for a new license if permitted
by the laws of the state in which the application is being made.
2.1.6.4. The licensing authority determines that, under the laws and/or
regulations of the issuing jurisdiction, the applicant has habitually violated
vehicle and traffic laws. Such applicant may reapply for a license in a time
frame consistent with the laws and regulations of the issuing state, provided
that the applicant is eligible to be reinstated in the prior licensing jurisdiction
or the jurisdiction in which the driving privilege has been suspended or
revoked.
2.1.6.5. The licensing authority may refuse to issue a license to any
applicant if, after investigation, such as a review of the driver history record of
another state, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to
grant to the applicant the privilege to drive on its public streets and highways.
This refusal may result from the applicant’s driver history record containing
violations, restrictions, medical indicators, and/or incidents which
would have resulted in a current suspension, revocation, or restriction had
the violations, conditions, and/or incidents occurred in the jurisdiction of the
current licensing authority.
7
2.1.6.6. The exception specified in 2.1.5.3. has a suspension, revocation,
or cancellation of the basic driving privilege appearing in his driver history
record. The applicant may be licensed if his commercial privilege has been
withdrawn but the underlying privilege remains valid.
2.1.6.7. This section shall be liberally construed by an issuing authority so
as to give the greatest force and effect to the promotion of highway safety.
2.2. Notification and Exchange of Records
2.2.1. Notice to Prior Jurisdiction of Residence
Each issuing jurisdiction shall notify all other jurisdictions in which the applicant is
currently licensed. This may be done in one or two ways, either manually or electronically.
Regardless of the method of inquiry used to request transmittal of a
record, the surrendered license, or an affidavit, must be returned to the former
state, except as outlined in 2.2.1.2. and 2.2.1.3.
2.2.1.1. Manual Transmission
All driver licenses or affidavits surrendered by an applicant when applying for
a driver license in a new jurisdiction shall be returned to the jurisdiction that
issued the license. These licenses may be returned by U.S. Postal Service or
by other means and may be in a local issuing office or in a centralized
location, but in no case should the accumulation exceed one calendar
month. The returned licenses shall be accompanied by a form (3.1.2.) which
states the name and address of the jurisdiction returning the license and may
contain a statement requesting transmission of the existing record to the new
jurisdiction.
2.2.1.2. Electronic Transmission
In lieu of manually transmitting licenses or affidavits, a jurisdiction may electronically
notify the previous jurisdiction of the issuance of a license and
request transmission of the existing driver history record. Such electronic
notification shall include the following information: name, state of issuance,
driver license number, sex, date of birth and social security number (if available),
as well as an indicator for transmission of the driver history record and
the state to which the record will be transmitted.
2.2.1.3. Destruction Agreements
While surrendered licenses should as a rule be returned to the issuing jurisdiction,
there may be occasions when they should be destroyed by shredding
or cutting rather than being returned. This can occur when two jurisdictions
have entered into an agreement to destroy one another’s licenses rather
than returning them to the former state of licensure.
2.2.1.4. Affidavits
Affidavits of non-licensure in accordance with Section 2.1.3. may take the
place of surrendered licenses.
8
9
2.2.2. Action Upon Receipt of Notification
2.2.2.1. Determination of Prior Record
When any jurisdiction receives from another jurisdiction a surrendered driver
license, affidavit or electronic request, the jurisdiction shall determine if a
driver history record exists for the individual named. If a record containing
history is located, that record shall be sent to the jurisdiction from which the
notification was received. If a record contains no driver history, it need not
be sent in a manual transmission; however, some indication of receipt of the
request and the existence of a record shall be returned through electronic or
manual means. The manual transmission could be a listing rather than an
individual record. Notification of receipt of a request must be sent to the
requesting state within 30 days of receipt of request.
2.2.2.2. Record Entry Upon Notification
Upon receipt from another jurisdiction of a notification, a jurisdiction shall
enter into its record the name of the jurisdiction where the person is now
licensed and the date of entry of the notation.
2.2.2.3. No Existing Record
Upon receipt from another jurisdiction of a notification, and a review of
existing records indicates that a record for that person does not exist, a
report will be sent to the requesting jurisdiction that no record exists. This may
be in a form or format as desired by the sending jurisdiction, but shall be
provided regardless of whether the request was in manual or electronic form.
2.3 Driver History Record
Each jurisdiction shall maintain individual records for those persons to whom it has issued a
driver license of any kind. This record, as described in 2.3.2., should contain basic information
sufficient to identify the person to whom the license was issued as well as information
concerning driver capabilities or problems. Accident involvement and convictions of
traffic offenses should also be a part of such a record. Additional data, such as medical
information, communications, notations, or other convenient or required information may
be a part of this record as desired by the issuing jurisdiction. This record may be in manual
or in automated fashion as dictated by the jurisdiction maintaining the record.
2.3.1. Form of Record
While each jurisdiction may keep their records in whatever form or fashion they
desire, certain data is required when manually transmitting a driver history record to
another jurisdiction. This data will include the name of the state sending the data
and identification of the Bureau, Office, Department, or Division responsible for
maintaining the driver history record. No codes shall be used and all information
should be printed in English language. Standard abbreviations shall be in accordance
with ANSI D-20 standards. When electronic transmission of records takes
place, the ANSI D-20 data elements and proposed amendments which constitute
the CDLIS driver history record shall be used. (See Section 3.2. for format).
2.3.2. Data Transmitted
The data transmitted shall be in accordance with the latest version of the AAMVA
standard for driver record history.
2.3.3. Length of History
Data transmitted shall include all activity occurring within ten years immediately
preceding the date of request. If ten years of history is not available, all available
data shall be transmitted. If desired, data for a period longer than ten years may
be included, but the minimum time period is ten years for specified convictions and
three years for all other convictions and for accidents. Specified convictions are
manslaughter or negligent homicide, DUI, reckless driving, hit and run, failure to stop
and render aid, and any felony in which a motor vehicle is used. When computing
the time period for transmitting history information on convictions for traffic related
information on convictions for traffic related offenses, the conviction date shall be
used.
2.3.4. Inclusion of Prior History
The jurisdiction currently licensing the individual shall, within thirty days of receipt of
the driver history record of the prior state, enter information from the prior record
onto its record for that individual. Any data received on convictions of traffic
offenses, accidents, suspensions or revocations within the past ten years shall be
placed in the new record, consistent with Section 2.3.3. All other data received
may or may not be included in the new record at the option of the receiving
jurisdiction. The data should be retained as a part of the driver history as if it were
an offense committed in the home jurisdiction.
2.3.5. Timeliness
Upon receipt of a surrendered license or affidavit, the former state of residence
should respond by sending its record to the new state of residence within thirty
days.
2.3.6. Heading
Any record transmitted from one jurisdiction to another shall have a proper heading
so as to identify the sending jurisdiction. This heading shall not only identify the
jurisdiction by name but shall also contain the name of the department or agency
responsible for maintaining and supplying the record. The date the record was
printed shall either be a part of the heading or shall be included as a part of the
record itself.
2.3.7. Certification
Certification applies only to manually transmitted records. Any record manually
transmitted from one jurisdiction to another shall be certified in some manner. This
certification may be in the form of a machine imprint at the time the form was
printed, through a rubber stamp imprint, an original signature of the custodian of
records of the sending jurisdiction, affixing of the seal of the jurisdiction, or by any
other means in common usage. When transmitting records electronically, authenti-
10
cation codes will be used so as to verify transmission from a sending jurisdiction.
2.4 Reports of Conviction
2.4.1. Conviction Reports Required
Each jurisdiction shall report each conviction of a person from another jurisdiction
occurring within its boundaries to the home jurisdiction of the licensee.
2.4.2. Timeliness
Each jurisdiction shall report each conviction to the home jurisdiction of the licensee
within fifteen days after receiving a report of the conviction from a court.
2.4.3. Form of Report
The form of the report of conviction may be any of the following:
2.4.3.1. A copy of the abstract of court record.
2.4.3.2. A copy of the traffic citation showing final disposition.
2.4.3.3. Any paper document, magnetic medium, or electronic transmission
which contains the minimum data described in section 2.4.4.
2.4.4. Data Content
Each report sent to a jurisdiction shall clearly identify the report as a report of
conviction and identify the jurisdiction that is the source of the report. If the report is
other than an abstract of court record, all data elements must meet applicable
ANSI D-20 standards. Data for each conviction shall:
2.4.4.1. Clearly identify the person convicted. Minimum data requirements
are, name, address, sex, date of birth, driver license number, and any
available identifying number, such as social security number.
2.4.4.2. Describe the violation. Data shall include the section of the
statute, code or ordinance violated along with a common English language
description of the offense and coded in accordance with ANSI D-20.
2.4.4.3. Identify the court in which action was taken.
2.4.4.4. Specify year, month and day of both the arrest and the conviction.
2.4.4.5. Indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was entered, or
the conviction was a result of the forfeiture of bail, bond or other security;
and include any special findings made in connection therewith.
2.4.4.6. Indicate whether the violation was committed in a commercial
motor vehicle.
11
2.4.4.7. Indicate whether the violation was committed in a motor
vehicle carrying hazardous materials.
2.5. Administrative Acts
2.5.1. Adverse Actions
All adverse administrative actions and decisions by a jurisdiction other than the
home jurisdiction of the licensee should be forwarded to the home jurisdiction.
2.5.1.1. If an administrative suspension has been enforced on a licensee,
all documentation supporting that act must be forwarded to the
home jurisdiction. This includes the details of the law enforcement officer’s
stop, the results of the breath, blood, or urine test or the refusal to take the
test, the results of any hearing held, the license confiscated, the order issued,
and any other relevant information or documents.
2.5.1.2. Upon receipt of documentation reflecting administrative
actions, the home jurisdiction should take action against the licensee in
accordance with its own laws just as though the act causing the administrative
action took place within its own borders.
2.5.2. Administrative actions of the driver licensing authority in one jurisdiction
should precipitate action taken by the home licensing jurisdiction of the licensee.
2.6. Clearances
2.6.1. Clearance Required
No jurisdiction shall issue a driver license to any person identified in any of the
situations outlined below until the issuing jurisdiction receives a clearance from the
jurisdiction which had previously withdrawn the driving privilege.
2.6.1.1. Any driver who, at the time of application discloses that his or
her driving privilege has been withdrawn as a result of a traffic violation by
another jurisdiction, and whose privilege has not been restored.
2.6.1.2. Any driver reported by the National Driver Register as having his
or her driving privilege currently withdrawn by another jurisdiction as a result
of a traffic violation.
2.6.1.3. Any driver for whom a notification has been received from
another jurisdiction as outlined in Section 2.1.4. and 2.2. of this manual,
indicating that the privilege of such driver has been withdrawn as a result of
a traffic violation.
2.6.1.4. Any driver who, at the time of application, discloses or is determined
to be under suspension for failure to satisfy the judgment of a court
having civil jurisdiction over findings of liability arising out of an accident
involving a motor vehicle.
12
2.6.2. When States Shall Issue Clearance
2.6.2.1. A state shall issue a clearance for a person whose driving
privilege has been withdrawn and who no longer lives in the state if the
person meets all reinstatement requirements, including payment of reinstatement
or restoration fees.
2.6.2.2. If the sole reason for continued withdrawal of the driving
privilege is the failure of the person to complete one or more of the items in
2.6.2.3., the state shall issue a clearance if the person presents satisfactory
evidence that a legitimate change of residency has occurred and the driver
is eligible for a license from the licensing authority in the new state of residence.
2.6.2.3. The procedure in 2.6.2.2. applies to the following reinstatement
requirements:
1. Vision, knowledge or behind the wheel tests,
2. Remedial school or training,
3. Medical, alcohol or other evaluation, and
4. If allowed under state law, to waive the SR-22 filing requirement.
2.6.2.4. Exception: A state shall not be required to issue a clearance if
an evaluation performed in the new state of residence as provided in 2.6.2.2.
indicates that the person is not fit to drive safely.
2.7 Withdrawals and Restorations
2.7.1. NDR Notification is Required
Jurisdictions shall notify the NDR of all license withdrawals as a result of traffic violations
or physical or mental disabilities (suspensions or revocations), license restorations
(reinstatements), and rescissions of prior withdrawal actions.
2.7.2. Timeliness
Notification of withdrawal or restoration shall be reported to the NDR within fifteen
days after the driving privilege is withdrawn or restored.
2.7.3. Content of Notices
Notification required under this section shall contain at a minimum the following:
2.7.3.1. The clear identity of the driver involved, including but not
limited to the following: name, sex, date of birth, driver license number, and
if available, the social security number.
2.7.3.2. The date of the withdrawal.
2.7.3.3. The date of actual restoration of privilege, when that date
occurs.
13
2.7.3.4. A clear identification of the reason for withdrawal, including but
not limited to the codes utilized by the NDR.
NOTE: Once the NDR’s Problem Driver Pointer System has been implemented by the States, substantive data
related to a license withdrawal (reason for withdrawal, date of withdrawal, etc.) will no longer be reported
to the NDR.
3.0 FORMS USED FOR COMPLIANCE
3.1 Formats for Manual Transmission
3.1.1. Affidavit of Non-Licensure (See 2.1.3.)
(A notarized statement)
3.1.2. Transmittal of Licensure (See 2.2.1.1.)
(Sample Appendix D - Formats)
3.1.3. Clearance Form (See 2.6.)
(Sample Appendix D - Formats)
3.1.3.1. General
Clearances commonly replace the surrender of a driver’s license upon a
change in residency. Clearances take on an appearance through typewritten
letters, teletype messages, phone calls, and form letters.
A clearance in any form should be treated in the same way the actual
surrender of a license is treated. The authorization to license a driver should
also enable the new licensing jurisdiction to substantially decide whether or
not to grant a license based on the record in your jurisdiction. While it is
recognized the clearance form may take a minute to complete, the information
is crucial to the new licensing jurisdiction to determine eligibility.
3.1.3.2. Form Content
The draft clearance form is designed for requesting and submitting information
for both jurisdictions. It can be easily completed by hand, or adapted to
a PC program. Some agencies may prefer to type them. The data categories
provide a detailed summary of the person’s driving record, and if suspended
or revoked, what is needed for reinstatement.
3.1.3.3. Purpose
To ensure consistency and uniformity among jurisdictions to determine if a
license is authorized for a new resident. Universal use of this form can simplify
the screening process completed by hundreds of state employees nationwide.
3.1.3.4. Procedure
Always require the driver to surrender the driver’s license or accept only the
attached clearance form. If a state accepts phone clearances, the same
14
information should be recorded by the caller on the form and become a
part of the state’s records.
Treat the clearance as a license surrender. Update your records and generate
a notice to the previous state of record of a change in residency and
license status.
Investigate and communicate between jurisdictions for any “no record”
responses.
3.1.4. Conviction Report (See 2.4.)
(Sample Appendix D - Formats)
3.1.4.1. Article III requires each jurisdiction to report convictions. Data
specified by the Compact as necessary to effective recordkeeping includes:
*Identity of the person convicted.
*Description of the violation.
*Identity of the court.
*Any special findings.
3.1.4.2. Many data elements contained in various states’ conviction
reports are common and it is crucial that states seriously consider minimizing
the amount of information exchanged which is unnecessary and using a
form such as prescribed by the Compact. Use of a standard conviction
report can reduce labor required to extract only critical information to key
into a system, to identify a court, state, etc., and to ensure the conviction is
reportable under the Compact.
3.1.5. Statement of Withdrawal/Reinstatement (See 2.7.)
3.2. Format for Electronic Transmission
3.2.1. Driver History Record
3.2.2. Conviction Report
3.2.3. Withdrawals/Restorations
15
4.0 BYLAWS OF THE DRIVER LICENSE COMPACT AND NONRESIDENT
VIOLATOR’S COMPACT
ARTICLE I
NAME
The name of this Joint Board shall be the Driver License Compact Commission and Nonresident
Violator’s Compact, Executive Board, hereafter referred to as the Board.
ARTICLE II
PURPOSES
The Compacts have been organized for the following purposes:
(1) to administer the provisions of the Driver License Compact and Nonresident
Violator’s Compact as amended, hereafter referred to as the “Compacts”;
(2) to serve as a governing body for the resolution of all matters relating to the operations
of the Compacts;
(3) to recommend revisions to the Compacts that would enhance their objectives,
goals and benefits;
(4) to publish, amend and maintain each operations manual for the Compacts;
(5) to publish, amend and maintain, either as a separate publication or as a part of the
operations manual, a list of Compact Administrators and contact persons;
(6) to provide and promote reasonable and uniform reporting systems between
member jurisdictions;
(7) to promote closer personal contacts between member jurisdictions for the exchange
of information and solution of mutual problems relating to the Compacts;
(8) to recommend the adoption of solutions to mutual problems relating to the Compacts;
(9) to actively solicit the membership of nonparticipating jurisdictions into the Compacts;
and
(10) to assist all nonparticipating jurisdictions in any manner necessary or requested in
obtaining membership in the Compacts.
ARTICLE III
MEMBERSHIP
Section 1 - The Compacts shall be composed of one representative from each member
16
jurisdiction. A member jurisdiction is any jurisdiction that has adopted either compact and
has filed a Resolution of Ratification with the Secretariat. The member jurisdiction shall
appoint the representative and the representative shall serve and be subject to removal in
accordance with the laws or rules and regulations of the member jurisdiction. The representatives
shall be known as the member jurisdiction’s Compact Administrator.
Section 2 - A Compact Administrator may appoint an alternate to perform the Compact
Administrator’s functions. The appointment of an alternate shall be effective when
written notice is given to the Secretariat.
Section 3 - Each member jurisdiction shall have equal rights and privileges and shall be
entitled to one vote.
ARTICLE IV
OFFICERS
Section 1 - The officers of the Board shall consist of a Chair and Vice Chair, each
elected by the Compact membership, and a representative of each of the four regions as
defined by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, each elected by
the members of the respective regions. These six officers, and the immediate past Chair of
the Board, collectively shall compose the Board Executive Committee.
Section 2 - These officers shall hold office for two years with the Region I and Region III
representatives having terms expiring in even years, and Region II and Region IV representatives
having terms expiring in odd years. Any person who replaces an officer during the
term of the office shall serve the remainder of the unexpired term.
Section 3 - Officers of the Board shall be from jurisdictions having membership in both
Compacts.
ARTICLE V
ELECTION OF OFFICERS
Section 1 - Election of officers shall be at the annual meetings of the Compacts.
Section 2 - The nominating committee shall consist of four members, a Chair and three
members, one from each AAMVA region, as appointed by the Chair. After soliciting
suggestions from members who wish to express themselves, the nominating committee,
with two of its members constituting a quorum, shall nominate a candidate for Chair and
Vice Chair. The Chair shall make those nominations known at the annual meetings.
Section 3 - The Chair and Vice Chair shall be elected by the Compact members in
attendance at an annual meeting. The Chair and Vice Chair shall be from different
regions.
Section 4 - Regional representatives shall be nominated by Compact members of the
respective regions and elected by regional Compact members in attendance at an
annual meeting.
17
Section 5 - An officer shall assume office immediately upon election. The Chair and Vice
Chair shall not be elected to the same office for consecutive terms.
ARTICLE VI
VACANCIES
Section I - The Vice Chair shall fill any vacancy in the office of Chair. The Executive
Committee shall then select a new Vice Chair to serve the remainder of the unexpired
term. The new Vice Chair shall be from a region other than that of the Chair.
Section 2 - In event of vacancy in the office of regional representative, the Chair shall,
following consultation with the Compact members of the region, appoint an acting
representative from that region to serve the remainder of the unexpired term.
ARTICLE VII
OFFICER’S DUTIES
Section 1 - The Chair shall be the Executive Board’s chief executive officer and shall
carry out the following duties:
(a) call and preside at all meetings of the Compacts;
(b) call and preside at all meetings of the Executive Committee;
(c) create, appoint and provide direction to all committees;
(d) consult with regional members before appointing interim
regional representatives to existing vacancies;
(e) serve as official spokesman for the Compacts, represent the
Compacts at official meetings and conferences, and conduct
business on behalf of the Compacts;
(f) guide the Secretariat’s work in support of the Compacts;
(g) perform such other duties as may be authorized and appropriate;
and
(h) provide the Compacts an annual report concerning the
activities and the status of the Compacts.
Section 2 - The Vice Chair shall assist the Chair in discharging his duties.
Section 3 - The regional representatives shall carry out the following duties:
(a) to serve as liaisons with members of their respective regions;
(b) to facilitate effective communication with their regions;
(c) to insure that the interests and views of regional members are
considered as the Executive Committee conducts business;
and
(d) to investigate and attempt to resolve compliance disagreements
between jurisdictions within their respective regions.
18
ARTICLE VIII
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Section 1 - The Executive Committee shall be the executive body of the Compacts. As
such, the Executive Committee shall direct and supervise the affairs, committees, and
publications of the Compacts; promote its objectives; and supervise disbursement of its
funds. The Executive Committee may adopt such rules and regulations for the conduct of
its business as shall be deemed appropriate. Specifically, the Executive Committee shall
carry out the following duties:
(a) conduct the business of the Compact between meetings of
the Compacts;
(b) determine general policies during periods between annual
meetings, such policies to be subject to Compact confirmation
at its next annual meeting;
(c) authorize purposes and amounts for which funds of the Compacts
may be expended;
(d) define the duties, approve the contract and reimbursement of
the Secretariat for services to the Compacts;
(e) authorize solicitation for, and receipt of, grants, endowments,
gifts, and all other offers of assistance and cooperation from
appropriate sources;
(f) to have the Secretariat annually audit all accounts of receipts
and expenditures of funds of the Compacts, and to provide
copies of such audit to the Executive Committee members;
(g) act as necessary and appropriate to implement all resolutions
and recommendations adopted by the Compacts at their
meetings;
(h) to research new matters of interest to the Compacts; and
(i) to investigate and attempt to resolve issues dealing with noncompliance
with the Compacts and their operations manual.
Section 2 - The Executive Committee shall meet at least once each calendar year, with
other meetings at such times and places as the Chair may direct. These meetings shall be
held in accordance with the following rules:
(a) the Chair shall give reasonable notice of all meetings called;
(b) members present shall constitute a quorum for the transaction
of business;
(c) voting shall be by members present;
(d) members may vote by mail or telephone conference if the
Chair determines that an issue must be resolved without delay
between meetings; mailing and counting ballots shall be the
Chair’s responsibility or that of the Secretariat, if so directed by
the Chair; and
(e) the minutes of the Executive Committee shall be submitted to
all jurisdictions in each Compact.
19
ARTICLE IX
SECRETARIAT
The Secretariat shall have the following duties:
(1) to maintain a master membership file including names, title, addresses, and
telephone numbers of all Compact Administrators, alternates and operational
contacts; to notify membership of changes;
(2) to maintain all Ratification Resolutions filed by member jurisdictions;
(3) to take and publish minutes of meetings;
(4) to handle correspondence;
(5) to prepare and distribute an annual report of each Compact’s previous
year’s activities, business and financial status;
(6) to receive notification of problems which cannot be resolved by member
jurisdictions, notify all member jurisdictions about the problem and present
the problems at annual meetings for discussion and resolution;
(7) to receive individual interpretations for information and discussion at annual
meetings;
(8) to arrange times and places for annual meetings in cooperation with the
Chair;
(9) to provide information, as requested, from sources expressing interest in
joining the Compacts; and
(10) to perform other duties as may be specified by the Chair, Executive Committee
or other Compact committees.
ARTICLE X
MEETINGS
Section 1 - There shall be at least one meeting held annually. The Chair shall determine
the time, place and date of the annual meeting.
Section 2 - Additional meetings of each Compact may be held as scheduled by the
Chair or at the request, in writing, of thirty percent of the members of the Compact.
Section 3 - General notice of any meeting shall be given at least thirty (30) days prior to
the meeting. The notice shall contain a statement of the purpose and tentative
agenda of the meeting. The agenda shall address each Compact’s issues sepa rately.
Section 4 - Forty percent of the membership of each Compact shall constitute a quorum.
Section 5 - Except as specifically provided for in these bylaws, all matters subject to a
vote shall be decided by a plurality vote of the Compact members.
Section 6 - All meetings of committees, the Board and the membership shall be governed
by Robert’s Rules of Order, Newly Revised, except as otherwise provided herein.
20
ARTICLE XI
FUNDING
Section 1 - The Compact funds shall be maintained in an interest bearing bank account
in the name of the Joint Executive board. All checks and withdrawals shall be signed by
the Secretariat and either the Chair or Vice Chair.
Section 2 - Member jurisdictions shall be assessed annual dues, in an amount to be
approved by the membership, to finance the Compacts and its Secretariat services.
Annual dues will be an itemized part of the jurisdictional dues from AAMVA. Dues for new
members shall not be assessed until the fiscal year following entry into the Compact.
Section 3 - A member jurisdiction shall be considered in good standing when the dues
requirement of such member jurisdiction has been met under terms of these Bylaws. Only
member jurisdictions in good standing shall be entitled to vote and hold office.
ARTICLE XII
AMENDMENTS
Amendment of these Bylaws shall be proposed and submitted to the Chair in
written form. A proposed amendment shall require a two-thirds majority vote of the
membership for adoption. Members shall have thirty (30) days to respond to the amendment,
after the mailing date of the amendment(s) by the Secretariat. A non-response by
a member jurisdiction shall be counted as a “yes” vote for amending the Bylaws.
ARTICLE XIII
DISSOLUTION
In the event either Compact is dissolved, unexpended and unobligated funds
provided by member jurisdictions shall be returned to them in proportion to their contributions.
Any remaining funds from other sources will be given to a non-profit or charitable
organization or organizations having aims and objectives similar to those of the Compact,
as determined by the Executive Committee at that time.
ARTICLE XIV
SEVERABILITY
If either Compact is dissolved by action of its members, by action of the United
States Congress or by any judicial body, the remaining Compact shall have and be given
full force and effect.
21
APPENDIX A
Model Enabling Legislation
LONG FORM
The purpose of the enabling act is to fit the Compact into the existing pattern of law in the
party State. Except for the text of the Compact, which should be identical in all states, the
language of the enabling act may be varied by each enacting state to fit its own law and
policy. Some provision should be made for all matters covered in the model act; other
provisions may be added if they are needed. Material enclosed in brackets should be
replaced by specific language to accomplish the desired purpose.
Suggested Legislation
[Title should conform to state requirements]
Section 1. The Driver License Compact is hereby enacted into law and entered into
with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in and form substantially as follows:
DRIVER LICENSE COMPACT
(At this point insert the exact text of the Driver License Compact as set forth in Section 1.2.
of this Manual. The text of the Compact should be enacted in identical language by all
ratifying states.)
Section 2. As used in the Compact, the term “licensing authority” with reference to this
State, shall mean the [name of appropriate State agency]. Said [agency] shall furnish to
the appropriate authorities to any other party state any information or documents reasonably
necessary to facilitate the administration of articles III, IV, and V of the Compact. [If
provisions of existing law restrict the furnishing of any such materials, sufficient amendment
to them should be made to permit compliance with the letter and the spirit of the Compact.]
Section 3. The Compact administrator provided for in article VII of the Compact shall
not be entitled to any additional compensation on account of his service as such administrator,
but shall be entitled to expenses incurred in connection with his duties and responsibilities
as such administrator, in the same manner as for expenses incurred in connection
with any other duties or responsibilities of his office or employment.
Section 4. As used in the Compact, with reference to this State, the term “executive
head” shall mean the Governor.
Section 5. Any court or any other agency of this State, or a subdivision thereof, which
has jurisdiction to take any action suspending, revoking, or otherwise limiting a license to
drive, shall report any such action and the adjudication upon which it is based to the
[State driver license authority] within [five] days on forms [furnished by] [approved by] the
[State driver license authority].
22
APPENDIX A continued
Section 6. [Use this section to identify specifically those provisions of statute to which the
four items enumerated in article IV(a) are equivalent and which will be given effect within
the purpose of article IV(a) and (c). Also use this section to add additional offenses or
violations, if any, to be given effect under article IV(b).]
Section 7. [This section may be used if it is necessary to amend other statutes to avoid
possible conflict with subdivision (3) of article V.]*
Section 8. [Insert effective date.]
______________________________
*Subdivision (3) of article V applies the “one-license principle” to the issuance of new licenses to applicants
from other States. It provides that a person who holds a valid license in one party State must turn it in before
he may be issued a license by another party State. Problems may arise unless suitable changes are made in
other statutes that might conflict with this subdivision. For example, a person may reside in party state A and
be gainfully employed in party state B. Under the Compact, he may not hold licenses from both States at
the same time. In this situation, a problem would arise if the other statutes of the two party States required
both residents and gainfully employed persons to be licensed.
SHORT FORM
(Title, enacting clause, etc.)
Section 1. The Motor Vehicle Administrator (or other designated official) is authorized
and directed to execute all documents and perform all other acts necessary to enter into
and carry out the provisions of the Driver License Compact.
Section 2. (Use this section to certify to the four requirements for entry into the Compact.
1. State statute must clearly authorize the administrative official/department to
enter into a reciprocal agreement such as the Driver License Compact.
2. State statutes must be in compliance with the four major provisions of the
Compact with no other state statutes in conflict with any Compact provisions.
a. One license,
b. One record,
c. Uniform and predictable treatment of drivers, and
d. Exchange of driver record information.
3. An official letter, preferably in the form of a state attorney general's opinion,
must be submitted attesting to provisions 1 and 2 just mentioned.
4. The state indicates, in written agreement, its intention to comply with all
provisions of the Driver License Compact.)
Section 3. (Insert effective date.)
23
APPENDIX B
NOTICE OF CONFIRMATION
WHEREAS, The Driver License Compact was formed to provide means through which
the several jurisdictions may participate in a reciprocal program to effectuate the stated
policies and purposes of the Compact, and
WHEREAS, authority to enter the Compact is contained in Public Law 85-684 (The
Beamer Resolution), and
WHEREAS, the Compact will serve to mutually benefit the residents, and the operation
of government in the party jurisdictions.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual and reciprocal benefits to flow
therefrom, and pursuant to the authority contained in: (insert statutory cite of authority)
the “Driver License Compact” is hereby confirmed.
FURTHER PROVIDED that the desired date of entry is */was ____________, 19____, and
FURTHER PROVIDED that this jurisdiction agrees to comply with the terms and provisions
of the Compact.
Authority for administration of this Compact within this jurisdiction is vested in the
office of________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
DATED: _________________, 19 ____
For the State/Province of_________________________________________________________
NAME________________________________________________________________________________________
TITLE__________________________________________________________________________________________
SIGNATURE_____________________________________________________________________________
*EFFECTIVE DATE OF ENTRY MUST BE AT LEAST 60 DAYS AFTER NOTIFICATION IS GIVEN TO
OTHER COMPACT MEMBERS BY THE SECRETARIAT.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
For Secretariat Use:
Notice Received ____________________ (date)
Notice sent to Compact members __________________(date)
24
APPENDIX C
DEFINITIONS
AAMVA - American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, an organization of State
and provincial officials in the United States and Canada, responsible for the administration
and enforcement of laws pertaining to the motor vehicle and its use.
Conviction - includes the forfeiture of bail deposited to secure a defendant’s appearance
in court, a plea of nolo contendere accepted by the court, the payment of a fine, a
plea of guilty, or a finding of guilt on a traffic-violation charge. Traffic infractions are also
included within this definition for the jurisdictions that have decriminalized their traffic
violations.
Highway safety compact - agreement entered into by States for the express purpose of
resolving mutual problems in interstate highway traffic.
Home State - State that has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the
license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.
Interstate compact - a formal and contractual agreement between two or more States
that may include the U.S. Government as a party; authorized by the Constitution; usually
requires the consent of Congress; enforced by the Supreme Court of the United States;
recognized as taking preeminence over any other ordinary and/or conflicting State
statute.
License revocation - the cancellation of a person’s driver license, not subject to renewal
or restoration except upon application for a new license and action by the motor vehicle
department after the expiration of the applicable period of time.
License suspension - the temporary withdrawal of a person’s driver license, for a specific
period of time designated by the motor vehicle department.
NDR - National Driver Register, a nationwide file of information provided voluntarily by the
States on drivers with licensing sanctions for drunk driving and other serious traffic violations,
that provides State licensing officials with a central index; administered by the Department
of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Restoration - reinstatement of the driving privilege following a suspension or revocation.
Specified offenses - offenses specified in the Compact are universally recognized as
dangerous and subject to the provisions of the DLC:
(1) manslaughter or negligent homicide;
(2) driving while intoxicated;
(3) conviction of a felony in which a motor vehicle was used; and
(4) conviction of failure to stop and render aid in an accident
resulting in death or personal injury (hit and run).
25
APPENDIX C continued
State - State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Withdrawal - suspension or revocation of the driving privilege.
26
APPENDIX D
FORMATS
(3.1.2)
27
(#1)
State of “XXXXXXXXXX”
TRANSMITTAL OF OUT-OF-STATE DRIVER’S LICENSES
The enclosed driver licenses were surrendered by former residents of your state who
have been issued “XXXXXXXXXX” drivers’ licenses.
These licenses are returned to you in accordance with the “one license” principle of the
Interstate Driver License Compact. We would appreciate receiving any existing driving
records including accidents, convictions, revocations, or suspensions on any of these
former residents. Please forward these records to:
Agency Name
Street Address/Box Number
City, State Zip
(#2)
State of “XXXXXXXXXXX”
TRANSMITTAL OF OUT-OF-STATE DRIVER’S LICENSES
The enclosed driver licenses were surrendered by former residents of your state who
have been issued “XXXXXXXXXX” drivers’ licenses.
These licenses are returned to you in accordance with the “one license” principle of the
Interstate Driver License Compact. We would appreciate receiving any existing driving
records including accidents, convictions, revocations, or suspensions on any of these
former residents. If the driver has a “clear record” in your state, it is not necessary to
forward a driving record. We will consider no response to mean the individual has a
clear record. Please forward these records to:
Agency Name
Street Address/Box Number
City, State Zip
APPENDIX D continued (3.1.3)
STATE DRIVERS LICENSE BUREAU
STREET ADDRESS/P.O. BOX #
CITY, STATE, ZIP DATE:
This clearance/status is
valid for 30 days from the
date issued.
DRIVERS LICENSE CLEARANCE/STATUS OF LICENSE
TO:
I am now a resident of ___________________________ and am applying for a
_______________________ drivers license. I request verification of my license status.
PLEASE PROVIDE A CLEARANCE FOR: MAIL CLEARANCE TO:
Name: Last First Middle
License Number
Date of Birth
Address on License
Signature of Applicant
DRIVER RECORD STATUS - FOR USE BY LICENSING OFFICIAL ONLY
Full Name License Expiration
License Number License Type
Date of Birth License Restrictions
Address License Endorsements
STATUS REINSTATEMENT REQUIREMENT(S)
No record of a XXXXXXXXX driver Accident Report
license.
Accident security compliance.
Clear in this state. Not under
suspension/revocation. Financial Responsibility,
SR-22, etc.
Pending suspension/revocation,
action effective______________________. Reinstatement fee of $_____________.
License cancelled. Reason: Other_____________________________.
_____________________________________.
Other_____________________________.
License denied. Reason:
_____________________________________. Official Completing Authorization
Motorcycle qualified only. Address
Other_______________________________. Date
28
29
APPENDIX D continued
(3.1.4)
CONVICTION REPORT
STATE OF
Licensing Agency Address:
Telephone Number:
DRIVER INFORMATION
Name Drivers License # State
Address D.O.B. Sex
City, State, Zip Ht. Wt. Eyes
VEHICLE INFORMATION
Vehicle License # State Year Make
VIOLATION INFORMATION
Citation # Date of Offense Location of Offense
Description of Violation
Court Conviction Date Fine/Not Guilty
APPENDIX E
HISTORY
An interstate compact is a formal and contractual agreement between two or more
States, and may include the U.S. Government as a party. It originated in the colonial
period, and is authorized by the Constitution. Interstate compacts usually require the
consent of Congress, and Congress always has the authority to forbid a compact by
specific enactment. The Supreme Court of the United States enforces interstate compacts,
and recognizes them as taking preeminence over any ordinary and/or conflicting
State statute.* Interstate compacts are enacted into State law in each participating
jurisdiction, usually with identical wording.
Highway safety compacts are agreements entered into by States for the express purpose
of resolving mutual problems in interstate highway traffic. Interstate motor vehicular travel
creates complex problems that may be successfully overcome through the use of interstate
compacts.
In 1958, Congress adopted the Beamer Resolution (Public Law 85-684), which granted
congressional approval in advance to interstate compacts to further highway traffic
safety.
The first major response to the Beamer Resolution came in 1960, when resolutions urging
the formation of the agreement were passed by the Western Interstate Committee on
Highway Policy Problems and the Western Governor’s Conference. The Council of State
Governments then began drafting what would become the Driver License Compact, in
close cooperation with State motor vehicle administrators, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP), the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
(AAMVA), the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, and other national safety organizations.
Assistance and comments on subsequent drafts were provided by legislators from a
variety of States and from the Interstate Compact Committee of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The Driver License Compact became a reality in 1961, when Nevada became the first
State to adopt it. Mississippi entered the DLC in 1962 and the compact became a viable
interstate instrument. Ten additional States joined in 1963, and the number grew to 20 by
1966.
In March 1965, the Board of Directors of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
approved a recommendation that AAMVA serve as the Secretariat for States
participating in the Compact. The Compact States ratified this action.
However, the promotion of the Compact languished for many years. This was overcome
by NHTSA in 1980 when a contract was awarded to the Council of State Governments to
study and provide recommendations on how the Compact should be strengthened. The
primary recommendations from the study were that a Compact Commission should be
organized, bylaws adopted, and long-term funding achieved.
*Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). The Court held that an interstate compact is superior in force to both prior and
subsequent statutory law that is in conflict with the compact.
30
31
APPENDIX E continued
In 1982, NHTSA provided funds to AAMVA to (1) call a meeting of Compact member
States, (2) form a Compact Commission as a governing body along with the officers and
bylaws of that Commission, (3) develop an operations manual, and (4) promote the
Compact among nonmember jurisdictions.
A Driver License Compact Commission (DLCC), made up of motor vehicle administrators
from Compact member States, was established in 1983 to administer the DLC and develop
a long-term plan to increase membership and service.
In 1990, the Executive Boards of both the DLCC and the Nonresident Violator Compact
(NRVC) initiated action to amend both Compacts' Bylaws. The proposed amendment
was aimed at establishing one joint Executive Board that would represent and act for the
membership of both the DLCC and the NRVC. The amendment to the Bylaws was approved
by mail ballot August 1990.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE
Driver License Applicant Identification and Licensing System Security
(1979)
State Medical Advisory Boards and Problem Drinker Drivers
(1986)
Dealing with Drinking Drivers
(1986)
Improved Driver Entry System for Young, Novice Drivers
(1989)
Driver License Examiner Certification Instructor's Lesson Plan
(1985, Revised 1990)
Driver License Examiner Certification Program
(1985, Revised 1990)
Driver License Compact Operations Manual
(1985, Revised 1990)
Nonresident Violator Compact Operations Manual
(1985, Revised 1990)
Administrative Per Se -- Summary of State Forms and Procedures
(1986, Revised 1990)
Comparative Data -- State/Provincial Licensing Systems
(1986, Revised 1990)
Motorcycle Operator Licensing System
(1990)
Model Driver Screening and Evaluation Program
(1992)
ORDER THROUGH:
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA)
4301 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400
Arlington, VA 22203

>

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Although not driving, McNair charged in DUI case



NASHVILLE, Tenn. -- Baltimore Ravens quarterback Steve McNair was charged with driving under the influence Thursday even though police said his brother-in-law was behind the wheel of the pickup registered to the former Tennessee Titan.

Although McNair was just a passenger, he was charged with a misdemeanor under a Tennessee law that prohibits a vehicle owner from letting it be driven by someone who is inebriated.

Police said officer Harold Taylor pulled over McNair's 2003 Dodge pickup just before midnight Wednesday because it was speeding. The driver, 31-year-old Jamie Cartwright, smelled of alcohol, failed a field sobriety test and refused to take a breath alcohol test, police spokesman Don Aaron said.

Cartwright said he was McNair's brother-in-law and acknowledged drinking at least two beers, police said.

The law used to charge McNair doesn't consider whether the vehicle owner was drinking, but only if the driver was impaired. Aaron said Nashville police have used the law to cite 42 other people this year.

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McNair's attorney, Roger May, said he spoke to the player after the arrest.

"Mr. McNair was arrested because of the actions of the driver of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. It had nothing to do with any actions on his part whatsoever. It's totally a derivative arrest," May said.

Ravens president Dick Cass said team officials had talked with McNair and people familiar with the incident. They also have been briefed about Tennessee law.

"We do know that Steve was a passenger in a car he owns that was stopped for speeding," Cass said in a statement. "Steve was not arrested for drinking, or driving the car irresponsibly. There is a court process that will now take place, and Steve will participate in these procedures."

Ravens coach Brian Billick spoke with McNair, and the quarterback issued a statement through the team that he was trying to act responsibly.

"I have to go through the court process now, and I understand that. I was planning to be in Baltimore for most of the remainder of this month to work out with my teammates, and anticipate that I will be doing that," McNair said.

Greg Aiello, an NFL spokesman, said it was too early to determine whether McNair would face any punishment from the league.

"Any law enforcement matter that involves any of our people, we look into it to determine whether there is ultimately any violation of our policies," Aiello said.

McNair was arrested on DUI charges once before in Nashville in May 2003, when he also was charged with illegal gun possession.

After a year of legal wrangling, a judge dismissed those charges, ruling that police didn't have sufficient reason to pull over McNair.

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California Drunk Driving information:

0.01-0.05% Subclinical
Influence/effects usually not apparent or obvious
Behavior nearly normal by ordinary observation
Impairment detectable by special tests

0.03-0.12 Euphoria
Mild euphoria, sociability, talkativeness
Increased self-confidence; decreased inhibitions
Diminished attention, judgment and control
Some sensory-motor impairment
Slowed information processing
Loss of efficiency in critical performance tests

0.09-0.25 Excitement
Emotional instability; loss of critical judgment
Impairment of perception, memory and
comprehension
Decreased sensitory response; increased reaction
time
Reduced visual acuity & peripheral vision; and slow
glare recovery
Sensory-motor incoordination; impaired balance;
slurred speech; vomiting; drowsiness

0.18-0.30 Confusion
Disorientation, mental confusion; vertigo; dysphoria
Exaggerated emotional states (fear, rage, grief, etc)
Disturbances of vision (diplopia, etc.) and of
perception of color, form, motion, dimensions
Increased pain threshold
Increased muscular incoordination; staggering gait;
ataxia
Apathy, lethargy

0.25-0.40 Stupor
General inertia; approaching loss of motor functions
Markedly decreased response to stimuli
Marked muscular incoordination; inability to stand or
walk
Vomiting; incontinence of urine and feces
Impaired consciousness; sleep or stupor

0.35-0.50 Coma
Complete unconsciousness; coma; anesthesia
Depressed or abolished reflexes
Subnormal temperature
Impairment of circulation and respiration
Possible death

0.45+% Death
Death from respiratory arrest



Source:
KURT M. DUBOWSKI, Ph.D., D.A.B.C.C., D.A.B.F.T.
The University of Oklahoma
Department of Medicine


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A Houston man wanted a breathalyzer test during a traffic stop to prove he wasn't driving drunk. But he was denied that, so he complained.

Clarence Archer was driving home from a club with a lady friend when a police officer pulled him over, saying he ran a red light.

"He asked if I'd been drinking," Clarence recalled. "I told him I don't drink. I expressed to him that I've been in sobriety for six years. ... I belong to AA."

The officer asked him to step out of the car, where he failed a field sobriety test even though Clarence says he asked for a full breathalyzer test.

"He said he didn't have the equipment," Clarence told Houston's Eyewitness News.

The officer handcuffed Clarence and his lady friend passenger, had Clarence's car towed and hauled them both to the jail downtown, where Clarence took the full breathalyzer test.

He said, "The test came up that I wasn't drunk, I hadn't been drinking, I was free to go."

Clarence wasn't charged with anything, but because his car was towed from the scene, Clarence says he was charged $189 to get his car out of the lot.

I went to see assistant chief of police Martha Montalvo about Clarence's case. I wasn't questioning the officer's action. My concern was why police cars don't have breathalyzer equipment.

"We did attempt approximately six months ago to obtain the funding for this equipment, but since that time the district attorney's office has stepped forward and offered to assist us in purchasing two of these mobile units," explained Montalvo. "I do sympathize with him and so does the chief sympathize with that, and that is the reason why it's very important to get these mobile units out on the streets for these officers."

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A Wayne Jones Page 1 5/2/2006
PHYSIOLOGY, PHARMACOLOGY, AND TOXICOLOGY OF ALCOHOL
Glossary of Terms - Update 2006
Complied by 1A.W. Jones, B.Sc., Ph.D., D.Sc.
Absorption. This refers to the uptake of a drug (e.g. alcohol) from the site of administration into the blood-stream. The absorption of alcohol occurs by passive diffusion and begins immediately after drinking. For ethanol, absorption starts in the stomach but occurs more rapidly from the upper part of the small intestine (duodenum). When the alcohol molecules reach the portal blood they are transported to the liver and thereafter the heart and peripheral circulation. The rate of absorption depends on many factors, e.g. food in the stomach, type of beverage consumed, anatomy of the gut, gastric emptying rate, concomitant drug use, smoking, time of day etc.
Accreditation. Accreditation of a laboratory is formal recognition by an authorized agency that the analytical laboratory is competent to perform certain measurements or tests.
Accuracy. Is a measure of the closeness of agreement between the result of analysis and the true value of the quantity being measured.
Acetaldehyde. The first product of ethanol metabolism by all known pathways. Acetaldehyde (CH3CHO) is produced in the liver and is a highly toxic and chemically reactive substance.
Acidosis. Too much acid in the blood and body fluids (opposite = alkalosis).
Acute tolerance. The development of tolerance within the course of a single exposure to a drug.
Addictive Drug. The name given to a drug or chemical agent often self-administered usually without a medical prescription, repeatedly and compulsively.
Adulterate. Means to contaminate by addition of another substance or to make impure but still maintain the same appearance as the original, e.g. dilution of drug concentrations in urine by adding another liquid such as water. In connection with the illegal manufacture and sale of illicit drugs, the pure drug e.g., cocaine or heroin is often blended with some other cheap inert substances a process known as “cutting” before being distributed and sold to consumers.
Agonist. An agonist is a chemical substance, drug or other molecule that binds to a receptor to produce an effect or start a sequence of events leading to a physiological response.
Agreement. The extent to which two different tests or two different observers agree with each other when measuring the same thing.
Alcohols. A collective name for a class of organic compounds containing carbon, hydrogen and oxygen and the hydroxyl (-OH) group.
Alcoholism. A primary chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial, and environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations.
Alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH). The enzyme (actually class I ADH) catalyzing the conversion of primary alcohols into aldehydes and secondary alcohols into ketones. Thus, ethanol is oxidized into acetaldehyde and isopropanol becomes acetone.
Aldehyde dehydrogenase (ALDH). The mitochondrial enzyme (very low km) that converts acetaldehyde to acetate.
1 Department of Forensic Genetics and Forensic Chemistry, Artillerigatan 12, Linköping 581 33, Sweden. Tel +46 13 252114, Fax +46 13 104875, e-mail wayne.jones@RMV.se
A Wayne Jones Page 2 5/2/2006
Allele. One or two or more variants of a gene or other DNA sequence. Different alleles of a gene generally serve the same function e.g. code for proteins that determine eye color, but may produce different phenotypes (e.g. blue, green or brown eyes). Some alleles may be defective and produce a protein (e.g. an enzyme) that has no function at all or an abnormal function.
Alveolar. Pertaining to the alveolar sac - the air cells - the site of gas exchange in the lungs.
Alveoli. The alveoli are situated at the extreme ends of the branches of bronchial tree and are the air sacs at the base of the bronchioles where gases and volatile substances such as oxygen and carbon dioxide can enter and leave the pulmonary circulation.
Alveolar air. Alveolar or end-expired air represents that fraction of the exhaled breath remaining after the deadspace region has been ventilated. For determination of alcohol in breath at least 1.5 liters of a prolonged exhalation should be discarded prior to sampling.
Amino acids. Organic compounds containing both an acid and amino group, e.g. carboxylic acid (-COOH) and amine (-NH2) groups. Twenty amino acids are important in human nutrition and biology and they are the building blocks of proteins.
Amylase. An enzyme produced in the pancreas to catalyze the digestion of carbohydrates (sugars).
Analyte. The specific component or substance measured in a chemical analysis.
Analytical specificity. Ability of a measurement procedure to determine solely the desired substance it purports to measure without responding to any others.
Analytical sensitivity. The ability of a method or instrument to discriminate between samples with different concentrations of substance or containing different amounts of the analyte. The slope of the analytical calibration function (plot) is one index of the methods sensitivity.
Analytical wavelength. Any wavelength at which an absorbance measurement is made for the purpose of the determination of a constituent of a sample.
Analytical run (series). A set of measurements carried out successively by one analyst using the same measuring system, at the same location, under the same conditions, and during the same short period of time.
Anaerobic. A biological process not requiring oxygen.
Anemia. A deficiency of hemoglobin in the blood which can result from a decrease in the proportion of erythrocytes - an abnormally low number of red blood cells.
Antagonist. A chemical substance (drug) that binds to a receptor to block or reverse the action of another drug or chemical substance; Naloxone is an opiate antagonist that blocks the action of morphine at its receptor.
Anthropometric data. Are physical measurements (height, weight, age) that provide an indirect assessment of body composition and development.
Antibody. An antibody is a large protein molecule produced by the body’s immune system to recognise and bind foreign molecules such as viruses.
Anticoagulant. A chemical substance that delays or counteracts blood clotting. Heparin is a natural anticoagulant in the body. Potassium oxalate, EDTA, and sodium fluoride are other examples of chemicals added to Vacutainer tubes to prevent clotting.
Antidiuretic hormone (ADH). A hormone produced in the posterior pituitary gland that promotes the conservation of body water by its effect on the kidney thus influencing the production of urine.
Antigen. A molecule that binds to an antibody.
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Artery. An artery is a blood vessel that carries oxygenated blood from the heart and lungs to the rest of the body.
Ascites. Is the pathologic accumulation of fluid in the peritoneal cavity. This condition is often associated with alcoholism and develops as one consequence of chronic liver disease (cirrhosis). The volume of ascites fluid might reach 10 liters or more.
Asthma. A chronic inflammatory disorder of the airways which causes airflow obstruction and forced expiratory volumes are markedly reduced. Those suffering from asthma might not be able to fulfill the sampling requirements (time-pressure-volume) of some breath-alcohol analyzers.
Ataxia. Inability to coordinate voluntary muscle movements owing to various influences (drugs or diseases) on the cerebellum.
Atrophy. Means the wasting away or shrinkage of tissue caused by cell death.
Autopsy. The word autopsy derives from the Greek word meaning “to see for oneself.” In UK necropsy is used instead of autopsy also from Greek, which means “seeing a dead body.” In USA autopsy is synonymous with postmortem examination by a medical examiner.
Bariatric surgery. Bariatric comes from the Greek words baros, which means weight and iatric which means treatment. Hence bariatric surgery is an operation for treatment of being severely overweight (obesity) and usually involves making the stomach smaller by gastric banding or a gastric bypass.
Basal metabolism. The total energy output of the body at rest after a 12 h fast amounting to 1.0 kcal/kg/h for men (0.9 for women). For a 150 lb (68 kg) man the energy requirement for basal metabolism is 1632 kcal/day.
Baseline measure. An observation or quantitative measurement made before administration of a drug or an experimental treatment. When evaluating results, the post-treatment measures are usually compared with the baseline measure.
Beer's law. The absorbance of a homogeneous sample containing an absorbing substance is directly proportional to the concentration of the absorbing substance.
Bias. A systematic error of measurement expressed as the difference between the expected result of a measurement and a true value (compare with accuracy).
Bibliometrics. The quantitative study of published articles and books and evaluation of these in terms of authorship, readership and citation practices.
Bile. A greenish-yellow secretion produced in the liver and collected and stored in the gallbladder until needed. Bile is an emulsifier which promotes mixing and digestion of fatty foods.
Biological specimen. A material of human or animal origin commonly used for identification of the individual (DNA) or forensic or clinical laboratory analysis of endogenous or exogenous substances.
Biopsy. Removal and laboratory examination of tissue from a living body, e.g. liver biopsy is the gold standard for investigating liver cirrhosis.
Blind (masked) sample. A proficiency test sample for which the analyst or laboratory is unaware of the test nature of the sample at the time of analysis. Thus an undeclared proficiency trial entails submitting samples for analysis blinded or masked.
Blood-brain-barrier. Permeable barrier controlling the passage of substances from the blood into the brain tissue and cerebrospinal fluid.
BMI. Stands for body mass index and is the most widely used definition of an individual’s degree of obesity. The index is derived by dividing the person’s weight in kg by the square of the height in meters, hence the units (kg/m2). Normal BMI is from 18.5 to 24.9, overweight is from 25-29.9, obesity (grade 1) is from 30-34.9, obesity (grade II) is 35-39.9 and obesity grade III is > 40.
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Bolus. The amount of drug swallowed at one time.
Bronchi. The large air-tubes or conducting airways of the lungs (one such tube is a bronchus).
Bronchioles. Small subdivisions and tiny branches of air tubes within the bronchi.
Candida Albicans. An yeast or fungi sometimes found in living humans (skin, mouth, gut, vagina), that can utilize glucose to produce ethanol.
Capillary. A small blood vessel that branches from an artery; capillaries connect arteries to veins. Exchange of oxygen, nutrients and waste material takes place across capillary walls.
Carbohydrate Deficient Transferrin (CDT). Transferrin is a glycoprotein normally present in serum which helps to transport and delivery iron to the body. The analysis of CDT (a carbohydrate deficient form) has proven to be a sensitive and specific biological marker of heavy continuous drinking. After drinking about 80 g ethanol per day for men and 60 g per day for women for 7 continuous days CDT levels are elevated.
Central nervous system (CNS). The central part of the nervous system consisting of the brain and spinal cord.
Cerebellum. The structure at the base of the brain involved in the control of muscle tone, balance, and sensorimotor coordination.
Cerebral cortex. This is the outer layer of gray matter covering the cerebellum. The cerebral cortex processes sensory information for controlling motor functions, speech, higher cognitive functions, emotions, behavior, and memory.
Cerebrospinal fluid. The clear fluid that fills the cavities (ventricles) that surround the brain and spinal cord.
Chain-of-custody. The procedure used to document how laboratories receive and handle specimens from the moment of collection, during transport, arrival at the laboratory, and during the testing process.
Chromosomes. Microscopic rod-shaped structures composed of double stranded DNA and proteins and located within the cell nucleus. There are normally 46 chromosomes 23 inherited from each parent.
Chronic tolerance. The gradual decrease in degree of intoxication at the same blood alcohol level in the course of repeated exposures.
Cirrhosis. Advanced liver disease in which the liver cells have died, hardened and turned an orange color.
Clandestine Laboratory. A clandestine laboratory is a secret and unlawful facility for production of narcotic drugs. These labs take many forms and might be a kitchen, garage, bathroom, or out-house equipped with the necessary glassware, apparatus, chemicals, organic solvents, and other materials necessary for the synthesis, isolation, or purification of drugs of abuse.
Clinical laboratory science. This entails the examination of some part of the living patient – his excreta, or blood or secretions – to help the physician reach a diagnosis or provide a better treatment.
Cognition. The term cognition involves all the mental functions through which information and knowledge is processed. It includes global functions such as consciousness, drive and attention as well as specific functions like memory, language and calculations.
Collagen. The major protein of fibrous connective tissue e.g. tendons and ligament involve din the production of scar tissue produced in the liver.
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Concentration. The quantity of substance contained in a unit quantity of sample. When working with solutions, the recommended unit of concentration is grams of solute per liter of solution.
Congeners. Substance or thing of the same kind or form, e.g. the other constituents of alcoholic beverages besides alcohol and water such as other higher alcohols, aldehydes and esters.
Correlation coefficient. A statistic which measures the strength of the relation between two methods of measurements (association), but not whether two methods agree. It is important to note that high correlation does not necessarily mean good agreement.
Controls. Tests performed in parallel with experimental samples and designed to demonstrate that a procedure worked correctly.
COPD. Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease is characterized by airflow limitations caused by chronic bronchitis and emphysema. Those suffering from COPD have reduced forced expiratory volumes and might be unable to satisfy the breath-sampling requirements with some breath-alcohol analyzers. ref. NEJM 343;269-279, 2000.
Creatinine. Is a waste product derived from creatine a substance synthesized from amino acids mainly in muscle cells. Creatinine is excreted in the urine without being reabsorbed and U-creatinine analysis is therefore used as a test for impaired renal function. In connection with urine-drug testing, a creatinine concentration below 0.2 g/L indicates a highly dilute specimen.
Cross reactivity. This refers to the response in an assay caused by a substance other than the target drug being analysed. Usually an antibody for an immunoassay recognises only a part of the target drug by binding to a specific functional group or structure in the molecule.
Cytochrome P450. A family of enzymes that can metabolize (detoxify) foreign chemical substances that enter the body as well as many endogenous species. The P450 enzymes are found in the microsome fraction of cells especially liver cells (hepatocytes). The particular P-450 enzyme that metabolizes ethanol is denoted P450IIE1.
Cytoplasm. Or cytosol is the soluble fraction or jelly-like substance within cells and outside the nucleus where many of the cell’s biochemical reactions take place.
Depressants. These represent a class of psychoactive drugs, both licit and illicit, that relieve anxiety by depressing the central nervous system (CNS). Such drugs have a high abuse potential and ethyl alcohol is the prime example along with barbiturates and the sedative hypnotic chloral hydrate.
Digestive system. The organs responsible for getting food into and out of the body consisting of the esophagus, stomach, liver, gallbladder, pancreas, small intestine, colon and rectum.
Distribution. The transport of absorbed drug or alcohol by the blood-stream to all parts of the body. The distribution of alcohol follows the distribution of body water and the rate of distribution depends on the rate of flow of blood to various organs and tissue.
Diuretic. A drug that promotes water excretion through an increase in the volume of urine.
DNA. Deoxyribonucleic acid, a family of large molecules within the cells of an organism that carry genetic information by specifying the structure of proteins. DNA is composed of a linear sequence of nucleotides.
Drug. Any chemical substance that influences body function.
Duodenum. The first part (~12 inches) of the small intestine from the pylorus to the jejunum.
Ecstasy. Is the popular name for the drug 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA). Like amphetamine, MDMA is a derivative of phenethylamine.
Edema. Excess accumulation of fluid in body tissues usually resulting in swelling.
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Electromagnetic spectrum. A spectrum of electromagnetic radiation or energy ranging from very high energy (short wavelength) such as gamma rays to very low energy (long wavelength) such as radio waves. X-rays, ultraviolet, visible, infrared, and microwaves are other examples of electromagnetic radiation.
Elimination. The term used to denote removal of a drug (e.g. alcohol) from the body. The process of elimination involves both metabolic breakdown (biotransformation) and removal in an unchanged form in breath, urine, and sweat (excretion).
EMIT. Is an acronym for Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay a modern technique of chemical analysis. This method of analysis is a homogenous assay which does not require a prior clean-up or extraction of analyte prior to analysis. EMIT involves an antibody-antigen reaction where a candidate drug in the biological specimen (urine or blood) and the same drug labelled with the enzyme e.g. glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase compete for binding sites on the antibody.
Endocrinology. This is the study of hormones and their effects and the system of glands that produce hormones.
Endocrine glands. Ductless glands that secrete hormones into the bloodstream. The pituitary, adrenal, and thyroid glands are examples.
Endogenous. Produced or originating within the body by natural processes such as metabolism.
Endoplasmic reticulum. Membrane structure within the cytoplasm of cells.
Enzymes. Protein molecules that serve to speed-up chemical reactions in the body - An enzyme acts as a catalyst for promoting biochemical reactions.
Epidemiology. Derived from the Greek epidemia or prevalence of disease. The branch of medical science concerned with the incidence and distribution of disease.
Epilepsy. The term epilepsy applies to a group of central nervous system disorders characterized by recurrent seizures, which are sometimes called convulsions. Seizures can affect vision, speech or movement and can affect only part of the brain.
Erythrocytes. The name given to the red blood cells.
Esophagus. A tube connecting the pharynx with the stomach.
Excretion. Is the removal of a drug or alcohol in an unchanged form in body excreta - urine, breath, sweat, stools, and saliva (if not swallowed).
Exogenous. Produced or originating outside the body.
External proficiency trial. A test programs whose design and management are outside the control of the participating laboratory.
Extravascular. Outside of the blood stream.
Extracellular fluid. Fluid outside the cells (interstitial fluid and plasma) amounting to about 20% of body weight.
Exocrine glands. These are glands that secrete their product out of the gland through a duct and into a cavity; the enzyme producing glands of the pancreas are typical examples.
False positive rate. This represents the proportion of healthy subjects who give a positive test result when screened for a certain disease state.
False negative rate. This is the proportion of subjects with the disease but who give a negative test result.
A Wayne Jones Page 7 5/2/2006
Fatty liver. An accumulation of fat in the liver representing the first stage of deterioration of the organ often the result of a period of heavy drinking. Fatty liver is reversible after a period of abstinence.
Fatty acid. A compound made up of a hydrocarbon chain (either saturated or unsaturated) terminating in a carboxylic acid group.
Fermentation. An enzymatically controlled anaerobic decomposition of carbohydrates to carbon dioxide and ethanol.
Fibrosis. The formation of fibrous (scar) tissue another intermediate stage of liver deterioration.
First-pass metabolism. This refers to the metabolism (removal) of part of the dose of a drug such as alcohol when administered orally before it reaches the systemic circulation. First-pass metabolism can occur either in the stomach or in the liver and for some substances also in the lung.
Forensic. From the Latin word forensis meaning of the forum. In ancient Rome the forum was where debates took place and as such served as the courtroom.
Free radicals. Molecular intermediates that have a single unpaired electron and often arise during oxidation reactions. They are highly reactive and readily attack other molecules.
GABA. Gamma aminobutyric acid a major inhibitory neurotransmitter within the brain and is involved in the mechanism of alcohol’s effects on behavior.
Gas Chromatography. An analytical technique for separating volatile substances on the basis of their solubility and volatility.
Gastrectomy. Surgery to remove part of the stomach.
Gastric bypass. A surgical operation to treat grossly obese individuals. The operation involves dramatically reducing the size of the stomach.
General anesthetic. An agent (drug) that renders a person unconscious and oblivious to pain.
GERD. Abbreviation for gastroesophageal reflux disease which is a clinical syndrome that manifests as heartburn and regurgitation owing to reflux of gastric contents into the esophagus.
Gene. A combination of DNA segments that together constitute a unit capable of expressing one or more functional gene products.
Generic. A nonproprietary drug name usually describing the drug’s chemical structure and which is not protected by a trademark.
Glucagon. A hormone secreted by cells of the pancreas in response to low blood sugar. This hormone promotes an increase in blood sugar levels by initiating the breakdown of liver glycogen to produce glucose.
G-Proteins. G-proteins are involved in signal transduction through the cell membrane and have the ability to activate different cellular amplifier systems. They get their name because they bind guanosine triphosphate (GTP). Various aspects of alcohol addiction such as development of tolerance and dependence may depend on altered signals through G-proteins. The discovery of G-proteins and the elucidation of their function by the US scientists Gilman and Rodbell was recognized by the award of the Nobel prize in Medicine or Physiology for 1994.
Gluconeogenesis. The synthesis of glucose molecules from non-carbohydrates such as protein and fat. This process begins when blood glucose levels are diminished and cellular levels of carbohydrates are depleted.
Glutamate. An amino acid that serves as the major excitatory neurotransmitter in the brain.
Glutathione (GSH). An antioxidant molecule found naturally in the body, composed of three amino
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acids, glutamate, cysteine and glycine.
Glycogen. A polysaccharide and the principle carbohydrate reserve in the body. Excess glucose is converted to glycogen and is stored in the liver and muscle. Glycogen can be converted easily into glucose when more energy is required.
Glycogenesis. Formation of glycogen from glucose molecules.
Glycogenolysis. Hydrolysis of glycogen to glucose.
Glycolysis. The metabolic breakdown of glucose to pyruvic acid.
Gout. A painful metabolic disorder characterized by accumulation of urate (uric acid crystals) which deposit in the joints - often a side effect of heavy drinking.
Hallucinogens. Are substances that bring about a state of dreaming or wandering of the mind characterized by an altered perception of sight and hearing. Hallucinogens e.g. LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) are psychoactive substances often occurring naturally in various plants or fungi and if taken alter mood and perceptions of reality.
Hematocrit. The percentage of blood volume occupied by erythrocytes, 44-54% in men and 38-48% in women.
Hemolysis. The bursting of red blood cells.
Hepatic vein. The vein that receives blood after it passes through the central veins of the liver and transports blood into the inferior vena cava of the heart.
Hepatitis. Generalized inflammation of the liver, often accompanied by tissue death and fibrosis (scar tissue). Alcoholic hepatitis can prove fatal but is reversible with abstinence.
Hepatocyte. The name given to the principal cells within the liver responsible for most of the metabolic activity.
Homeostasis. The maintenance of relatively constant internal body conditions; a state of equilibrium within the body with respect to functions, composition of fluids and tissues.
Hormone. A chemical messenger produced in an organ or tissue and transported to another part of the organism where it produces a behavioral or physiological response (effect).
Hydrophilic. Attracts water - water liking
Hydrocarbon. A class of organic compounds only containing hydrogen and carbon atoms in various proportions.
Hyperglycemia. A condition resulting when an excessive amount of glucose is dissolved in the blood.
Hypertension. High blood pressure.
Hypoglycemia. An abnormally low concentration of glucose in the circulating blood.
Hypoventilation. The term hypoventilation defines a condition in which alveolar ventilation is insufficient to meet the metabolic demands of the individual and this results in an inappropriate tension of carbon dioxide.
Hypoxia. Lower than normal level of oxygen in the blood or tissue.
Impairment. The influence of alcohol or a drug manifested in the subject's decreased ability to perform a given task safely.
Incidence. The number of new cases of a variable (condition, symptoms, disease, or trait) occurring
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during a particular period of time.
Inflammation. A defensive response to local tissue injury or infection, serving to prevent the spread of injury and activate the immune system.
Infrared. Pertaining to the region of the electromagnetic spectrum from approximately 0.78 to 300 μm.
Insulin. A hormone produced in the islets of Langerhans in the pancreas as a response to elevated blood sugar levels. The hormone permits the metabolism and utilization of glucose. Insulin in fairly pure form was prepared first by Banting, Best, Collip and Macload from University of Toronto and led to successful treatment of diabetes.
Interferent. A chemical compound or substance other than the substance of interest (e.g. ethanol) to which the measuring instrument responds to give a falsely elevated result.
Inter-individual variation. The distribution of a measurement or a quantity in a given sample of individuals.
Intra-individual variation. The distribution of measured values of a quantity in a given individual over time.
Intravascular. Within the blood vessels.
Intracellular fluid. Fluid within the cells making up about 40% of body weight.
Interstitial fluid. Fluid between the cells.
In-vivo. From the Latin meaning in the living body a term commonly used to signify tests made with living subjects (humans or animals).
In-vitro. From the Latin meaning in glass a term commonly used to signify experiments in a test tube or flask as opposed to in the living organism.
Isozyme or isoenzyme. Is an enzyme with the same function as another enzyme but having a slightly different composition of amino-acids and with different kinetic properties.
Jejunum. Pertaining to the second part of the small intestine from the duodenum to the ileum.
Ketogenesis. The production of ketone bodies (acetone, acetoacetate, beta-hydroxybutyrate)..
Ketosis. A condition characterized by the enhanced production of ketone bodies, e.g. during starvation or in disease states such as diabetes mellitus.
Ketonuria. Excess ketone bodies in the urine
Ketonemia. Excess ketone bodies (acetone, acetoacetate and ß-hydroxybutyrate) in the blood.
Ketone bodies. The end-products of lipid metabolism; acetone, acetoacetate and beta-hydroxybutyrate.
Kinetic properties. The characteristics of an enzyme including speed of reaction, and affinity for the substrate.
Lactic acid. An organic acid produced from pyruvate during anaerobic metabolism.
Licit. Means lawful or permitted and is the term used to describe pharmaceutical preparations obtainable on prescription or over-the-counter as opposed to illicit or unlawful drugs listed under the controlled substance act such as heroin, methamphetamine and cannabis.
Lipase. A pancreatic enzyme that facilitates the digestion of fats.
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Lipids. Fatty substances - a class of organic compounds that include fats, waxes, oils, (triglycerides) phospholipid and sterols (cholesterol) consisting largely of esters formed by combining fatty acids with alcohols or other molecules.
Lipogenesis. The synthesis of lipids from glucose and amino acids.
Lipid peroxidation. The destructive metabolism of lipids (fatty substances) within cells by chemical oxidation leading eventually to the destruction of cell membranes.
Limit of detection (LOD). The smallest result obtainable by a given measurement procedure that can be accepted with a stated level of confidence as being different from the value of the measurable quantity obtained on blank material; by convention LOD = 3 x so where so is the standard deviation of measurements without the analyte present, e.g. blanks.
Limit of Quantitation (LOQ). The lower limit of concentration or amount of substance that must be present before a method is considered to provide quantitative results. By convention, LOQ = 10 x SDo, where SDo = the estimate of standard deviation at the lowest level of concentration measurable.
Macronutrients. Refers to dietary nutrients that are required in large quantities such as protein, fat and carbohydrate.
Micronutrients. Refers to the vitamin and mineral constituents of the diet.
Malnutrition. A deficiency in protein and energy,
Matrix Effects. Influence of a component in the analytical sample other than the component being investigated and how this impacts on the measurements being made.
Mean corpuscular volume (MCV). Refers to the average size of a red blood cell. Abnormally high MCV is one indication of over consumption of alcohol.
Mellanby effect. Greater impairment on the ascending limb of the blood alcohol profile (absorption phase) compared with the descending phase (post abrorptive phase) despite the same concentration of alcohol in venous blood.
MEOS. The microsomal ethanol oxidizing system (now called P4502E1), is an enzyme system in the liver that oxidizes ethanol to acetaldehyde but also oxidizes many other drugs, solvents and xenobiotics.
Metabolism. The totality of chemical reactions occurring in a cell, an organ, or the body. The term is sometimes applied more narrowly to the breakdown of a particular substance e.g. alcohol by specific enzymes.
Metabolite. A compound produced by a chemical reaction taking place in the body such as the metabolism of a drug; acetaldehyde is a metabolite of ethanol.
Metrology. The science of measurement.
Microsomes. A subcellular fraction of cells obtained by differential centrifugation of liver homogenates that contains fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The microsomes are rich in drug-metabolizing enzymes.
Microsomal enzymes. Detoxifying enzymes (cytochrome P450) associated with certain membranes (microsomes) within the liver cells.
Mitochondria. Small spherical rod-shaped structures within the cytoplasm that generate most of the cell’s energy through the production of adenosine triphosphate (ATP).
Motor function. This is a general term and refers to movement, mobility and behaviour.
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NAD/NADH. Nicotinamide adenine dinucletide (NAD) is a coenzyme molecule that binds with hydrogen atoms during alcohol metabolism and becomes reduced to NADH. This NAD-NADH couple moves hydrogen atoms back and forth between various oxidation-reduction reactions within the cell.
Necrosis. Cell death that occurs in response to adverse conditions in the cell’s environment.
Neurotransmitter. A chemical agent or molecule released by a neuron on excitation that crosses the synaptic cleft to activate or inhibit an adjacent neuron.
Neuron. A nerve cell - the functional unit of the nervous system consisting of the nerve cell body, the dendrites and the axon.
NMDA. N-methyl-D-aspartate, a synthetic amino acid capable of activating certain glutamate receptors.
Nystagmus. Rhythmical oscillation (bouncing or jerking movement) of the eyeballs often involuntary. Gaze nystagmus occurs when the eyes gaze or move to the side along a horizontal plane.
Obesity. The word obesity is derived from the Latin word meaning “to overeat”. Obesity is a medical problem and today means degree of over-weight or excess adiposity. The body mass index is the standard measure for obesity.
Ordinal scale. Ordered set of measurements consisting of words and or numbers indicating the magnitude of the possible values that a type-of-quantity can take.
Osmolality. This is a measure of the solute or particle concentration of a fluid, e.g. serum or urine. In a random urine sample osmolality might span from 50 to 1400 mOsmol/kg
Outlier. A value in a sample of values so far separated from the remainder so as to suggest that it may be from a different population.
Oxidation. A chemical reaction that usually involves removing a hydrogen atom from a molecule or adding an oxygen atom, or both.
Pancreas. Abdominal gland located behind the stomach that secretes pancreatic juice into the intestine and also manufactures the hormones insulin and glucagon that are released into the blood stream.
Pancreatitis. The pancreatic is an organ located behind the stomach in the upper abdomen and produces enzymes and hormones (insulin and glucagons) Pancreatitis is an inflammation of the pancreas and is a painful condition including nausea and vomiting. Chronic pancreatitis is often caused by excessive consumption of alcohol or gallstones.
Pathology. The word pathology comes from the Greek word pathos, suffering or distressed state or the disturbance of vital processes.
Per se alcohol limits. Statutory concentration limits of alcohol in blood, breath, or urine above which a motorist is in violation of the law.
Peer Review. The human judgment of a scientific study (manuscript) by individuals “peers” having expertise and experience in the same or a closely related area.
Peroxisome. Membrane bound body within the cell containing enzymes (catalase) that either synthesis or decompose hydrogen peroxide.
Pharmacokinetics. The study of absorption, distribution, and elimination of drugs and their metabolites and the associated changes in these processes over time; what the body does to the drug.
Pharmacodynamics. The study of the action of drugs in the body; what the drug does to the body and the relationship between drug concentration and the pharmacological effect produced.
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Pharmacogenetics. This is the study of the role of inheritance in inter-individual variation in drug response. Thus the study of racial, ethnic, and genetic aspects of kinetics and dynamics of drugs and related substances that might explain observed variability in pharmacokinetic parameters.
Phase I reactions. A term used to describe various metabolic (detoxification) reactions whereby drugs and other chemical compounds foreign to the body are oxidized, reduced or hydrolyzed by the addition of polar groups thus rendering them less toxic and more soluble in water.
Phase II reactions. A term used to describe metabolic reactions whereby certain enzymes convert drugs or foreign chemicals entering the body into more water-soluble compounds to facilitate excretion in the urine. The main conjugates are glucuronide, sulfate, acetate, and various amino acids. A phase I reaction often precedes a phase II reaction
Physical dependence. Is a state that develops in parallel with chronic tolerance and is revealed by the precipitation of serious physiological disturbances (abstinence) when intake of the drug is terminated.
Physiology. The scientific discipline that deals with the functions of the living body.
Placebo. From Latin “I shall be acceptable or pleasing” thus a preparation or medicine given to please the patient. Placebos are used in experiments as control treatments - a tablet or drink that might look, taste, and smell like the active drug but devoid of any pharmacological effect.
Polycythemia. An over abundance of erythrocytes (red blood cells) resulting in increased viscosity of the blood and abnormally high hematocrit. -
Polymorphism. The presence of two or more alleles of a gene or other DNA sequence in a population. An existence of more than one form of a genetic trait,
Portal vein. A large blood vessel that collects blood from the stomach and intestine and transports nutrients to the liver.
Potentiation. The action of two drugs in which the combined effects are greater than the sum of the individual effects.
Precision. Closeness of agreement between independent results of measurements obtained by a procedure under prescribed conditions; the variation or scatter of the measurements about the mean. The precision is expressed by the standard deviation of the measured values. Near synonyms for precision are reliability, repeatability, stability, consistency, reproducibility, agreement.
Prevalence. The frequency with which a variable (condition, symptom, disease, or trait) occurs in the population at a certain point in time.
Proficiency test. A test designed to evaluate the reliability of an analytical method or procedure and the overall quality performance of a laboratory.
Proteins. Large molecules composed of long chains of amino-acids. The shape and function of a protein is determined by the sequence of its amino-acids. Proteins help to maintain the cells structure and participate in many biological reactions as catalysts (enzymes).
Protein binding. A reversible binding of a drug or endogenous compound to the major proteins of plasma (e.g. albumin). The binding consists of weak ionic bonds, Van der Waals forces and hydrogen bonding.
Psychotropic drug. A drug with its main site of action in the central nervous system (brain) often associated with altered mood, thought processes and behavior. Results in euphoria and tolerance and dependence.
Psychomotor functions. Motor functions as a consequence of mental activity.
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Pyruvic acid. An endogenous substance produced from glucose as the end product of glycolysis.
Pylorus. The sphincter muscle separating the stomach from the small intestine also called pyloric sphincter.
Quality assurance. Those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide confidence that the work done at a laboratory meets given requirements and high standards of performance.
Radioisotope. This is an element with radioactive properties. In analytical chemistry the radio immunoassay (RIA) was the first immunoassay introduced. There are three isotopes used in RIA, tritium (3H), carbon-14 (14C), and iodine-125 (125I).
Randomized controlled trials. These are the mainstay of evaluating new medicines. In such trials, the participants who receive the treatment are assigned at random or by chance, which is essential to ensure that the outcomes are determine only by the treatment.
Reaction time. The time interval between presentation of a stimulus and initiation of a response.
Receptor. A protein embedded in the wall of a neuron or other cell that recognizes and binds a neurotransmitter or other chemical messenger.
Reduction. This is a chemical reaction that usually involves removing an oxygen atom from the molecule, or adding a hydrogen to it or both.
Response latency. The time interval between presentation of a stimulus and making a response.
Reference standard. A sample prepared or acquired that has known properties in terms of its identity, purity, chemical composition, and concentration. Reference standards are used for the purpose of calibrating analytical equipment and for use as a control in actual experiments.
Repeatability. The closeness of agreement between the results of successive measurements during a short time, defined as the within-run standard deviation).
Reproducibility. The closeness of agreement between the results of measurements of the same measurable quantity on different occasions (e.g. the between run standard deviation). Different observers, different calibrations, different locations, different times.
Respiratory membrane. The membrane within the lungs being only a few microns thick across which an exchange of gases takes place.
Retrograde extrapolation. The practice of estimating a person's blood or breath alcohol concentration at some time prior to the time of obtaining a specimen for analysis - back extrapolation, back- tracking.
Ribosome. A small spherical body within cells where the synthesis of proteins occur.
Saccadic eye movements. Rapid conjugate shifts of gaze when following a target.
Second messenger. A molecule produced within a cell that carries information to a site within the cell eventually eliciting a physiological response; an example is cyclic AMP.
Sensitivity of an analytical method. This is the measured detector signal per unit increase in the concentration of the analyte as reflected by the slope of the linear calibration plot.
Sensitivity of a diagnostic test. This is defined as the proportion of the patients having a disease and for whom the test results were positive.
Sensorimotor functions. Functions involving perception of information from the senses and the resulting physical reactions of muscles.
Serotonin. 5-hydroxytryptamine (5HT) a neurotransmitter associated with mood, sleep, aggression,
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anger, appetite and drinking.
Serum. The fluid portion of blood remaining after coagulation (removal of fibrin and blood cells).
Slurred speech. A clinical sign of intoxication e.g. after drinking alcohol or taking medication which is characterized by imprecise speech articulation including deviation in rate, pitch and intensity of speech and incorrect production of consonants and vowels.
Specificity of a diagnostic test. This is defined as the proportion of healthy subjects in whom the test results were negative.
Spirometer. A device for measuring the volume of respiratory gases.
Spleen. The spleen is an organ that lies behind the stomach on the left side of the abdomen. Old red blood cells and platelets are stored in the spleen, which also serves to clear and fight bacteria.
Stimulants. Are a class of drugs that stimulate the central nervous system (CNS) by interfering with the brain’s neurotransmitters. CNS stimulants cause stimulation of the sympathetic nervous system by altering neurotransmission of catecholamines such as dopamine, noradrenaline and serotonin. Cocaine and amphetamine are the prototype central nervous system (CNS) stimulants.
Stroke. Any condition during which the blood supply to the brain or regions of the brain is suddenly interrupted.
Substrate. The substance (molecule) acted upon by an enzyme; its conversion to a particular product is catalyzed by a specific enzyme, e.g. ethanol is the substrate for alcohol dehydrogenase.
Symptom. Any subjective evidence of a disease or of a patient’s condition.
Synapse. A microscopic gap (or cleft) separating presynaptic and postsynaptic neurons.
Synovial fluid. The fluid lubricant found inside synovial joints.
Tidal volume. The volume of air inspired and expired in a single breath being approximately 500 ml in adults.
Tolerance. A state that develops after long-term exposure to a drug. Metabolic tolerance infers a faster removal of the drug, e.g. by metabolic degradation in the liver. Functional tolerance infers a change in sensitivity of the brain to the effects of the drug.
Tolerance Interval. That range within which a specified percentage of individual values of a population are expected to fall with a stated level of confidence.
Toxicity. The ability of a substance to harm living organisms - all substances are toxic even water if ingested in large enough amounts.
Toxicology. The word toxicology derives from the Greek term “toxon”, which means a bow for shooting arrows. During antiquity poisons were often placed on the tips of arrows making them more deadly, hence the word hence the word toxicos and intoxicated, which means made sick by poison..
Tracking. A laboratory test often used to measure impairment and which involves adjusting an instrument to maintain a desired value (compensatory tracking) or to follow a moving reference marker or object (pursuit tracking).
Trypsin. An enzyme in the small intestine produced in the pancreas that digests proteins.
Type I diabetes. Insulin-dependent diabetes also known as juvenile-onset diabetes.
Type II diabetes. Non-insulin-dependent diabetes (the more common form) also called adult onset diabetes.
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U-Creatinine. The creatinine content of urine can span over a wide range depending on the relative concentration of water in the specimen. A U-creatinine below 0.2 g/L is taken to indicate a highly dilute specimen, which might occur after drinking water or an alcoholic beverage before voiding.
Ultraviolet. Pertaining to the region of the electromagnetic spectrum from approximately 10 to 380 nm.
Unit of alcohol. In USA a unit of alcohol is the same as 14 gram ethanol or the amount containe din a standard drink being 5 oz table wine (12%), 1½ oz spirits (40%), 12 oz beer (5%) or 12 oz wine cooler.
Upper respiratory tract. That part of the lungs comprising the nasal cavity, pharynx and associated structures.
Uroscopy. This term refers to the examination of urine especially to observe its volume, appearance, smell, color and taste to aid in making a diagnosis. Uroscopy is considered the oldest clinical test to evaluate what was going on within the body.
Vasodilation. Increased diameter of blood vessels - the opposite of vasoconstriction.
Vasopressin. The antidiuretic hormone secreted from the pituitary gland in response to dehydration, which instructs the kidney to reduce urinary volume. Alcohol inhibits the hormone thus resulting in an increased production of urine.
Vein. A vein is a blood vessel that carries blood back from body organs and tissue to the heart.
Viscera. Pertaining to the internal organs - the soft parts - the internal organs of the abdominal cavity.
Visible. Pertaining to radiant energy in the electromagnetic spectral range visible to the human eye corresponding to wavelengths from approximately 380 to 780 nm.
Vital Capacity. This is defined as the total volume of air that can be expelled from the lungs after a maximum inspiration. A healthy adult person might have a vital capacity of approximately 4600 ml, being less in women compared with men and markedly diminished in heavy smokers and those with lung disease.
Vitreous humor. Means glassy fluid and refers to a transparent jelly-like substance that fills the space between the lens and the retina and is a fluid commonly taken for alcohol analysis in postmortem toxicology.
Wavelength. A property of radiant energy, such as IR, visible or UV. The distance measured along the line of propagation, between two points that are in phase on adjacent waves.
Widmark. Erik MP Widmark (1889-1945), a pioneer worker in forensic alcohol studies and is best known for his seminal work on pharmacokinetics of alcohol published in 1932. Widmark was appointed Professor of Physiological and Medicinal Chemistry at the University of Lund, Sweden at the age of 31 y.
Widmark’s ß-factor. This denotes the slope of the post-absorptive elimination phase assuming zero-order kinetics; the rate of alcohol elimination from blood slang = burn-off rate.
Widmark’s rho-factor. From German “die reduzierte Körpermasse” (the reduced body mass) or the factor by which an individual’s body weight needs to be lowered to obtain the theoretical body mass having the same concentration of alcohol as the blood. The factor rho characterizes the distribution of alcohol between the body and the blood as a whole and is given by the quotient [alcohol in organism] / [alcohol in blood]. Today rho is generally taken to mean the volume of distribution of alcohol and has units of L/kg, because dose is in g/kg and BAC is in g/L.
Xenobiotic. From the Greek xeno (foreign) and the name given to chemical substances not normally found in the living body e.g. synthetic chemicals, environmental chemicals, drugs, and organic solvents.
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Yeast infection. Fungal infection caused by yeast such as candida albicans.
Z-score. The Z-score is one measure of the accuracy of the results obtained by a laboratory participating in an external proficiency tests. The z-score is calculated as [(laboratory result - assigned or target value)/standard deviation (SD) of all participants]. Before SD is computed outliers need to be eliminated from the material.

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DUI / Drunk DRiving News (California DUI Attorney news:)

A Cincinnati police officer was jailed Thursday morning, charged with driving while intoxicated.

Charles Bebee, 53, was arrested in Aurora, Ind., around 11:30 p.m. Wednesday.

A police report stated that an officer spotted a sport utility vehicle moving at a high rate of speed, then a car behind the SUV stopped to tell the officer that the driver of the SUV was going to cause an accident.

The officer followed the SUV for some time before pulling it over for doing 55 in a 35 mph zone.

The report said the officer gave a field sobriety test to Bebee, who failed it. The report said Bebee consented to a chemical test, where his blood-alcohol level was determined to be .08 percent.

Police said that Bebee was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated and operating while intoxicated with a blood alcohol content of .08 or higher.

Mothers Against Drunk Driving presented Bebee with a Top Cop award earlier this year.

Cincinnati police said Beebe would be assigned to desk duty, with police powers suspended, pending the outcome of his court case.

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SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA DUI news-

Former San Diego Chargers linebacker Steve Foley pleaded guilty Thursday to a San Diego California misdemeanor charge of driving with a blood-alcohol level above the state's legal limit the night he was followed and shot by an off-duty police officer.

Foley was sentenced by Judge Charles Rogers to five years probation and ordered to submit to alcohol testing if requested by authorities. He also was ordered to pay a $1,756 fine and appear at a public event for Mothers Against Drunk Driving.

A related charge of driving under the influence was dropped, prosecutor James Koerber said.

Attorneys entered the plea on behalf of Foley, who was not in court. A trial had been set to begin next week.

The 31-year-old Foley was shot early on Sept. 3 near his Poway home by officer Aaron Mansker, who had tailed the player's 1971 Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme for nearly 30 miles on a freeway on suspicion the driver was drunk.

Foley, who had been partying in downtown San Diego, was taken to a hospital, where tests showed he had a blood-alcohol level of 0.16 percent. California's limit is 0.08 percent.

Mansker, a rookie officer with the Coronado Police Department, was in civilian clothes and driving his own car. He ended up cornered in a cul-de-sac in front of Foley's home. The player got out of his car and began walking toward Mansker, who fired shots into Foley's knee, hand and thigh, effectively ending the linebacker's career.

Foley, who now walks with a limp, missed the season and in March was released two years early from his contract with the Chargers. He has filed a civil complaint seeking damages from Mansker and the city of Coronado.

"His justice is coming," said Foley's civil attorney, Jordan Cohen. "He has taken responsibility for the crime he committed, the system has imposed the proper punishment on him, and now it's time for the officer and the city of Coronado to take responsibility for what happened that night."

Last week, a jury found Foley's companion, Lisa Maree Gaut, guilty of felony assault with a deadly weapon. She was accused of trying to run Mansker down with Foley's car after the player got out to confront the officer. Mansker testified in Gaut's trial that he verbally identified himself repeatedly as a police officer and fired at Foley after the player reached for his waistband. Foley was unarmed.

Mansker remains under investigation for his actions.

Foley has been arrested at least five times since 1999, including an April 2006 incident in which he was booked on suspicion of resisting arrest after a scuffle with police officers in San Diego. Charges never were brought in that case.

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THE INVESTIGATORY STOP OF RESPONDENT’S VEHICLE BASED ON "WEAVING" WAS WHOLLY WITHOUT REASONABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE CAUSE, AND THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, REQUIRING SUPPRESSION OF ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM.

An officer must have reasonable suspicion that a driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law in order to make a legal stop. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926.) Absent such a showing, the stop is without constitutional support, and any and all fruits garnered therefrom must be suppressed because of the unlawfulness of the arrest.

In the present case, the officer stopped the driver because of "WEAVING".

Respondent was not speeding and was not traveling at an unlawfully slow speed. There is no indication that the speed was unsafe or interfered with other traffic. Movement within the traffic lanes is entirely normal behavior and in no way contributes to a finding that the vehicle stop was justified.

The weaving within one’s lane itself is not unlawful and without more does not establish lawful justification for a detention. Under some circumstances, this wholly lawful behavior can provide sufficient cause to justify a detention for a suspected violation of Vehicle Code section 23152. The California courts first addressed the issue of “weaving within a lane” in People v. Perez (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8. Today, the standard annunciated in Perez remains the benchmark by which these types of cases are measured.

In Perez, the officers followed the defendant for three quarters of a mile as he weaved within his lane two feet in either direction for the entire distance. (Id. at 9.) In finding reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Perez, the court held that “pronounced weaving within a lane provides an officer with reasonable cause to stop a vehicle on suspicion of driving under the influence where such weaving continues for a substantial distance.” (Perez, supra 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. at 11-12., emphasis supplied.) Clearly, the court intended its holding to be read narrowly given its choice of adjectives and the corresponding facts of that case. Likewise, in People v. Bracken (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, the defendant was stopped because the experienced officer observed extremely pronounced weaving within the lane for approximately one-half mile.

In both Perez and Bracken, the defendants were weaving within their lanes, but had done so for a considerable distance. Further, the weaving was severe and pronounced.
The weaving within a lane issue was also addressed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal. In United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit held that only in cases where the weaving was pronounced and where the distance traveled was substantial did the Perez holding have valid application.

In Colin, the police observed the defendant for 35-40 seconds, during which time he drifted to the far side of the lane he was in for approximately 10 seconds, before drifting back toward the other side.
Colin then made a legal lane change, and proceeded to repeat the drifting conduct.
The Colin court held that these circumstances did not warrant application of Perez. The court explained that “if failure to follow a perfect vector down the highway...[was] sufficient [reason] to suspect a person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be subject every day to an invasion of their privacy.” (Colin, supra at 446.)

In the instant case, there is no evidence that the weaving was so pronounced or lasted any specific distance.

Courts have limited their decisions in the weaving, drifting and straddling cases to permit a stop only in those cases where the movements are pronounced, recur over a substantial distance and specifically affects other traffic or while speeding:

United States v. Smith (11th Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 704 [crossing fog line by 6 inches not grounds for stop]
United States v. Gregory (10th Cir. 1996) 79 F.3d 973 [isolated incident of swerving into emergency lane under windy conditions not a violation of statutory requirement to stay in one lane]
Rowe v. State (Md. App. 2001) 769 A.2d 879 [momentary crossing of edge line of roadway and later touching of same line not a valid basis for traffic stop]
State v. Binette (Tenn. 2000) 33 S.W.3d 215 [non-exaggerated weaving entirely within one lane not grounds for a traffic stop]
Frasier v. Driver (2001) 172 Ore. App. [lane travel statute requires more for a violation than a momentary crossing or touching of an edge or lane line]
Commonwealth v. Chernosky (2004) WL 1576569 (Pa. Super.) [probable cause lacking over 5 minutes where driver drifted to the right so as to almost strike a telephone pole, crossed the center line more than once, drifted from the left side to the right side of the road and swerved within the lane of travel with no other traffic on the road but did not speed and obeyed all stop signs]
State v. Tague (Iowa 2004) 676 N.W.2d 197 [no probable cause when both tires drift across the left edge line during 1 mile distance]
State v. Brite (1997) 698 N.E.2d 478 [crossing right side road edge twice in a mile not grounds for stop]
Montana v. Lafferty (1998) 967 P.2d 363 [crossing fog line 2 times, driving on it once, is not grounds for stop]
Crooks v. State (1998) 710 So. 2d 1041 [failure to maintain a single lane of travel is not a violation of the statute unless the vehicle is being operated unsafely]
State v. Drogi (1994) 96 Ohio App. 3d 466 [no probable cause when left front tires cross 1 foot over centerline, then moves towards right edge line close to that line and eventually crosses the right edge line]
State v. Gullett (1992) 604 N.E.2d 176 [crossing lane edge 2 times not enough to justify stop where no speeding]
State v. Cerny (2000) 28 S.W.3d 796 (Texas) [touching or going over fog line, absent unsafe/erratic driving, is not grounds for stop]
Hernandez v. State (1998) 983 S.W.2d 867 [no grounds for stop when vehicle drove 18 inches across lane divider out of its main lane of travel when no showing it was unsafe to other vehicles]
State v. Boley (2005) WL 1225614 (Iowa App.) [no grounds to stop where officer vehicle made wide but legal turn, then over 2 miles drifted slowly from the center of lane towards curb on the right 4 times coming close to curb 2 times but not hitting it]
State v. Palmer (2005) WL 555281 (Texas App.) [no reasonable suspicion to stop when:
1) vehicle was driving 5 miles below the speed limit and riding the right line;
2) drove in an entrance ramp lane;
3) signaled his intention to turn right when there was nowhere to turn;
4) applied his brakes in sudden & unsafe manner when exiting the road;
5) touched the double white lines;
6) drove partially into the right-turn-only lane before rolling into the go-straight lane;
7) during early morning hours; and
8) near a number of local bars]
Salter v. North Dakota (1993) 505 N.W.2d 111 [no reasonable suspicion when weaving within own lane while traveling 30-35 mph in a 50 mph zone]

There is still no probable cause for a stop even in those above cases involving straddling unless the movement were unsafe to other vehicles or while speeding. In these cases, no matter how bad the driving is, if other traffic is not specifically affected, there lacks a basis for a stop.

Clearly a division line is necessary to preserve a meaningful definition of “reasonable suspicion.” This is precisely what the court in Perez seems to have established.

Respondent might not have driven in a straight vector within the lane for a short distance, but this wholly lawful conduct over any minuscule distance observed by the officer is a far cry from reasonable suspicion to stop.

For the foregoing reasons, the evidence fails to establish legal or probable cause for a traffic stop.




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Crackdown on Repeat DUI Offenders



Amy Kortland was killed when a repeat DUI offender smashed into her car.


Sgt. Dave Ferry with INSIDE EDITION's Jim Moret.

Melanie Kortlang lost her 22-year-old daughter, Amy, when a man smashed his pickup truck head-on into Amy's car on a highway outside San Diego, killing her instantly. He was driving drunk, without a license and had four prior convictions for driving under the influence.

Asked what went through her mind when she found out that the person who took her daughter had been arrested time and time again for drunk driving, Melanie said, "Absolute anger. You've got somebody that has four prior DUI convictions and is back out on the street and to do what? Do the inevitable and that's kill my daughter."

Now police departments are cracking down on repeat offenders. In Los Angeles, a special police unit was created to keep repeat DUI offenders with suspended or revoked licenses off the road.

INSIDE EDITION spent two days with Sgt. Dave Ferry who heads the special task force. His unit has arrested 235 people so far.

"We're not gonna wait," Sgt. Ferry said. "We're tired of waiting and going to collision scenes, and cleaning up the aftermath of DUI collisions. Now we're going to be out there and stop them before they occur."

INSIDE EDITION was there with police as they staked out neighborhoods looking for DUI offenders.

Incredibly, one man, who police say had a suspended license after a second conviction, was seen coming back from a DUI hearing, then he got right back in his car and drove away.

He had no idea officers from the task force were watching him. The man was pulled over and arrested for driving with a suspended license. He said he thought he had a valid restricted license and has pleaded not guilty.

Sgt. Ferry is convinced that his task force is saving lives.

As for Melanie, she hopes by speaking out, she too can save lives. "If I can prevent one other mother, one other parent from having to feel the pain and go through what I go through day, that's my job, I do it for her," she said.

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