Saturday, June 30, 2007

 

Productive California DUI Checkpoint Nets One California DUI Arrest

June 30, 2007


California Drunk Driving / D.U.I. Checkpoint Nets One Arrest

Santa Clarita Sheriff’s Station conducted a D.U.I. Sobriety checkpoint Friday from 7pm through 3am Saturday morning. The checkpoint was conducted on eastbound Lyons Avenue, east of Wheeler Road. There were a total of 882 vehicles that passed through the checkpoint. Of those, 832 vehicles were screened. Seven vehicles were pulled off the line where the drivers received further California DUI field sobriety testing.

One of those drivers was arrested for California DUI - driving under the influence of alcohol / drunk driving at the California DUI checkpoint.


 

Drunk driving / DWI / DUI in any state to serve as prior in Michigan

June 30, 2007

DETROIT Michigan

Michigan introduced new legislation to include all DUI / DWI /drunk driving incidents that occurred in the United States when prosecuting a Michigan driver.

If passed, the legislation would allow prior DUI / DWI / drunk driving convictions in other states to be taken into consideration and may be used to increase the punishment if the person is prosecuted in Michigan for drunken driving.

The legislator does not want Michigan to be known as a safe harbor for drunk drivers.

 

California DUI Checkpoint

California DUI lawyer news

June 30, 2007

BAKERSFIELD, California

This holiday weekend, California DUI officers will be out in full force looking to catch California drunk drivers.

This weekend, officers from all of the law enforcement agencies in Kern County will be working.

The Avoid 18 program reminds drivers to do their part. In addition to increased patrol officers, officers will again be setting up California DUI checkpoints.

 

DUI arrest every 2.6 hours of police work

DUI award for most arrests

DUI Police Officer Ed Koczan makes one DUI arrest on the average of every 2.6 hours he patrols.

"We keep track of our own stats, but to hear them together like that ... I didn't realize the numbers," the top South Bend Indiana DUI officer said. Koczan, along with three other officers in St. Joseph County, were honored Friday morning during a news conference for being top officers when it comes to DUI arrests in the past quarter.
An enthusiastic crowd of community leaders, family members and law enforcement officials crowded the room at the city's Commerce Center, and nodded approvingly when the official figures on arrests and citations were read. "To be recognized today is a great thing."

 

CHP Officer reportedly called "racist" during California DUI arrest of Actress Vivica Fox

June 29, 2007

LOS ANGELES, California

Vivica A. Fox purportedly called a California Highway Patrol officer a "racist white cop" during her California DUI arrest, according to a CHP report.

The 42-year-old actress, who is black, was pulled over in March after passing a CHP officer who said her Cadillac was doing 80 mph (129 kph) and weaving in its lane on the Hollywood Freeway.
The officer noticed that Fox's eyes were red and watery and she had a "strong odor" of alcohol, according to the report.

After she allegedly failed a series of California DUI field sobriety tests, the officer arrested Fox for investigation of a California DUI / driving under the influence / drunk driving.

"Fox began to walk away, yelling at my partner, 'Brother, help a sister, are you going to let this racist white cop do this... well, are you?'" according to the report.
The arresting officer is identified as Officer Laubscher and his partner Officer De Alba.
Fox continued to speak in a "condescending manner" as she was placed in the patrol car, the report said.
She was taken to the Van Nuys jail, where a breath test was conducted but had to be stopped when she "burped quite loudly," the report said.
Breath tests indicated her blood-alcohol level was greater than .08 percent, California's legal limit for a driver.

She was charged with two misdemeanor counts of California DUI / driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood-alcohol level above the legal limit. Her arraignment is scheduled for July 19. If convicted, Fox could face six months in jail and a $1,000 + California DUI fine. Fox has appeared in such films as "Kill Bill: Vol. 1," "Soul Food" and "Independence Day."

 

Lindsay Lohan's California DUI

Lindsay Lohan may be facing a cocaine charge to go along with her alleged California DUI.

Someone apparently leaked an alleged report claiming the troubled actress had cocaine in her system and a blood-alcohol level nearly double the legal limit after the accident.

But the Los Angeles County District Attorney's office is still awaiting toxicology results and no charges have been filed against the 20-year-old Mean Girls star.

On Memorial Day weekend, she allegedly plowed her Mercedes over a curb and into some trees. Police said they discovered a "usable amount" of a substance believed to be cocaine on the scene of the crash. Two days later, Lohan reportedly went to Promises Malibu to sober up.

Lindsay reportedly spent the first stage of her treatment detoxing from alcohol and narcotics, including the painkiller OxyContin, and then would receive intense counseling to avoid using again. Lindsay was expected to check out of rehab earlier this week, but Lindsay may be extending her stay. She cancelled her much-hyped 21st birthday celebration originally scheduled to be a multiday blowout in Las Vegas next week. We hope she gets better.

 

DUI Suspect spits up blood, in Sandwich

La Salle County sheriff's deputies likely saw red after a disturbance at Hideout Tavern in rural Sandwich, Illinois led to a DUI suspect damaging a police car and spitting blood in the face of an arresting officer.
Bryant V. Pawson was arrested at 2:50 a.m. Saturday for allegedly DUI / drunk driving / driving under the influence of alcohol, illegal transportation of alcohol, leaving the scene of an accident with property damage, felony aggravated battery and felony criminal damage to state-supported property.

Deputies were handling a disturbance at the Hideout Tavern when a vehicle driven by Pawson struck a parked vehicle and left the scene. He was stopped by police south of the tavern.

Pawson allegedly had two open containers of alcohol in plain view inside the vehicle. After being handcuffed and placed in the back seat of a squad car, Pawson reportedly became violent and kicked both back windows out. While being restrained by deputies, Pawson allegedly spit blood in the face of an officer.
Pawson was taken to La Salle County Jail, where he is being held without bond but with blood.

Friday, June 29, 2007

 

CHP Conflict of Interest triggers search warrant

A CHP lieutenant allegedly aggressively promoted his daughter's business to companies seeking California Highway Patrol contracts he oversaw, signed a state purchase order for a deal involving her firm and listed himself as her venture's sole contact in state tax records, according to allegations in warrants used to search the officer's home and bank.
The CHP started scrutinizing Lt. Gregory Williams after issues relating to his purported role in awarding $600,000 in CHP license plate scanning system deals. Investigators subsequently discovered, the search warrant alleges, that key e-mails were deleted from Williams' police computer and that videos he made of scanning system field tests had gone missing.
CHP Sgt. Angela Ditzenberger outlined details of those allegations in sworn statements used to obtain four search warrants in January.

Censored versions of those warrants were unsealed Thursday after a four-month legal battle to make them public. The California Supreme Court rejected a last-minute bid by Williams' lawyers to keep them sealed.
Williams, Ditzenberger alleged, "negotiated, influenced, recommended and/or co-signed contracts on behalf of the CHP that directly and/or indirectly involved a company called Miner Fabrication, owned by his daughter Krystal and son-in-law, Chad Miner."
Since the January searches, the CHP has recommended to the Sacramento County District Attorney's Office that Williams be charged with a felony conflict of interest. The district attorney is still reviewing that recommendation, said spokeswoman Lana Wyant.
Williams has made no public comment since being put on administrative leave last November, though his daughter has said that neither she nor her father did anything wrong. Christopher Wing, a Sacramento attorney who represents Williams, declined to comment Thursday, saying he had not received nor read the warrants.
A CHP person would not say whether the deleted e-mail or missing videos were recovered.
CHP officers use license plate scanning systems to identify stolen vehicles automatically, without having to manually enter each plate.
One of the search warrants states that a month before officers raided his house, Williams had his CHP union attorney give an assistant chief a package of original scanning system documents he had kept at his home.
At the time, Williams had "primary oversight" for the scanning program, Ditzenberger alleged in her search-warrant application. She cited documents, witness statements and e-mails suggesting that Williams favored one Tennessee vendor, PIPS Technology Inc., over rivals and that he had been in close contact with PIPS since 2004.
During that time, PIPS hired Miner Fabrication to supply metal brackets that attach the scan systems to patrol car light bars. PIPS also used Miner as a small-business agent that resold its systems to the CHP. State officials interviewed by the CHP said they were unaware of the Williams family link to Miner Fabrication and that Williams did not disclose it, according to the search warrants.
Records for Williams' state- issue Nextel cellular telephone account also show he contacted Miner Fabrication multiple times in one week in May 2005 during bidding for a CHP license plate scanning system contract.
A witness whose name was redacted from the documents told the CHP that Williams "knew the contents of all the bids received by fax because (the witness) discussed them with him throughout the process." Miner Fabrication got the $101,000 contract a month later.
The unsealed documents also allege:
• Williams recommended to state officials strategies designed to steer contracts to Miner Fabrication and avoid Department of General Services bid procedures.
• Though a rival company called Home Electronics submitted a slightly lower bid, Miner Fabrication was awarded another $12,331 CHP contract for police antennas in November 2006 before officials canceled it as the conflict-of-interest probe continued.
• Williams attended seminars in California and Nevada and "promoted PIPS Technology systems" while on CHP assignment.
• Several witnesses, whose names and jobs were redacted from the documents, told CHP officers "they heard statements by Lt. Williams that they believed showed favoritism to PIPS Technology" during the CHP field testing of the systems.
• Williams told CHP officials that he might have a conflict of interest. He was put on leave that same day.
• An electronic folder of Williams' e-mail exchanges with PIPS Technology was cleared from CHP computers. The CHP did not shut down his mail until Dec. 1, four days after he was put on leave.
When a CHP investigator contacted PIPS Technology, an executive with the company agreed to turn over all documents describing its financial links to Miner Fabrication.

 

California DUI suspect shot last night

California drunk driving suspect Shot, Killed in Costa Mesa

A DUI suspect was fatally shot in Costa Mesa at the end of a pursuit by Newport Beach police officers.

The shooting happened about 1 a.m. at Cambridge Circle and Aliso Avenue.

The California DUI / California Drunk Driving suspect allegedly used his vehicle to ram an officer’s patrol car.

Steve Foley's California DUI Lawyer ready?

 

DUI Definition broadened to include drivers hung over from drugs

A state appeals court yesterday ruled a driver who is hung over from using cocaine can be considered impaired / DUI even if the drug is no longer in her or his system.

The legal meaning of "under the influence" is expanded. A driver, who had taken cocaine but was not intoxicated when police stopped him, was ruled to still be a danger to other drivers. While the cocaine was no longer active it was the "proximate cause of his impaired behavior," the judges found.
"While the defendant was not 'high,' he was physically impaired," wrote Appellate Division Judge Thomas Lyons in a nine-page opinion, joined by Judges Ariel Rodriguez and Jack Sabatino. "As a result of ingesting cocaine, defendant's condition was such that his normal physical coordination was impaired so as to render him a danger to others on the highway."
Thiscould have an impact on alcohol-related DUI cases. None knew of a similar decision elsewhere in the country.
Now, they said, it could be possible for a person who had been drinking one night to be charged the next day if he or she had severe hangover symptoms.
"The potential impact is enormous," said John Tumelty, who represented the driver, David Franchetta, in the case. "Where do you draw the line? Even though a guy is not high and a drug is not active in the guy's system, if he's tired and sluggish and hung over from previous use, does that makes him under influence? If they say a drug hangover makes you guilty, what about an alcohol hangover?"
The law has traditionally been interpreted to mean a person is under the influence while a substance is pharmacologically active, said Jeffrey Gold, one of the state's leading experts in DUI law.
"The legislature didn't say hangover," Gold said. "They are really painting with a wide brush here to get as many people as possible. It's one more step to getting people off the road who are using drugs."
Richard Saferstein, the former head of the New Jersey State Police crime lab, who testified for the defense in the case, said he could possibly see the definition of "influence" covering more unusual circumstances, like a person having an LSD flashback long after taking the drug.
Vincent Molitor, assistant Cape May County prosecutor, said he was pleased with the decision and said was not concerned about widespread application of the ruling to drunk driving / DUI cases.

Thursday, June 28, 2007

 

Nevada license information after a DUI

The statute covering the revocation of Nevada licenses is NRS 483.460:

NRS 483.460 Mandatory revocation of license, permit or privilege to drive; period of revocation; tolling of period of revocation during imprisonment; eligibility for restricted license; action to carry out court's order.
1. Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, the Department shall revoke the license, permit or privilege of any driver upon receiving a record of his conviction of any of the following offenses, when that conviction has become final, and the driver is not eligible for a license, permit or privilege to drive for the period indicated:
(a) For a period of 3 years if the offense is:
(1) A violation of subsection 2 of NRS 484.377.
(2) A violation of NRS 484.379 that is punishable as a felony pursuant to NRS 484.3792.
(3) A violation of NRS 484.3795 or a homicide resulting from driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance or resulting from any other conduct prohibited by NRS 484.379, 484.3795 or 484.37955.
Ê The period during which such a driver is not eligible for a license, permit or privilege to drive must be set aside during any period of imprisonment and the period of revocation must resume upon completion of the period of imprisonment or when the person is placed on residential confinement.
(b) For a period of 1 year if the offense is:
(1) Any other manslaughter, including vehicular manslaughter as described in NRS 484.3775, resulting from the driving of a motor vehicle or felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used, including the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
(2) Failure to stop and render aid as required pursuant to the laws of this State in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or bodily injury of another.
(3) Perjury or the making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the Department pursuant to NRS 483.010 to 483.630, inclusive, or pursuant to any other law relating to the ownership or driving of motor vehicles.
(4) Conviction, or forfeiture of bail not vacated, upon three charges of reckless driving committed within a period of 12 months.
(5) A violation of NRS 484.379 that is punishable pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 1 of NRS 484.3792 and the driver is not eligible for a restricted license during any of that period.
(6) A violation of NRS 484.348.
(c) For a period of 90 days, if the offense is a violation of NRS 484.379 that is punishable pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of NRS 484.3792.
2. The Department shall revoke the license, permit or privilege of a driver convicted of violating NRS 484.379 who fails to complete the educational course on the use of alcohol and controlled substances within the time ordered by the court and shall add a period of 90 days during which the driver is not eligible for a license, permit or privilege to drive.
3. When the Department is notified by a court that a person who has been convicted of a violation of NRS 484.379 that is punishable pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of NRS 484.3792 has been permitted to enter a program of treatment pursuant to NRS 484.37937, the Department shall reduce by one-half the period during which he is not eligible for a license, permit or privilege to drive, but shall restore that reduction in time if notified that he was not accepted for or failed to complete the treatment.
4. The Department shall revoke the license, permit or privilege to drive of a person who is required to install a device pursuant to NRS 484.3943 but who operates a motor vehicle without such a device:
(a) For 3 years, if it is his first such offense during the period of required use of the device.
(b) For 5 years, if it is his second such offense during the period of required use of the device.
5. A driver whose license, permit or privilege is revoked pursuant to subsection 4 is not eligible for a restricted license during the period set forth in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection, whichever applies.
6. In addition to any other requirements set forth by specific statute, if the Department is notified that a court has ordered the revocation, suspension or delay in the issuance of a license pursuant to title 5 of NRS, NRS 176.064 or 206.330, chapter 484 of NRS or any other provision of law, the Department shall take such actions as are necessary to carry out the court's order.
7. As used in this section, “device” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 484.3941.

The highlighted portions of the statute show a revocation for a DUI offense, but the offense has to be “a violation of NRS 484.379”, not a generic DUI. In other words, there is no provision for revoking a Nevada DL for a violation of a DUI statute from another state.

The case of Krahn v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 108 Nev. 1015, 842 P.2d 728 (1992) held that a violation of a federal DUI statute didn’t trigger the revocation because it wasn’t a violation of NRS 484.379. This same argument sgould apply to DUI convictions from other jurisdictions if a case were taken up on appeal.

 

Ambien DUI / DWI kills

June 28, 2007

A woman takes a plea deal, admitting to killing a man while driving under the influence - but it is not your typical DWI/ DUI.

Police say 52-year-old Darlene Kawczak of Feura Bush was driving her SUV last July, just before 11 o'clock in the morning, when she hit a bicyclist on Route 32 in Bethlehem. The victim, Joel Melnikoff, died at the scene.

It took a while for attorneys on both sides to come to an agreement on the case, because they say a popular sleep aid may have had a hand in it.
Tearful in Albany County Court Thursday, Darlene Kawczak pleads guilty to vehicular manslaughter. It is a charge that normally sees a maximum sentence of two-and-a-third to seven years in prison. But Kawczak will spend only six months in jail, and five years on probation - part of an unusual plea deal.
"Normally someone wouldn't be pleading to this sentence - but because of the various circumstances, that's what we decided was the most appropriate," says the Chief Assistant District Attorney.

Those circumstances surround what happened the night before the accident. Prosecutors say Kawczak drank five or six beers, then took a dose of the popular sleep aid "Ambien." But according to reports, that "dose" turned out to be a "double-dose," leading to tragedy the next morning.
"While I think there have been DWI arrests involving the use or misuse of Ambien, to my understanding, there have not been any other cases that have resulted in someone's death," Harris says.
Because of that, among other factors, attorneys on both sides say it was difficult to determine the most appropriate course of action.
"She took the breathalyzer test at the Bethlehem Police Department, it rang up zero - so, there were gonna' be some potential difficulties, that proof, if it went to trial," says Andrew Safranko, Kawczak's attorney.
As another part of her deal, Kawczak will work with the "Albany County Stop DWI" program, teaching about the possible dangers of using drugs like Ambien.

 

Rockers deliver anti- drunk driving / DUI campaign

Seekonk musician joins anti-drunk driving campaign

June 28, 2007

There remains a connection between rock music and alcohol isn't always a flattering one: Images of intoxicated artists tripping over instruments and fumbling song lyrics while drunk fans flail around in mosh pits may come to mind.But Seekonk resident and musician Phil Ayoub is helping to forge a different relationship between alcohol and music through his involvement with the Ground Control drunk-driving prevention campaign.The campaign was started last year by Ron Bellanti, founder and president of Beverly-based Illumina records, after a 15-year-old girl died in his arms as the result of a drunk driving crash.Ground Control spreads the drunk driving prevention message through a number of programs that leverage the power of music and art, including music-oriented presentations in schools, music festivals, fashion shows, a "Rock & Roll Circus," an art series with the anti-drunk driving message at its core and compilation CDs."What better way to create awareness or get somebody's attention than with music or the arts?" said Brooke Anido, vice president of operations at Illumina Records.

Ayoub, 33, will appear on both the Providence and Boston "Rockers for Life" compilation CDs, which fund Ground Control's programs and media campaigns while giving local artists greater exposure.The CDs are sold through Discarc.com and Newbury Comics as well as through the musicians featured on them; each musician is required to buy 50 copies of the CD with the option to sell them or give them away.Artists are promoted on the Illumina Records Web site, the "Rockers for Life" MySpace page, as well as posters and other promotional material.They are selected for inclusion on the CDs based on their desire to help as well as the quality of their music.
"This is not a talent competition," Anido said. "We're looking for talented people, of course, but at the same time we're looking for people with good hearts."Ayoub - a full-time musician in the Americana/pop/rock genre who cites his influences as U2, Bruce Springsteen and Bob Dylan - was contacted by Illumina Records through his MySpace page. Although he hasn't been personally affected by drunk driving, Ayoub said he was immediately interested in the cause."It's a two-fold thing," he said. "It gets my music out there, which is sort of of secondary importance to helping out the charity. Any sort of good cause, if I can be a part of it musically or any other way, I will."Ayoub has taken part in charity efforts to benefit several causes, including multiple sclerosis, homeless pets, and the Jimmy Fund. As a musician performing in locations where liquor typically flows freely, he said the issue of drunk driving is particularly relevant.
"It's difficult because sometimes if I'm onstage or talking to people in the crowd, I sort of get a sense for how drunk they are," he said. "And sometimes I do sit and wonder to myself, is this person going to be driving home? Obviously I can't be a policeman to everybody, but it is something you sort of ask yourself: Where is this person going from here, and how are they getting there?" Visit www.myspace.com/philayoub.

Ground Control drunk driving prevention campaign: www.preventdrunkdriving.net or www.myspace.com/rockersforlife

 

5th DUI is a Felony now in Washington

Here comes yet another tougher stance on drunk driving / dwi / dui.

Starting Sunday, a new law aimed at keeping reoffenders from climbing back behind the wheel takes effect.
Right now, it doesn't matter how many DUIs you have, they're all misdemeanors.
Starting Sunday, that'll change. On your fifth DUI it'll automatically be a felony.
It doesn't matter, one, two, ten, right now, even if you've killed someone while behind the wheel, drunk driving remains a misdemeanor.
So in response to constant reoffenders, the state is making drunk driving an automatic felony if you're convicted five times in a ten year period.
"I mean I understand everybody makes a mistake, but five times. Five convictions for a dui is way too many before they do something more serious," said one driver.
"I've seen some very damaging things, and a lot of broken families and homes as a result of it," said another.
The change comes after 25 years of political wrangling for tougher punishment for drunk drivers.
For the state patrol, they say it's way too often they pull over a person with multiple previous convictions. Usually those reoffenders have alcohol problems.
"About the only way you can take somebody that's got a drinking problem out from behind the wheel is to put them in jail or to make the punishment so severe that it will prevent them from driving in the future," said Sgt. Roger Wilbur with WSP.
The majority of offenders will never reoffend, but for those who do, a fifth conviction could carry as many as five years in jail.
"Those small group of DUI offenders, they do seem to be, they are better off in Superior Court, facing a prison sentence," said Benton County Prosecutor Andy Miller.
That time won't be in the county jail. Miller says it'll be in prison, with a felony on your record.
Washington is one of only a few states that doesn't have a felony DUI law.
It takes effect Sunday, just in time for the Fourth of July.

 

Diabetic or Drunk or both?

June 28, 2007
Breaking News Alerts

PHOENIX, Az

A 65-year-old St. Louis man is missing after Amtrak personnel, mistaking his diabetic shock for drunk and disorderly behavior, kicked him off a train in the middle of a national forest, according to police in Williams, Ariz.

Police said Roosevelt Sims was headed to Los Angeles but was asked to leave the train shortly before 10 p.m. Sunday at a railroad crossing five miles outside Williams.

"He was let off in the middle of a national forest, which is about 800,000 acres of beautiful pine trees," Lt. Mike Graham said.
Police said there is no train station or running water at the crossing, which is about two miles from the nearest road, at an elevation of about 8,000 feet.
Amtrak personnel told police dispatchers that Sims was drunk and unruly.
The Sims family said Sims is diabetic and was going into shock.
Sims' brother, Brian Mason, said his family tried to call Sims on his cell phone that night, but Sims was incoherent.

Williams police told CBS 5 that Amtrak has used the abandoned crossing as a drop-off site in the past. Graham said that whether drunk or not, no one should be dropped off there.

 

4 killed in California DUI / vehicular manslaughter case

The Sacramento man accused of killing four people in a DUI crash is facing up to 17 years in prison.

Vellanoweth is accused of driving drunk on South Land Park Drive in Sacramento on March 26, when his Jeep Cherokee slammed head-on into another car. Three women and a toddler in the other car were killed.

A fifth person was injured.Among the victims were Rice's daughters, 21-year-old Brizchelle Rice and 17-year-old Brittanya Nash. Rice's grandson, 19-month old Kamall Osby, was also killed. The fourth victim was a family friend, Shanice Carter, 18."The accident reconstruction investigation is still ongoing, and we don't have those complete reports yet," said prosecutor Albert Locher. "There's no point in moving forward until we have those completed reports."After the hearing, Locher explained the situation to Rice and other family members in the hallway.

He said the police reports should be complete within a few days and expects the case will move forward at the next appearance August 2."I know you're frustrated. I am too," Locher told them.Vellanoweth, a 63-year-old political activist, was freed on bond just a couple of days after the crash.

He hasn't entered a plea to the charges of four counts of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence and two counts of felony California drunk driving /DUI .

 

Police Officer charged with DUI / Driving under the influence of alcohol

A police officer was arrested Wednesday night after state police say they suspected him of DUI - under the influence of alcohol.

Police officer Jamie Stamper was off duty when he was allegedly spotted at a gas station. A Kentucky state trooper noticed some strange behavior when he questioned the officer. Stamper was then taken into custody and charged with driving under the influence / DUI / drunk driving.

Wednesday, June 27, 2007

 

DUI does not stop Republican Politician

Chris Healy was re-elected Tuesday night as Republican state chairman, two weeks after informing the GOP's state central committee he was an alcoholic and had been convicted of drunken driving / DUI / DWI for the second time in five years.

Healy, 49, who has followed a program of counseling and support for years, was elected without opposition to a two-year term by committee members willing to view Healy's recent conviction as a lapse by a colleague struggling with a disease.


 

DUI law is new, stricter & ready to go

New DUI law ready to take affect

Big Island Police are warning the public that the state's DUI law has been amended to target highly intoxicated drivers / drunk drivers. The law, which takes affect on July 1, 2007, has stricter sanctions for those drivers who are arrested with a blood alcohol content of .150 or higher, which is nearly twice the legal limit of .08.
Under the new law, repeat offenders or highly intoxicated drivers who are arrested will have to surrender their motor vehicle registration, driver's license and license plates to the arresting officer. The officer will then issue a temporary registration and plates until a review is conducted. The driver will not be eligible for a conditional driving permit.
There is a mandatory six-month revocation of the driver's license and driving privileges. The maximum revocation is one year. The driver may also face 72 hours of community service, not less than 48 hours in jail, and a fine of $150 to $1,000 if convicted.
"Similar high blood alcohol content laws have been enacted in many other states due to the rise of highly intoxicated drivers throughout the nation," said Sergeant Dexter Veriato of the Police Department's Traffic Services Section.
Hawaii has one of highest alcohol-related fatality rates in the nation and the Big Island has the highest in the state. "While the average for the state is about 45 percent, the Big Island's alcohol fatality rate has averaged about 60 percent over the last two years," Veriato said. "Impaired driving is a big problem in our community. We need everyone's help in saving lives."

Police will increase DUI roadblocks island-wide during the 4th of July holiday period and will also maintain roving patrols that will be out looking for impaired / drunk / DUI / DWI drivers.

 

California DUI - Parked Car hit and then off

California DUI Man Faces Drunk Driving Charges After Hitting Parked Car

PALM SPRINGS, Calif.

A Valley Village man who fled a collision in Palm Springs, then ran into a stopped car, was facing a California DUI / drunk driving charge Wednesday and possibly others, police said.James Justin Mitchell, 45, of Valley Village, was allegedly driving a BMW that collided with another vehicle near Sunrise Way and East Palm Canyon Drive about 6 Tuesday night, police Sgt. Mitch Spike said.About five minutes later, Mitchell's BMW hit a stopped Nissan Altima at Morongo Road and South Palm Canyon Drive, Spike said. No one seriously injured, he said. Mitchell was booked for driving under the influence / DUI / drunk driving.

 

State Fire Marshal's DUI has repercussions

The state fire marshal has lost the use of his state vehicle and will soon lose his ability to get behind the wheel as part of the fallout from a May drunken-driving / DUI / DWI arrest.But it is not clear whether David B. Foreman’s job is in danger after his May 15 run-in with Springfield police.A spokeswoman for Gov. Rod Blagojevich, who appointed Foreman to the $102,000-per-year post in February 2006, said the governor is awaiting the outcome of Foreman’s court case before taking any disciplinary action.“Before we take any administrative action, we’ll wait until the legal process has played itself out,” said spokeswoman Rebecca Rausch.That’s a different approach than the state used in 2005, when a supervisor in the state fire marshal’s office fought to keep his job after allegations surfaced that he was drinking on the job.In that case, Michael P. O’Donnell was in a state vehicle in Chicago’s suburbs when he crashed. A police officer said he smelled alcohol after the wreck.But, despite not being charged with drunken driving, O’Donnell was removed from his nearly $70,000-per-year state job. The state’s decision was unanimously supported by the Illinois Civil Service Commission in an August 2005 ruling.Foreman’s drunken-driving trial is set to begin July 23 in Sangamon County Circuit Court.Police reports indicate he refused to take a breath test after being pulled over on Springfield’s west side about 4 a.m.He was taken to jail and was bailed out within an hour by a colleague.Patti Thompson, spokeswoman for the fire marshal’s office, said Foreman has been using his own vehicle for state business since the arrest. Once he loses his ability to drive this Sunday as part of a state-mandated six-month license suspension, Foreman will take taxis and hitch rides with co-workers in order to conduct his business while in Springfield, she said.“He lives up in the Joliet area so he’ll be taking a train coming down here,” Thompson said Wednesday. “He can use cabs if he needs to get around. He’ll do like anybody else would when they don’t have a way of getting around.”Unlike other top state agency officials, Thompson said Foreman will not have a driver assigned to him during this time of the DUI.

 

DUI + Indecent Exposure Arrest

A Rehoboth Beach, Delaware man faces indecent exposure and DUI charges after allegedly fondling himself in front of a woman in a grocery store parking lot.
Delaware State Police say that on Monday, June 25, at approximately 10 a.m. troopers responded to the Super G parking lot on and County Road 270 after receiving information that a man allegedly exposed himself to a 38-year-old Frederick, Md. woman.
According to police, the woman called 911 after she observed a man fondling himself in a blue Nissan Altima parked next to her car. Police say that as the woman entered her car she looked out of her driver's side window and the man continued to expose his genitalia to her. The woman backed out of her parking space and obtained the Altima's registration number and later provided that information along with the man's description to the police. Troopers responded to the parking lot and located the Altima and a man matching the description provided by the woman.
Upon arrival at the scene, troopers located 30-year-old Lancer Q. Perry, a.k.a. Lance Perry, of Rehoboth Beach, in the driver's seat of the Altima. During the investigation troopers questioned Perry. Police say that during the questioning, troopers smelled an odor of alcoholic beverage coming from Perry's breath. Police say they arrested Perry after failed a field sobriety test at the scene.
Perry was later arrested for one count of second-degree indecent exposure and driving under the influence / DUI / DWI / Drunk Driving.

 

Drunk Driving laws combine Boat, Off-road vehicle and snowmobiles

Bill aligns boat, snowmobile, ORV, road drunk driving laws

June 27, 2007 -

Legislation recently introduced in the state House of Representatives to revise current off-road vehicle (ORV), snowmobile, and boat operation standards has earned wide support from lawmakers and made its way to the Senate.With a vote of 103-5, House Bill (HB) 4789 left the lower chamber for Senate approval, which could make changes effective Jan. 1, 2008.The measure, as it stands by amendment, makes two noteworthy revisions to the current ORV operational codes by aligning those provisions with current automobile operation standards. It prohibits the use of an ORV with a blood alcohol level of .08 grams, lowered from 1.0. It also aligns drunken ORV operation that results in death with the automobile criminal code dealing with homicide, manslaughter and murder.The move essentially makes drinking and ORV operating standards the same as those involving road vehicles.In the House, the bill went through the judiciary committee, on which lakes area state Rep. David Law (R-Commerce, West Bloomfield, Wolverine Lake) serves."I believe this is tying up loose ends," he said. "There were some questions as to snowmobiles, off road vehicles, and things like that. This makes it clear."When the drunk driving standards for road vehicles were recently changed in the state, provisions dealing with ORV operation were left ambiguous. Typically, operation standards are applied across the board, but according to Law, the holes left some gaps that may have allowed offenders to slip away without proper punishment."There was argument on whether the law change from before really dealt with snowmobiles and other ORVs," he said. "So, these provisions make it equal to the automobile change. There should be no questioning now whether it applies to ORVs or not."As a former assistant prosecutor for Oakland County, Law said he hopes this makes it easier for others to make their case against future offenders."I don't think it's right to have different penalties if you kill someone with a car vs. killing them with an ORV," he said. "There were times prosecutors couldn't charge as high a crime as they could have because the law was ambiguous."HB 4789 was received in the Senate and referred to the Judiciary Committee on Thursday, June 14 and awaits a hearing.This bill is tied to several others that specifically address certain types of ORVs. HB 4794 deals with watercraft, HB 4795 with snowmobiles, and HB 4813 provides sentencing guidelines. Those bills also await a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, after also clearing the House floor."Common sense would dictate that if you're driving a motor vehicle of any sort, be it a snowmobile, a car, or motorcycle, or boat, that drinking and driving don't mix," said Sen. Nancy Cassis (R-Commerce, Milford, Highland, White Lake, West Bloomfield, Orchard Lake, Wixom, Walled Lake and Wolverine Lake) . "I'm certainly interested in looking at this legislation. We don't need more people injured or killed in accidents related to (DUI / DWI / Drunk Driving ) alcohol."

 

DUI penalties

Virginia's Exorbitant New Abuser Fees: Happy Motoring!

Starting on Sunday, if a jerk from Maryland or the District drives recklessly in Virginia, he'll be liable for a $100 fine. But if the jerky driver is a Virginian, he'll get slapped with an extra $1,050 fine on top of the $100. Similarly, if an out of state drunk gets caught on a Virginia road, he'll face a $250 fine if this is his first DUI. But a Virginian caught in the same act will have to pay the $250 plus a bonus fee of $2,250.

Needless to say, this innovation in soaking roadway miscreants is not going over especially well in the Old Dominion.
There's a great uproar about the supposed unfairness of hitting Virginians with giant fees that out of state drivers don't have to worry about. There's a wave of grumbling about how this new fee structure came to pass, with a special focus on the role of the lawyer/politicians who stand to gain big money from this novel way of raising tax dollars.
There's a big bonanza of fees awaiting those law firms around the state that are selected to go chase after the highway miscreants who don't pay their fines in a timely way. Let's take a look at some of the discomfiting effects of this new law. State attorney general Bob McDonnell, who wants to be your next governor, used to work at the firm of Huff, Poole & Mahoney in Virginia Beach, which has an exclusive contract with local prosecutors' offices to go out and collect those unpaid fines. The firm, according to the Virginian-Pilot, earned more than $2 million in collection fees last year. McDonnell, as his staff was quick to remind me this morning, does not give out those contracts and has no financial connection to his old firm. But still, it doesn't exactly breed confidence in the system when lawyers who go on to work for the people of Virginia appear to be in the position of creating law that could help their old friends.
Closer to home, it's northern Virginia Delegate David Albo who's getting slammed as the creator of this new fee structure. It turns out that the Fairfax delegate is, in his off hours from his legislative work, a lawyer at a firm that handles a lot of traffic matters. That, his critics say, puts Albo in a position to profit handsomely from the new fees.
Albo himself defends the abuser fees as a good way to raise state money for transportation improvements--goodness knows we wouldn't want to raise taxes in an open and fair manner--and as a fair tool to wield against the jerks who make driving more dangerous than it ought to be.
"My job as a delegate is to make people slow down and build some roads," Albo told the Post's Tom Jackman. "This bill does both.... It's basically a voluntary tax. If you don't commit a crime on the streets, or run up a huge amount of points, you don't pay anything. We believe its main effect will be to get people to stop driving like maniacs."
This is a bipartisan load: Gov. Tim Kaine said pretty much the same thing yesterday. "I don't have the ability to give driving instructions to 7 1/2 million Virginians, but hopefully the prospect of stiff fines will make people drive right," the guv told WTOP radio.
Ok--I agree with the new law's critics that there's something distasteful and even unfair about smacking the state's own residents with these fees while letting out of state drivers carry on as usual. And I think it's essentially dishonest to rely on sneaky fees like this to raise the money that should be raised with a straightforward tax increase, in this case, by hiking the gas tax.
But Albo is correct about one very important part of this initiative: Confiscatory fees do have a good social impact. In New Jersey, where similar fees have been on the books since 1983 (though they are imposed on all offenders, no matter whether they live in Jersey), drivers have become more careful--the number of points they've accrued has dropped since the fees were imposed. And in European countries, insanely high fines have helped to reduce drunk driving & DUI / DWI.

 

Man gets caught for 2nd DUI in same day

Man caught drunk driving twice in one day
June 27, 2007

A GERMAN man making a routine trip to the police station to reclaim his stolen car ended up being busted for drunk driving twice in the same day, police said today.
In order to claim the recovered car, the 45-year-old had driven to the station in another vehicle, police in the western city of Marburg said.
After officers noticed alcohol on his breath, a test showed he was over the legal limit and his driving licence and keys were confiscated.
"Officers could not quite believe it when they came across the same man driving his car four hours later," police said.
"He had been drinking in the meantime and a fresh test showed he was even more over the limit," they said.
They called the man's partner to come and pick him up and made sure she drove him home.

 

Police Crackdown on DUI / DWI / Drunk Driving

News From New York State Department of Motor Vehicles
News from New York State Department of Motor Vehicles
For more information contact: Barbara Kirker, 518-473-7000
Officials Announce Statewide Stop-DWI Effort
Law Enforcement to Crackdown on Motorists that Drink and Drive
ALBANY, NY (06/27/07; 1411)(readMedia)-- Commissioner David J. Swarts of the Department of Motor Vehicles and chair of the Governor’s Traffic Safety Committee (GTSC); James May, President of New York State STOP-DWI; Preston Felton, Acting Superintendent of the State Police; John Grebert, Executive Director of the Chiefs of Police Association; and other local law enforcement officials today announced STOP-DWI efforts that will take place statewide. The crackdown is aimed at making sure people are celebrating wisely and safely this holiday week.
STOP-DWI stands for “Special Traffic Options Program for Driving While Intoxicated”. A STOP-DWI enforcement effort to crackdown on drunk driving during the July 4th holiday period will take place from June 29 – July 8. Law enforcement agencies throughout the state will be out in force to reduce the incidence of drunk driving and to ensure our roadways are safe.
“STOP-DWI efforts have led to significant reductions in the number of alcohol related fatalities, but still too many lives are being lost because of crashes caused by drunk or impaired drivers,” Commissioner Swarts said. “I commend law enforcement for their efforts to ensure the safety of all motorists in New York State.”
James May, President of the STOP-DWI Association said, “The New York State STOP-DWI Association is pleased to join forces with the New York State Police, County Sheriff's and municipal police agencies from across New York for the 4th of July STOP-DWI Crackdown Campaign. Highly visible, highly publicized efforts like the 4th of July STOP-DWI Crackdown serve to remind everyone to driver sober. We hope this special effort by law enforcement helps make our roadways safe during the 4th of July holiday week.”
New York State Police Acting Superintendent Preston L. Felton said, “The New York State Police proudly join the Governor's Traffic Safety Committee and the STOP-DWI campaign in the continued effort to discourage, detect, and apprehend impaired drivers. Scores of senseless deaths occur on our highways because of drinking and driving, speeding, aggressive driving, and improper use of safety restraints. State Police enforcement, combined with safe and responsible driving behaviors by motorists, will give way to safer roadways for all New Yorkers this Independence Day holiday.”
John Grebert, Executive Director of the State Police Chiefs said, “The Association, its municipal partners and STOP-DWI coordinators are committed to this important enforcement initiative. This effort, which targets the impaired driver, will save lives and improve highway safety across the State.”
At the news conference, law enforcement agencies noted they will be stepping up their enforcement efforts throughout the year, especially during the upcoming week of the 4th of July holiday. Last year during the 4th of July reporting period of June 30 – July 4 there were six alcohol-related crashes that resulted in six deaths, which was down from the eight fatalities during the same period in 2005.
While these crackdown periods produce positive results, it is important to keep in mind that every 30 minutes, someone in this country dies in an alcohol-related crash. Last year alone, more than one million people nationwide were injured in automobile crashes in which alcohol was a factor.
The STOP-DWI Crackdowns will target the popular holidays of 2007. This week, through the 4th of July holiday, the target period is from June 29 – July 8. During the Labor Day holiday, September 1-3, will have increased enforcement and the holiday period from December 21 – January 1, 2008 will also be targeted.
The STOP-DWI program was enacted for the purpose of coordinating local efforts to reduce alcohol and other drug-related crashes in a comprehensive and financially self-sustaining highway safety program.
The STOP-DWI program permits each of the state’s counties to establish a STOP-DWI Program which qualifies for the return of all fines collected for alcohol and other drug-related traffic offenses occurring within its jurisdiction.
All 62 counties have opted to participate. Each county appoints a STOP-DWI Coordinator, whose duties include the coordination of efforts by agencies involved in alcohol and highway safety.
Although the development and implementation of STOP-DWI programs rests with the counties, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is charged with the task of approving county STOP-DWI plans.

Tuesday, June 26, 2007

 

Niceville Bicyclist DUI

June 26, 2007


A Niceville woman was charged with DUI driving under the influence after she fell off of her bicycle while an Okaloosa County Sheriff ’s deputy was driving down the street. The woman was on Pine Street when she fell down, left her bicycle in the roadway and walked away from the deputy, who asked her to remove it, according to a Sheriff ’s Office report. Instead of complying, she “staggered away towards the house,” and the deputy followed her, the report stated The report said the deputy could smell alcohol and that the woman had difficulty with the DUI field sobriety test. She was so unsteady on her feet that he noted in the report that he thought it was “unsafe” for her to continue try to pass the test. She told him she had only one drink in the morning. It was about 11 a.m. June 17 when the deputy encountered her. On the breath test, she had a 0.22 and 0.22 BAC.


 

San Diego Police Sergeant and San Diego DUI suspect hospitalized

DUI Incident- Police Sergeant And DUI Suspect In Hospital


A San Diego police sergeant who was hit by a suspected San Diego DUI driver & an alleged San Diego Drunk Driver have been hospitalized.

The sergeant pulled over a vehicle at the corner of University and Granada avenues in North Park . San Diego Police Lt. Lori Luhnow said, While the officers were outside of their vehicle assessing the sobriety of the driver, another alleged San Diego drunk driver hit the rear of the police car with its lights on.

Reports from the police have it that the driver was approaching the eastern part of the University before colliding with the vehicle of the Police officer. The driver who caused the accident was apprehended at the spot.

Injuries were sustained by the officer, the driver and a passenger that was in the car that was collided and as a result, they were taken to the hospital for medical attention.

An alleged San Diego drunken driver that caused the San Diego DUI accident would be arrested for San Diego DUI when released from the hospital.

 

Drunken drivers targeted in Illinois: You Drink, You Drive, You Lose

Illinois DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI police have begun participating in a two-week state program targeting drunken drivers.

The Carol Stream police department will conduct saturation patrols and covert enforcement efforts through July 8 as part of the state's "You Drink, You Drive, You Lose" mobilization.

Funding for the village's increased enforcement effort is being provided by the Illinois Department of Transportation Division of Traffic Safety.

 

DUI Breath Alcohol Machine Source Code protected by trade secrets?

DUI / DWI / Drunk Driving Attorney news:

DUI Breath alcohol machine source code discovery may be done in florida and most probably elsewhere in other states. There may be no silver lining.

http://arstechnica. com/news. ars/post/ 20070625- florida-appeals- court-says- trade-secret- protection- takes-priority- over-election- transparency. html

Protecting trade secrets takes priority over election transparency
June 25, 2007

A Florida appeals court has upheld a lower court decision that denies requests for an independent source code audit of voting machines used by Florida's 13th district, which suffered election irregularities in a highly controversial congressional race.

The appeals court has chosen to support a lower court decision which asserts that forcing voting machine maker Election Systems and Software (ES&S) to provide source code access to independent security auditors would amount to "gutting the protections afforded those who own trade secrets."

It all started when candidate Christine Jennings lost to Rep. Vern Buchanan by only 368 votes in a House race last year, the slimmest margin of any congressional race in the country. Irregularities in the election, particularly high undervote rates, caused Jennings to express doubts about the validity of the outcome. During the election, approximately 15 percent (or 18,000) of the total ballots cast in the district did not include a vote in the disputed race. By comparison, the absentee ballots in the same district and regular paper ballots used in neighboring districts only exhibit a 2 percent undervote rate for congressional races. The high undervote rates have been attributed to the ES&S iVotronic machines used in the 13th district.

Although efforts to get the state to force ES&S to submit to additional independent code audits have failed, a bipartisan congressional task force working closely with the Government Accountability Office is actively scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding election irregularities in Florida's 13th district, and may decide to subpoena ES&S. The congressional task force plans to issue a progress report late next month, but the entire investigation is expected to last until September.

Could the iVotronic systems be responsible for the voting irregularities? A growing body of evidence indicates that electronic voting machines, particularly those that use touch-screens, lead to higher undervote rates. Touch-screen voting machines made by major vendors also frequently exhibit serious technical flaws and poor reliability. In response to widespread voting machine problems, Florida governor Charlie Crist is encouraging the state legislature to pass a law that would prevent districts from buying most kinds of touch-screen voting machines.

A bill that was approved by the House Committee on Administration last month includes source code disclosure requirements which stipulate that voting machine makers would be required to disclose their code to independent third-party auditors who may be required to sign nondisclosure agreements. As Tim Lee pointed out in his article on the subject last month, independent code audit requirements are important for election transparency, but nondisclosure agreements would prevent broad public analysis of source code and could potentially be used to intimidate security analysts. Considering the high level of vulnerability exhibited by mainstream electronic voting technology, Congress needs to do all that it can to help the states protect themselves from faulty products.

Monday, June 25, 2007

 

DUI in Australia - Radio personality Steve Price Pleads Not Guilty

RADIO personality Steve Price has appeared in a Sydney court where he will contest a charge of mid-range drink-driving.

Price, who hosts the drive-time program on Sydney radio station 2UE, was charged after a night out on April 14. Police caught him riding a Vespa scooter at Neutral Bay, on Sydney's lower north shore, carrying his wife Wendy as a passenger.

As the 52-year-old faced North Sydney Local Court today, Magistrate Andrew George heard that the level of alcohol allegedly found in Price's system would be a matter of debate.

The court was told Price had been prepared to plead guilty to low-range drink-driving, but prosecutors had refused to accept his plea.

Price's lawyer indicated that his client was pleading not guilty to the mid-range drink driving charge.

 

California DUI Man who survived double fatal DUI arrested again for drunk driving

A man who survived a double-fatal DUI /drunk driving wreck on Indian Valley Road in Novato two years ago was arrested Saturday on suspicion of California DUI, after his speeding 1998 Oldsmobile Cutlass tore through 25 feet of wood fencing on the same road.

Juan Carlos Ascencio, 21, fled in his damaged vehicle before abandoning it and running south on Indian Valley Road, where he was picked up by Marin County sheriff's deputies about 4:20 a.m. Saturday, according to the California Highway Patrol.

A CHP officer determined Ascencio was DUI / under the influence of alcohol and arrested him on suspicion of California drunk driving and hit-and-run property damage.

The accident occurred at the intersection with Indian Springs Road, about 1.5 miles west of the November 2005 crash site where Novato residents Scott Van Hootegem, 18, and Alex Hunt, 19, were killed. Ascencio was one of two passengers who survived.

"When I found out about it this morning, the previous accident was the first thing that came to my mind," CHP spokeswoman Mary Ziegenbein said. "Obviously, this is a lesson that's really slow to sink in. Drinking and driving just don't mix. It impairs your faculties. You don't realize how fast you're going, your vision and judgment are both impaired."

Ascencio, who was not injured in Saturday's crash, has not yet been charged by the Marin County District Attorney's Office. Toxicology tests generally take two to four weeks.

"One fortunate thing is that no one was hurt and only property was damaged," Ziegenbein said. "It could have been far, far worse."

According to the CHP, Ascencio was driving at a high rate of speed and failed to negotiate a 90-degree turn at Indian Springs Road - near Slowdown Court. The car veered wide around the turn, skidded and ran onto the shoulder of the roadway before striking two ornamental structures and destroying a section of fencing at 1897 Indian Valley Road, the CHP reported.

Ascencio was in the back seat of Van Hootegem's Ford F-250 pickup truck that crashed into an oak tree on a winding turn on Indian Valley Road near Arthur Street in the early-morning hours of Nov. 12, 2005. The crash occurred after a birthday party at which alcohol was served.

In the aftermath of that crash, the county Board of Supervisors adopted a social host ordinance in which fines can be levied against parents and other adults who host parties where alcohol is served to underage youth.

 

Increased California DUI patrols in Orange County

Increased DUI patrols

The Anaheim, Brea, Buena Park, California Highway Patrol, Cal State Fullerton, Cypress, Fullerton, La Habra, La Palma and Placentia law enforcement agencies will be conducting increased California DUI / drunk driving patrols from Friday through July 6.

The agencies are part of a two-year grant program funded by the Office of Traffic Safety, which conducts a California DUI / drunk driving enforcement activity each month.

California DUI enforcement activities include California DUI patrols and checkpoints, and California DUI warrant and parolee compliance checks. The goal of the grant is to reduce the incidence of fatalities, injuries and property damage due to California DUI /drunk driving on highways.

 

DUI check point Tuesday

California DUI and Driver's license checkpoint to be held Tuesday


Bakersfield Police will be conducting a DUI and Driver's License checkpoint Tuesday morning in Bakersfield.

The checkpoint will be held from 7 am until 1 pm Tuesday at an undisclosed location.

The purpose of the checkpoint is to educate the public about laws dealing with DUI / driving under the influence of intoxicants and the importance of being a legally licensed driver.

 

DUI law calls for harsher penalties

Unsigned: DUI law puts government into perspective

June 25, 2007

Read an article in the paper that restores your faith in the U.S. political system. Read something that does the opposite.

A bill signed into law recently by Gov. Janet Napolitano will require any DUI / drunk driving offender - extreme or not, to have an ignition interlock device placed on their vehicle. The device acts as a breathalyzer before the driver can start the engine. The law will also go into play for first-time DUI / drunk driving offenders.

Now, whether you agree with this law or not, that's not really the issue at hand. The issue at hand is that shortly after Napolitano signed the bill, there was talk of changes being made.

With one last DUI bill that could pass through the legislature before the session ended, Rep. John Kavanagh R-Fountain Hills attached an amendment that would repeal the law from effecting first-time offenders unless they caused an accident.

In the end, the bill failed and the DUI law will stay as it is. But the question arises of why would something Kavanagh originally voted for be contested so shortly after becoming law? Is there a good reason? Probably not.

 

San Diego County DUI arrests (North County)

Escondido DUI patrol nets 3 DUI arrests

June 25, 2007

ESCONDIDO ---- 3 people were arrested for DUI during a weekend patrol targeting San Diego County DUI or drunk drivers, Escondido police said.

The patrol was conducted between 7 p.m. Saturday and 1 a.m. Sunday.

Police arrested three drivers on suspicion of driving under the influence / DUI / drunk driving.

 

Drunk driving for hitting deer

Motorcyclist hits deer, faces DWI charges


Victoria Freile
Staff writer



(June 25, 2007) — A man, accused of driving drunk, was seriously injured in a motorcycle accident early today, according to Ontario County Sheriff’s deputies.

Joshuwia R. Szkapi, 22, was driving a motorcycle on County Road 32 in Canandaigua and struck a deer about 12:45 a.m., according to Ontario County Sheriff’s deputies. He was allegedly speeding at the time of the crash and sustained internal injuries and burns, deputies said.

The status of the deer was not available.

Szkapi was charged with driving while intoxicated / DWI / drunk driving and ticketed for unsafe speed.

 

Cell phone talking while driving more dangerous than drunk driving?

A study warned against the use of a cell phone while behind the wheel.

In the study, David Strayer and Frank Drews, professors of psychology, showed that cell phone users were five times more likely to get in an accident -- the same risk as a drunk driver with an alcohol level of 0.08 or DUI.

Now their alarming findings are being used to fuel a political debate. In the most recent state legislative session, Kory Holdaway, R-Taylorsville, Utah, used the study to argue for a bill banning drivers from chatting on the phone. The measure failed.

Holdaway, who's been trying for years to pass legislation prohibiting cell phone use in the car, said the study provided vital information that he hopes will convince state legislators to pass the bill next session.

However, some think legislation against driving and talking is an infringement on personal liberties.

Penalties would "have to be stiff" to get anybody to listen.

Although some may view the legislation as an infringement on personal rights, there's no argument when public safety is concerned.

Some people think it doesn't affect them, but everybody is impaired when they talk on their phone and drive at the same time.

Drews said that people are already making changes in their driving habits because they are becoming more aware of the danger associated with talking on a cell phone behind the wheel. He hopes to see lobbying groups in the future similar to Mothers Against Drunk Driving.

 

Texas gets DWI / DUI van to fight drunk driving

The Houston Police Department hopes a new vehicle will help fight the trend of more drunk driving and DUI's / DWI's.

Breath alcohol testing vans will have the equipment. The breath anlyzer equipment will be in the van along with a computer and fax and possibly a small holding cell, reports the Chief.

In a news conference June 25, 2007, the Chief believes these self-contained DWI / DUI / drunk driving processing vans will allow arresting officers to transport suspects faster to jail for DUI / DWI / drunk driving.

 

How to avoid a DUI if you're planning a 4th of July party

June 25, 2007

Nearly 18,000 people were killed in alcohol-related crashes in the last year -- an average of one every half hour. Upcoming holidays like the 4th of July and Labor Day are some of the most dangerous days on the road, in part, because of people who had one too many drinks at parties hosted by family or friends.

Many people lose their lives every year because of drunk driving, an easily preventable act. While many people spend days and even weeks planning the perfect party, they don't give a second thought to how their guests will arrive safely home and what action they will take if someone drinks too much and wants to drive.

While it may seem awkward asking a guest not to drive while intoxicated, it could save lives, and at the same time, spare you possible legal responsibility for your guest's actions should he or she get in an auto accident.

To help reduce the risk your guests will be involved in DUI's or alcohol-related accidents, it is recommends that hosts take the following important steps:

Planning the Party:
-- Let your guests know ahead of time how you feel about drinking and driving, and their need to be responsible about their alcohol consumption.

-- As guests RSVP, confirm each groups' non-drinking designated driver.

-- Plan activities to engage your guests, to take the focus away from drinking.

-- Provide plenty of high-protein foods, like cheese and meats, to help slow the absorption of alcohol and keep guests from drinking on an empty stomach. Keep in mind, however, that food does not affect the pace alcohol leaves someone's system.

-- Avoid salty snacks, like potato chips, that can cause thirsty guests to drink more.

-- Plan to offer unique, non-alcoholic beverages, or "mocktails," with clever names for designated drivers and others who prefer not to drink alcohol.

-- If preparing an alcoholic punch, use a fruit juice instead of a carbonated base, which can speed the absorption of alcohol into the blood stream.

-- Have the number of a taxi service on hand for anyone who may need a ride, or plan to drive any intoxicated partygoers home.

Party Time:
-- Have fun. Remember you are responsible for the safety of your guests, and in some cases, their actions when they leave your party. Good hosts stay in control and don't drink too much in order to make sure guests do the same.

-- Never serve alcohol to someone under the legal drinking age and keep alcohol in a central, visible place, where teen drivers can't "sneak" a drink.

-- Never ask children to serve alcohol at parties.

-- Don't let guests mix their own drinks. Use a reliable "bartender" who can track the size and number of drinks each guest consumes.

-- If a guest is drinking too much, stop serving them and offer them a
non-alcoholic beverage.

-- Close the bar 90 minutes before the end of the party; use the rest of the party to serve coffee and dessert.

-- If guests drink too much, don't let them drive: Drive them home yourself, (leaving another sober guest to fill-in as host while you are gone). Arrange for another guest or a taxi to take guests home, or invite them to stay over.

 

DUI man loses control of his Maruti, runs over 3 jhuggi dwellers

June 25: In yet another case of DUI / DRUNK DRIVING / “driving under the influence”, a man lost control of his Maruti and ran over three jhuggi dwellers sleeping on the pavement on Bhairon Road. All three sustained injuries. One of them is still in hospital, the other two were discharged after first aid.

The driver, Inderjeet Singh, who runs a dhaba in Indirapuram, tried to flee but has been arrested. Singh was inebriated while returning home from his dhabha along with his four workers around 1.30 am on Sunday. He was reportedly driving at a breakneck speed and the car, eyewitness told police, was careening wildly.

At Bhairon Road, he lost control of the vehicle, which went climbed the pavement, running over three persons.

The victims, Shabnam (20), Irfan (23) and Monu (18) are residents of a nearby jhuggi cluster. Singh tried to flee, but the victims’ relatives raised an alarm. A PCR van parked in the vicinity was informed, which gave chase to the Maruti and arrested Singh for DUI / drunk driving / driving under the influence.

 

DUI / DWI charges after collision that killed Arkansas girl

June 25, 2007

WALDRON, Arkansas

A Huntington man faces charges of driving on a suspended license and DUI/ DWI / drunk driving after he reportedly ran over and killed a 3-year-old girl, police said.

Richard Egan was leaving a home in Waldron on Saturday when he allegedly backed over the child, who was bent down playing in the dirt of the driveway or who was playing in the area. After he struck the girl, Egan allegedly left his car and began performing CPR on the child, witnesses told police.

The girl, Dawn Skylar Newell, died Sunday at Arkansas Children's hospital in Little Rock, authorities said.

The Waldron Police Department said Egan registered 0.14 on a blood-alcohol test.

Egan was charged with DWI / driving while intoxicated, driving on a suspended license and careless prohibitive driving, and may face a negligent homicide charge as well.

 

San Diego PD Officer injured during San Diego DUI FST's for a San Diego DUI suspect

A San Diego police officer was injured early yesterday morning during a DUI / drunk driving stop.

The officer had pulled over a suspected drunken driver and was standing outside her patrol car administering a field sobriety check, police said. A second driver then crashed into the officer's car, which hit the officer and injured her.

The incident occurred about 2:30 a.m. at University Avenue and Utah Street. Both drivers were arrested on suspicion of drunken driving. The officer was not hospitalized, police said.

While the officers were outside of their vehicle assessing the sobriety of the driver, another alleged drunk driver hit the rear of the police car with its lights on, San Diego Police Lt. Lori Luhnow indicated.

Police said the driver was heading east on University before slamming into the officer's vehicle, which then hit the car already pulled over on the side of the road.

The driver who caused the accident was arrested at the scene, police said.

The officer and the driver that was pulled over, and a passenger that was in the car that collided with the others, were taken to a hospital with minor injuries, officials said.

Police said the suspected drunken driver originally pulled over will be arrested once released from the hospital.

 

DUI conviction for .05?

Prosecutor Debunks .08 DUI Myth


High-profile alleged drunk driving accidents has put an increased focus on blood-alcohol content levels.

In May, a DuPage County Illinois prosecutor was killed in an accident where her BAC was later determined to be .25 percent. The driver in an Oswego crash in February that killed five teenagers is accused of having a BAC of around .084. A trial began last week for the alleged driver in a 2006 triple-fatal crash, where at least one report put his BAC at .18.

But if you think it takes an extreme blood-alcohol level to get a DUI conviction, think again.

While it's true that .08 is the legal limit for intoxication, drivers can be convicted of drunken driving with BAC as low as .05.

That means some women could be at risk for a drunk-driving conviction after just one drink; all men would be in jeopardy after three drinks consumed in an hour.

People say a case should be dismissed because the person blew under a .08. Not necessarily is what the State's Attorney says.

At .08 percent blood alcohol, prosecutors do not have to prove you were intoxicated at the time of the traffic stop -- it is presumed you were drunk.

But you can be charged and convicted of drunk driving if your blood alcohol is between .05 and .079 if prosecutors can prove that your driving was impaired at the time of your stop or accident. (Below .05, drivers are legally presumed to not be intoxicated.)

If such a borderline case went to trial, prosecutors would present evidence of the driver's actions or statements to show he or she was obviously too impaired to drive, even if their BAC was below .08. It's obviously a more difficult proposition to prove, but local prosecutors say they have gotten convictions.

Calculating blood-alcohol levels -- the percentage of alcohol in the blood stream -- is based on the amount of drinks a person consumes over how long a period of time measured against that person's weight.

According to the Illinois secretary of state's office, research has shown that critical driving skills are impaired for anyone with a .08 BAC. Skills such as changing lanes, braking and acceleration are affected at that level, according to the Illinois Secretary of State's office.

 

San Diego drunk driving at San Diego Casinos coraled by new bill?

Barona tribe is trying to change the state's trespassing law to give tribal governments the power to order people off Indian lands and have sheriff's deputies write $250 or $500 tickets.

The change is needed because it has little recourse for keeping non-Indian drug dealers and other criminals including San Diego drunk driving or DUI from coming onto its reservation or casino.

Current state trespassing laws apply when people go onto property that is cultivated, fenced or posted with at least three signs every mile.

The Barona tribe is working to change the law as it applies to Indian lands, which it says are often too large to fence, cultivate or post with signs. The bill would allow tribes to banish nontribal members in writing. Once warned, people would be subject to fines.

A state Assembly committee will hold a hearing on the issue Tuesday.

Tribal officials can tell troublemakers on the reservation's residential areas or casino to stay away, but that's about it. They know they won't be punished. What's the worst that's going to happen? The sheriff is going to put them in the car and take them down the hill. If the tribe-backed bill becomes law, trespassers would face a $250 fine if they return after being warned and $500 if they return again.

Local police agencies, which have jurisdiction on reservations for criminal matters, would be responsible for enforcing the law, and the cases would wind up in San Diego County Superior Court.

Critics say the law could be used to punish people who have angered tribal leaders; it also could be used against non-Indians who have legitimate reasons to be on the reservation.

The California Senate has approved Senate Bill 331, sponsored by Sen. Gloria Romero, D-Los Angeles.

San Diego County Sheriff Bill Kolender and District Attorney Bonnie Dumanis support the bill.

It is scheduled to be heard by the Assembly's Public Safety Committee tomorrow.
A spokesman for Romero said he couldn't comment on the legislation because legislators “are still meeting, negotiating until the very last minute.”

Another bill, written by Dumanis' office, would allow businesses across the state – from Indian casinos to discount stores to taco stands – to exclude for six months trespassers who have interfered with the business.

If they return, they could be arrested on misdemeanor trespassing charges. They're going to get drunk, grab women inappropriately. They're going to steal. They're going to try to cheat.

That measure, Senate Bill 804, sponsored by Sen. Dennis Hollingsworth, R-Murrieta, has stalled because of jail and prison overcrowding.

Several tribes with successful casinos have posted guards at gates to limit access to residential areas of their reservations.

Opposition to Barona's measure is coming from people such as Joe Liska, 46, of El Cajon.

A few years ago, Liska protested the Pechanga tribe, complaining that it wrongly refused to recognize his Indian roots. He later was banished from the reservation near Temecula, where his birth father – he was adopted – is buried.

Pechanga, like several other tribes, including some in San Diego County, has had membership disputes.

There are fears that the proposed law can be used to hurt Indians, particularly those who have been allotted land on reservations other than their own.

The complex and intertwined history of California Indian tribes makes that possible.

Another potential problem is for non-Indians who own property surrounded by reservations or whose property is only accessible by going onto Indian land.

At Barona, neighbors were cut off from their properties after the Cedar fire. The only way onto their land was by driving onto the reservation. After surveying its boundaries when the fire cleared, the tribe strung fencing across their driveways. That might keep out San Diego DUI drivers on those driveways.

Sunday, June 24, 2007

 

Actress Michelle Rodriguez & drunk driving

Michelle Rodriquez
Jun 24, 2007

Actress Michelle Rodriquez, known to be one of Hollywood's wild set, who is no stranger to the law, claims she's normal...while others in Hollywood are locked up in rehab. To that, we use the old adage...'people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones'.

Here's some history on Rodriquez courtesy of Celebrity Wonder...

June 2006: Michelle claimed not to have a problem with alcohol despite a conviction for drunk driving, saying "My father threw up his liver. If I were going to be an alcoholic, I'd know by now".

May 2006: Michelle, who was sentenced to two-months in a Los Angeles County jail, was released after only serving a few hours, because of crowded conditions.

In addition, Michelle served five days in jail in Hawaii for drunk driving and had to serve 60 days for violating her probation with that arrest.

 

Zero Tolerance for 4th of July

As the Fourth of July holiday approaches, the Henry County Police Department is one of more than 500 departments in the state participating in Operation Zero Tolerance to crack down on drunk driving.

The campaign, which began Friday, is part of the Georgia Office of Highway Safety’s 100 Days of Summer H.E.A.T.( Highway Enforcement of Aggressive Traffic) initiative.

Through July 8, police departments, sheriff’s offices and Georgia State Patrol posts will run intensive patrols and set up sobriety checkpoints, also monitoring the use of seat belts and child restraints.

Currently in its fourth straight year, H.E.A.T. represents GOHS’s efforts to reduce the number of drunk drivers on the roads by issuing citations for speeding and aggressive driving, writing tickets for failure to wear safety belts and imposing jail time on those who drive under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

According to GOHS Director Robert Dallas, Operation Zero Tolerance is about more than making arrests.

“We’re even telling motorists when to watch out for the blue lights. Because it’s not about writing more tickets, it’s about saving more lives,” he said in a statement. “The message is simple. You drive impaired in Georgia, you will go to jail.”

Among the tools used to enforce road checks are Breath Alcohol Testing Trailers, fully-equipped field units where officers can write arrest reports. The Henry department is one of several in the state with its own BAT-trailer.

Dallas called the trailer “a one-stop cop shop.”

“It’s a combination mobile command post and traffic enforcement toolbox on wheels,” he said.

According to GOHS spokesman Jim Shuler, these trailers are an efficient and effective way to reduce the number of drunk drivers on the road.

Each GOHS field trailer has a certified and calibrated Intoxilyzer Unit for checking breath alcohol levels, he said.

 

DUI / DWI suspect kills best friends - 3x legal limit

A DWI / DUI suspect whose blood alcohol level / BAC was three times the legal limit killed a pair of best friends.

The families of the two men say they left Mountainair for Belen to go shopping Friday morning. But on the way 37 year old Rhonda Trujillo crashed into their truck.
76 year old Florian Miranda died shortly after the crash, 79 year old Richard Silva died late Friday night.

Police have arrested Rhonda Trujillo on numerous charges, they say this is her fourth D. W. I. / DUI arrest.

Saturday Miranda’s family gathered in his Mountainair home, remembering the vibrant but quiet man who they say was always with his childhood friend Richard Silva.

Friday morning the two men left Mountainair for Belen. But along the way they were hit and their pickup was totaled.

“It appears the female driver failed to stop at the stop sign at that intersection,” said Valencia County Sheriff’s Deputy Ed Chavez.

Police confirmed that Trujillo blew three times the legal limit.

Miranda's family says their heart broke after hearing Trujillo was allegedly drunk.

They say they hope D. W. I. laws become tougher, so Miranda hasn't died in vain.

And they hope Trujillo can change for the better.

“I hope and pray maybe from this she will gain some sense of what she did and how her life is going in the wrong direction,” said Miranda’s sister Rosalie Medina.

Miranda’s family says the two men were also riding with a dog in the car. A tan female German Shepard and Labrador mix named Candy.

The family believes the dog may have jumped from the truck, and could be hurt. If you have any information call them at 847 0246.

Rhonda Trujillo remains in the hospital in serious condition.

Deputies say she will be charged with two counts of vehicular homicide, D. W. I., reckless driving, and endangerment of a child since her 7 year old was in the vehicle but not killed when the crash happened.

 

Duke Lacrosse case costly to Prosecutor Nifong

Michael B. Nifong, the district attorney in Durham, N.C., took the stand to defend his law license after his failed crusade to convict innocent Duke University lacrosse players of gang rape.

Upon being disbarred for "dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation," he had no more success with his own defense, was suspended from his job last week and now faces a possible lawsuit in civil court. Is this rare or the course? Nifong's misconduct was not really rare.

Some high-profile cases in history have involved similar acts of prosecutorial abuse. The worst violators are often rewarded for their aggressive styles -- maybe offered with a cable television show.

Nifong is a good example of the weird effect of high-profile cases on a prosecutor's judgment and sense of decency. Even before the players were indicted, the district attorney had played to the passions surrounding a black stripper's allegations that she had been raped by affluent white college boys. Nifong inappropriately called the Duke players "a bunch of hooligans'' and essentially promised that he would not allow "Durham in the mind of the world to be a bunch of lacrosse players from Duke raping a black girl in Durham."

The accuser kept changing her story, and there was no evidence of a gang rape. So this prosecutor had to make decisions in light of proof issues. In addition to his prejudicial comments, Nifong was accused of withholding test results showing that DNA found on the woman's body and underwear came from at least four unknown males -- but none of the 46 lacrosse team members.

Nifong is not the first prosecutor who, in his words, "got carried away" in the glare of television lights. History has repeatedly seen such "great prosecutors" convicting the innocent to satisfy the public. Prosecutors are sworn to protect the rights of the accused as well as the accuser, to refuse to pursue cases that would not serve the interests of justice. Yet in today's environment, it appears that prosecutors can never be too tough, the way models can never be too skinny.

Nifong's disbarment may deter some prosecutorial abuse, but until less visible cases are subjected to more scrutiny, it may prove to be an isolated event -- driven by the same publicity that led to the abuse in the first place. If the case hadn't been so high-profile, it's doubtful that Nifong would have been charged, let alone disbarred, for his misconduct. The Duke case should teach us that a truly fair criminal justice system must strive to protect the rights of the accused as vigorously as it does those of the accuser. Bottom Line: Many Prosecutors Go Too Far, Many Get Away With It.

 

California DUI - Star arrested 78 years ago

California DUI flashback: Bing Crosby in 1929


LOS ANGELES -- Decades before Paris Hilton and voracious media hordes anxiously awaited her release from a county jail, aspiring crooner Bing Crosby was quietly jailed with nary a mention in the newspapers. And after he became a star, his arrest and court records just as quietly vanished.

Crosby, then 27, allegedly crashed his car in front of the Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel in November 1929 after a night of alleged drinking. This was during Prohibition, when liquor was illegal in the U.S.

The incident meant Crosby missed his big break, a solo in Paul Whiteman's 1930 movie musical "The King of Jazz." But he later wondered whether his voice had been suited to the tune -- a flop could have torpedoed his career before it began.

Eventually he became one of the nation's most beloved entertainers. He won an Oscar in 1944 for "Going My Way." His best known song was "White Christmas," first recorded in 1942. He also starred in the famed "Road" pictures with Bob Hope.

Although his alleged drunk driving wasn't reported in newspapers at the time, and the records disappeared, the facts are not in dispute.

Crosby himself discussed the incident more than 20 years later during a radio broadcast in the early hours of New Year's Day 1950.

The incident is also documented in a 2001 biography by Gary Giddins and in a 1955 Hollywood Reporter article by Crosby's brother, Harry.

In 1929, Crosby and his trio, the Rhythm Boys, came west to film the Whiteman musical, a vaudeville-type production.

To make the band feel at home, Universal Studios, the film's producer, built a recreational lodge for the 24 musicians on the back lot. Whiteman arranged for each of them to buy a Ford to drive around L.A.

"We all bought autos -- or at least we made the down payments with money which Pops [Whiteman] advanced to us, then deducted from our salaries," Harry Crosby wrote in the Nov. 15, 1955, article in the Hollywood Reporter. Bing chose a convertible.

"Pops had promised me a song, 'Song of the Dawn,' " Harry Crosby quoted his brother as saying. "I rehearsed and rehearsed, then took time out to see the SC-UCLA game."

Crosby was a fan of St. Mary's College, or SMC, and the Galloping Gaels beat UCLA at the Coliseum on Nov. 16, 1929.

"There was quite a shindig after the game in our studio bungalow, involving some tippling, but not to excess," his brother recalled.

Bing evidently drove an unknown party guest to her hotel, the Hollywood Roosevelt. There, Bing told his brother, "a car bumped mine after the party," and he was taken to the slammer. The other driver, also allegedly drunk, was arrested, though his name is not known.

"Bing made a left turn into an oncoming car with such force that he and his passenger were knocked over the windshield and onto the pavement. He was fine, but the woman was bloody and unconscious," Giddins wrote in "Bing Crosby, A Pocketful of Dreams: The Early Years 1903-1940."

"He practically drove through the lobby of the Roosevelt Hotel," Bobbe Brox Van Heusen, a singer in Whiteman's film, told Giddins.

From the Lincoln Heights jail, Bing Crosby called a friend and he was bailed out a day later. At his hearing, he came "directly from the golf course, wearing green plus-fours, an orange sweater and check socks," Giddins wrote.

The judge didn't take kindly to his attire, or to his drinking. He asked the singer if he was familiar with the 18th Amendment, the constitutional measure enacting Prohibition.

"Yes, but no one pays much attention to it," Crosby reportedly replied.

Crosby maintained his innocence, claiming he was a victim of a bad driver and a zealous cop. "But it was his brazen court performance," Giddins wrote, that got him a sentence of 60 days. Crosby fumed in his cell over the severity of his sentence. He was later transferred to a jail with a liberal visitation policy. His new jailers apparently allowed two police officers to escort Crosby to the studio during the day and back to jail at night.

But during the two weeks or so it took to arrange the deal, Whiteman gave Crosby's solo to John Boles, arguing it was too costly to hold up filming.

It's not clear how Crosby's arrest records were erased, how his sentence was calculated or whether the judge specified he serve it all -- but he got out early.

Once Crosby became secure in his career, he became philosophical about the 1929 arrest and his loss of the solo.

"[Boles] had a bigger voice and a better delivery for that kind of song than I had, and I often wondered what might have happened to me if I had sung it. I might have flopped with the song. I might have been cut out of the picture. I might never have been given another crack at a song in any picture."

Perhaps Paris Hilton shares an unlikely bond with the singing legend Crosby.

 

Lame California DUI Checkpoint results one 1 DUI arrest

California DUI lawyer news

June 24, 2007

California DUI Officers costs taxpayers an arm and a leg but only arrested one driver on suspicion of California DUI or driving under the influence during an expensive DUI and driver license checkpoint Friday night in Santa Rosa.

According to Santa Rosa police Sgt. Don Hasemeyer, 968 vehicles passed through the California DUI checkpoint, which was set up on Farmers lane near Sonoma Avenue.

One person was arrested on suspicion of DUI or alleged drunk driving.

Police cited 14 drivers for being unlicensed and two others for driving with a license that had been suspended or revoked. Were there more officers working than citations? At what cost? Waste of taxpayer money?!

A grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration provided funding for the program.

 

Man parked on Interstate arrested for DUI & Drug charges

A Sioux Falls man faces drug-related charges after a recent DUI traffic stop on Interstate 29 at the Tea interchange.

Dustin Kern, 24, was arrested June 13 for marijuana possession with intent to distribute, drug paraphernalia possession and DWI / driving while intoxicated, according to the state Highway Patrol.

Trooper Matt Wosje stopped to check on Kern's 1998 Chevrolet Cavalier parked on I-29. While talking with Kern, Wosje noticed an odor of alcohol. After a DUI arrest, the trooper found several marijuana baggies, a digital scale and a glass pipe.

 

California Checkpoint on Friday

California DUI Attorney news

June 24, 2007

LA VERNE - The Police Department will conduct a driver's license and sobriety checkpoint Friday.

The times and location will not be disclosed, according to a news release from La Verne police.

The checkpoint is funded by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety. Anyone caught driving under the influence or driving without a license will face criminal penalties and the impound of their vehicle for up to 30 days.

 

Al Under Jr. crashes, charged with DUI

Unser Jr. charged with DUI after leaving crash

LAS VEGAS, Nev. -- Two-time Indianapolis 500 winner Al Unser Jr. was charged with DUI or driving under the influence after leaving the scene of a crash.

He was arrested after he was identified as the driver of a car that sideswiped another on the Las Vegas Beltway on Thursday.

Unser allegedly failed several field sobriety tests before being taken into custody. The 44-year-old Unser was charged with DUI / driving under the influence, misdemeanor hit and run, failure to render aid in an accident and failure to report an accident.

Saturday, June 23, 2007

 

Injury accident DWI suspect gets out in hours

They're being mean to me. I cannot get no air, and I hope this is on the radio. I hope this is on the news," Melinda Jackson screamed, handcuffed in the back of a police cruiser.

That was her bizarre behavior on the scene of Thursday's accident. Police say the distracted driver slammed into a teenager standing in the road and was given a field sobriety test.

We learned today Jackson was able to bond out of jail the same day.

"She has no business being out of jail. She has no business being behind the wheel of a car," says Judy Uithoven, who learned about the accident watching the news Thursday.

"If it's her first offense, it's a Class B misdemeanor. Generally the bond on those is $500," says Tyler Police Public Information Officer Don Martin.

The day before, Jackson was arrested for four warrants, including public intoxication. She spent three hours behind bars.

She spent less than five hours in jail after Thursday's accident. She was charged with a DWI or drunk driving.

"So how do explain to someone, a Regular Joe on the outside looking in, that whoever commits a DWI and hits someone, how can they get out of jail the same day?," Smith County District Attorney Matt Bingham is asked..

Bingham says for the DWI charge to be upgraded, there has to be evidence Jackson's actions caused serious bodily injury.

The victim has two broken legs and a severe laceration to his mid-section.

Only time will tell if DWI charges stick as the accused exercises her right to walk free.

 

NYC Cop Busted for DUI

Monroe

A New York City police officer has been charged with DWI following a one-car accident on Forest Road near the intersection of Franklin Avenue in the early morning hours of June 14.

Monroe Village Det. James Frankild said when that when officers arrived at 3:33 a.m., they found a 21-year-old passenger inside the 1991 Toyota SRV conscious and alert.

However, the driver, 24-year-old Martin Polignone of Monroe, was unconscious, suffering from head injuries. He had to be removed from his vehicle by Monroe firefighters and EMS first-responders.

Polignone’s passenger was taken to the Arden Hill campus of Orange Regional Medical Center in Goshen for observation and later released.

Polignone, who remained unconscious at the scene, was airlifted to Westchester Medical Center.

Police said his blood alcohol content was .14 percent; the legal limit is .08 percent. He remains hospitalized and will be formally charged with DWI OR DUI - driving while intoxicated, a misdemeanor, when he is released.

Frankild said the department’s accident reconstructionists have determined that speed and alcohol played a role in this accident. He also said that the incident is being investigated by the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Unit.



Polignone has been a New York City cop for 11 months.

 

Marijuana legalized in NY for medicinal purposes

The State Assembly passed a bill legalizing medical use of marijuana Wednesday, after about a decade of attempts to approve similar legislation in the state.

“This would mean an awful lot to thousands of suffering New Yorkers,” said Manhattan Assemblyman Richard Gottfried. “The current prohibition in keeping them from that medical benefit is just political correctness run amok.”

The bill allows caregivers and seriously ill patients with diseases like cancer or aids to register with the state to purchase up to two and half ounces of marijuana and grow up to a dozen plants.

“I think it's important people, who that is the only thing that gives them relief, should have it available to them,” said Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver.

Now it's up to the Republican-lead State Senate to take on the controversial issue. The idea got a warm reception from Senate Majority Leader Joe Bruno – but he says that the Assembly bill needs tighter controls.

“The Assembly version doesn't work, in my estimation, in all due respect and we’re not going to do that,” said Bruno. “It’s too broad.”

Sponsors of the Senate bill say it could be introduced as early as Thursday and could explore the option of having the state's Department of Health grow and distribute the marijuana. But that would require federal approval – a big leap and a possible court battle.

The Assembly bill allows patients to get the drug through certified dealers. It would still be illegal for the user to re-sell the marijuana.

Opponents say patients already have access to legal drugs to combat pain and nausea. The bill also faces critics in the Senate, who say lawmakers should be addressing more pressing issues.

“It's inappropriately timed,” said State Senator Martin Golden of Brooklyn. “I think it’s the last five days of session and the last thing we have to be discussing here is medical marijuana.”

If both houses can agree on a compromise bill, Governor Eliot Spitzer – a former critic – now says he's open to signing it into law.

 

7,000 motorists stopped - 52 DUI arrests

Motorists caught drunk-driving
June 24, 2007

North Shore police in Auckland are disappointed at the number of motorists caught drunk-driving during a weekend operation. Fifty-two people were caught with excess breath alcohol, and 18 of them are awaiting blood test results to determine appropriate court action. Seven teenagers were among those processed.

Between Friday night and early this morning, nearly 7,000 vehicles were stopped and two cars impounded.

Looks like they will need the one and only:

John Churchill

john@armstrong- churchill. co.nz>
P.O. Box 34043
Birkenhead
Auckland 0746
New Zealand

Country code [64]
Phone: 9 480 9258
Fax: 9 480 9752
New Zealand Time: http://www.worldtim eserver.com/ current_time_ in_NZ.aspx


__._,_.___

 

License Ramifications of California DUI on Illinois Resident

An Illinois resident is arrested for DUI while visiting San Diego California.

This discusses the effects of the San Diego California DUI prosecution and whether one's Illinois driver’s license will be affected.

A California DUI conviction will result in the automatic revocation of an Illinois driver’s license.

A California refusal to submit to chemical testing, (breath, blood and/or urine) after a California arrest for DUI will additionally result in the suspension of an Illinois driver’s license.

LICENSE ACTIONS

A) Effective Date and Duration

The Illinois Secretary of State will automatically revoke the driver’s license of a resident upon receipt of a report of a conviction for California DUI or a similar offense where the cause of action is the same or substantially similar to the offense of DUI as defined in the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code.

Different states have statutory schemes that provide for different impairment levels of DUI. A reduction or amendment of the pending charges to a lower impairment level will still result in a revocation in Illinois as Illinois does not have any graduated scheme.

To avoid a license revocation, any amendment or reduction must be to an offense that will be recognized separately (e.g. Reckless Driving) under the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code.

Assuming that the case will result in a conviction, it usually takes several weeks for the report of the conviction to reach the Illinois Secretary of State. However, upon receipt, the Secretary of State immediately serves a Notice of Revocation upon the affected driver by mailing same to the address listed with the Secretary of State’s office. The revocation’s effective date is normally within a few days of mailing. On this note, you should ask the client whether they still live at the address listed on their Illinois driver’s license. If not, they should be advised to change their address directly with the Secretary of State’s Drivers Services Department forthwith as official notices from the Secretary are not forwarded and the failure of the driver to actually receive the notice does not affect the validity or effective date of the revocation.

In Illinois, license revocations are for a minimum of 1 year if the driver has never been previously convicted of DUI. Two DUI convictions within a 20 year period will result in a minimum revocation of 5 years, and three convictions within twenty years results in a minimum revocation of 10 years. A fourth conviction for DUI renders the driver permanently ineligible from applying for an unrestricted license in Illinois. It is the policy of the Secretary of State’s office not to fully reinstate an otherwise eligible driver until they have first been issued a Restricted Driving Permit (RDP) and drove on it without incident for at least 9 months.

B) Restricted Driving Permit (RDP)-Eligibility and Conditions

Once a revocation is effective, the next issue is when, and under what conditions, one becomes eligible to apply for an RDP. In Illinois, an RDP may be issued for: a) driving to and from work as well as within the scope of the petitioner’s employment related duties; b) to allow transportation of the petitioner or a family member for necessary medical care; c) to and from certain alcohol rehabilitative activities; (i.e. AA meetings), and d) for the petitioner to travel to and from classes at an accredited educational institution. The Secretary of State also will not issue permits for more than 12 hours a day or 6 days a week. Petitioners who have traffic tickets pending in any court (other than a DUI with a pending suspension) or who are also suspended or revoked for other reasons are ineligible to apply for an RDP until the other matters are resolved.

Before one is eligible to apply for an RDP, a petitioner must obtain an alcohol evaluation from an agency licensed by the Illinois Office of Alcohol and Substance Abuse (OASA), and complete the treatment recommended therein at a treatment service provider licensed by OASA. Depending on the treatment level at which a petitioner is classified by the evaluation, other requirements may also apply. The various treatment levels and other requirements are set forth as follows:

Level 1/Minimal Risk - Completion of an Alcohol/Drug Risk Education course (usually 10 hours). Note-Level 1 can only be recommended for petitioners who, at a minimum: a) have no prior DUI dispositions or suspensions; b) submitted to chemical testing with a resulting blood alcohol level of less than .15; and c) were not diagnosed with any other recognized symptoms of substance abuse or dependence.

Level 2M/Moderate Risk - Completion of an Alcohol/Drug Risk Education course (usually 10 hours) and an Early Intervention Counseling Program (Minimum of 12 hours). Note-Level 2M can only be recommended for petitioners who, at a minimum: a) have no prior DUI dispositions or suspensions; b) submitted to chemical testing with a resulting blood alcohol level of .15 to .19; and c) were not diagnosed with any other recognized symptoms of substance abuse or dependence.

Level 2S/Significant Risk - Completion of an Alcohol/Drug Risk Education course (usually 10 hours), Substance Abuse Treatment, (Minimum of 20 hours) and enrollment in and at least partial completion of Aftercare a/k/a Continuing Care (usually 2-3 hours a month for 6 consecutive months). Note-Level 2S will, at a minimum, be recommended for petitioners who: a) have at least 1 prior DUI disposition or suspension; and/or b) submitted to chemical testing with a resulting blood alcohol level of at least .20; and/or c) were diagnosed with other recognized symptoms of substance abuse.

Level 3 High Risk/Dependent - Completion of a minimum of 75 hours of substance abuse treatment and enrollment in and at least partial completion of Aftercare a/k/a Continuing Care (usually 2-3 hours a month for 6 consecutive months). In addition, at the hearing the Petitioner will have to submit proof of establishment of an ongoing support/recovery program (i.e. regular attendance at AA meetings for at least 6 months and having obtained an AA sponsor). Petitioner will also have to document at least 12 consecutive months of abstinence from alcohol and drugs.

Level 3 High Risk/Non-Dependent - Completion of a minimum of 75 hours of substance abuse treatment and enrollment in and at least partial completion of Aftercare a/k/a Continuing Care (usually 2-3 hours a month for 6 consecutive months). In addition, at the hearing the Petitioner will have to submit proof of at least 12 consecutive months of non-problematic use of alcohol (or abstinence if it had been recommended by an evaluator or treatment service provider) as well as abstinence from drugs.

Once the foregoing conditions applicable to the petitioner have been met, they will need to obtain an updated alcohol evaluation from either the original evaluator or the treatment service provider. If the petitioner has never previously been revoked for a DUI conviction, they are eligible for the appropriate type of administrative reinstatement hearing at this point. However, if the petitioner had previously been revoked for another DUI conviction, they are ineligible for a hearing until the revocation has been in effect for at least one year.

C) Informal vs. Formal Reinstatement Hearings

The next step is to determine the type of reinstatement hearing applicable. An informal hearing is available for petitioners who are seeking an RDP and/or full reinstatement and have neither previously been convicted of DUI nor had a statutory summary suspension from a previous DUI. All other petitioners must apply for relief through a formal hearing.

Informal hearings are conducted at many Secretary of State Drivers Service facilities throughout the State. There is no requirement that an informal hearing be requested in writing. A petitioner may retain an attorney to represent them at the hearing. Informal hearings are normally conducted on a "first come-first served" basis.

Petitioners must submit, at a minimum: the original alcohol evaluation and, if necessary an updated evaluation; appropriate documentation verifying completion of the recommended level of counseling; a letter verifying employment schedules and any scope of employment driving that may be required and/or a current school schedule, and, if applicable, appropriate letters documenting abstinence and/or ongoing support group (i.e. AA) involvement. At the hearing, it is the petitioner’s burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that; 1) the alcohol and/or drug problem has been resolved; 2) that the petitioner will be a safe and responsible driver and the issuance on an RDP will not endanger the general public; and 3), that an undue hardship is currently being suffered as a result of the inability to legally operate a motor vehicle.

The decision from the informal hearing is usually mailed to the petitioner within 3 to 4 weeks after the hearing. If the petitioner was approved for an RDP, the letter will be accompanied by a set of instructions on additional steps that may be necessary, such as filing insurance proof, taking a driving test, etc. Once the petitioner receives the permit, they must drive on it for at least 9 months without incident before they will be considered eligible for full reinstatement. This requires another informal hearing for which the petitioner will have to obtain an updated evaluation. If the petitioner was denied at the informal hearing, the letter will explain the reason(s) for the denial, i.e., inconsistencies between the petitioner’s testimony and the documents submitted, improper documentation, etc. Once the problem has been corrected, the petitioner may have another informal hearing, provided it has been at least 30 days since the last hearing. The testimony at an informal hearing is not recorded or transcribed in any way. The only "record" is a form filled out by the hearing officer and submitted to a review board along with the documentation submitted by the petitioner. Finally, there are no appeal procedures following an informal hearing.

Petitioners who are ineligible for informal hearings must proceed with a formal hearing. Formal hearings differ from informal hearings in a variety of ways. Initially, formal hearings are only available in Chicago, Joliet, Springfield or Mount Vernon. A request for a formal hearing is made in writing by the petitioner or their attorney. The Secretary of State’s office then mails a Notice of Hearing to the petitioner (and their attorney if applicable). The Notice sets forth the date, time and place of the hearing and is accompanied by a list of the documentation required to be submitted at the hearing. Once the hearing date has been assigned, it can only be continued for good cause shown.

A formal hearing is conducted by an appointed hearing officer who administers an oath to the petitioner (and any witnesses), takes testimony, issues subpoenas upon request, and rules on objections made during the hearing. The Secretary of State is represented by an appointee who acts as a prosecutor during the hearing. The petitioner’s burden of proof (resolution of alcohol/drug problem, safe driver and undue hardship) is the same as described above for informal hearings. Official notice may be taken of the decisions of any prior hearings as well as any documents (i.e., evaluations, treatment documents, Notices of Summary Suspensions) previously submitted. The hearing is recorded either by an electronic recording system or a court reporter. If requested, a transcript (or copy of the cassette tape of the hearing) can later be ordered by the petitioner at their own expense. After the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer reviews the entire record, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and prepares a recommendation. This is then sent to a review board which either adopts or rejects the recommendation and a written Order is prepared and mailed to the petitioner and their attorney, usually within 6 to 8 weeks. If the petitioner was approved for an RDP, the Order will be accompanied by a set of instructions on additional steps that may be necessary, such as filing insurance proof, taking a driving test, etc. Once the petitioner receives the permit, they must drive on it for at least 9 months without incident before they will be considered eligible for full reinstatement. This requires another formal hearing for which the petitioner will have to obtain an updated evaluation and any applicable letters regarding abstinence, employment and support group attendance. If the petitioner was denied relief at the formal hearing, the Order will set forth in detail the reason(s) for the denial, i.e., inconsistencies between the petitioner’s testimony and the documents submitted, improper documentation, etc. If a petitioner is denied relief, they must wait 4 months before they are eligible for a subsequent hearing. The Order constitutes a final administrative decision which is subject to review under the Illinois Administrative review Law.

D) Breath Alcohol Ignition Interlock Devices (BAIID)

In addition to the foregoing requirements, many petitioners will also be required to have a Breath Alcohol Ignition Interlock Device (BAIID) installed on their car as a further condition of the issuance of an RDP. Simply stated, a BAIID is a breathalyzer wired into the ignition system of an automobile. Before a BAIID-equipped car can be started, the driver must provide a breath sample into the device. If the sample registers above the alcohol setpoint (currently 0.025 breath alcohol concentration), the car is rendered incapable of starting, or "locked out". Petitioners who meet any of the following criteria are designated "BAIID Eligible Petitioners," must have formal hearings and must have a BAIID device installed within 14 days of the issuance of any RDP.

1) Any petitioner who had a DUI arrest on or after January 1st, 1982 which resulted in the loss of driving privileges who then received driving relief after a formal or informal hearing and thereafter received another DUI resulting in another loss of driving privileges;
2) Any Petitioner who received a Judicial Driving Permit (JDP) and within 3 years after the date the JDP was issued, received another DUI and had to seek driving relief at an administrative hearing;
3) Any petitioner classified as Level 3 Dependent with at least 6 but less than 12 months of abstinence from alcohol and/or drugs at the time of the hearing;
4) Any petitioner with 3 DUI dispositions if:
a) The last DUI arrest occurred within 3 years years of the date of the hearing; or
b) Any of the DUI dispositions involved a breath or blood concentration of 0.20 or more.
5) Any petitioner with 4 or more DUI dispositions.

When the RDP is mailed to a BAIID Eligible Petitioner, it is accompanied by a list of approved installers where the device can be obtained. The petitioner has 14 days to have the device installed and can only operate the vehicle for the purpose of obtaining the BAIID device until it has been installed. Any violation of this requirement will result in the immediate cancellation of the RDP.

STATUTORY SUMMARY (IMPLIED CONSENT) SUSPENSIONS
An Illinois licensed driver arrested in another state for DUI who subsequently refused to submit to chemical testing will have their license suspended by the Illinois Secretary of State upon receipt of a report from the State where the incident occurred.

The Illinois Vehicle Code does not specify the length of the suspension as it is classified as "discretionary". However, the Secretary of State’s office typically will issue a 6 month suspension, the same duration applicable to a statutory summary suspension for a first time offender who refuses chemical testing in this State after being arrested for a DUI. The affected driver presumably has a right to a judicial or administrative hearing in the circuit court of venue for the arresting agency to contest the arrest and/or the "refusal." In addition, the driver can both contest the suspension at a formal hearing, and/or request the issuance of an RDP.

If the driver is only seeking an RDP, that can be done at a formal hearing. If the driver is subsequently convicted of the DUI charge, then the length of the implied consent suspension served will automatically be credited against the minimum period of revocation imposed once the Notice of Revocation is issued by the Secretary of State.

Make sure you consult a San Diego California DUI attorney for help in fighting the DUI.

 

How the States try to Deter DUI Test Refusals

Here's a study entitled: “Determine Whether There Is an Increase in Breath Test Refusals and Develop and Evaluate a Promising Program to Deter Refusals.”

Background

The number of alcohol-related fatalities decreased 37 percent from 25,165 in 1982 to 15,935 in 1998. However, recent numbers of alcohol-related fatalities for 2000 (16,653), 2001 (17,400), 2002 (17,419), and 2003 (17,013) indicate that fatalities continue to exceed the numbers seen in the mid-1990's. It appears that new initiatives are required to achieve additional reductions.

New initiatives to achieve additional reductions in alcohol-related fatalities require an understanding of the problem and efforts to affect it so far. In two recent studies, researchers have identified States that achieved the largest reductions in alcohol-related fatalities from 1982 to 1996 (Ulmer, Hedlund, and Preusser, under review) and examined the reductions as a function of driver age, with a particular emphasis on youth (Hedlund, Ulmer and Preusser, 2000). It appears that stronger laws have been effective in reducing the number of people who choose to drink and drive, but some believe that these same laws have produced an unwanted consequence of higher breath test refusal rates in some States. Offenders receive implied consent penalties for refusal in most States, but refusals may help offenders avoid a DWI conviction, which carries more severe penalties.

A reduction in the number of test refusals will increase the effectiveness of the administrative and criminal systems so offenders can no longer avoid penalties, may help to identify more problem drinkers, and may help identified problem drinkers get some help.

Objective

The three goals of this study are (1) to document the extent of the breath test refusal problem, (2) to investigate the reasons for breath test refusals or lack of a significant percentage of refusals in selected States, and (3) to develop, implement, and evaluate effective and efficient countermeasures to deal with the problem. The first and second goals are covered in this report. A later report will detail the results of the program implementation and evaluation.

Method A review of the administrative sanctions and criminal penalties for breath test refusal in each State, DC, and Puerto Rico was conducted. After the review, each State, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico were contacted to obtain breath test refusal data for the period from 1996 to 2001. Five case-study States were selected to learn more about the causes for refusals. Connecticut, Maryland, Florida, Louisiana, and Oklahoma were selected because they all had rates above the national average and provided a mix in terms of the magnitude of refusal rates and variations in impaired driving laws and practices. Refusal rates ranged from slightly above average to far above the national average. Laws pertaining to test refusals ranged from moderately weak to good. The case studies consisted of interviews with prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, police officers, police supervisors, and administrative unit officers to (1) evaluate the arrest, breath test, administrative, and judicial processes, and (2) identify refusal problems, barriers, and potential solutions.

Results

State laws vary widely with regard to administrative and criminal penalties for refusal. All States but one have administrative sanctions for refusal. Depending upon the State, the administrative sanctions are sometimes more stringent than those for failing a breath test. Most States do not criminalize refusal, but many admit refusals in criminal cases. Most of those that admit refusals in criminal cases do not permit refusals to be used as evidence of guilt. Some States have provisions to force a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test after a refusal.

The distribution of refusal rates amongst States is depicted below in figure 1. The rates shown for 2001 are somewhat higher than rates reported for 1987 in an earlier study (Jones, Joksch, and Wiliszowski, 1991).


*2000 data were used for Massachusetts and New Jersey
**Complete data was not available from AZ, CO, MO, NV, NY, SD, VA, VT, or WY


Refusal rates for some individual States differ markedly from 1987 to 2001, which may be due to real differences or due to real differences combined with differences produced by different data collection methods used by these States for assessing refusal rates in 1987 and in 2001. Refusal rates nationwide remained stable at about one-quarter of all drivers arrested for DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI from 1996 to 2001. States with statistically significant changes in refusal rates during this period were split evenly between those with increases and those with decreases. In general, the States where refusal rates decreased already had low rates, and States where rates increased already had high refusal rates. No State with a significant increase in refusals criminalizes refusal. Six of the eight States with statistically significant decreases in refusals have hard license suspensions in which no hardship or work permits are available during the suspension period.

Case Study Results

In Connecticut, 75 percent of those refusing the test are first-time offenders who would receive much less severe administrative penalties and the same criminal penalties for taking and failing a breath test. They become eligible immediately for a work permit during the entire administrative suspension period if they fail a BAC test and almost always receive the Pretrial Alcohol Education program, which results in dismissal of their criminal cases after one year. First-time offenders reportedly often refused based on a lack of understanding of these consequences.

In Maryland, the majority of the refusals are reportedly from first-time offenders. First-time offenders who fail breath tests can receive permission to drive during their entire administrative suspensions, while those who refuse and want to continue driving must have an interlock device installed for one year. First-time offenders almost always have their cases pled down to a lesser impaired driving charge and receive Probation Before Judgment (PBJ), which results in the dismissal of their criminal cases and no record of a DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI, regardless of whether they take or refuse the test. The consensus advice for first-time offenders was to take the breath test because of the reduced administrative penalties and the same PBJ outcome for their criminal cases. As in Connecticut, many first-time offenders in Maryland do not understand these consequences.

In Florida, refusal benefits all offenders arrested for DUI / Drunk Driving. The increased severity of the administrative suspension for refusal is mitigated by the availability of hardship permits that can be obtained if the person does not have a prior BAC test refusal. Both defense attorneys and prosecutors agreed that the consequences for refusal are less severe than the consequences of conviction, even for a first offense. A new law in Florida criminalizing the second refusal may lead to a reduction in refusals by repeat offenders, but the law has not been in effect long enough for State officials to determine its impact.

In Louisiana, first-time offenders have a high rate of breath test refusal. Refusing the breath test benefits the criminal cases of all offenders arrested for DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI. Without a test result, district attorneys have a much more difficult time getting a DWI conviction and usually reduce the charges to obtain a guilty plea. Refusal has the added benefit of avoiding the sanctions contained in Louisiana's high-BAC law if the offender's test result would have been .15 or higher. In at least one jurisdiction, a judge has issued warrants to order blood tests for those who refuse. The strategy may be the best solution to reduce refusals without new legislation.

In Oklahoma, repeat offenders usually refuse the breath test, but most first-time offenders reportedly take it. All those interviewed agreed that it is to the advantage of any offender to refuse the test. The administrative penalties are essentially the same for those who fail and those who refuse a breath test, which means that the criminal case outcome affects refusal more than the administrative sanctions. First-time offenders almost always have their charges pled down regardless of whether they refuse or fail the test.

Conclusions by the Federal Government

In many States across the country officers are instructed to read verbatim to suspects from an Administrative License Revocation (ALR) card - the information on this card is read to the suspect when the officer requests a breath sample, and this provides the suspect with information regarding the consequences of refusing to provide the sample. Officers are often instructed to read this information verbatim to ensure that each suspect receives the same information in a uniform manner that limits any possible coercion on the part of the officer.

In Connecticut and Maryland first-time offenders typically receive less severe penalties for failing the test, even with a high BAC, than for refusing the test. It is believed that many first-time offenders refuse the test because they do not understand these consequences. For States such as these, State officials may want to review their process for notifying suspects of both the administrative and criminal consequences of refusing to provide a breath sample. However, States such as Connecticut and Maryland must then consider the consequences of these offenders receiving less severe sanctions. In addition, if these offenders are not convicted of an alcohol-related offense and are later stopped for DWI, they will not be considered repeat offenders.

Louisiana, and 11 other States with similar laws or case law (e.g., Arizona, California, and Wisconsin), could reduce breath test refusals by encouraging officers to obtain a warrant, when needed, to draw blood for a chemical test.

Warrants could be obtained for as many types of DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI arrests as judges would be willing to issue warrants, such as cases in which the arrested driver had a minor in the vehicle, cases where the driver is suspected of having a BAC above .15, or in cases of driver involvement in an injury crash.

Judges who may not be willing to issue warrants to draw blood for a chemical test for the standard first-time DUI / Drunk Driving / DWI offenders may be more willing to issue a warrant for more egregious offenders. Warrants are already used in at least one jurisdiction in Louisiana. The extent of their use is not known, but they have reportedly eliminated the problem of refusals in cases where they are issued.

It is believed that Oklahoma and Florida are unlikely to reduce refusal rates substantially without new legislation. In each State, the administrative and criminal penalties for refusal are less severe than those for taking and failing the breath test.

(Study conducted for DTNH22-98-D-45079 Task Order 11)

 

DUI detention unconstitutional

Detention in DUI case ruled unconstitutional

June 23, 2007

The Utah Supreme Court ruled Friday that a man suspected of drunken driving who was stopped in a remote canyon and taken to an off-duty officer's home for sobriety tests was unconstitutionally detained.
In a 4-1 decision, the court said the detention violated Mitchell Worwood's Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
On June 20, 2003, an off-duty Utah Highway Patrol trooper encountered Worwood standing by a truck that was partially blocking a dirt road up Deep Canyon near Levan, about 80 miles south of Salt Lake City, according to court papers. Worwood then got in the truck to pull it over to the side of the road, and an off-duty officer, Korey Wright, stopped. Wright reported that he smelled alcohol and Worwood's speech seemed slurred so he told him to he should be checked out by a trooper before driving more. Wright told Worwood to get into Wright's truck. Wright had a friend with him drive Worwood's truck down the canyon and asked that friend to call police and meet them at Wright's house. At Wright's house, an on-duty officer named Kevin Wright arrived and gave Worwood field sobriety tests and arrested him.
Worwood pleaded not guilty to a third-degree felony charge of driving under the influence with two prior convictions. He then filed a motion to have the basis for the charge, including the field sobriety test, suppressed, contending that his constitutional rights had been violated. His motion was denied and he entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court's decision.
But the Utah Supreme Court said that although Wright's initial encounter with Worwood was justified under reasonable suspicion, the rest of the detention exceeded the constitutional bounds of an investigative stop.
The Supreme Court ruled that because the field sobriety tests were part of that detention, the test results should be suppressed and the case should be sent back to 4th District Court in Nephi for further action.

 

Baltimore Ravens QB Steve McNair DUI case set

Baltimore Ravens Player DUI Trial Rescheduled

Baltimore Ravens quarterback Steve McNair's DUI case has recently been postponed until July 10th.

McNair was charged with a DUI while riding in the passenger seat while his brother-in-law drove his car.

Media reports had recently stated previously that the Davidson County District Attorney's office would likely dismiss the case; however, the D.A. office has announced they plan to move forward with the case, and that it would be continued until July.

 

DUI manslaughter and DUI charges Dropped

DUI manslaughter and DUI property damage charges were dropped against a 22-year-old man stemming from a July 2005 crash that killed an Englewood teenager.

However, 12th Circuit Court Judge Deno G. Economou may still determine there is enough evidence to try Shawn M. Minor for vehicular homicide in August.

Economou dismissed the DUI-related charges against Minor on Tuesday. He was expected to issue a ruling on the vehicular homicide charge Friday, but did not do so.

If convicted, Minor could be sentenced up to 15 years in prison.

According to the Florida Highway Patrol, Minor, driving a 2004 Ford pickup, strayed onto the eastbound shoulder of East Dearborn Street near Stratford Road and hit and killed Kelvin Jackson, 15, just after midnight on July 21, 2005.

Jackson and friend, Bruce Gordon, had gone to Englewood Bowl on State Road 776 for teen night.

They were walking back to Gordon's home at 381 E. Dearborn St. -- only a few blocks away -- when both were struck by Minor.

Gordon was hit by the pickup's side mirror and suffered only minor injuries.

Jackson was thrown onto the truck's hood and then onto the road. He was taken to Englewood Community Hospital where he was declared dead.

Minor was not charged in the accident until March 2006 when blood test results from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement lab detected marijuana in his body.

However, state prosecutor Wyndel Darville said Thursday, the DUI-related charges were dismissed after Minor's attorney, Bertram Danheiser, presented evidence that his client was not impaired when the accident occurred.

Darville said FDLE lab results were challenged by findings from a University of Florida lab that contend marijuana "detected was not significant enough" to influence Minor's driving.

He said during depositions, nurses and other medical professionals at Englewood Community Hospital testified that "they didn't notice any sign of impairment" in Minor after the accident.

Darville said based on this evidence, Danheiser successfully filed a motion to dismiss the DUI charges because the state could not "prove the element of recklessness due to impairment."

Nevertheless, he contends the vehicular homicide charge against Minor is strong enough to warrant a trial.

"Given the prevailing condition of the vehicle with balding tires, traveling at a speed that was unsafe for those conditions on a two-lane road at night, you have a driver that was reckless in my mind," Darville said.

He said the impetus is on the defense to prove there is not enough evidence to support charges before a trial.

"There is sufficient evidence to proceed," Darville said. "We get the benefit of the doubt."

Of course, during a trial, the onus is on the prosecution to prove a defendant is guilty of those charges.

 

Southern California DUI after striking 22 cars

California DUI attorney news:

Saturday, June 23, 2007

Long Beach, Calififornia

A California man looking for a parking place hit nearly two dozen cars and two people during a wild ride was charged with drunk driving / DUI and hit-and-run.

David Wecksler, 31, of Long Beach, was charged with two misdemeanor counts including California DUI after the blocks-long accident spree in Belmont Heights.

Prosecutors contend that Wecksler was drunk when his GMC Sierra Truck sideswiped rows of parked cars on Feb. 15. Two people also were struck but had only minor scrapes.

According to a police report, Wecksler told officers he had been drinking while playing poker with some friends but contended a blown tire caused him to lose control of the car. Wecksler also complained that he could not see after the hood of his car popped up. He reportedly may have been looking for a place to park.

Wecksler allegedly has a 2003 conviction for DUI and his license was suspended 4 times.

Friday, June 22, 2007

 

Paris Hilton is granting interviews in jail, after her California DUI

Caught in the whirlwind of bad publicity that often surrounds Paris Hilton, NBC and ABC sought to distance themselves Friday from reports that they were opening their wallets in pursuit of an exclusive interview with the heiress after her release from jail.

ABC News said the Hilton family offered the interview to Barbara Walters, but that Walters and ABC News executive David Sloan turned it down on Friday, said an ABC News executive who said he would discuss the talks only on condition of anonymity.

NBC News, which has said it was interested in speaking to Hilton only if no money were involved, said no interview had been arranged. But the network did not immediately address contradictory media reports about whether it was still pursuing the interview.

The networks and Hilton family appeared anxious to avoid a public backlash over the idea that the wealthy hotel heiress, slated to be released early next week, would profit from her time in jail.

ABC backed off "because the process left us pretty cold," the executive said.

Earlier in the week, ABC News said it believed it had secured the Hilton interview with Walters. The network had agreed to pay the Hilton family up to $100,000 for the use of exclusive video and other material to go with the story. But ABC learned from the Hiltons that it had lost out to an "astronomical" offer from NBC, the executive said.

NBC News denied having an interview lined up with Hilton. "We don't pay for interviews and we'll never pay for interviews," spokeswoman Allison Gollust.

Although it's considered a journalistic sin to pay for interviews, the ban can be sidestepped in many ways for hotly contested ones. One is agreeing to pay for videos and other materials, and another is shifting negotiations to a network's entertainment division, which observes no such prohibitions.

A spokesman for the Hilton family issued a statement Thursday saying they had not requested any payment for an interview or related material. He did not immediately return a call for comment on Friday.

The New York Post, which had first reported ongoing talks over a post-jail interview, headlined a story Friday: "So Crime DOES pay, Paris."

A spokesman for OK! magazine said Hilton's representatives had approached them a few weeks ago to see if they were interested in pictures and an interview when she got out of jail.

"We didn't reciprocate with a bid," said spokesman Brian Strong.

Recently, NBC landed an exclusive interview with Britain's Princes William and Harry, which, conducted by Matt Lauer, aired Monday as an edition of "Dateline NBC." NBC also reportedly paid a fee in the low seven figures for American rights to air a concert next month in honor of their late mother, Diana, to mark the 10th anniversary of her death.

As for CBS News, "we have no interest in the interview," spokeswoman Leigh Farris said

 

New California DUI law bill

SENATE BILL No. 177
Introduced by Senator Migden
(Principal coauthor: Assembly Member Spitzer)
(Coauthors: Senators Maldonado and Scott)
(Coauthor: Assembly Member Lieu Coauthors: Assembly Members
Adams, Benoit, Blakeslee, Cook, DeSaulnier, DeVore, Duvall,
Emmerson, Gaines, Galgiani, Horton, Jeffries, La Malfa, Lieu, Maze,
Nakanishi, Parra, Plescia, Sharon Runner, Strickland, and Villines)
February 5, 2007
An act to amend Sections 13352, 14602.6, and 23575 of 13350,
13352, 13352.4, 13352.5, 13353.3, 13353.5, 13353.7, 23247, 23502,
23536, 23538, 23546, 23548, 23550.5, 23575, and 23576 of, to amend,
renumber, and add Section 13352.6 of, to add Sections 13352.7,
13352.8, 13352.81, 13352.82, 13352.85, 13353.71, 13353.72, 13353.73,
and 23575.5 to, and to repeal Section 13352.1 of, the Vehicle Code,
relating to vehicles.
legislative counsel’s digest
SB 177, as amended, Migden. Driver’s license: DUI: ignition
interlock.
(1) Existing law requires a person’s privilege to operate a motor
vehicle to be suspended or revoked for a specified period of time if the
person has been convicted of violating specified provisions prohibiting
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage or drug or the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage
or drug, or with 0.08% or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her
blood or who is addicted to the use of any drug. The time for which the
privilege is suspended depends on specified circumstances, including
98
prior convictions of driving under the influence offenses within a
specified time period. Existing law authorizes a person whose privilege
is suspended or revoked in that manner to receive a restricted driver’s
license if specified requirements are met, including, in some instances,
the installation of an ignition interlock device on the person’s vehicle.
This bill would revise and recast those suspension, revocation, and
restriction provisions, including, but not limited to, by increasing the
periods of suspensions or revocations and imposing ignition interlock
device requirements on a person whose license is suspended or revoked
or applies for and receives a restricted driver’s license.
(2) Existing law requires the Department of Motor Vehicles to
immediately administratively suspend the privilege of a person to
operate a motor vehicle if the person was driving a motor vehicle when
he or she had 0.08% or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood.
Existing law specifies the period of that suspension depending on
specified circumstances, including prior convictions of related offenses
within a specified time period. Existing law authorizes a person whose
privilege was suspended in that manner to receive a restricted driver’s
license if specified requirements are met.
The bill would revise and recast those provisions, including by
authorizing restricted licenses in additional circumstances and imposing
additional requirements with respect to ignition interlock devices on
those restricted licenses.
(3) The bill would establish the Ignition Interlock Device Assistance
Fund in the State Treasury. The money in the fund would be available,
upon appropriation, to fund the installation of ignition interlock devices.
The bill would require a person who is convicted of specified driving
under the influence offenses to pay a fee of $100 to be deposited in the
fund.
The bill would require the Director of Motor Vehicles to establish
standards and criteria for implementing and maintaining an ignition
interlock device assistance program.
(4) The bill would make numerous technical and conforming changes.
(5) Because it is a crime to operate a vehicle that is not equipped
with a functioning, certified interlock device by a person whose driving
privilege is so restricted, the bill would impose a state-mandated local
program, by expanding the scope of that crime.
(6) The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local
agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state.
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SB 177 — 2 —
Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that
reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act
for a specified reason.
(1) Existing law authorizes a court to require a person convicted of
a first offense violation of specified provisions prohibiting driving a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or a
combination of alcohol and any drug (DUI) to install a certified ignition
interlock device on any vehicle that the person owns or operates and to
prohibit that person from operating a motor vehicle unless it is so
equipped.
This bill would require the court to require that a person convicted
of a DUI offense to install a certified ignition interlock device on each
vehicle that the person owns or operates and to prohibit that person
from operating a motor vehicle unless that vehicle is so equipped.
Because it is a crime to operate a vehicle that is not equipped with a
functioning, certified interlock device by a person whose driving
privilege is so restricted, this bill would impose a state-mandated local
program by expanding the scope of that crime.
(2) Existing law allows a peace officer in conjunction with an
immediate arrest to cause the removal and seizure of a motor vehicle
when a person is driving a motor vehicle while his or her driving
privilege is suspended or revoked, when driving a vehicle while his or
her driving privilege is restricted to the operation of a motor vehicle
that is equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device and the
vehicle is not so equipped, and when driving without ever having been
issued a driver’s license.
This bill would specify that for the purposes of the removal and
seizure of a motor vehicle, an immediate arrest includes the issuance
of a notice to appear.
(3) The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local
agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state.
Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act
for a specified reason.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes.
State-mandated local program: yes.
98
— 3 — SB 177
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
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SECTION 1. Section 13350 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
13350. (a) The department immediately shall revoke the
privilege of any a person to drive a motor vehicle upon receipt of
a duly certified abstract of the record of any a court showing that
the person has been convicted of any of the following crimes or
offenses:
(1) Failure of the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in injury or death to any a person to stop or otherwise
comply with Section 20001.
(2) Any A felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle
is used, except as provided in Section 13351, 13352, or 13357.
(3) Reckless driving causing bodily injury.
(b) If a person is convicted of a violation of Section 23152
punishable under Section 23546, 23550, or 23550.5, or a violation
of Section 23153 punishable under Section 23550.5 or 23566,
including a violation of paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) (b) of
Section 192 191.5 of the Penal Code as provided in Section 193.7
of that code, the court shall, at the time of surrender of the driver’s
license or temporary permit, require the defendant to sign an
affidavit in a form provided by the department acknowledging his
or her understanding of the revocation or suspension required by
paragraph (5), (6), or (7) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352, and
an acknowledgment of his or her designation as a habitual traffic
offender. A copy of this affidavit shall be transmitted, with the
license or temporary permit, to the department within the prescribed
10 days.
(c) The department shall not reinstate the privilege revoked
under subdivision (a) until the expiration of one year after the date
of revocation and until the person whose privilege was revoked
gives proof of financial responsibility as defined in Section 16430.
SEC. 2. Section 13352 of the Vehicle Code is amended to read:
13352. (a) The department shall immediately suspend or
revoke the privilege of a person to operate a motor vehicle upon
the receipt of an abstract of the record of a court showing that the
person has been convicted of a violation of Section 23152 or 23153
or subdivision (a) of Section 23109, or upon the receipt of a report
of a judge of the juvenile court, a juvenile traffic hearing officer,
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or a referee of a juvenile court showing that the person has been
found to have committed a violation of Section 23152 or 23153
or subdivision (a) of Section 23109. If an offense specified in this
section occurs in a vehicle defined in Section 15210, the suspension
or revocation specified below shall apply to the noncommercial
driving privilege. The commercial driving privilege shall be
disqualified as specified in Sections 15300 to 15302, inclusive.
For the purposes of this section, suspension or revocation shall be
as follows:
(1) Except as required under Section 13352.1 or Section
13352.4, upon a conviction or finding of a violation of Section
23152 punishable under Section 23536, the privilege shall be
suspended for a period of six months one year.
The privilege may shall not be reinstated until the person gives
proof of financial responsibility and gives proof satisfactory to the
department of successful completion of a
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code described in subdivision (b)
of Section 23538. If the court, as authorized under paragraph (3)
of subdivision (b) of Section 23646, elects to order a person to
enroll, participate, and complete either program described in
paragraph (4) of subdivision (b) of Section 23542, the department
shall require that program in lieu of the program described in
subdivision (b) of Section 23538. For the purposes of this
paragraph, enrollment, participation, and completion of an
approved program shall be subsequent to the date of the current
violation. Credit may shall not be given to any for program
activities completed prior to the date of the current violation.
(2) Upon Except as required under Section 13352.8, upon a
conviction or finding of a violation of Section 23153 punishable
under Section 23554, the privilege shall be suspended for a period
of one year two years. The privilege may shall not be reinstated
until the person gives proof of financial responsibility and gives
proof satisfactory to the department of successful completion of
a driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code as described in subdivision
(b) of Section 23556. If the court, as authorized under paragraph
(3) of subdivision (b) of Section 23646, elects to order a person
to enroll, participate, and complete either program described in
paragraph (4) of subdivision (b) of Section 23542, the department
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shall require that program in lieu of the program described in
Section 23556. For the purposes of this paragraph, enrollment,
participation, and completion of an approved program shall be
subsequent to the date of the current violation. Credit may shall
not be given to any for program activities completed prior to the
date of the current violation.
(3) Except as provided in Section 13352.5, upon a conviction
or finding of a violation of Section 23152 punishable under Section
23540, the privilege shall be suspended for two three years. The
privilege may shall not be reinstated until the person gives proof
of financial responsibility and gives proof satisfactory to the
department of successful completion of a
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code as described in subdivision
(b) of Section 23542. For the purposes of this paragraph,
enrollment, participation, and completion of an approved program
shall be subsequent to the date of the current violation. Credit shall
not be given to any for program activities completed prior to the
date of the current violation. The department shall advise the person
that after completion of 12 months of the suspension period, which
may include credit for a suspension period served under subdivision
(c) of Section 13353.3, the person may apply to the department
for a restricted driver’s license, subject to the following conditions:
(A) The person has satisfactorily provided, subsequent to the
violation date of the current underlying conviction, either of the
following:
(i) Proof of enrollment in an 18-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code.
(ii) Proof of enrollment in a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, if available in the county of
the person’s residence or employment.
(B) The person agrees, as a condition of the restriction, to
continue satisfactory participation in the program described in
subparagraph (A).
(C) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” form
described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 13386.
(D) The person agrees to maintain the ignition interlock device
as required under subdivision (g) of Section 23575.
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(E) The person provides proof of financial responsibility, as
defined in Section 16430.
(F) The person pays all administrative fees or reissue fees and
any restriction fee required by the department.
(G) The restriction shall remain in effect for the period required
in subdivision (f) of Section 23575.
(4) Except as provided in this paragraph required under Section
13352.81, upon a conviction or finding of a violation of Section
23153 punishable under Section 23560, the privilege shall be
revoked suspended for a period of three four years. The privilege
may shall not be reinstated until the person gives proof of financial
responsibility, and the person gives proof satisfactory to the
department of successful completion of a
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as described in subdivision
(b) of Section 23562. For the purposes of this paragraph,
enrollment, participation, and completion of an approved program
shall be subsequent to the date of the current violation. Credit shall
not be given to any for program activities completed prior to the
date of the current violation. The department shall advise the person
that after the completion of 12 months of the revocation period,
which may include credit for a suspension period served under
subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3, the person may apply to the
department for a restricted driver’s license, subject to the following
conditions:
(A) The person has satisfactorily completed, subsequent to the
violation date of the current underlying conviction, either of the
following:
(i) The initial 12 months of an 18-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code.
(ii) The initial 12 months of a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, if available in the county of
the person’s residence or employment, and the person agrees, as
a condition of the restriction, to continue satisfactory participation
in that 30-month program.
(B) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” form
described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 13386.
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(C) The person agrees to maintain the ignition interlock device
as required under subdivision (g) of Section 23575.
(D) The person provides proof of financial responsibility, as
defined in Section 16430.
(E) The person pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees
and any restriction fee required by the department.
(F) The restriction shall remain in effect for the period required
in subdivision (f) of Section 23575.
(5) Except as provided in this paragraph required under Section
13352.6, upon a conviction or finding of a violation of Section
23152 punishable under Section 23546, the privilege shall be
revoked suspended for a period of three five years. The privilege
may shall not be reinstated until the person files proof of financial
responsibility and gives proof satisfactory to the department of
successful completion of one of the following programs: an
18-month driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant
to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as described in
subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 23548, or, if available in the
county of the person’s residence or employment, a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, or a program specified in
Section 8001 of the Penal Code. For the purposes of this paragraph,
enrollment, participation, and completion of an approved program
shall be subsequent to the date of the current violation. Credit shall
not be given to any for program activities completed prior to the
date of the current violation. The department shall advise the person
that after completion of 12 months of the revocation period, which
may include credit for a suspension period served under subdivision
(c) of Section 13353.3, the person may apply to the department
for a restricted driver’s license, subject to the following conditions:
(A) The person has satisfactorily completed, subsequent to the
violation date of the current underlying conviction, either of the
following:
(i) The initial 12 months of an 18-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code.
(ii) The initial 12 months of a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, if available in the county of
the person’s residence or employment, and the person agrees, as
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a condition of the restriction, to continue satisfactory participation
in the 30-month driving-under-the-influence program.
(B) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” form
described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 13386.
(C) The person agrees to maintain the ignition interlock device
as required under subdivision (g) of Section 23575.
(D) The person provides proof of financial responsibility, as
defined in Section 16430.
(E) An individual convicted of a violation of Section 23152
punishable under Section 23546 may also, at any time after
sentencing, petition the court for referral to an 18-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, or, if available in the county
of the person’s residence or employment, a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code. Unless good cause is shown,
the court shall order the referral.
(F) The person pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees
and any restriction fee required by the department.
(G) The restriction shall remain in effect for the period required
in subdivision (f) of Section 23575.
(6) Except as provided in this paragraph required under Section
13352.82, upon a conviction or finding of a violation of Section
23153 punishable under Section 23550.5 or 23566, the privilege
shall be revoked suspended for a period of five seven years. The
privilege may shall not be reinstated until the person gives proof
of financial responsibility and proof satisfactory to the department
of successful completion of one of the following programs: an
18-month driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant
to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as described in
subdivision (b) of Section 23568 or, if available in the county of
the person’s residence or employment, a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, or a program specified in
Section 8001 of the Penal Code. For the purposes of this paragraph,
enrollment, participation, and completion of an approved program
shall be subsequent to the date of the current violation. Credit shall
not be given to any for program activities completed prior to the
date of the current violation. The department shall advise the person
that after the completion of 12 months of the revocation period,
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which may include credit for a suspension period served under
subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3, the person may apply to the
department for a restricted driver’s license, subject to the following
conditions:
(A) The person has satisfactorily completed, subsequent to the
violation date of the current underlying conviction, either of the
following:
(i) The initial 12 months of a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, if available in the county of
the person’s residence or employment, and the person agrees, as
a condition of the restriction, to continue satisfactory participation
in the 30-month driving-under-the-influence program.
(ii) The initial 12 months of an 18-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, if a 30-month program is
unavailable in the person’s county of residence or employment.
(B) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” form
described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 13386.
(C) The person agrees to maintain the ignition interlock device
as required under subdivision (g) of Section 23575.
(D) The person provides proof of financial responsibility, as
defined in Section 16430.
(E) An individual convicted of a violation of Section 23153
punishable under Section 23566 may also, at any time after
sentencing, petition the court for referral to an 18-month
driving-under-the-influence program or, if available in the county
of the person’s residence or employment, a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code. Unless good cause is shown,
the court shall order the referral.
(F) The person pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees
and any restriction fee required by the department.
(G) The restriction shall remain in effect for the period required
in subdivision (f) of Section 23575.
(7) Except as provided in this paragraph required under Section
13352.7, upon a conviction or finding of a violation of Section
23152 punishable under Section 23550 or 23550.5, or Section
23153 punishable under Section 23550.5, the privilege shall be
revoked for a period of four years life. The privilege may shall not
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be reinstated pursuant to Section 13352.7 until the person gives
proof of financial responsibility and proof satisfactory to the
department of successful completion of one of the following
programs: an 18-month driving-under-the-influence program
licensed pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code,
or, if available in the county of the person’s residence or
employment, a 30-month driving-under-the-influence program
licensed pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code,
or a program specified in Section 8001 of the Penal Code. For the
purposes of this paragraph, enrollment, participation, and
completion of an approved program shall be subsequent to the date
of the current violation. Credit shall not be given to any for
program activities completed prior to the date of the current
violation. The department shall advise the person that after the
completion of 12 months of the revocation period, which may
include credit for a suspension period served under subdivision
(c) of Section 13353.3, the person may apply to the department
for a restricted driver’s license, subject to the following conditions:
(A) The person has satisfactorily completed, subsequent to the
violation date of the current underlying conviction, either of the
following:
(i) The initial 12 months of an 18-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code.
(ii) The initial 12 months of a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, if available in the county of
the person’s residence or employment, and the person agrees, as
a condition of the restriction, to continue satisfactory participation
in the 30-month driving-under-the-influence program.
(B) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” form
described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 13386.
(C) The person agrees to maintain the ignition interlock device
as required under subdivision (g) of Section 23575.
(D) The person provides proof of financial responsibility, as
defined in Section 16430.
(E) An individual convicted of a violation of Section 23152
punishable under Section 23550 may also, at any time after
sentencing, petition the court for referral to an 18-month
driving-under-the-influence program or, if available in the county
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of the person’s residence or employment, a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code. Unless good cause is shown,
the court shall order the referral.
(F) The person pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees
and any restriction fee required by the department.
(G) The restriction shall remain in effect for the period required
in subdivision (f) of Section 23575.
(8) Upon a conviction or finding of a violation of subdivision
(a) of Section 23109 that is punishable under subdivision (e) of
that section, the privilege shall be suspended for a period of 90
days to six months, if ordered by the court. The privilege may shall
not be reinstated until the person gives proof of financial
responsibility, as defined in Section 16430.
(9) Upon a conviction or finding of a violation of subdivision
(a) of Section 23109 that is punishable under subdivision (f) of
that section, the privilege shall be suspended for a period of six
months, if ordered by the court. The privilege may shall not be
reinstated until the person gives proof of financial responsibility,
as defined in Section 16430.
(b) For the purpose of paragraphs (2) to (9), inclusive, of
subdivision (a), the finding of the juvenile court judge, the juvenile
hearing officer, or the referee of a juvenile court of a commission
of a violation of Section 23152 or 23153 or subdivision (a) of
Section 23109, as specified in subdivision (a) of this section, is a
conviction.
(c) A judge of a juvenile court, juvenile hearing officer, or
referee of a juvenile court shall immediately report the findings
specified in subdivision (a) to the department.
(d) A conviction of an offense in a state, territory, or possession
of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, or Canada that, if committed in this state, would
be a violation of Section 23152, is a conviction of Section 23152
for the purposes of this section, and a conviction of an offense
that, if committed in this state, would be a violation of Section
23153, is a conviction of Section 23153 for the purposes of this
section. The department shall suspend or revoke the privilege to
operate a motor vehicle pursuant to this section upon receiving
notice of that conviction.
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(e) For the purposes of the restriction conditions specified in
paragraphs (3) to (7), inclusive, of subdivision (a), the department
shall terminate the restriction imposed pursuant to this section and
shall suspend or revoke the person’s driving privilege upon receipt
of notification from the driving-under-the-influence program that
the person has failed to comply with the program requirements.
The person’s driving privilege shall remain suspended or revoked
for the remaining period of the original suspension or revocation
imposed under this section and until all reinstatement requirements
described in this section are met.
(f)
(e) For the purposes of this section, completion of a program is
the following:
(1) Satisfactory completion of all program requirements
approved pursuant to program licensure, as evidenced by a
certificate of completion issued, under penalty of perjury, by the
licensed program.
(2) Certification, under penalty of perjury, by the director of a
program specified in Section 8001 of the Penal Code, that the
person has completed a program specified in Section 8001 of the
Penal Code.
(g)
(f) The holder of a commercial driver’s license who was
operating a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in Section 15210,
at the time of a violation that resulted in a suspension or revocation
of the person’s noncommercial driving privilege under this section
is not eligible for the restricted driver’s license authorized under
paragraphs (3) to (7), inclusive, of subdivision (a) by Section
13352.5, 13352.6, 13352.7, 13352.81, or 13352.82.
SEC. 3. Section 13352.1 of the Vehicle Code is repealed.
13352.1. (a) Pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 13352 and
except required under Section 13352.4, upon a conviction or
finding of a violation of Section 23152 punishable under Section
23536, if the court refers the person to a program pursuant to
paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 23538, the privilege
shall be suspended for ten months.
(b) The privilege may not be reinstated until the person gives
proof of financial responsibility and gives proof satisfactory to the
department of successful completion of a
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
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11836 of the Health and Safety Code described in subdivision (b)
of Section 23538. For the purposes of this paragraph, enrollment,
participation, and completion of an approved program shall be
subsequent to the date of the current violation. Credit may not be
given to any program activities completed prior to the date of the
current violation.
SEC. 4. Section 13352.4 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
13352.4. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (h) (f), the
department shall issue a restricted driver’s license to a person
whose driver’s license was suspended under paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of Section 13352 or Section 13352.1, if the person
meets all of the following requirements:
(1) Submits proof satisfactory to the department of enrollment
in, or completion of, a driving-under-the-influence program
licensed pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code,
as described in subdivision (b) of Section 23538.
(2) Submits the “Verification of Installation” of an ignition
interlock device form described in Section 13386 for his or her
vehicle.
(2)
(3) Submits proof of financial responsibility, as defined in
Section 16430.
(3)
(4) Pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees and any
restriction fee required by the department.
(b) The restriction of the driving privilege shall become effective
when the department receives all of the documents and fees
required under subdivision (a) and shall remain in effect until the
final day of the original suspension imposed under paragraph (1)
of subdivision (a) of Section 13352 or Section 13352.1, or until
the date all reinstatement requirements described in Section 13352
or Section 13352.1 have been met, whichever date is later, and
may include credit for any a suspension period served under
subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3 or a restriction period served
under Section 13353.7.
(c) The restriction of the driving privilege shall be limited to
the hours necessary for driving to and from the person’s place of
employment, driving during the course of employment, and driving
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to and from activities required in the driving-under-the-influence
program.
(d)
(c) Whenever the driving privilege is restricted under this
section, proof of financial responsibility, as defined in Section
16430, shall be maintained for three years. If the person does not
maintain that proof of financial responsibility at any time during
the restriction, the driving privilege shall be suspended until the
proof required under Section 16484 is received by the department.
(e)
(d) For the purposes of this section, enrollment, participation,
and completion of an approved program shall be subsequent to the
date of the current violation. Credit may shall not be given to a
program activity completed prior to the date of the current
violation.
(f)
(e) (1) The department shall terminate the restriction issued
under this section and shall suspend the privilege to operate a motor
vehicle pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section
13352 or Section 13352.1 immediately upon receipt of notification
from the driving-under-the-influence program that the of either of
the following:
(A) The person has failed to comply with the
driving-under-the-influence program requirements. The
(B) The person attempted to remove, bypass, or tamper with,
or failed to maintain the ignition interlock device, or operates a
motor vehicle without a properly installed ignition interlock device,
while the restriction of the driving privilege is in effect as described
in subdivision (b).
(2) The privilege shall remain suspended until the final day of
the original suspension imposed under paragraph (1) of subdivision
(a) of Section 13352 or Section 13352.1, or until the date all
reinstatement requirements described in Section 13352 or Section
13352.1 have been met, whichever date is later.
(g) The holder of a commercial driver’s license who was
operating a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in Section 15210,
at the time of a violation that resulted in a suspension or revocation
of the person’s noncommercial driving privilege under paragraph
(1) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352 or Section 13352.1 is not
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eligible for the restricted driver’s license authorized under this
section.
(h)
(f) If, upon conviction, the court has made the determination,
as authorized under subdivision (d) of Section 23536 or paragraph
(3) of subdivision (a) of Section 23538, to disallow the issuance
of a restricted driver’s license, the department may shall not issue
a restricted driver’s license under this section.
(g) For purposes of this section, “vehicle” does not include a
motorcycle until the state certifies an ignition interlock device that
can be installed on a motorcycle. A person subject to this section
shall not operate a motorcycle for the duration of the period in
which he or she is required to have an ignition interlock device.
SEC. 5. Section 13352.5 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
13352.5. (a) The Except as provided in subdivision (f), the
department shall issue a restricted driver’s license to a person
whose driver’s license was suspended under paragraph (3) of
subdivision (a) of Section 13352, if all of the following
requirements have been met:
(1) Proof satisfactory to the department of enrollment in, or
completion of, a driving-under-the-influence program licensed
pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as
described in subdivision (b) of Section 23542 has been received
in the department’s headquarters.
(2) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” of an
ignition interlock device form described in Section 13386 for his
or her vehicle.
(2)
(3) The person submits proof of financial responsibility, as
described in Section 16430.
(3)
(4) The person completes not less than 12 months of the
suspension period imposed under paragraph (3) of subdivision (a)
of Section 13352. The 12 months may include credit for any a
suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.
(4)
(5) The person pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees
and any restriction fee required by the department.
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(b) The restriction of the driving privilege shall become effective
when the department receives all of the documents and fees
required under subdivision (a) and shall remain in effect until the
final day of the original suspension imposed under paragraph (3)
of subdivision (a) of Section 13352, or until the date all
reinstatement requirements described in Section 13352 have been
met, whichever date is later, and may include credit for a
suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3
or a restriction period served under Section 13353.71.
(c) The restriction of the driving privilege shall be limited to
the hours necessary for driving to and from the person’s place of
employment, driving during the course of employment, and driving
to and from activities required in the driving-under-the-influence
program.
(d)
(c) Whenever the driving privilege is restricted under this
section, proof of financial responsibility, as defined in Section
16430, shall be maintained for three years. If the person does not
maintain that proof of financial responsibility at any time during
the restriction, the driving privilege shall be suspended until the
proof required under Section 16484 is received by the department.
(e)
(d) For the purposes of this section, enrollment, participation,
and completion of an approved program shall be subsequent to the
date of the current violation. No credit may Credit shall not be
given to any for program activities completed prior to the date of
the current violation.
(f)
(e) (1) The department shall terminate the restriction imposed
pursuant to issued under this section and shall suspend the privilege
to drive under operate a motor vehicle pursuant to paragraph (3)
of subdivision (a) of Section 13352 immediately upon receipt of
notification from the driving-under-the-influence program that the
of either of the following:
(A) The person has failed to comply with the
driving-under-the-influence program requirements.
(B) The person attempted to remove, bypass, or tamper with,
or failed to maintain the ignition interlock device, or operates a
motor vehicle without a properly installed ignition interlock device,
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while the restriction of the driving privilege is in effect as described
in subdivision (b).
(g)
(f) If, upon conviction, the court has made the determination,
as authorized under subdivision (b) of Section 23540 or subdivision
(d) of Section 23542, to disallow the issuance of a restricted
driver’s license, the department may shall not issue a restricted
driver’s license under this section.
(h) Any person restricted pursuant to this section may apply to
the department for a restricted driver’s license, subject to the
conditions specified in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section
13352. Whenever proof of financial responsibility has already
been provided and a restriction fee has been paid in compliance
with restrictions described in this section, and the offender
subsequently receives an ignition interlock device restriction
described in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352,
the proof of financial responsibility period shall not be extended
beyond the previously established term and no additional restriction
fee shall be required.
(i) This section applies to a person who meets all of the
following conditions:
(1) Has been convicted of a violation of Section 23152 that
occurred on or before July 1, 1999, and is punishable under Section
23540, or former Section 23165.
(2) Was granted probation for the conviction subject to
conditions imposed under subdivision (b) of Section 23542, or
under subdivision (b) of former Section 23166.
(3) Is no longer subject to the probation described in paragraph
(2).
(4) Has not completed the licensed driving-under-the-influence
program under paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352
for reinstatement of the driving privilege.
(5) Has no violations in his or her driving record that would
preclude issuance of a restricted driver’s license.
(j) This section shall become operative on September 20, 2005.
(g) For purposes of this section, “vehicle” does not include a
motorcycle until the state certifies an ignition interlock device that
can be installed on a motorcycle. A person subject to this section
shall not operate a motorcycle for the duration of the period in
which he or she is required to have an ignition interlock device.
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SEC. 6. Section 13352.6 of the Vehicle Code is amended and
renumbered to read:
13352.6.
13352.9. (a) The department shall immediately suspend the
driving privilege of any a person who is 18 years of age or older
and is convicted of a violation of Section 23140, upon the receipt
of a duly certified abstract of the record of any a court showing
that conviction. The privilege may shall not be reinstated until the
person provides the department with proof of financial
responsibility and until proof satisfactory to the department, of
successful completion of a driving-under-the-influence program
licensed under Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code has
been received in the department’s headquarters. That attendance
shall be as follows:
(1) If, within 10 years of the current violation of Section 23140,
the person has not been convicted of a separate violation of Section
23140, 23152, or 23153, or of Section 23103, with a plea of guilty
under Section 23103.5, or of Section 655 of the Harbors and
Navigation Code, or of Section 191.5 of, or paragraph (3) of
subdivision (c) (a) of Section 192 192.5 of, the Penal Code, the
person shall complete, at a minimum, the education component of
that licensed driving-under-the-influence program.
(2) If the person does not meet the requirements of paragraph
(1), the person shall complete, at a minimum, the program
described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 11837 of
the Health and Safety Code.
(b) For the purposes of this section, enrollment, participation,
and completion of the program shall be subsequent to the date of
the current violation. Credit for enrollment, participation, or
completion may shall not be given for any program activities
completed prior to the date of the current violation.
SEC. 7. Section 13352.6 is added to the Vehicle Code, to read:
13352.6. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (f), the
department shall issue a restricted driver’s license to a person
whose driver’s license was suspended under paragraph (5) of
subdivision (a) of Section 13352, if all of the following
requirements have been met:
(1) Proof satisfactory to the department of enrollment in, or
completion of, a driving-under-the-influence program licensed
pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as
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described in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 23548, has been
received in the department’s headquarters.
(2) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” of an
ignition interlock device form described in Section 13386 for his
or her vehicle.
(3) The person submits proof of financial responsibility, as
described in Section 16430.
(4) The person completes not less than 18 months of the
suspension period imposed under paragraph (5) of subdivision
(a) of Section 13352. The 18 months may include credit for a
suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.
(5) The person pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees
and any restriction fee required by the department.
(b) The restriction of the driving privilege shall become effective
when the department receives all of the documents and fees
required under subdivision (a) and shall remain in effect until the
final day of the original suspension imposed under paragraph (5)
of subdivision (a) of Section 13352, or until the date all
reinstatement requirements described in paragraph (5) of
subdivision (a) of Section 13352 have been met, whichever date
is later, and may include credit for a suspension period served
under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3 or a restriction period
served under Section 13353.72.
(c) Whenever the driving privilege is restricted under this
section, proof of financial responsibility, as defined in Section
16430, shall be maintained for three years. If the person does not
maintain that proof of financial responsibility at any time during
the restriction, the driving privilege shall be suspended until the
proof required under Section 16484 is received by the department.
(d) For the purposes of this section, enrollment, participation,
and completion of an approved program shall be subsequent to
the date of the current violation. Credit shall not be given for
program activities completed prior to the date of the current
violation.
(e) The department shall terminate the restriction issued under
this section and shall suspend the privilege to operate a motor
vehicle pursuant to paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section
13352 immediately upon receipt of notification of either of the
following:
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(1) The person failed to comply with the
driving-under-the-influence program requirements.
(2) The person attempted to remove, bypass, or tamper with, or
failed to maintain the ignition interlock device, or operates a motor
vehicle without a properly installed ignition interlock device, while
the restriction of the driving privilege is in effect as described in
subdivision (b).
(f) If, upon conviction, the court has made the determination to
disallow the issuance of a restricted driver’s license because,
considering the circumstances taken as a whole, the court
determines that the person would present a traffic or public safety
risk if authorized to operate a motor vehicle during the period of
restriction authorized by this section, the department shall not
issue a restricted driver’s license under this section.
(g) For the purposes of this section, “vehicle” does not include
a motorcycle until the state certifies an ignition interlock device
that can be installed on a motorcycle. A person subject to this
section shall not operate a motorcycle for the duration of the period
in which he or she is required to have an ignition interlock device.
SEC. 8. Section 13352.7 is added to the Vehicle Code, to read:
13352.7. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (h), the
department shall issue a restricted driver’s license to a person
whose driver’s license was revoked under paragraph (7) of
subdivision (a) of Section 13352, if all of the following
requirements have been met:
(1) Proof satisfactory to the department of enrollment in, or
completion of, a driving-under-the-influence program licensed
pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as
described in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 23548, has been
received in the department’s headquarters.
(2) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” of an
ignition interlock device form described in Section 13386 for his
or her vehicle.
(3) The person submits proof of financial responsibility, as
described in Section 16430.
(4) The person completes not less than 24 months of the
revocation period imposed under paragraph (7) of subdivision (a)
of Section 13352. The 24 months may include credit for a
suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.
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(5) The person pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees
and any restriction fee required by the department.
(b) The restriction of the driving privilege shall become effective
when the department receives all of the documents and fees
required under subdivision (a) and may include credit for a
suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.
(c) Whenever the driving privilege is restricted under this
section, proof of financial responsibility, as defined in Section
16430, shall be maintained for three years. If the person does not
maintain that proof of financial responsibility at any time during
the restriction, the driving privilege shall be suspended until the
proof required under Section 16484 is received by the department.
(d) For the purposes of this section, enrollment, participation,
and completion of an approved program shall be subsequent to
the date of the current violation. Credit shall not be given for
program activities completed prior to the date of the current
violation.
(e) The department shall terminate the restriction issued under
this section and shall revoke the privilege to operate a motor
vehicle pursuant to paragraph (7) of subdivision (a) of Section
13352 immediately upon receipt of notification of either of the
following:
(1) The person failed to comply with the
driving-under-the-influence program requirements.
(2) The person attempted to remove, bypass, or tamper with, or
failed to maintain the ignition interlock device, or operates a motor
vehicle without a properly installed ignition interlock device, while
the restriction is in effect.
(f) (1) After completing seven years of restriction under this
section, the person may submit a request to the department for an
administrative review for the purpose of reinstating his or her
driving privilege free of the restriction.
(2) The department shall reinstate the person’s driving privilege
if the department finds that the person has not been convicted of
a driving-related offense during the previous seven years.
(g) Notwithstanding paragraph (7) of subdivision (a) of Section
13352, the department may reinstate a person’s privilege to operate
a motor vehicle pursuant to subdivision (f).
(h) If, upon conviction, the court has made the determination
to disallow the issuance of a restricted driver’s license because,
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considering the circumstances taken as a whole, the court
determines that the person would present a traffic or public safety
risk if authorized to operate a motor vehicle during the period of
restriction authorized by this section, the department shall not
issue a restricted driver’s license under this section.
(i) For the purposes of this section, “vehicle” does not include
a motorcycle until the state certifies an ignition interlock device
that can be installed on a motorcycle. A person subject to this
section shall not operate a motorcycle for the duration of the period
in which he or she is required to have an ignition interlock device.
SEC. 9. Section 13352.8 is added to the Vehicle Code, to read:
13352.8. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (f), the
department shall issue a restricted driver’s license to a person
whose driver’s license was suspended under paragraph (2) of
subdivision (a) of Section 13352, if all of the following
requirements have been met:
(1) Proof satisfactory to the department of enrollment in, or
completion of, a driving-under-the-influence program licensed
pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as
described in subdivision (b) of Section 23538 or paragraph (3) of
subdivision (b) of Section 23646 has been received in the
department’s headquarters.
(2) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” of an
ignition interlock device form described in Section 13386 for his
or her vehicle.
(3) The person submits proof of financial responsibility, as
described in Section 16430.
(4) The person completes not less than 12 months of the
suspension period imposed under paragraph (2) of subdivision
(a) of Section 13352. The 12 months may include credit for a
suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.
(5) The person pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees
and any restriction fee required by the department.
(b) The restriction of the driving privilege shall become effective
when the department receives all of the documents and fees
required under subdivision (a) and shall remain in effect until the
final day of the original suspension imposed under paragraph (2)
of subdivision (a) of Section 13352, or until the date all
reinstatement requirements described in Section 13352 have been
met, whichever date is later, and may include credit for a
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suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3
or a restriction period served under Section 13353.7.
(c) Whenever the driving privilege is restricted under this
section, proof of financial responsibility, as defined in Section
16430, shall be maintained for three years. If the person does not
maintain that proof of financial responsibility at any time during
the restriction, the driving privilege shall be suspended until the
proof required under Section 16484 is received by the department.
(d) For the purposes of this section, enrollment, participation,
and completion of an approved program shall be subsequent to
the date of the current violation. Credit shall not be given for
program activities completed prior to the date of the current
violation.
(e) The department shall terminate the restriction issued under
this section and shall suspend the privilege to operate a motor
vehicle pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section
13352 immediately upon receipt of notification of either of the
following:
(1) The person failed to comply with the
driving-under-the-influence program requirements.
(2) The person attempted to remove, bypass, or tamper with, or
failed to maintain the ignition interlock device, or operates a motor
vehicle without a properly installed ignition interlock device, while
the restriction of the driving privilege is in effect as described in
subdivision (b).
(f) If, upon conviction, the court has made the determination to
disallow the issuance of a restricted driver’s license because,
considering the circumstances taken as a whole, the court
determines that the person would present a traffic or public safety
risk if authorized to operate a motor vehicle during the period of
restriction authorized by this section, the department shall not
issue a restricted driver’s license under this section.
(g) For the purposes of this section, “vehicle” does not include
a motorcycle until the state certifies an ignition interlock device
that can be installed on a motorcycle. A person subject to this
section shall not operate a motorcycle for the duration of the period
in which he or she is required to have an ignition interlock device.
SEC. 10. Section 13352.81 is added to the Vehicle Code, to
read:
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13352.81. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (f), the
department shall issue a restricted driver’s license to a person
whose driver’s license was suspended under paragraph (4) of
subdivision (a) of Section 13352, if all of the following
requirements have been met:
(1) Proof satisfactory to the department of enrollment in, or
completion of, a driving-under-the-influence program licensed
pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as
described in subdivision (b) of Section 23562 has been received
in the department’s headquarters.
(2) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” of an
ignition interlock device form described in Section 13386 for his
or her vehicle.
(3) The person submits proof of financial responsibility, as
described in Section 16430.
(4) The person completes not less than 18 months of the
suspension period imposed under paragraph (4) of subdivision
(a) of Section 13352. The 18 months may include credit for a
suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.
(5) The person pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees
and any restriction fee required by the department.
(b) The restriction of the driving privilege shall become effective
when the department receives all of the documents and fees
required under subdivision (a) and shall remain in effect until the
final day of the original suspension imposed under paragraph (4)
of subdivision (a) of Section 13352, or until the date all
reinstatement requirements described in Section 13352 have been
met, whichever date is later, and may include credit for a
suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3
or a restricted period served under Section 13353.71.
(c) Whenever the driving privilege is restricted under this
section, proof of financial responsibility, as defined in Section
16430, shall be maintained for three years. If the person does not
maintain that proof of financial responsibility at any time during
the restriction, the driving privilege shall be suspended until the
proof required under Section 16484 is received by the department.
(d) For the purposes of this section, enrollment, participation,
and completion of an approved program shall be subsequent to
the date of the current violation. Credit shall not be given for
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program activities completed prior to the date of the current
violation.
(e) The department shall terminate the restriction issued under
this section and shall suspend the privilege to operate a motor
vehicle pursuant to paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of Section
13352 immediately upon receipt of notification of either of the
following:
(1) The person failed to comply with the
driving-under-the-influence program requirements.
(2) The person attempted to remove, bypass, or tamper with, or
failed to maintain the ignition interlock device, or operates a motor
vehicle without a properly installed ignition interlock device, while
the restriction of the driving privilege is in effect as described in
subdivision (b).
(f) If, upon conviction, the court has made the determination to
disallow the issuance of a restricted driver’s license because,
considering the circumstances taken as a whole, the court
determines that the person would present a traffic or public safety
risk if authorized to operate a motor vehicle during the period of
restriction authorized by this section, the department shall not
issue a restricted driver’s license under this section.
(g) For the purposes of this section, “vehicle” does not include
a motorcycle until the state certifies an ignition interlock device
that can be installed on a motorcycle. A person subject to this
section shall not operate a motorcycle for the duration of the period
in which he or she is required to have an ignition interlock device.
SEC. 11. Section 13352.82 is added to the Vehicle Code, to
read:
13352.82. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (f), the
department shall issue a restricted driver’s license to a person
whose driver’s license was suspended under paragraph (6) of
subdivision (a) of Section 13352, if all of the following
requirements have been met:
(1) Proof satisfactory to the department of enrollment in, or
completion of, a driving-under-the-influence program licensed
pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as
described in subdivision (b) of Section 23568, or if available in
the county of the person’s residence or employment, a 30-month
driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to Section
11836 of the Health and Safety Code, or a program specified in
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Section 8001 of the Penal Code, has been received in the
department’s headquarters.
(2) The person submits the “Verification of Installation” of an
ignition interlock device form described in Section 13386 for his
or her vehicle.
(3) The person submits proof of financial responsibility, as
described in Section 16430.
(4) The person completes not less than 24 months of the
suspension period imposed under paragraph (6) of subdivision
(a) of Section 13352. The 24 months may include credit for a
suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.
(5) The person pays all applicable reinstatement or reissue fees
and any restriction fee required by the department.
(b) The restriction of the driving privilege shall become effective
when the department receives all of the documents and fees
required under subdivision (a) and shall remain in effect until the
final day of the original suspension imposed under paragraph (6)
of subdivision (a) of Section 13352, or until the date all
reinstatement requirements described in Section 13352 have been
met, whichever date is later, and may include credit for a
suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3
or a restriction period served under Section 13353.72.
(c) Whenever the driving privilege is restricted under this
section, proof of financial responsibility, as defined in Section
16430, shall be maintained for three years. If the person does not
maintain that proof of financial responsibility at any time during
the restriction, the driving privilege shall be suspended until the
proof required under Section 16484 is received by the department.
(d) For the purposes of this section, enrollment, participation,
and completion of an approved program shall be subsequent to
the date of the current violation. Credit shall not be given for
program activities completed prior to the date of the current
violation.
(e) The department shall terminate the restriction issued under
this section and shall suspend the privilege to operate a motor
vehicle pursuant to paragraph (6) of subdivision (a) of Section
13352 immediately upon receipt of notification of either of the
following:
(1) The person failed to comply with the
driving-under-the-influence program requirements.
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(2) The person attempted to remove, bypass, or tamper with, or
failed to maintain the ignition interlock device, or operates a motor
vehicle without a properly installed ignition interlock device, while
the restriction of the driving privilege is in effect as described in
subdivision (b).
(f) If, upon conviction, the court has made the determination to
disallow the issuance of a restricted driver’s license because,
considering the circumstances taken as a whole, the court
determines that the person would present a traffic or public safety
risk if authorized to operate a motor vehicle during the period of
restriction authorized by this section, the department shall not
issue a restricted driver’s license under this section.
(g) For the purposes of this section, “vehicle” does not include
a motorcycle until the state certifies an ignition interlock device
that can be installed on a motorcycle. A person subject to this
section shall not operate a motorcycle for the duration of the period
in which he or she is required to have an ignition interlock device.
SEC. 12. Section 13352.85 is added to the Vehicle Code, to
read:
13352.85. (a) A person whose driving privilege is suspended
or revoked pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 13352 shall
install an ignition interlock device on all vehicles that the person
owns or operates, and is prohibited from operating a motor vehicle
unless the vehicle is equipped with a functioning, certified ignition
interlock device and the person is otherwise authorized to operate
a motor vehicle with that device.
(b) Nothing in this section authorizes a person to operate a
vehicle without a valid driver’s license.
(c) If a person has a medical condition that does not permit the
person to breathe with sufficient strength to activate the device,
the person shall only have the suspension or revocation option
pursuant to Section 13352, and is not eligible for a restricted
driver’s license.
(d) Pursuant to this section, an out-of-state resident who
otherwise would qualify for an ignition interlock device restricted
driver’s license in California shall be prohibited from operating
a motor vehicle in California unless that vehicle is equipped with
a functioning ignition interlock device. An ignition interlock device
is not required to be installed on a vehicle owned by the defendant
that is not driven in California.
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(e) For purposes of this section “owned” means solely owned
or owned in conjunction with another person or legal entity. For
purposes of this section “operates” includes operating a vehicle
that is not owned by the person subject to this section.
(f) For purposes of this section, “vehicle” does not include a
motorcycle until the state certifies an ignition interlock device that
can be installed on a motorcycle. A person subject to this section
shall not operate a motorcycle for the duration of the period in
which he or she is required to have an ignition interlock device.
SEC. 13. Section 13353.3 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
13353.3. (a) An order of suspension of a person’s privilege to
operate a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 13353.2 shall become
effective 30 days after the person is served with the notice pursuant
to Section 13382 or 13388, or subdivision (b) of Section 13353.2.
(b) The period of suspension of a person’s privilege to operate
a motor vehicle under Section 13353.2 is as follows:
(1) Except as provided in Section 13353.6, if If the person has
not been convicted of a separate violation of Section 23103, as
specified in Section 23103.5, of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153,
of Section 191.5 of the Penal Code, or of paragraph (3) of
subdivision (c) (a) of Section 192 192.5 of that code, the person
has not been administratively determined to have refused chemical
testing pursuant to Section 13353 or 13353.1, or the person has
not been administratively determined to have been driving with
an excessive concentration of alcohol pursuant to Section 13353.2
on a separate occasion, that offense or occurrence occurred within
10 years of the occasion in question, the person’s privilege to
operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for four months.
(2) If the person has been convicted of one or more separate
violations of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5,
Section 23140, 23152, or 23153, Section 191.5 of the Penal Code,
or paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) (a) of Section 192 192.5 of that
code, the person has been administratively determined to have
refused chemical testing pursuant to Section 13353 or 13353.1, or
the person has been administratively determined to have been
driving with an excessive concentration of alcohol pursuant to
Section 13353.2 on a separate occasion, that offense or occasion
occurred within 10 years of the occasion in question, the person’s
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privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for one
year.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a person has
been administratively determined to have been driving in violation
of Section 23136 or to have refused chemical testing pursuant to
Section 13353.1, the period of suspension shall not be for less than
one year.
(c) If a person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle is
suspended pursuant to Section 13353.2 and the person is convicted
of a violation of Section 23152 or 23153, including, but not limited
to, a violation described in Section 23620, arising out of the same
occurrence, both the suspension under Section 13353.2 and the
suspension or revocation under Section 13352 shall be imposed,
except that the periods of suspension or revocation shall run
concurrently, and the total period of suspension or revocation shall
not exceed the longer of the two suspension or revocation periods.
(d) For the purposes of this section, a conviction of any an
offense in any a state, territory, or possession of the United States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or
the Dominion of Canada that, if committed in this state, would be
a violation of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, or
Section 23140, 23152, or 23153, or Section 191.5 or paragraph
(3) of subdivision (c) (a) of Section 192 192.5 of the Penal Code,
is a conviction of that particular section of the Vehicle Code or
Penal Code.
(e) This section shall become operative on September 20, 2005.
SEC. 14. Section 13353.5 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
13353.5. (a) If a person whose driving privilege is suspended
or revoked under Section 13352, former Section 13352.4, Section
13352.4, 13352.6 13352.9, paragraph (1) of subdivision (g) of
Section 23247, or paragraph (2) of subdivision (f) of Section 23575
is a resident of another state at the time the mandatory period of
suspension or revocation expires, the department may terminate
the suspension or revocation, upon written application of the
person, for the purpose of allowing the person to apply for a license
in his or her state of residence. The application shall include, but
need not be limited to, evidence satisfactory to the department that
the applicant now resides in another state.
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(b) If the person submits an application for a California driver’s
license within three years after the date of the action to terminate
suspension or revocation pursuant to subdivision (a), a license
shall not be issued until evidence satisfactory to the department
establishes that the person is qualified for reinstatement and no
grounds exist including, but not limited to, one or more subsequent
convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol or other
drugs that would support a refusal to issue a license. The
department may waive the three-year requirement if the person
provides the department with proof of financial responsibility, as
defined in Section 16430, and proof satisfactory to the department
of successful completion of a driving-under-the-influence program
described in Section 13352, and the driving-under-the-influence
program is of the length required under paragraphs (1) to (7),
inclusive, of subdivision (a) of Section 13352.
(c) For the purposes of this section, “state” includes a foreign
province or country.
(d) This section shall become operative on September 20, 2005.
SEC. 15. Section 13353.7 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
13353.7. (a) Subject to subdivision (c), if the person whose
driving privilege has been suspended under Section 13353.2 has
not been convicted of, or found to have committed, a separate
violation of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, or
Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of this code, or Section 191.5 or
paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) (a) of Section 192 192.5 of the
Penal Code, and if the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle
has not been suspended or revoked pursuant to Section 13353 or
13353.2 for an offense that occurred on a separate occasion within
10 years of the occasion in question and, if the person subsequently
enrolls in a driving-under-the-influence program licensed under
Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as described in
subdivision (b) of Section 23538, and installs and maintains an
ignition interlock device certified pursuant to Section 13386 on
all vehicles that the person owns or operates, that person, if 21
years of age or older at the time the offense occurred, may apply
to the department for a restricted driver’s license limited to travel
to and from the activities required by the program and to and from
and in the course of the person’s employment. After receiving
proof of enrollment in the program, and the “Verification of
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Installation” of an ignition interlock device form described in
Section 13386, and if the person has not been arrested subsequent
to the offense for which the person’s driving privilege has been
suspended under Section 13353.2 for a violation of Section 23103,
as specified in Section 23103.5, or Section 23140, 23152, or 23153
of this code, or Section 191.5 or paragraph (3) of subdivision (c)
(a) of Section 192 192.5 of the Penal Code, and if the person’s
privilege to operate a motor vehicle has not been suspended or
revoked pursuant to Section 13353 or 13353.2 for an offense that
occurred on a separate occasion, notwithstanding Section 13551,
the department shall, after review pursuant to Section 13557,
suspend the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle for 30
days and then issue the person a restricted driver’s license under
the following conditions:
(1) The program shall report any a failure to participate in the
program to the department and shall certify successful completion
of the program to the department.
(2) The person was 21 years of age or older at the time the
offense occurred and gives proof of financial responsibility as
defined in Section 16430.
(3) The restriction shall be imposed for a period of five months.
(4) If a person who has been issued a restricted license under
this section fails at any time to participate in the program, the
department shall suspend the restricted license immediately. The
department shall give notice of the suspension under this paragraph
in the same manner as prescribed in subdivision (b) of Section
13353.2 for the period specified in Section 13353.3, that is effective
upon receipt of the notice by the person.
(5) If a person who has been issued a restricted license under
this section attempts to remove, bypass, or tamper with, or fails
to maintain the ignition interlock device, or operates a motor
vehicle without a properly installed ignition interlock device, within
the time described in Section 13353.73, the department shall
suspend the restricted license immediately. The department shall
give notice of the suspension under this paragraph in the same
manner as prescribed in subdivision (b) of Section 13353.2 for the
period specified in Section 13353.3, that is effective upon receipt
of the notice by the person.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), and upon a conviction of
Section 23152 or 23153, the department shall suspend or revoke
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the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle under Section
13352.
(c) If the holder of a commercial driver’s license was operating
a commercial vehicle, as defined in Section 15210, at the time of
the violation that resulted in the suspension of that person’s driving
privilege under Section 13353.2, the department shall, pursuant
to this section, if the person is otherwise eligible, issue the person
a class C driver’s license restricted in the same manner and subject
to the same conditions as specified in subdivision (a), except that
the license may not allow travel to and from or in the course of
the person’s employment.
(d) This section does not apply to a person whose driving
privilege has been suspended or revoked pursuant to Section 13353
or 13353.2 for an offense that occurred on a separate occasion, or
as a result of a conviction of a separate violation of Section 23103,
as specified in Section 23103.5, or Section 23140, 23152, or 23153,
that violation occurred within 10 years of the offense in question.
This subdivision shall be operative only so long as a one-year
suspension of the driving privilege for a second or subsequent
occurrence or offense, with no restricted or hardship licenses
permitted, is required by Section 408 or 410 of Title 23 of the
United States Code.
(e) This section shall become operative on September 20, 2005.
SEC. 16. Section 13353.71 is added to the Vehicle Code, to
read:
13353.71. (a) Subject to subdivision (c), if the person whose
driving privilege has been suspended under Section 13353.2 has
been convicted of, or found to have committed, one prior separate
violation of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, or
Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of this code, or Section 191.5 or
subdivision (a) of Section 192.5 of the Penal Code and, if the
person subsequently enrolls in a driving-under-the-influence
program licensed under Section 11836 of the Health and Safety
Code, as described in subdivision (b) of Section 23542, and installs
and maintains an ignition interlock device certified pursuant to
Section 13386, on all vehicles registered in the person’s name,
that person, if 21 years of age or older at the time the offense
occurred, may apply to the department for a restricted driver’s
license. After receiving proof of enrollment in the program and
the “Verification of Installation” of an ignition interlock device
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form described in Section 13386, and if the person has not been
arrested subsequent to the offense for which the person’s driving
privilege has been suspended under Section 13353.2 for a violation
of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, or Section 23140,
23152, or 23153 of this code, or Section 191.5 or subdivision (a)
of Section 192.5 of the Penal Code, and if the person’s privilege
to operate a motor vehicle has not been suspended or revoked
pursuant to Section 13353 for an offense that occurred on a
separate occasion, notwithstanding Section 13551, the department
shall, after review as described in Section 13557, suspend the
person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle for 90 days and then
issue the person a restricted driver’s license under the following
conditions:
(1) The program shall report a failure to participate in the
program to the department and shall certify successful completion
of the program to the department.
(2) The person was 21 years of age or older at the time the
offense occurred and gives proof of financial responsibility as
defined in Section 16430.
(3) The restriction shall be imposed for a period of 21 months.
(4) If a person who has been issued a restricted license under
this section fails at any time to participate in the program, the
department shall suspend the restricted license immediately. The
department shall give notice of the suspension under this
paragraph in the same manner as prescribed in subdivision (b) of
Section 13353.2 for the period specified in Section 13353.3, that
is effective upon receipt of the notice by the person.
(5) If a person who has been issued a restricted license under
this section attempts to remove, bypass, or tamper with, or fails
to maintain the ignition interlock device, or operates a motor
vehicle without a properly installed ignition interlock device, within
the time described in Section 13353.73, the department shall
suspend the restricted license immediately. The department shall
give notice of the suspension under this paragraph in the same
manner as prescribed in subdivision (b) of Section 13353.2 for the
period specified in Section 13353.3, that is effective upon receipt
of the notice by the person.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), and upon a conviction of
Section 23152 or 23153, the department shall suspend or revoke
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the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle under Section
13352.
(c) If the holder of a commercial driver’s license was operating
a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in Section 15210, at the
time of the violation that resulted in the suspension of that person’s
driving privilege under Section 13353.2, the department shall,
pursuant to this section, if the person is otherwise eligible, issue
the person a class C driver’s license restricted in the same manner
and subject to the same conditions as specified in subdivision (a).
SEC. 17. Section 13353.72 is added to the Vehicle Code, to
read:
13353.72. (a) Subject to subdivision (c), if the person whose
driving privilege has been suspended under Section 13353.2 has
been convicted of, or found to have committed, two or more prior
separate violations of Section 23103, as specified in Section
23103.5, or Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of this code, or Section
191.5 or subdivision (a) of Section 192.5 of the Penal Code and,
if the person subsequently enrolls in a driving-under-the-influence
program licensed under Section 11836 of the Health and Safety
Code, as described in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 23548, and
installs and maintains an ignition interlock device certified
pursuant to Section 13386, on all motor vehicles registered in that
person’s name, that person, if 21 years of age or older at the time
the offense occurred, may apply to the department for a restricted
driver’s license. After receiving proof of enrollment in the program
and the “Verification of Installation” of an ignition interlock device
form described in Section 13386, and if the person has not been
arrested subsequent to the offense for which the person’s driving
privilege has been suspended under Section 13353.2 for a violation
of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, or Section 23140,
23152, or 23153 of this code, or Section 191.5 or subdivision (a)
of Section 192.5 of the Penal Code, and if the person’s privilege
to operate a motor vehicle has not been suspended or revoked
pursuant to Section 13353 for an offense that occurred on a
separate occasion, notwithstanding Section 13551, the department
shall, after review as described in Section 13557, suspend the
person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle for six months and
then issue the person a restricted driver’s license under the
following conditions:
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(1) The program shall report a failure to participate in the
program to the department and shall certify successful completion
of the program to the department.
(2) The person was 21 years of age or older at the time the
offense occurred and gives proof of financial responsibility as
defined in Section 16430.
(3) The restriction shall be imposed for a period of 30 months.
(4) If a person who has been issued a restricted license under
this section fails at any time to participate in the program, the
department shall suspend the restricted license immediately. The
department shall give notice of the suspension under this
paragraph in the same manner as prescribed in subdivision (b) of
Section 13353.2 for the period specified in Section 13353.3, that
is effective upon receipt of the notice by the person.
(5) If a person who has been issued a restricted license under
this section attempts to remove, bypass, or tamper with, or fails
to maintain the ignition interlock device, or operates a motor
vehicle without a properly installed ignition interlock device, within
the time described in Section 13353.73, the department shall
suspend the restricted license immediately. The department shall
give notice of the suspension under this paragraph in the same
manner as prescribed in subdivision (b) of Section 13353.2 for the
period specified in Section 13353.3, that is effective upon receipt
of the notice by the person.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), and upon a conviction of
Section 23152 or 23153, the department shall suspend or revoke
the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle under Section
13352.
(c) If the holder of a commercial driver’s license was operating
a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in Section 15210, at the
time of the violation that resulted in the suspension of that person’s
driving privilege under Section 13353.2, the department shall,
pursuant to this section, if the person is otherwise eligible, issue
the person a class C driver’s license restricted in the same manner
and subject to the same conditions as specified in subdivision (a).
SEC. 18. Section 13373.73 is added to the Vehicle Code, to
read:
13373.73. (a) A person issued a restricted driver’s license
pursuant to Section 13353.7 shall install and maintain an ignition
interlock device for six months. Installation may occur 30 days
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after the issuance of the notice pursuant to Section 13382 or
subdivision (b) of Section 13353.2.
(b) A person issued a restricted driver’s license pursuant to
Section 13353.71 shall install and maintain an ignition interlock
device for two years. Installation may occur 30 days after the
issuance of the notice pursuant to Section 13382 or subdivision
(b) of Section 13353.2.
(c) A person issued a restricted driver’s license pursuant to
Section 13353.72 shall install and maintain an ignition interlock
device for three years. Installation may occur 30 days after the
issuance of the notice pursuant to Section 13382 or subdivision
(b) of Section 13353.2.
SEC. 19. Section 23247 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
23247. (a) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly rent, lease,
or lend a motor vehicle to another person known to have had his
or her driving privilege restricted as provided in Section 13352,
13352.4, 13352.5, 13352.6, 13352.7, 13352.8, 13352.81, 13352.82,
13353.7, 13353.71, 13353.72, or 23575, unless the vehicle is
equipped with a functioning, certified ignition interlock device.
Any A person, whose driving privilege is restricted pursuant to
Section 13352, 13352.4, 13352.5, 13352.6, 13352.7, 13352.8,
13352.81, 13352.82, 13353.7, 13353.71, 13353.72, or 23575 shall
notify any other another person who rents, leases, or loans a motor
vehicle to him or her of the driving restriction imposed under that
section.
(b) It is unlawful for any a person whose driving privilege is
restricted pursuant to Section 13352, 13352.4, 13352.5, 13352.6,
13352.7, 13352.8, 13352.81, 13352.82, 13353.7, 13353.71,
13353.72, or 23575 to request or solicit any other another person
to blow into an ignition interlock device or to start a motor vehicle
equipped with the device for the purpose of providing the person
so restricted with an operable motor vehicle.
(c) It is unlawful to blow into an ignition interlock device or to
start a motor vehicle equipped with the device for the purpose of
providing an operable motor vehicle to a person whose driving
privilege is restricted pursuant to Section 13352, 13352.4, 13352.5,
13352.6, 13352.7, 13352.8, 13352.81, 13352.82, 13352.7,
13353.71, 13353.72, or 23575.
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(d) It is unlawful to remove, bypass, or tamper with, an ignition
interlock device.
(e) It is unlawful for any a person whose driving privilege is
restricted pursuant to Section 13352, 13352.4, 13352.5, 13352.6,
13352.7, 13352.8, 13352.81, 13352.82, 13353.7, 13353.71,
13353.72, or 23575 to operate any a vehicle that is not equipped
with a functioning ignition interlock device.
(f) Any A person convicted of a violation of this section shall
be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
six months or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars
($5,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(g) (1) If any a person whose driving privilege is restricted
pursuant to Section 13352 is convicted of a violation of subdivision
(e), the court shall notify the Department of Motor Vehicles, which
shall immediately terminate the restriction and shall suspend or
revoke the person’s driving privilege for the remaining period of
the originating suspension or revocation and until all reinstatement
requirements in Section 13352 are met.
(2) If any a person who is restricted pursuant to subdivision (a)
or (l) of Section 23575 is convicted of a violation of subdivision
(e), the department shall suspend the person’s driving privilege
for one year from the date of the conviction.
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a vehicle in
which an ignition interlock device has been installed is impounded,
the manufacturer or installer of the device shall have the right to
remove the device from the vehicle during normal business hours.
No A charge shall not be imposed for the removal of the device
nor shall, and the manufacturer or installer shall not be liable for
any removal, towing, impoundment, storage, release, or
administrative costs or penalties associated with the impoundment.
Upon request, the person seeking to remove the device shall present
documentation to justify removal of the device from the vehicle.
Any damage to the vehicle resulting from the removal of the device
is the responsibility of the person removing it.
SEC. 20. Section 23502 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
23502. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a
person who is at least 18 years of age is convicted of a first
violation of Section 23140, in addition to any penalties, the court
shall order the person to attend a program licensed under Section
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11836 of the Health and Safety Code, subject to a fee schedule
developed under paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section
11837.4 of the Health and Safety Code.
(b) The attendance in a licensed driving-under-the-influence
program required under subdivision (a) shall be as follows:
(1) If, within 10 years of the current violation of Section 23140,
the person has not been convicted of a separate violation of Section
23140, 23152, or 23153, or of Section 23103, with a plea of guilty
under Section 23103.5, or of Section 655 of the Harbors and
Navigation Code, or of Section 191.5 of, or paragraph (3) of
subdivision (c) (a) of Section 192 192.5 of, the Penal Code, the
person shall complete, at a minimum, the education component of
that licensed driving-under-the-influence program.
(2) If the person does not meet the requirements of paragraph
(1), the person shall complete, at a minimum, the program
described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 11837 of
the Health and Safety Code.
(c) The person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be
suspended by the department as required under Section 13352.6
13352.9, and the court shall require the person to surrender his or
her driver’s license to the court in accordance with Section 13550.
(d) The court shall advise the person at the time of sentencing
that the driving privilege will not be restored until the person has
provided the department with proof satisfactory to the department
that the person has successfully completed the
driving-under-the-influence program required under this section.
SEC. 21. Section 23536 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
23536. (a) If a person is convicted of a first violation of Section
23152, that person shall be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for not less than 96 hours, at least 48 hours of which shall be
continuous, nor more than six months, and by a fine of not less
than three hundred ninety dollars ($390), nor more than one
thousand dollars ($1,000).
(b) The court shall order that a person punished under
subdivision (a), who is to be punished by imprisonment in the
county jail, be imprisoned on days other than days of regular
employment of the person, as determined by the court. If the court
determines that 48 hours of continuous imprisonment would
interfere with the person’s work schedule, the court shall allow
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the person to serve the imprisonment whenever the person is
normally scheduled for time off from work. The court may make
this determination based upon a representation from the defendant’s
attorney or upon an affidavit or testimony from the defendant.
(c) The person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be
suspended by the department under paragraph (1) of subdivision
(a) of Section 13352 or Section 13352.1. The court shall require
the person to surrender the driver’s license to the court in
accordance with Section 13550.
(d) Whenever, when considering the circumstances taken as a
whole, the court determines that the person punished under this
section would present a traffic safety or public safety risk if
authorized to operate a motor vehicle during the period of
suspension imposed under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of
Section 13352 or Section 13352.1, the court may disallow the
issuance of a restricted driver’s license required under Section
13352.4.
SEC. 22. Section 23538 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
23538. (a) (1) If the court grants probation to person punished
under Section 23536, in addition to the provisions of Section 23600
and any other terms and conditions imposed by the court, the court
shall impose as a condition of probation that the person pay a fine
of at least three hundred ninety dollars ($390), but not more than
one thousand dollars ($1,000). The court may also impose, as a
condition of probation, that the person be confined in a county jail
for at least 48 hours, but not more than six months.
(2) The person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be
suspended by the department under paragraph (1) of subdivision
(a) of Section 13352 or Section 13352.1. The court shall require
the person to surrender the driver’s license to the court in
accordance with Section 13550.
(3) Whenever, when considering the circumstances taken as a
whole, the court determines that the person punished under this
section would present a traffic safety or public safety risk if
authorized to operate a motor vehicle during the period of
suspension imposed under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of
Section 13352 or Section 13352.1, the court may disallow the
issuance of a restricted driver’s license required under Section
13352.4.
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(b) In any a county where the board of supervisors has approved,
and the State Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs has
licensed, a program or programs described in Section 11837.3 of
the Health and Safety Code, the court shall also impose as a
condition of probation that the driver shall enroll and participate
in, and successfully complete a driving-under-the-influence
program, licensed pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and
Safety Code, in the driver’s county of residence or employment,
as designated by the court. For the purposes of this subdivision,
enrollment in, participation in, and completion of an approved
program shall be subsequent to the date of the current violation.
Credit may shall not be given for any program activities completed
prior to the date of the current violation.
(1) The court shall refer a first offender whose blood-alcohol
concentration was less than 0.20 percent, by weight, to participate
for at least three months or longer, as ordered by the court, in a
licensed program that consists of at least 30 hours of program
activities, including those education, group counseling, and
individual interview sessions described in Chapter 9 (commencing
with Section 11836) of Part 2 of Division 10.5 of the Health and
Safety Code.
(2) The court shall refer a first offender whose blood-alcohol
concentration was 0.20 percent or more, by weight, or who refused
to take a chemical test, to participate for at least nine months or
longer, as ordered by the court, in a licensed program that consists
of at least 60 hours of program activities, including those education,
group counseling, and individual interview sessions described in
Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 11836) of Part 2 of Division
10.5 of the Health and Safety Code.
(3) The court shall advise the person at the time of sentencing
that the driving privilege shall not be restored until proof
satisfactory to the department of successful completion of a
driving-under-the-influence program of the length required under
this code that is licensed pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health
and Safety Code has been received in the department’s
headquarters.
(c) (1) The court shall revoke the person’s probation pursuant
to Section 23602, except for good cause shown, for the failure to
enroll in, participate in, or complete a program specified in
subdivision (b).
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(2) The court, in establishing reporting requirements, shall
consult with the county alcohol program administrator. The county
alcohol program administrator shall coordinate the reporting
requirements with the department and with the State Department
of Alcohol and Drug Programs. That reporting shall ensure that
all persons who, after being ordered to attend and complete a
program, may be identified for either (A) failure to enroll in, or
failure to successfully complete, the program, or (B) successful
completion of the program as ordered.
SEC. 23. Section 23546 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
23546. (a) If a person is convicted of a violation of Section
23152 and the offense occurred within 10 years of two separate
violations of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, 23152,
or 23153, or any combination thereof, that resulted in convictions,
that person shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail
for not less than 120 days nor more than one year and by a fine of
not less than three hundred ninety dollars ($390) nor more than
one thousand dollars ($1,000). The person’s privilege to operate
a motor vehicle shall be revoked suspended by the Department of
Motor Vehicles as required in paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of
Section 13352. The court shall require the person to surrender his
or her driver’s license to the court in accordance with Section
13550.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Section 23152
punishable under this section shall be designated as a habitual
traffic offender for a period of three years, subsequent to the
conviction. The person shall be advised of this designation pursuant
to subdivision (b) of Section 13350.
SEC. 24. Section 23548 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
23548. (a) (1) If the court grants probation to any a person
punished under Section 23546, in addition to the provisions of
Section 23600 and any other terms and conditions imposed by the
court, the court shall impose as conditions of probation that the
person be confined in the county jail for at least 120 days but not
more than one year and pay a fine of at least three hundred ninety
dollars ($390) but not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(2) The person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be
revoked suspended by the department under paragraph (5) of
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subdivision (a) of Section 13352. The court shall require the person
to surrender the driver’s license to the court in accordance with
Section 13550.
(b) In addition to subdivision (a), if the court grants probation
to any a person punished under Section 23546, the court may order
as a condition of probation that the person participate, for at least
30 months subsequent to the underlying conviction and in a manner
satisfactory to the court, in a driving-under-the-influence program
licensed pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code.
In lieu of the minimum term of imprisonment specified in
subdivision (a), the court shall impose as a condition of probation
under this subdivision that the person be confined in the county
jail for at least 30 days but not more than one year. The court shall
not order the treatment prescribed by this subdivision unless the
person makes a specific request and shows good cause for the
order, whether or not the person has previously completed a
treatment program pursuant to paragraph (4) of subdivision (b) of
Section 23542 or paragraph (4) of subdivision (b) of Section 23562.
In order to enable all required persons to participate, each person
shall pay the program costs commensurate with the person’s ability
to pay as determined pursuant to Section 11837.4 of the Health
and Safety Code. No condition of probation required pursuant to
this subdivision is a basis for reducing any other probation
requirement in this section or Section 23600 or for avoiding the
mandatory license revocation provisions of suspension imposed
under paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352.
(c) In addition to the provisions of Section 23600 and
subdivision (a), if the court grants probation to any a person
punished under Section 23546 who has not previously completed
a treatment program pursuant to paragraph (4) of subdivision (b)
of Section 23542 or paragraph (4) of subdivision (b) of Section
23562, and unless the person is ordered to participate in and
complete a driving-under-the-influence program under subdivision
(b), the court shall impose as a condition of probation that the
person, subsequent to the date of the current violation, enroll and
participate, for at least 18 months and in a manner satisfactory to
the court, in a driving-under-the-influence program licensed
pursuant to Section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code, as
designated by the court. The person shall complete the entire
program subsequent to, and shall not be given any credit for
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program activities completed prior to, the date of the current
violation.Any A person who has previously completed a 12-month
or 18-month program licensed pursuant to Section 11836 of the
Health and Safety Code shall not be eligible for referral pursuant
to this subdivision unless a 30-month licensed
driving-under-the-influence program is not available for referral
in the county of the person’s residence or employment. The
program shall provide for persons who cannot afford the program
fee pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 11837.4
of the Health and Safety Code in order to enable those persons to
participate. No condition of probation required pursuant to this
subdivision is a basis for reducing any other probation requirement
in this section or Section 23600 or for avoiding the mandatory
license revocation provisions of suspension imposed under
paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352.
(d) The court shall advise the person at the time of sentencing
that the driving privilege may shall not be restored until the person
provides proof satisfactory to the department of successful
completion of a driving-under-the-influence program of the length
required under this code that is licensed pursuant to Section 11836
of the Health and Safety Code.
(e) This section shall become operative on September 20, 2005.
SEC. 25. Section 23550.5 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
23550.5. (a) A person is guilty of a public offense, punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison or confinement in a county
jail for not more than one year and by a fine of not less than three
hundred ninety dollars ($390) nor more than one thousand dollars
($1,000) if that person is convicted of a violation of Section 23152
or 23153, and the offense occurred within 10 years of any of the
following:
(1) A prior violation of Section 23152 that was punished as a
felony under Section 23550 or this section, or both, or under former
Section 23175 or former Section 23175.5, or both.
(2) A prior violation of Section 23153 that was punished as a
felony.
(3) A prior violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of
Section 192 of the Penal Code that was punished as a felony.
(b) Every A person who, having previously been convicted of
a violation of Section 191.5 of the Penal Code or a felony violation
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of paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) (a) of Section 192 192.5 of the
Penal Code, is subsequently convicted of a violation of Section
23152 or 23153 is guilty of a public offense punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison or confinement in a county jail
for not more than one year and by a fine of not less than three
hundred ninety dollars ($390) nor more than one thousand dollars
($1,000).
(c) The privilege to operate a motor vehicle of a person
convicted of a violation that is punishable under subdivision (a)
or (b) shall be revoked by the department under paragraph (7) of
subdivision (a) of Section 13352, unless paragraph (6) of
subdivision (a) of Section 13352 is also applicable, in which case
the privilege shall be revoked suspended under that provision. The
court shall require the person to surrender the driver’s license to
the court in accordance with Section 13550.
(d) Any A person convicted of a violation of Section 23152 or
23153 that is punishable under this section shall be designated as
a habitual traffic offender for a period of three years, subsequent
to the conviction. The person shall be advised of this designation
under subdivision (b) of Section 13350.
SEC. 26. Section 23575 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
23575. (a) (1) In addition to any other provisions of law, the
court may require that a person convicted of a first offense violation
of Section 23152 or 23153 to install a certified ignition interlock
device on any vehicle that the person owns or operates and prohibit
that person from operating a motor vehicle unless that vehicle is
equipped with a functioning, certified ignition interlock device.
The court shall give heightened consideration to applying this
sanction to a first offense violator with 0.20 percent or more, by
weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at arrest, or with two or more
prior moving traffic violations, or to persons who refused the
chemical tests at arrest. If the court orders the ignition interlock
device restriction, the term shall be determined by the court for a
period not to exceed three years from the date of conviction. The
court shall notify the Department of Motor Vehicles, as specified
in subdivision (a) of Section 1803, of the terms of the restrictions
in accordance with subdivision (a) of Section 1804. The
Department of Motor Vehicles shall place the restriction in the
person’s records in the Department of Motor Vehicles.
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(2) The court shall require a person convicted of a violation of
Section 14601.2 to install an ignition interlock device on any
vehicle that the person owns or operates and prohibit the person
from operating a motor vehicle unless the vehicle is equipped with
a functioning, certified ignition interlock device. The term of the
restriction shall be determined by the court for a period not to
exceed three years from the date of conviction. The court shall
notify the Department of Motor Vehicles, as specified in
subdivision (a) of Section 1803, of the terms of the restrictions in
accordance with subdivision (a) of Section 1804. The Department
of Motor Vehicles shall place the restriction in the person’s records
in the Department of Motor Vehicles.
(b) The court shall include on the abstract of conviction or
violation submitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles under
Section 1803 or 1816, the requirement and term for the use of a
certified ignition interlock device. The records of the department
shall reflect mandatory use of the device for the term ordered by
the court.
(c) The court shall advise the person that installation of an
ignition interlock device on a vehicle does not allow the person to
drive without a valid driver’s license.
(d) A person whose driving privilege is restricted by the court
pursuant to this section shall arrange for each vehicle with an
ignition interlock device to be serviced by the installer at least
once every 60 days in order for the installer to recalibrate and
monitor the operation of the device. The installer shall notify the
court if the device is removed or indicates that the person has
attempted to remove, bypass, or tamper with the device, or if the
person fails three or more times to comply with any a requirement
for the maintenance or calibration of the ignition interlock device.
There is no obligation for the installer to notify the court if the
person has complied with all of the requirements of this article.
(e) The court shall monitor the installation and maintenance of
any ignition interlock device restriction ordered pursuant to
subdivision (a) or (l). If a person fails to comply with the court
order, the court shall give notice of the fact to the department
pursuant to Section 40509.1.
(f) (1) Pursuant to Section 13352, if If a person is convicted of
a violation of Section 23152 or 23153, and the offense occurred
within 10 years of one or more separate violations of Section 23152
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or 23153 that resulted in a conviction, the person may apply applies
to the Department of Motor Vehicles for a restricted driver’s license
pursuant to Section 13352 13352.4, 13352.5, 13352.6, 13352.7,
13352.8, 13352.81, or 13352.82, that prohibits the person from
operating a motor vehicle unless that vehicle is equipped with a
functioning ignition interlock device, certified pursuant to Section
13386. The, the restriction shall remain in effect for at least the
remaining period of the original suspension or revocation and until
all reinstatement requirements in Section 13352 are met.
(2) Pursuant to subdivision (g), the Department of Motor
Vehicles shall immediately terminate the restriction issued pursuant
to Section 13352 13352.4, 13352.5, 13352.6, 13352.7, 13352.8,
13352.81, or 13352.82, and shall immediately suspend or revoke
the privilege to operate a motor vehicle of a person who attempts
to remove, bypass, or tamper with the device, who has the device
removed prior to the termination date of the restriction, or who
fails three or more times to comply with any a requirement for the
maintenance or calibration of the ignition interlock device ordered
pursuant to Section 13352 13352.4, 13352.5, 13352.6, 13352.7,
13352.8, 13352.81, or 13352.82. The privilege shall remain
suspended or revoked for the remaining period of the originating
suspension or revocation and until all reinstatement requirements
in Section 13352 are met.
(g) A person whose driving privilege is restricted by the
Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to Section 13352 13352.4,
13352.5, 13352.6, 13352.7, 13352.8, 13352.81, or 13352.82, shall
arrange for each vehicle with an ignition interlock device to be
serviced by the installer at least once every 60 days in order for
the installer to recalibrate the device and monitor the operation of
the device. The installer shall notify the Department of Motor
Vehicles if the device is removed or indicates that the person has
attempted to remove, bypass, or tamper with the device, or if the
person fails three or more times to comply with any a requirement
for the maintenance or calibration of the ignition interlock device.
There is no obligation on the part of the installer to notify the
department or the court if the person has complied with all of the
requirements of this section.
(h) Nothing in this section permits a person to drive without a
valid driver’s license.
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(i) The Department of Motor Vehicles shall include information
along with the order of suspension or revocation for repeat
offenders informing them that after a specified period of suspension
or revocation has been completed, the person may either install an
ignition interlock device on any vehicle that the person owns or
operates or remain with a suspended or revoked driver’s license.
(j) Pursuant to this section, an out-of-state resident who
otherwise would qualify for an ignition interlock device restricted
license in California shall be prohibited from operating a motor
vehicle in California unless that vehicle is equipped with a
functioning ignition interlock device. An ignition interlock device
is not required to be installed on any vehicle owned by the
defendant that is not driven in California.
(k) If a person has a medical problem that does not permit the
person to breathe with sufficient strength to activate the device,
then that person shall only have the suspension option.
(l) This section does not restrict a court from requiring
installation of an ignition interlock device and prohibiting operation
of a motor vehicle unless that vehicle is equipped with a
functioning, certified ignition interlock device for a person to
whom subdivision (a) or (b) does not apply. The term of the
restriction shall be determined by the court for a period not to
exceed three years from the date of conviction. The court shall
notify the Department of Motor Vehicles, as specified in
subdivision (a) of Section 1803, of the terms of the restrictions in
accordance with subdivision (a) of Section 1804. The Department
of Motor Vehicles shall place the restriction in the person’s records
in the Department of Motor Vehicles.
(m) For the purposes of this section, “vehicle” does not include
a motorcycle until the state certifies an ignition interlock device
that can be installed on a motorcycle. Any A person subject to an
ignition interlock device restriction shall not operate a motorcycle
for the duration of the ignition interlock device restriction period.
(n) For the purposes of this section, “owned” means solely
owned or owned in conjunction with another person or legal entity.
For purposes of this section, “operates” includes operating vehicles
a vehicle that are is not owned by the person subject to this section.
(o) For the purposes of this section, “bypass” includes, but is
not limited to, either of the following:
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(1) Any combination of failing or not taking the ignition
interlock device rolling retest three consecutive times.
(2) Any incidence of failing or not taking the ignition interlock
device rolling retest, when not followed by an incidence of passing
the ignition interlock rolling retest prior to turning off the vehicle’s
engine.
SEC. 27. Section 23575.5 is added to the Vehicle Code, to
read:
23575.5. (a) The Ignition Interlock Device Assistance Fund
is hereby created in the State Treasury. The money in the fund is
available to the department, upon appropriation by the Legislature,
to fund the installation of ignition interlock devices.
(b) In addition to any other fines or fees imposed, a person
convicted of violating Section 23152 or 23153 shall pay a fee of
one hundred dollars ($100) to be deposited in the Ignition Interlock
Device Assistance Fund.
(c) The director shall establish standards and develop criteria
for implementing and maintaining the Ignition Interlock Device
Assistance Program. The criteria shall include at least all of the
following:
(1) Requirements for financial assistance to install and maintain
an ignition interlock device.
(2) The maximum amount of financial assistance, not to exceed
50 percent of the cost of installing and maintaining an ignition
interlock device, available for a person to install and maintain an
ignition interlock device.
(3) The application process by which a person can apply for
financial assistance.
(4) Criteria to terminate financial assistance.
SEC. 28. Section 23576 of the Vehicle Code is amended to
read:
23576. (a) Notwithstanding Section Sections 13352.85 and
23575, if a person is required to operate a motor vehicle in the
course and scope of his or her employment and if the vehicle is
owned by the employer, the person may operate that vehicle
without installation of an approved ignition interlock device if the
employer has been notified by the person that the person’s driving
privilege has been restricted pursuant to Section 13352.4, 13352.5,
13352.6, 13352.7, 13352.8, 13352.81, 13352.82, 13353.7,
13353.71, 13353.72, or 23575 and if the person has proof of that
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notification in his or her possession, or if the notice, or a facsimile
copy thereof, is with the vehicle.
(b) A motor vehicle owned by a business entity that is all or
partly owned or controlled by a person otherwise subject to Section
13352.4, 13352.5, 13352.6, 13352.7, 13352.8, 13352.81, 13352.82,
13353.7, 13353.71, 13353.72, or 23575, is not a motor vehicle
owned by the employer subject to the exemption in subdivision
(a).
SEC. 29. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant
to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because
the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school
district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or
infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty
for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of
the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within
the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California
Constitution.
All matter omitted in this version of the bill
appears in the bill as introduced in the
Senate, February 5, 2007. (JR11)
O
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http://www.sandiegoduilawyer.com

 

Murder - DUI case in California

An Inverness man delayed entering a plea to a California DUI this morning in Marin County Superior Court to charges in connection with a fatal vehicle crash that killed a 16-year-old boy.

Larios is charged with second-degree murder, vehicular manslaughter and California DUI in connection with the crash that killed Richard Teague, of Point Reyes, a passenger in his 1988 Chevrolet pickup. The accident happened June 12 on state Highway 1 between Olema and Point Reyes Station, according to the California Highway Patrol.

The truck allegedly went off the road and struck a power pole and neither Larios or Teague was wearing a seatbelt, according to the CHP. Teague was pronounced dead at Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital.

The Marin County District Attorney's Office said Larios has two prior DUI convictions in Marin County, California.

His California DUI attorney is presently not named.

 

50 DUI checkpoints planned

Brighton, Colorado DUI police will be conducting a DUI or drunk driving sobriety checkpoint from 8 p.m. June 22 to 3 a.m. Saturday, June 23.

It's part of the Colorado Department of Transportation's DUI Checkpoint Colorado program to put motorists on notice against drinking and driving, drunk driving, DUI and DWI.

50 DUI checkpoints are planned in Colorado this summer. Last summer's effort turned up 411 DUI arrests and an 8 percent eduction in alcohol-related fatalities from 2005.

 

Tank goes back in the tank for DUI

Chicago Bears defensive lineman Terry "Tank" Johnson was pulled over for speeding by Gilbert police early this morning, and had blood drawn at the police station on suspicion of driving impaired or drunk driving.

Gilbert Police spokesman Sgt. Andrew Duncan released a statement this afternoon with details of the McClintock High graduate's arrest.

"Gilbert Police stopped Johnson for driving 40 mph in a 25 mph zone on Gilbert Road at about 3:30 a.m. on Friday morning. Observations were made at the scene leading the officer to believe that Johnson was impaired,"

The statement added "Johnson was arrested for DUI impaired to the slightest degree," and was transported to police headquarters to have blood drawn.

"Johnson was cooperative with the process and was released pending lab analysis of the blood sample," police said.

Police did not book or charge Johnson and "DUI charges are pending lab analysis results."

In the statement, Gilbert police declined to comment or conduct interviews "to avoid the perception of "grandstanding" and to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial."

Already preparing to sit out eight games in the upcoming NFL season, Johnson's season becomes even cloudier after reports said NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell said Johnson's suspension could be reduced to six if he had no further incidents with law enforcement.

Johnson was released from jail on May 13, after serving 60 days of a 120-day sentence after pleading guilty to violating probation on a 2005 weapons charge.

Da Bears.

 

California DUI charges dropped vs. Shemar Moore

MOORE PLEADS NO-CONTEST TO SPEEDING, DUI CHARGES DROPPED

June 22, 2007

American actor SHEMAR MOORE has been fined $1,400 and ordered to do community service after entering a no-contest plea to speeding. Just hours after being charged with two counts of California DUI, the 37-year-old's lawyer made the plea and the DUI charges were dropped. Moore, who has also been placed on probation, was arrested on 1 June (07) after being pulled over by Los Angeles California police near Santa Monica Boulevard at 1.30am.

 

BAC of .50!

TACOMA, Washington. - A Pierce County woman apparently tied a record for the amount of alcohol in her blood when the Washington State Patrol toxicology lab measured a blood-alcohol content of 0.50 two hours after she was arrested for investigation of drunken driving.

Ann Marie Gordon, manager of the lab in Seattle, said the reading — more than six times the legal limit of 0.08 — tied the highest level ever found by technicians at the patrol's lab. A King County driver also registered 0.50 on a blood test in 2000, Gordon said.

"It certainly would kill many people," she said.

The average blood-alcohol content of drunken drivers stopped in Washington is about 0.15, Gordon added.

Rebecca G. Lingbloom, 45, pleaded not guilty Wednesday to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol on May 10. Authorities contended in an affidavit that she nearly hit a pedestrian that day and was seen swerving all over the road.

A Pierce County sheriff's deputy later found her passed out behind the wheel of her car in the Summit area, the affidavit states.

Deputy Prosecutor Bradley Moericke pointed out that Lingbloom was arrested for investigation of drunk driving twice in the 1990s, and asked District Court Judge Frank Dacca to jail her in lieu of $20,000 bail. Moericke also asked that Lingbloom be monitored with an electronic bracelet that would record her movements should she make bail.

 

DUI's up & CARD provides shuttle service

DUI arrests have skyrocketed during the month of June.

Not only are more drivers getting behind the wheel while intoxicated, but they're also consuming more alcohol before driving, sheriff's officials said. The average blood alcohol content (BAC) of those arrested was .20 - or more than twice the legal limit.

With 35 arrests in Incline Village and Crystal Bay, Nevada, during June through Thursday, sheriff's officials this week said this month could "easily eclipse" the all-time high of September 2006, when 37 drivers were arrested. The sheriff's office has kept track of DUI numbers in the area since 2004.

As a knee-jerk to last September's high number of arrests, Incline residents and decided to form a community nonprofit Citizens Advocating Responsible Driving (CARD) to educate the public and provide a shuttle service.

Information from the sheriff's office last fall that most DUI arrests were of local residents is congruous with this month's arrest tally thus far.

Out of the 34 arrests in June thus far, 15 are Incline locals, nine others are from the North Shore and two from South Shore. The balance are from the Carson/Minden or Reno/Sparks area or out-of-state.

Kelly and Sgt. Bill Devine have worked since last fall to get the word out to local bar patrons as well as the establishments themselves. Yet without some kind of safe ride program, some bartenders feel the problem will continue.
Sheriff's officials agreed.

Capt. Kelly admitted finding people rides during the high season is one of the greatest concerns that he hopes will be addressed soon by CARD.

 

California DUI for Charity Founder

Charity Founder Charged With DUI


Michael Scott Kerr, the founder of the Snowball Express charity has recently been charged with a California DUI in the Orange County California Superior Court.

The Snowball Express charity has helped hundreds of families of servicemen killed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is Kerr's second DUI arrest, which may violate probation from a 2005 DUI and may give the charity founder some jail time.

 

San Diego Chargers' DUI companion gets 180 days jail

SAN DIEGO California DUI News

San Diego Chargers linebacker Steve Foley's companion - when he was shot by an off-duty police officer in Poway - was sentenced for her San Diego California DUI conviction. She was ordered to serve 180 days in jail.

San Diego Superior Court Judge Charles Rogers said the evidence in the case showed that Gaut started the evening of Sept. 2 wanting to hang out with celebrities, but ended up in a situation that devolved into chaos.

“We are dealing with a confused, intoxicated and in some ways naive young woman,” Rogers said, explaining his decision. “That's not a case for prison, that's a case for probation.” On April 26, a jury convicted Gaut, 26, of assault with a deadly weapon – a car – and misdemeanor San Diego DUI. She was acquitted of assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer.

Off-duty Coronado police Officer Aaron Mansker testified that he was driving home from work shortly after 3 a.m. – in his personal car and street clothes – when he saw Foley's 1971 Oldsmobile Cutlass driving erratically along state Route 163. He radioed for assistance and was told that a California Highway Patrol officer was responding.

Mansker followed the Oldsmobile for 24 minutes, talking the Pomerado Road exit from Interstate 15 and heading toward Poway.

Mansker said he contacted Foley and Gaut several times, but they ignored his commands. When Foley stopped his car near his home at the bottom of Travertine Court, the officer said he decided to give up and drive off, but he realized he had driven into a cul-de-sac.

Mansker said he saw Foley walking up the hill with Gaut behind the wheel of the Oldsmobile following closely behind.

Mansker testified that he got out of his car and fired a warning shot into a dirt berm as Gaut drove the car straight at him. He said Foley continued to approach him and reached into his waistband as though he had a weapon, so he fired again.

Foley was wounded in the knee, hip and hand. Police said he was unarmed.

Foley has since pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor San Diego California DUI charge.

The judge said Foley had acted in a “random and chaotic way” and continued to advance toward Mansker even after the officer fired a warning shot.

He also said he considered Foley's “unpredictable and chaotic conduct” in sentencing Gaut.

Gaut had testified that she got behind the wheel to help Foley after he was shot but had trouble driving his heavily customized car.

Gaut said she regretted ever getting behind the wheel of Foley's car.

 

10 year DUI sentence remains for causing beauty pageant winner

A man serving 10 years in prison for causing the death of a Somerset beauty pageant winner in a DUI car accident in 2005 was denied parole by parole board in Frankfort Friday.

Ryan West, 22, of Somerset, was originally charged with murder, DUI and two counts of assault resulting from the June 2005 single-car accident that killed passenger Brittany Shoap, 20. He pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of second-degree manslaughter.

West was questioned extensively by the parole board, which took less than five minutes to make its decision. West was asked for details about how much alcohol he consumed before that crash, and talked for the first time about another fatal crash he was involved in when he was a juvenile. West admitted during that McCreary County wreck he had been drinking.

Shoap had won the Miss Taylor County Fair beauty pageant just two days prior to the accident to qualify for the Miss Kentucky County Fair pageant.

Police say West, who hit a utility pole at a high rate of speed, causing the car to roll into an embankment, had a blood alcohol level twice the legal limit when tested more than two hours after the accident.

Shoap was a student at Somerset Community College, where she majored in early childhood education. In her biography for the Miss Taylor County pageant, Shoap said she hoped to earn her degree, work with disabled children and start a family of her own.

Two other passengers were thrown from the vehicle in the crash and were hospitalized. Shoap rode in the back seat and wore a seat belt, he said. She was pronounced dead at the scene. Authorities later determined she died of blunt force trauma.

West is set to be released from prison in 2012.

 

70 years in jail for 8th DUI - vehicle = deadly weapon

A 52-year-old was sentenced to man to 70 years in prison after finding him guilty of felony driving while intoxicated.

The jury also found that the vehicle driven by Wendel Glenn Klotz was used as a deadly weapon, making Klotz ineligible for parole for 30 years.

During trial, Klotz tried to convince the jury that he got intoxicated back at home after his accident in the truck. During a punishment hearing, the jury learned Klotz had seven prior convictions for driving while intoxicated. The convictions were in 1983 (2 cases), 1987 (2 cases), 1988, 1991 and 1996.

He failed to complete probation every time he received it and went to prison four times. He had received numerous opportunities for treatment and was kicked out of the Central Texas Treatment Center, a local inpatient treatment facility for chronic drunks and drug abusers.

"There is no excuse for getting into a truck and driving drunk," said District Attorney John Bradley.

Thursday, June 21, 2007

 

These drunk driving killers are MADD

WASHINGTON, DC

June 21, 2007:

Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) announced significant state legislative victories in Arizona and Illinois that mandate alcohol ignition interlocks for all convicted drunk drivers, moving one step closer to its goal of a drunk-driving free America. The legislative progress is part of a bold new offensive in the war against drunk driving -- MADD's Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving, launched in November 2006.

Legislative victories on alcohol ignition interlocks in Arizona and Illinois applauded as new national data show drunk driving fatalities on the rise.

"Our vision of eliminating drunk driving is one step closer to becoming a reality," said MADD National President Glynn Birch. "As part of MADD's Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving, we will continue to work nationwide until every state does what Arizona and Illinois have done."

MADD is also calling for congressional hearings to develop a comprehensive strategy built upon solutions proven to work. MADD's National Board of Directors met recently with members of Congress to champion the Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving and lobby for increased focus on the issue of drunk driving.

The Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving has four elements: full implementation of alcohol ignition interlocks for all convicted drunk drivers, intensive high-visibility law enforcement, development of advanced vehicle technologies to prevent drunk driving and grassroots support led by MADD and its 400+ affiliates.

The need for the Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving has been underscored by a recent federal report showing that drunk driving deaths are at their highest point since 1992, according to preliminary figures.

According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, fatalities involving a driver with a .08 blood alcohol content or higher rose from 13,613 in 2005 to 13,990 in 2006, representing almost a 3 percent increase. At the same time, overall traffic fatalities were down slightly by 0.3 percent.

"It's clear that more of the same will not help in the fight to make our roads safer," Birch said. "We still have states without the most effective tools in place to deter and stop drunk driving -- sobriety checkpoints and ignition interlocks. These tools stop higher-risk offenders and first-time drunk drivers. There is no justification for not using the tools we know will save lives and prevent injuries."

MADD's aggressive legislative strategy aims to strengthen drunk driving laws in all 50 states. Last month, the Arizona legislature and Governor took a bold step for public safety by mandating alcohol ignition interlocks for all convicted drunk drivers. The Illinois legislature also passed interlock legislation last month, which awaits Governor Blagojevich's signature before becoming law. Louisiana, New York, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania are actively considering interlock laws.

An alcohol ignition interlock is a breath test device linked to a vehicle's ignition system. When a driver wishes to start his or her vehicle, he or she must first blow into the device. The vehicle will not start unless the driver's alcohol level is below a pre-set blood alcohol content (BAC).

"Alcohol ignition interlocks, when installed and monitored, save thousands of lives and help save society money in part by giving offenders the ability to drive without endangering the public," said MADD CEO Chuck Hurley.

Multiple studies have shown alcohol ignition interlocks are up to 90 percent effective in keeping both first-time and repeat offenders from recommitting the crime as long as the interlock is installed on the vehicle. Furthermore, 65 percent of the public supports the mandatory installation of alcohol ignition interlocks for all convicted drunk drivers.

Early results from New Mexico, the first state to mandate ignition interlocks as part of sentencing for all convicted drunk drivers, make the case for a national alcohol ignition interlock policy if reducing the number of drunk drivers on roadways is a priority.

The New Mexico Department of Transportation reported that alcohol-related injury crashes dropped by 20 percent and overall alcohol-related crashes declined by more than 17 percent in the first year the state adopted mandatory interlock legislation.

Despite a 40 percent decline in alcohol-related traffic fatalities since MADD was founded in 1980, the threat of one of the nation's most deadly crimes still remains. Last year, nearly 14,000 people were killed by drunk drivers with an illegal BAC of .08 or above and countless others were injured. This represents more than 1,000 families every month that must live with the tragic consequences of drunk driving.

About MADD

Founded in 1980, MADD's mission is to stop drunk driving, support the victims of this violent crime and prevent underage drinking. MADD is a 501c(3) non-profit, grassroots organization with approximately 400 affiliates and 2 million members and supporters nationwide.

 

Iraq War Vet gets death DUI sentence

Twenty-nine-year old Anthony Klecker faced more than four years in prison after pleading guilty to Criminal Vehicular Homicide for killing a teenager.

On Thursday, Judge David Knutson gave him a downward departure, sentencing him to 365 days in jail and 1,000 hours of community service. His probation will last for 10 years.

Casey's 16-year-old daughter Deanna was killed on Interstate 494 on October 28, 2006. Authorities say Klecker was drunk when he crashed into the median that Casey hit head-on on her way home from work.

Defense attorneys have been asking for the downward departure, citing Klecker's post traumatic stress disorder diagnosis. Klecker served the armed forces overseas, fighting in Iraq.

Knutson's sentence requires Klecker to go through 45 days of in-patient alcohol treatment, 45 days of treatment at the VA Hospital for post traumatic stress, and a 45 day independent living skills program.

After Klecker serves the final 188 days of his jail sentence, he'll be speaking to groups about alcohol abuse and post traumatic stress disorder.

 

214 drunk driving cases in 3 hours

The traffic control branch of Mumbai Police registered 214 cases of drunk driving in just 3 hours on Thursday. From 11 pm to 3 am, 38 cases of rash and negligent driving and 52 cases of speeding were also recorded.

Although the motorists booked for drunk driving were let off after they paid a fine of Rs 2,000, their licenses were impounded, which means they can’t drive without getting it back.

“Such checkings are usually conducted during weekends. But we were surprised when more than 200 motorists were caught within three hours,” said Joint Commissioner of Traffic Vijay Kamble.

Police officers from all traffic chowkies were instructed to detect drunk drivers with breath analysers. The senior inspectors of all the traffic divisions in Mumbai assisted by sub inspectors and other staff members were deployed at various junctions like Worli Naka, Mahim junction, Maheshwari Circle, BARC flyover, S V Road, Linking Road and near Palm Grove Hotel, Juhu.

Driving under the influence of alcohol is considered a serious offence in India. In the event of an accident under the influence of alcohol, the punishment for the offender can be a fine and/or imprisonment up to six months.

“A person is booked for drunk driving when alcohol content in his blood is more than 0.05 per cent. His driving licence is suspended for at least six months,” said a senior police official.

The Traffic police have intensified checking at various points in the city after a number of cases of accidents due to drunk driving were registered in the recent past.

The Mumbai Traffic Police have made an appeal to motorists to exercise more control on their drinking and avoid driving after consuming alcohol.

People should make use of public transport like autos and taxis if they have consumed alcohol, the police said.

 

SCHAUMBURG Man guilty in DUI crash that killed 2 children

June 22, 2007

A Schaumburg, Illinois man admitted Thursday in court that he was drunk nearly two years ago when his pickup truck ran a red light and collided with a van that burst into flames, trapping and killing two children inside.

Ralph Pollock, 48, pleaded guilty to 10 counts of aggravated DUI related to the deaths of Nathan Hockerman, 5, and his sister, Claire, 14, and injuries to their parents, Gregory and Sherry, and brother, Paul, who survived the crash.

This was the third time Pollock was charged with DUI, said Assistant State's Atty. Maureen O'Brien. The first time, he received supervision, and the second time, he was convicted. He now faces a minimum sentence of six years in prison and a maximum of 28, she said.

Cook County Judge Lawrence Terrell will sentence Pollock on Aug. 28 at the Maybrook courthouse in Maywood.

 

Yankee executive's DUI

A DUI hearing for New York Yankees executive Steve Swindal has been postponed in Clearwater.

Swindal was arrested by St. Petersburg police on February 15th and charged with driving under the influence, a misdemeanor.

Police said he was weaving and speeding when he was pulled over. Swindal, who had been designated as George Steinbrenner's successor as head of the Yankees, has pleaded not guilty.

 

Former undercover State Police officer cleared of DUI

State narc cleared of DWI
Source: KRQE News 13











ALBUQUERQUE

A former undercover New Mexico State Police officer has been cleared of drunk driving.

An Albuquerque judge ruled Wednesday that there was not enough evidence to prove John Lytle was actually driving the night he was arrested.

Lytle was arrested in January while urinating outside of an unmarked police vehicle near downtown Albuquerque.

His attorney denied his client was DUI and accused Albuquerque police of compromising an undercover drug investigation.

Lytle was placed on leave after his arrest and later fired.

 

False Positive for GHB Drug from Soap (video) & GHB info

San Diego California DUI News:

Drug Test Kit Ideal for Testing Soap but Not Drugs

New Video Proves NarcoPouch® 928 Tests Positive on Various Natural Soaps and Negative on "Fake" Soap Based on Detergent Formulations

ESCONDIDO, CAlifornia

The Bronner family, makers of the popular organic Dr. Bronner's Magic Soaps have released a new video of NarcoPouch® 928 field drug tests of its soaps and other brands. The results prove that the test kit which was used to jail Don Bolles, drummer for the legendary punk band The Germs on April 4, will always give a false-positive for the drug GHB (Gamma Hydroxy Butyrate) if used on any true natural soap. However, in an interesting twist, the test will test negative for fake mislabeled "liquid soap" products that are actually detergent-based, not soap. The new video features David Bronner, President of Dr. Bronner's Magic Soaps, using the NarcoPouch® 928 on a wide variety of common natural soaps as well as detergent based fake "soap" products. The video can be viewed at http://www.drbronner.com/soap_test.html.

"Our testing shows that real soaps which are made using the ecological time-honored process of saponification of vegetable oil will always test positive for GHB, while complicated synthetic detergent-based so-called 'liquid soaps' test negative," said David Bronner. "The NarcoPouch® 928 is a great test for determining if a product labeled 'Soap' actually contains real soap or not. It's ironic that the flawed GHB field test used by cops shows in a graphic immediate way true versus fake soaps. Fortunately for Don Bolles, the much more accurate confirmation drug-testing by the Orange County crime lab proved our soap did not contain the drug GHB."
Detergents in fake soap products are usually made in part or even entirely from petroleum along with vegetable feedstocks. For instance, Sodium Myreth Sulfate, the main ingredient in JASON's so-called "Pure, Natural, & Organic Soap" is made by attaching ethylene oxide groups from petroleum to vegetable fatty acid, which also produces trace 1,4 dioxane as a side reaction. Olefin Sulfonate, the main ingredient in both Nature's Gate ORGANICS "Soap" and Kiss My Face ObsessivelyOrganic "Soap", is made entirely from petroleum. Cocamidopropyl Sultaine, the main ingredient in EO's so-called soap, is in significant part petroleum-based.

Bronner laments: "Companies mislead consumers in conflating their detergent-based products with ecological biodegradable soaps, even calling these synthetic detergent products 'organic'. Dr. Bronner's Magic Soaps are real soaps made from real organic oils, while these other so-called 'Soap' products are detergents made from petroleum and conventional vegetable material. They are not soap, they are not organic, they are not natural."

The crime lab confirmation test that exonerated Don Bolles and Dr. Bronner's soaps of GHB, uses the GC-MS method which is much more accurate than the field drug test kits used by the Newport Beach Police. "Police departments nationwide should immediately stop using the ODV, Inc. field test for GHB as it is not accurate when used on soaps and who knows what other common household products," said Bronner. ODV, Inc, maker of NarcoPouch® 928 Inc is a subsidiary of Armor Holdings, Inc. The company has done nothing to alert police departments about the false positives when used on natural soap.

According to retired FBI agent and forensics expert Dr. Frederick Whitehurst, "There is no effort by the National Academies of Science to validate forensic science protocols and there are no national standards for presumptive field drug tests. I believe our freedoms are being infringed upon because of fake science."



Gamma-hydroxybutyra te (GHB) is an endogenous metabolite, present in most mammalian tissues at low (nanomolar) concentrations.

Ref.

D.T. Anderson and T. Kuwahara. Endogenous gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB) levels in postmortem specimens. Presented at the quarterly meeting of the California Association of Toxicologists, Las Vegas, November 6, 1997.

Pages 498-501, Gamma-hydroxybutyra te in Disposition of Toxic Drugs and Chemicals in Man, Seveth Edition (2004) by Randall C. Baselt, Ph.D., Biomedial Publications, Foster City, California.



A general comment on GHB. It is gamma hydroxy butyric acid. That is, it is a normal product of fat metabolism. Think "butyric" as in butter. It is in beef, wine (not a "fatty" food, but the grapes and bugs result in the formation of GHB), beer, blood, urine, and just about anything else of biological origin. It can and does form very rapidly in biological samples.

A police department arranged for a test on some suspect wine. It contained GHB. So, a bottle of the same fine wine was purchased, and it was positive, too. The concentrations were essentially the same.

It also is a problem in that the analysis itself is fraught with problems due to the nature of the substance. A simple substance is often more difficult to analyze than is a larger, more complex, substance, such as cocaine or heroin.

 

65 DUI cases thrown out because of untrustworthy police officer

TAMPA Florida

Prosecutors dropped 65 of former sheriff's Deputy Daniel Brock's DUI arrests between October 2005 and October 2006. One was the case of William G. Lapanne.

Brock arrested Lapanne after a two-car crash on June 24, 2006, and then, a prosecutor said, forced him to give a blood sample without having a legal reason to do so.

The Hillsborough Sheriff's Office fired Brock on May 24 after an internal review found that he arrested 58 people with blood-alcohol content below the legal threshold, often without evidence of suspicious driving behavior, positive urine samples or video to back his claims.

Results from Lapanne's blood test indicated that he had used a prescription drug and marijuana but didn't show how recently, according to the State Attorney's Office. A Florida Department of Law Enforcement report said his blood-alcohol content was 0.03, below the 0.08 limit at which state law presumes a driver is impaired.

But Assistant State Attorney Kim Seace said they couldn't use the results in court.

The reason she gave: When a defendant refuses a breath test, as Lapanne did, a forced blood draw is allowed only if authorities have evidence that someone sustained "serious bodily injury" in the crash.

Serious injury or not?

In his report, Brock said a charge nurse at Brandon Hospital told him that one of the car crash victims "was being treated as a trauma alert." He did not name the nurse. Based on that information, he conducted the forced blood draw, his report states.

However, the victim told prosecutors that neither she nor her husband had been seriously injured, Seace said. Medical records from the hospital backed that claim, Seace added.

Hillsborough County Fire Rescue records indicate that emergency workers responded to a "minor two-vehicle accident, " said spokesman Ray Yeakley. He said a victim with injuries that weren't life-threatening was taken to the hospital.

Serious bodily injury, by state law, "creates a substantial risk of death, serious personal disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ."

Seace said she provided the medical records to the Sheriff's Office with the understanding that investigators would interview the charge nurse to discuss Brock's claims.

On Wednesday, she did not know if that occurred and could not say for certain what Brock had been told about the victim's condition.

But prosecutors were convinced that blood test results would be thrown out by a judge before trial. They dropped the case on Oct. 24 without ever formally filing charges against Lapanne, Seace said.

Then, based on a request by the Sheriff's Office, Seace said, prosecutors turned their attention to whether Brock committed a crime in his handling of the case. Specifically, they considered whether he might have made an incorrect official statement.

It was this review, Hillsborough State Attorney Mark Ober said Wednesday, that generated a letter from Chief Assistant State Attorney Karen Stanley on Nov. 6. Her letter said the "facts in this case meet the element of a crime" but would be best handled administratively by the Sheriff's Office.

But in Brock's internal affairs report, quoted widely by media outlets in recent days, Detective Bruce Crumpler stated that Stanley's letter referred to a different driving under the influence case involving the deputy.

Crumpler, who conducted the internal affairs investigation, wrote that Stanley sent the memo after reviewing the July 17, 2006, DUI arrest of Kristopher Amos. The internal investigation found that Brock submitted a second arrest report on Amos weeks after his arrest that contained revised field sobriety test results.

The subject line of Stanley's Nov. 6 letter includes the case number of the internal affairs probe into Brock released last week. But the letter does not specify a particular DUI case.

Investigator Crumpler and prosecutor Stanley spoke Wednesday about the genesis of her letter. Afterward, representatives from their offices still couldn't agree on whether it was about Amos or Lapanne.

A case of confusion

Sheriff's spokesman J.D. Callaway said Crumpler still contended the letter was about the Amos case.

Based on the Sheriff's Office internal audit, the State Attorney's Office is conducting a review of Brock's conduct to decide if criminal charges are warranted.

Brock and his attorney were unavailable Wednesday for comment.

Lapanne's attorney, Jeff Paulk, said his client may have a civil damages claim, too. The arrest required Lapanne, 49, who works in home restoration in St. Petersburg, to post bond, pay a lawyer and fight with his insurance company for money to repair his damaged truck.

Having blood drawn against his will was the most serious price Lapanne paid.

 

MADD awards officer for most DUI arrests in South Carolina

Charlie Musselwhite, a master deputy with the Pickens County Sheriff’s Office, has been recognized in South Carolina for the number of arrests made in 2006 for driving under the influence.

Mothers Against Drunk Driving recently presented the award in Columbia.

In agencies with up to 100 officers, Deputy Musselwhite was awarded the Agency Hero Award for leading the state with 36 arrests, according to information provided by Pickens County Sheriff C. David Stone.

A Pickens deputy also won the award in 2005.

 

More states add Ignition Interlock Device for DUI offenders

Add Illinois and Arizona to the list of states that now require alcohol interlocks for all convicted drunk drivers, according to a press release.Alcohol ignition interlocks are devices that require drivers to blow into a tube, similar to a breathalyzer. If the driver's alcohol level is above a pre-set blood alcohol content, the car will not start. Louisiana, New York, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania are all considering interlock laws.

The legislation was passed due in part to pressure from Mothers Against Drunk Driving, or MADD. "Alcohol ignition interlocks, when installed and monitored, save thousands of lives and help save society money in part by giving offenders the ability to drive without endangering the public," said MADD CEO Chuck Hurley. The legislation is part of MADD's Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving, which was launched in Novemeber 2006 amid reports of rising drunk driving fatalities. According to a report from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DUI fatalities jumped almost 3 percent to 13,990 in 2006, up from 13,13 the previous year. Overall traffic fatalities dropped by .3 percent, underscoring the increase in DUI related deaths.

New Mexico was the first state to develop mandatory alcohol interlock devices for all convicted drunk drivers, and the results show that the devices work in preventing road deaths. In the first year of the program, alcohol related injury crashes dropped by 20 percent and alcohol related crashes dropped by 17 percent.

In addition to pushing for the alcohol interlock devices, members of MADD's National Board of Directors are also meeting with members of Congress to help develop strategies that have been proven to work in reducing DUI related fatalities. "It's clear that more of the same will not help in the fight to make our roads safer," said MADD National President Glynn Birch. "We still have states without the most effective tools in place to deter and stop drunk driving -- sobriety checkpoints and ignition interlocks. These tools stop higher-risk offenders and first-time drunk drivers. There is no justification for not using the tools we know will save lives and prevent injuries." Almost 14,000 people were killed by drunk drivers with blood alcohol content of at least .08 percent last year. The statistics mark the highest number of drunk driving fatalities since 1992.

Other recommendations by MADD to reduce drunk driving include intensive high-visibility law enforcement, development of advanced vehicle technologies to prevent drunk driving and grassroots support led by MADD and its 400+ affiliates.

 

First-time DUI offenders lost chance to avoid new state law to install ignition interlock device

PHOENIX Arizona

First-time DUI offenders have lost a chance to dodge a new state law requiring them to install a device on their cars preventing them from drinking and driving.

An effort to repeal the law, which passed last month, died Wednesday after it failed to get enough support from a committee of six Republican and Democratic lawmakers, said Republican Rep. John Kavanagh of Fountain Hills, who wrote the repeal.

"I'm very disappointed," Kavanagh said. "The law is a useless weapon in the war against drunk driving. The police and courts need effective weapons to battle drunk driving. We're letting the public down."

Kavanagh said he also tried to drum up support for a watered-down version of the amendment that would have required first-time offenders to install the devices only if a judge ordered them to do so based on aggravating circumstances, such as a criminal record.

But support for that also was lacking, he said.

That means the new requirement passed last month stands as state law. It should go into effect 90 days from the end of the legislative session.

State law already required repeat DUI offenders or those convicted of extreme or aggravated DUI to use breath-testing ignition interlocks once their driving privileges are restored.

The new requirement, signed into law by Democratic Gov. Janet Napolitano, made Arizona the only state besides New Mexico to have an interlock requirement for first-time drunken driving offenders.

Though the new requirement easily won approval at the Legislature, some lawmakers said at the time that they hoped a special committee would scale back the requirement.

Kavanagh, who at first supported the requirement, said he changed his mind because he since read up on studies that conclude the devices don't lead to a reduction in traffic accidents or repeat offenses by first-time offenders.

"The whole rationale behind this is a blanket net that puts all first and non-extremes on the interlock and scoops up the people who will never re-offend," he said.

Republican Rep. Andy Biggs of Gilbert said he was glad the repeal died.

"It was an attempt to weaken the prosecution of a person convicted of DUI, so I had a problem with that," he said.

 

San Diego DUI news: DUI - Drugs, Evading Police & Slaying

San Diego DUI news

June 20, 2007

CHULA VISTA, California – A Spring Valley man charged in the slaying of a 24-year-old woman will get no deals on unrelated charges of DUI - drugs and evading police, a prosecutor told a judge yesterday.

Under the three strikes law, Robert Steven Carson faces a prison term of 25 years to life if convicted of the driving charges because of his criminal record. Deputy District Attorney John Rice rejected efforts by Carson's lawyer, Nicholas DePento, to resolve the case without going to trial.

Carson, 40, a registered sex offender convicted of rape and assault to commit rape, has been charged with murder in the slaying of Brittany Hart of Santee, whose body was found Friday in the Cleveland National Forest. He has pleaded not guilty.

Mason set an Aug. 3 readiness hearing for Rice and DePento to discuss a possible settlement. If no agreement is reached then, the judge set an Aug. 16 hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evidence for a trial on the driving charges.

Rice said the only settlement he will accept was if Carson pleads guilty to all charges.

Carson was charged with driving under the influence of drugs and evading police with reckless abandon in Coronado in November. He faces a preliminary hearing July 31 in El Cajon Superior Court in the Hart slaying case.

Carson was free on $50,000 bail on the driving charges when Hart disappeared May 24. The judge yesterday increased the bail on the DUI and evasion charges to $186,000, but said it was moot since Carson is being held without bail on the murder charge.

DePento told the judge that he was close to reaching a settlement with the District Attorney's Office on the driving charges when Carson was arrested in connection with Hart's slaying. DePento said he was awaiting completion of a psychological evaluation of Carson, which Judge Robert J. Trentacosta ordered as part of settlement talks on the DUI - drugs & evasion charges.

Because of graning more time, there has been a postponement of the hearing to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to try Carson on the DUI charges.

Wednesday, June 20, 2007

 

The Sober Key invented to stop DUI

ABC's American Inventor contestant Rayfil Wong of San Francisco invents the Sober Key. Sober Key aims to prevent drunk drivers access to their keys. After his nationally televised appearance, Rayfil Wong's energetic performance that included a robot dance has spread quickly over YouTube and has appeared on VH1's Best Week Ever.

I was saddened to find out that drinking and driving is one America's top preventable violent crimes. I was inspired to audition after watching William Hung on


San Francisco, CA June 20, 2007 -- ABC's "American Inventor" reject Rayfil Wong increase drunk driving awareness with the invention of the Sober Key.



Hong Kong - born UC Berkeley graduate inventor Rayfil Wong uses his appearance on ABC's American Inventor to increase drunk driving awareness. As a former Anheuser-Busch Budweiser marketing representative involved in weekend club promotions, Rayfil Wong saw numerous drivers who were under the influence. The Sober Key is an alcohol detector integrated to a key lock that aims to prevent drunk drivers access to their keys. Rayfil Wong developed Sober Key after researching with his local police station and researching the movement behind M.A.D.D (mother's against drunk driving).

One week after his televised appearance, Rayfil Wong's energetic presentation combined with his animated sounds and robot dance has been seen on YouTube as wells as VH1's "Best Week Ever." In just over a week, Rayfil Wong has had over 4,000 views of his appearance on "American Inventor" on YouTube. Rayfil Wong said, "I was saddened to find out that drinking and driving is one America's top preventable violent crimes. I was inspired to audition after watching William Hung on "American Idol", who is also a Hong Kong native and UC Berkeley educated.

Rayfil Wong auditioned for the "American Inventor" in March 2007 and was among about five hundred contestants.

 

Off-duty police officer charged with DUI after accident

An off-duty police officer has been charged with drunk driving after allegedly striking a Westville police cruiser.

Michael May, 28, of National Park, a Lumberton patrolman, has been charged with driving under the influence and assault by auto, West Deptford Police Chief Craig Mangano said Tuesday. May is temporarily taking leave time while the investigation is completed.

Police said the accident happened shortly before 3 a.m. Saturday at the intersection of Route 45 and Colonial Avenue.

Westville patrolman Michael Packer, 25, was traveling south on Route 45 toward Woodbury when his patrol car was struck on the driver's side door by a black 2000 Nissan Xterra as it attempted to make a left turn onto Colonial Avenue.

Packer, who had to be cut out of his patrol car, was taken to Underwood-Memorial Hospital in Woodbury where he was treated and released.

Packer, the son of former Westville Mayor William Packer, is a rookie officer and was driving a new cruiser. He returned to duty the next day.

The Borough of Westville purchased the Ford Crown Victoria Police Interceptor early last year, said Westville Mayor Michael Galbraith.

The incident is still under investigation by the West Deptford Police Department. Once completed, the investigation will be forwarded to the Gloucester County Prosecutor's Office for possible filing of DUI / drunk driving charges.

 

Los Angeles Lakers Owner Jerry Buss faces California DUI charges

74 year old Jerry Buss faces misdemeanor counts of California DUI or driving under the influence of alcohol, after his arrest last month in Carlsbad, California.

The San Diego County district attorney's office charged the owner of the Lakers with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and one count of driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08% or greater.

The nature of any alleged drug was not specified. In California, the DUI charge includes the words alcohol and/or drugs so there may be no drugs whatsoever. Buss allegedly declined to take a chemical test at the time. That may mean there is no proof of alcohol either. Much remains to be seen.

Dr. Buss, who owns a beautiful home in San Diego County, was pulled over May 29 after his gold Mercedes allegedly crossed over a double yellow line while making a turn. Buss, who had a great-looking 23-year-old woman in the car with him, must appear on July 10 to enter a not guilty to the California DUI.

Buss has been vacationing this summer, recently meeting with Kobe Bryant in Spain.

 

Nicole Richie's California DUI Trial

Nicole Richie is set for a California DUI trial, as ordered by a Los Angeles California Court.

The socialite, whose California DUI attorneys have already been successful in delaying the case five times have got new date for the California DUI trial that will now take place on 11th July.

It looks like ‘The Simple Life’ actress who has been escaping a California DUI trial from long time, will have to stand it this time.

Richie's California DUI lawyer Shawn Chapman Holley insisted that the actress might not attend the California drunk driving trial this time as well and they are studying the case to form grounds for plea agreement in lieu of a California DUI trial.

The actress is facing trial for her arrest on December 11, 2006, when she was arrested by the California Highway Patrol after she failed a California DUI field sobriety test.

She admitted to using marijuana and Vicodin before the incident.

Earlier also she has been arrested in Malibu, California and charged with possession of heroin in February 2003. She was also driving with a suspended driver's license.

If Richie undergoes trial she might be convicted for minimum 5 days or even one year in the California DUI jail.

Tuesday, June 19, 2007

 

Priest Crashes Into Restaurant, Arrested For DWI

Priest Crashes Into Restaurant, Arrested For DWI

A priest is charged with DUI after crashing the pickup truck he was driving into a restaurant.

Father Karel Fink, the pastor of St. Paul Parish according to the Diocese of Austin, was arrested Monday night for drunk driving.

From the outside, plywood covers up the physical damage at the La Cabana Restaurant. But broken tables, chairs and overturned booths inside tell a much scarier, emotional story.

Fink crashed into the restaurant, according to the Diocese, around 7 p.m.

Restaurant owner Gina Chronis says everyone was in shock.

"I was livid. I did not know that he had been drinking,” Chronis said. “Obviously, I didn't know he had problems. Personally it was a shock to me to find out that it was our Father."

Six people were injured, including Christie and Megan Mick.

"Everyone was screaming, glass was flying,” Megan Mick said. “No one knew what was happening. People were on the floor and stuck and yelling. It was really scary."

"We didn't know if it was a bomb or what it was at first,” Christie Mick said. “I just remember the glass flying and my kids screaming and us moving across the restaurant."

According to the Diocese of Austin, the 61-year-old priest had just been released from rehab a few weeks ago after being treated for alcoholism.

The Diocese says Bishop Gregory Aymond will decide what should happen next involving Father Fink when Aymond returns from an out of town trip.

The Catholic Diocese says Father Karel Fink was ordained in 1991 in the Diocese of Austin. He has been pastor in Smithville for more than nine years.

 

Out of state license driver asks Supreme Court to overturn suspension

An Illinois man convicted of drunken driving in Indiana has asked the Illinois Supreme Court whether it was fair for Illinois authorities to suspend his driver's license.

In a petition for leave to appeal, Darold A. Miller Jr. contends that the state's decision to revoke his license violates the ''letter and spirit'' of the Illinois Driver's License Compact. 625 ILCS 5/6-703(a).

''The compact requires the secretary to give the same effect to petitioner's conduct reported by Indiana as he would if such conduct had occurred in Illinois,'' the petition contends. ''It does not say the report of conviction controls, but it is the conduct that controls.

''The goal is to provide uniformity among the members of the compact, and to make enforcement of licensing laws more equitable. To allow petitioner to be treated more harshly because his offense was committed in Indiana frustrates the purpose of the compact,'' the petition contends.

Miller was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol in Newton County, Ind., on Jan. 9, 2005. According to his petition, Miller pleaded guilty and was sentenced to probation and assessed $1,100 in fines and costs.

The Indiana court made a ''special finding,'' quoted in the petition, ordering ''that the Clerk of Newton County Superior Court is directed to transmit to the Illinois Secretary of State that the plea of the defendant, Darold A. Miller Jr., and accompanying sentence be treated as a Supervision Order pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(c) in the State of Illinois.'' Indiana apparently does not have court supervision comparable to that in Illinois.

The secretary of state suspended Miller's license anyway, so he challenged the decision in Sangamon County Circuit Court.

Circuit Judge Leslie J. Graves reversed the secretary of state and ordered that Miller's license be reinstated.

Graves concluded that the secretary of state improperly violated the compact when his office ''failed to give the same effect to conduct occurring out of the state, as it would had such conduct occurred in Illinois.''

''[P]laintiff's sentence is entitled to be treated as supervision under the provision of section 5-6-1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections … in that the Indiana court specifically found that plaintiff should be granted court supervision,'' Graves held, as quoted in Miller's petition. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(c).

The 4th District Appellate Court, however, disagreed and reinstated the secretary of state's order to rescind Miller's driving privileges.

Justice Sue E. Myerscough wrote the opinion, which the court published at the request of the state; Justices Robert J. Steigmann and Robert W. Cook concurred. Miller v. White, No. 4-06-0673 (April 9, 2007).

Miller had pointed out that ''special findings'' are explicitly authorized by section 6-702 of the Vehicle Code, and argued that the secretary of state was wrong to ''ignore'' the Indiana judge's special finding that Miller's conviction be treated as supervision.

''However,'' Myerscough wrote, ''plaintiff has not cited, nor has our research revealed, authority for the proposition that a court sitting in another state has the authority to order the secretary how to treat citizens of this state who have been convicted of DUI or a 'substantially similar' offense in other states.''

The Appellate Court also noted that Indiana law does not appear to provide for supervision to a person convicted of drunken driving.

''It defies logic to give a court sitting in another jurisdiction the authority to require the secretary to treat a sentence as court supervision when the sentencing court could not impose such a sentence in the state in which it sits,'' Myerscough wrote.

The Appellate Court cited two cases to support its conclusions. In Schultz v. Edgar, 170 Ill.App.3d 36 (1988), an Illinois driver was convicted of DUI in Wisconsin, where his license was suspended for three months.

The Illinois secretary of state revoked the driver's privileges, but the circuit court overturned that decision, finding that the secretary could not ''add punishment on punishment.''

The Schultz court reversed, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that he might have received supervision had he been prosecuted in Illinois because he was a first-time offender.

Schultz held that ''this argument provides no basis to overturn the revocation of plaintiff's driver's license where he committed a DUI offense while on a Wisconsin highway and was therefore subject to the laws of that jurisdiction.''

''Furthermore, not every first-time DUI offender in Illinois is granted court supervision, which is a determination solely within the discretion of the trial court,'' the Schultz court held.

Miller counter in his petition to appeal that, unlike in Schultz, the Indiana judge specifically found him eligible for supervision.

The Appellate Court also rejected a would-have-had-supervision-in-Illinois argument in Mills v. Edgar, 178 Ill.App.3d 1054 (1989). In that case the court affirmed a suspension based on a Colorado conviction, finding the supervision argument too speculative.

But Miller contends that his eligibility for supervision is not speculative ''because the trial judge in the Indiana court stated its order was to be considered one of court supervision under Illinois law.''

Miller also noted that Illinois' supervision has benefited drivers in other states. An Illinois DUI conviction with supervision for a Pennsylvania man originally earned him a suspension in his home state. But the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that because the driver got supervision in Illinois, it could not be treated like a conviction in Pennsylvania. Felbaum v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 860 A.2d 1168 (Pa. 2004).

Miller is represented by Ronald E. Boyer of Watseka.

The case is Darold A. Miller Jr. v. Jesse White, Secretary of State, No. 104815.

 

School Board President apologizes for Drunk Driving Accident

PLEASANTVILLE, New Jersey

The board of education president here has apologized to the community following a weekend DWI accident in which he totaled his SUV, according to The Press of Atlantic City.

James Pressley was arrested on charges of drunk driving after he struck a car stopped at a red light at New Road and the Black Horse Pike. No one was injured in the wreck.

 

Tougher DUI penalties if fatal accident

Legislators propose a New York bill creating harsher penalties for DUI or drunk drivers convicted in a fatal accident.

A spokesman for Governor Spitzer says the governor will sign the bill into law after the Senate and Assembly pass it this week.

The deal was struck after an emotional plea by a mother who recounted holding her dead daughter following a crash after a family wedding on Long Island two years ago.

The bill was inspired by the crash that killed 7-year-old Katie Flynn. It moved unusually fast by Albany's standards. It was spurred along two weeks ago when Katie's mother recounted at a Senate press conference how she held her daughter's decapitated head immediately after the wreck that also killed the limousine driver.

The bill would create the crime of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, punishable by up to 25 years to life in prison.

The bill would also create the crime of aggravated vehicular assault, a Class C felony, punishable by up to 15 years in prison.

The driver convicted in the Flynn crash, 25-year-old Martin Heidgen, was convicted of 2 counts of murder and sentenced to 18 years to life in prison.

 

US Airways CEO going to Jail for DUI

US Airways CEO Doug "Dear Jerry" Parker has been ordered to spend a night in jail following an arrest for drunk driving the night he recalled his hostile bid for bankrupt Delta Airlines.

At a hearing in Scottsdale City court, Parker "accepted full and total responsibility for his recent DUI charge by entering a guilty plea to this charge (against the advice of his attorney)," US Airways said in a statement.

Parker was ordered to spend 24 hours in jail, was fined $1,646.25 and ordered to receive alcohol screening at the Center for Recovering Families, according to the Scottsdale City Court Clerk's office.

A second DUI charge and a speeding charge were dismissed.

Parker was stopped for speeding, driving 65 mph in a 45 zone. ( In California, that would be an Excessive Speed enhancement carrying 60 days consecutive custody if convicted. )

 

NBA Star Vin Baker arrested for drunk driving / DWI

06/19/07

NORWICH, Connecticut

Former NBA All-Star Vin Baker played for 14years in the NBA career. Allegedly, he was marred by bouts of depression and alcoholism. Tuesday Vin was charged with drunk driving after leaving a Connecticut casino.

Baker was spotted allegedly driving erratically after leaving Foxwoods Resort Casino. He allegedly failed a sobriety test and was charged with DWI.

A four-time All-Star 35 year old forward who attended the University of Hartford, Baker averaged a solid 15 points and 7.5 rebounds in a fine NBA career that ended in 2006.

 

Felony DUI / Vehicular Manslaughter in California

California

One 16-year-old girl died a day after being struck by a sport utility vehicle while riding her bicycle through an intersection.

Jessica Poungchailpuek of Buena Park, California died about 12:30 p.m. Monday at U.C. Irvine Medical Center in Orange, California.

The alleged DUI crash occurred about 4:40 p.m. Sunday when Poungchailpuek pedaled across Knott Avenue at Crescent Avenue, in California.

Poungchailpuek had the green light when George Bridgeforth Jr., 29, went through the red light at 40 miles per hour and hit the teen. He was suspected of allegedly being DUI.

Bridgeforth Jr. was arrested on suspicion of felony drunk driving and vehicular manslaughter, and George Bridgeforth Sr., his 56-year-old father, was arrested after police said he allegedly lied to them about who was driving the vehicle.

Bridgeforth was driving on a suspended license, per the media.

 

3-year driving ban not enough for 8 time DUI offender: MADD

June 19, 2007

Mothers Against Drunk Driving is outraged at the one-year jail sentence and three-year driving ban given to a 56-year-old B.C. man following his eighth drunk driving or impaired driving conviction.

The three-year ban for Angus Martin Craigan of Sechelt is the minimum driving prohibition under the Criminal Code of Canada for drivers convicted of drunk driving three times or more.

MADD spokesman John Banovich says repeat offenders should be banned from driving for life.

"Their driver's licence needs to be removed. They should not be allowed to drive. Period. A drinking driver is a lethal weapon."

Banovich, who nearly died in a crash involving an impaired driver in Surrey 10 years ago, said the public needs to pay more attention to habitual impaired drivers.

Monday, June 18, 2007

 

BUI - Boating under the influence can be dangerous

Two people fell overboard in two separate boating incidents on Dane County lakes this weekend.

Elise Schaffer with the Dane County Sheriff's office says in one case the victim was able to swim to shore. But in the other the person drowned. In both cases, she says, alcohol was involved.

Schaeffer says it's against the law for the person driving the boat to be intoxicated just as it is for someone driving a car. But it is different for passengers. There are no laws about people on the boat drinking as long as they don't drive it.

Schaeffer says, however, long hours on a Wisconsin lake during hot weather can mean more alcohol consumption and that can still be a deadly combination as seen in the death of the one man.

Schaeffer says neither victim was wearing a lifejacket which in the one tragic case may have made a difference.

 

Prosecutor leaving his job after busted for drunk driving

Prosecutor charged with drunken driving over the weekend is leaving his job.

Police say Joseph Meany was arrested after he crashed into two parked cars on his way home early Saturday morning. Meany was charged with misdemeanor DWI / drunk driving and with refusing a field sobriety test.

Albany County District Attorney David Soares said today that he can't allow a person who took an oath to enforce the law, to knowingly break the law and then continue prosecuting people for the same crime.

 

Boxers with DUI problems

Boxers Behaving Badly Update:

Toxicology test results showed that Diego Corrales had a blood-alcohol content of 0.25 percent – more than three times Nevada’s legal limit of 0.08 percent – when he died last month after crashing his motorcycle in southwest Las Vegas.

Corrales, who had previously been arrested multiple times for drunk driving, was riding without a valid license and was apparently speeding when he crashed.

Camacho, who was also sentenced to two years of probation, has another upcoming trial for alleged possession of the drug Ecstasy.

Kevin Rooney, a former fighter who received far more recognition as one of the men who helped build Mike Tyson into a heavyweight champion, was sentenced June 12 to five years of probation and fined $2,295, according to New York’s Kingston Daily Freeman.

Rooney had pleaded guilty last month to driving drunk, a felony charge due to his having been previously convicted of drunken driving within 10 years of his April 2006 arrest.

 

Child abuse charge accompanies DUI

A man, suspected of driving under the influence, was charged with child abuse Sunday after he was involved in a car wreck and officials found his 14-month-old daughter in the car.

Adrian Mascorra, 24, was charged with child abuse-intentional following the DUI arrest Sunday in Anthony, N.M.

Doña Ana County sheriffs deputies were dispatched to 504 Camino Real in Anthony after receiving a report that a vehicle struck a building and drove away. The driver and child were not injured.

 

DUI charges face Princeton Alumni reunion party people

Thousands of Princeton University alumni return to the area to attend reunion weekend, three days of partying that features the Saturday afternoon P-rade, where alumni parade by class and sometimes deck themselves out in themed costumes.

This summer, seven of the alumni will be back in the area to face drunken driving charges in municipal court.

Police and prosecutors say it's been happening for years. The reunion weekend draws up to 20,000 people to the campus, there's a lot of partying, and the odds are that some will end up in handcuffs after getting behind the wheel DUI.

They put on extra officers every year for the reunions, which traditionally start on a Thursday and run through Saturday night. One team of officers is especially looking for the signs of drinking and drunk driving.

Police take no pleasure in locking up someone attending the reunions, which he said for the most part, is a great event for the borough and the university.

However, none of the arrests at the recent alumni weekend, May 31 to June 2, involved crashes.

In all, the seven comprise two corporate vice presidents, two managing directors, a partner at a law firm, and two men in their 70s who were in town for their 50th reunion.

 

25 years jail for aggravated DUI death

A man convicted of aggravated DUI was sentenced today to 25 years in prison with 10 years suspended.

Jaison O. Harness, of Jackson, Miss. brushed away tears and sighed heavily throughout his relatives’ pleas for mercy to the judge.

Jurors agreed that Harness was driving drunk when he collided with a vehicle driven by Clyde Hampton, 51. Hampton later died at Baptist Medical Center from internal bleeding.

Harness’ blood-alcohol level was .11 about four hours after the crash. He denied that he had been drinking.

Harness was driving about 67 mph on a street with a speed limit of 40 mph, according to a Jackson police accident investigator. Hampton was driving about 35 mph.

 

Lady DUI

Being on a billboard as "Lady DUI" is pretty surprising.

Teresa DiNardi's boss at the law firm is into marketing, and they wanted to expand their way into Hartford.

He called her "Lady DUI" because he thought it was catchy and people would remember it.

She had never been on a billboard before and is not a glamour lady. Marshals, court staff tell her how they saw her on the billboard.

She always wanted to be an attorney. Her philosophy in representing the clients that come to her is that everyone drinks and drives. She thinks only a hypocrite says they don't. She does not think of clients as bad people. You'd be surprised who gets arrested for DUI.

It's a crime that has no intent. Some get caught, and others don't. She loves her job.

Sunday, June 17, 2007

 

$5 Million lawsuit against drunk driver

June 16, 2007

New York bar bouncer Sean Basdavanos has filed a $5 million lawsuit against a "rich frat boy" drunk driver college student who allegedly tried to run him down after being ejected from a Long Island country-club bar.

The bouncer threw Sayed El-Waraky out of the Soundview Restaurant at the Glen Cove Golf Club on the night of June 18, 2006.

El-Waraky was convicted last month of misdemeanor DWI and leaving the scene of an accident that caused injuries, but the jurors could not agree on the more serious assault charges.

After the drunk driving conviction, Basdavanos wanted the DA to re-try El-Waraky on the assault charges.

Their theory: This was a spoiled rich frat boy with a bad attitude and a bad temper. Once he got into that eight-cylinder weapon, hell broke loose.

 

Investigation reveals DUI arrests for those not drunk

San Diego California Lawyer DUI news:

Police officer Brock became a rock star deputy known for making a record number of drunk drivers and locking them up.

But the puffed up numbers came at the expense of innocent victims.

A lengthy internal affairs investigation showed dozens of people arrested for DUIs who weren’t even drunk.

Leo Palacious got caught in Brock’s zealous round-up.

Leo says Deputy Brock falsely accused him of drinking and driving while he was at home.

“He didn’t show no remorse. He just said, ‘another one!!’…he told me he’s locked up a lot of people for DUI,” Palacious said.

Last summer, Leo had been drinking when he began arguing with his father at their Riverview home. A nervous relative called police. Minutes later, Deputy Brock showed up.

“’Are you Leo? Yes, lets go.’ Just grabbed me and stuck me in the car and we took off and he went and gave me a field sobriety test”, explained Palacious.

Shocked, confused and bewildered, Leo hired an attorney and had the charges dropped.

But Leo wasn’t alone.

David Chalela represents another victim who was arrested in 2002 for DUI and disorderly conduct. But records show when she took a breathalyzer, she blew a .00.

“We feel this is a very egregious case of abuse of police authority,” said Chalela Those charges were also dropped.

Aside from bogus arrests, investigators say Brock violated policy by taking into custody more than one alleged drunk driver at a time.

In addition, 40 percent of the time, there was no dash cam video, and often, no field sobriety test.

As for Leo’s brush with a rogue cop, it’s shaken his confidence in those who wear the uniform.

“I know there are some good ones and some bad ones. That day, I got a bad one,” he said.

 

Death resulting from marijuana aggravated DUI

With 1,500 powder blue fliers and nearly two dozen friends, an Elgin man spent more than two hours Saturday at the intersection in Wood Dale where his older brother was killed seven years ago.

The fliers were given to motorists, asking them to never drink and drive. The people passing them out were friends of a dead teenager who wish Richard Gancarz had gotten that message.

Gancarz was a truck driver sentenced to 14 years in prison for reckless homicide and aggravated DUI in the wake of 17-year-old Aric Wooley's death two days before Father's Day 2000.

Gancarz was convicted of DUI for marijuana use. He never submitted to a Breathalyzer, but authorities said he had been drinking the day he killed the recent high school graduate from Schaumburg, IL.

 

DUI checkpoints

From 11 p.m. until 3 a.m. officers funneled nearly 800 cars through a sobriety checkpoint at the Hanover-Henrico county line on U.S. 360.

More than 100 drivers were questioned and had their licenses checked. Six were arrested on charges of driving under the influence. Ten others were administered breath tests that were positive for alcohol levels within legal limits.

"At first, you get the ones who have been drinking and get really mad because you've stopped them from getting home on time," said a veteran law enforcement officer on the scene.

"Then you get the ones who are more intoxicated and know they've been caught. They are the happy-goofy ones."

Before the evening was over, Hanover deputies had issued 33 summonses and arrested an additional 14 people on other offenses, ranging from drugs to outstanding warrants on immigration violations.

Immobile, expensive and labor-intensive, sobriety checkpoints are the fishing net of roadway law enforcement -- catching everyone who enters but keeping only the violators, including impaired mo- torists.

"DUI road checkpoints, in and of themselves, are not necessarily designed to catch people under the influence," said Sgt. Rob Netherland, who supervises DUI checkpoints and patrols for Henrico County.

But Netherland and other officials say checkpoints do provide a worthwhile deterrent against people getting behind the wheel after they drink -- a complement to the mobile and focused "saturation patrols," in which officers hit the road and actively target motorists whose driving suggests they may be under the influence.

"It's kind of like shock and awe," Hanover County Sheriff's Office Sgt. Mike Trice said of checkpoints.

"We're after the killers of the road, the predators," said Trice. "[A sobriety checkpoint] garners a lot of attention, and it's hard to evaluate what you may have prevented just by being out there."

And when it comes to drinking and driving in Virginia, there are plenty of killers out there.

. . .

In 2006, there were 374 alcohol-related deaths in Virginia -- the highest number since 2002, when there were 375 deaths, according to the Department of Motor Vehicles Highway Safety Office.

In the 20-locality Richmond region, 62 people were killed in alcohol-related motor vehicle fatalities last year. There were also 29,595 DUI convictions in state in 2006 -- the highest numbers in 15 years. State figures show 4,510 people were convicted of DUI in the Richmond region last year.

Not surprisingly, law enforcement officials and anti-drinking groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving endorse the use of sobriety checkpoints, which are legal in 39 states and the District of Columbia.

"We support both checkpoints and saturation patrols," said Chris R. Konschak, the executive director of MADD in Virginia and the District of Columbia.

"If you can get both of them going, you can you can pull some drivers off the road who would otherwise potentially hit and kill, or injure someone else."

Sobriety checkpoints are not exempt from criticism -- that they are costly, have limited effectiveness and unnecessarily inconvenience law-abiding motorists.

"Sobriety checkpoints are like asking the enemy to come into your camp and surrender," said Sarah Longwell, spokeswoman for the American Beverage Institute, which represents the restaurant and bar industry and favors roving patrols over checkpoints.

"It's because they are highly visible, and most seasoned drunk drivers -- and most of them out there driving drunk are -- just go around them," she added. "They yield a very low actual arrest rate of drunk drivers."

Area law enforcement agencies conduct sobriety checkpoints on selected occasions but put more emphasis on saturation patrols to catch DUI violators by targeting motorists who drive recklessly, aggressively or at high speeds.

In 2006, Henrico County police conducted eight sobriety checkpoints, resulting in 23 DUI arrests -- a small number compared with the 855 DUI convictions the county recorded that year from arrests on routine patrols and other anti-drinking initiatives.

The Hanover Sheriff's Office ran four sobriety checkpoints in 2006, yielding 12 DUI arrests. The county recorded 337 DUI convictions that year.

Four sobriety checkpoints run by Richmond Police last year netted three DUI arrests in a city that recorded 590 DUI convictions, though officers made 170 arrests on related and unrelated offenses.

Though checkpoint arrest numbers are a small portion of overall DUI convictions in the larger counties in the region, officials said the primary goal of a checkpoint is deterrence, not racking up DUI arrests.

On many occasions, the checkpoints are extensively publicized.

"They are more about the perception that we're out there," said Netherland, the Henrico police sergeant. "It's a deterrent."

"We get more DUI-related arrests [with saturation patrols] because the officers know exactly what they are looking for," he said.

Sobriety checkpoints aren't cheap, requiring a substantial amount of manpower and resources -- the primary reason the operations are often conducted around busy travel days and holidays.

For example, the Hanover checkpoint on May 25 involved more than a dozen Hanover deputies, two reserve officers and five troopers from the Virginia State Police, who work with local jurisdictions in dozens of sobriety checkpoints across the state each year.

Hanover estimated its cost for running the four-hour checkpoint at $1,600, plus the cost of the state police officers, who account for their time separately. The checkpoint was funded by federal grant money.

"It's less expensive to do a saturation patrol," said Hanover Sgt. Drew Darby, who supervised the May 25 checkpoint. "You don't use as many people, but you can cover a wider area."

Unlike checkpoints, which can require a dozen or more officers to stop traffic and check hundreds of vehicles, saturation patrols can involve as few as two or three officers whose focus is on identifying impaired motorists. Darby said a typical saturation patrol involving two officers could cost around $300.

Most jurisdictions depend on National Highway Transportation Safety Administration grants distributed by the state, and funding from nonprofits, to sponsor the overtime costs and additional equipment needed for checkpoints.

The Department of Motor Vehicles last year awarded more than $3.4 million in highway safety grants to Virginia localities. The 20-locality Richmond region received more than $500,000 in funding, earmarked for checkpoints and other highway safety initiatives.

The state police, which patrols interstate highways and assumes policing duties in many rural counties in the state, conducted nearly 281 saturation patrols between July and December last year as part of the federally funded Checkpoint Strikeforce program, spokeswoman Corinne Geller said.

Officials said saturation patrols might be more precise when it comes to catching people who are driving under the influence.

"Obviously one of the key indicators of DUIs is driving behavior," said Maj. John Austin of the Chesterfield County Police Department, which ran eight sobriety checkpoints and 321 saturation patrols in 2006 as part of its DUI strategy, resulting in 1,212 convictions last year, the most in the region according to the DMV.

"So being able to observe people driving is a way for us to detect that. When you do a DUI checkpoint, obviously you're dependent on the vehicles that are coming through that location," Austin added.

"At least with the saturation patrols, you have the opportunity to be much more mobile and cover larger areas of territory, as well as probably observe more vehicles."

That night at the Hanover checkpoint, responsibility seemed to be in short supply.

The roadside parking lot resembled an accumulation of mutterings, bitter oaths, weaving flesh and plaintive squeals against a backdrop of flashing lights and idling squad cars.

"My girlfriend's had too much to drink for them to let her drive," said one man whose friend was being held temporarily because she had an elevated, but not illegal, alcohol level in her blood. Asked why he didn't get behind the wheel in her place, the man responded frankly:

"Because I'm way more drunk than she is."

Another woman in handcuffs insisted she'd had only a single beer as she leaned against her car for support. "But my babies are at home asleep!" she wailed in protest.

Konschak said regardless of how law enforcement approaches the problem, the aim is the same.

"Our goal is just to get drunk drivers off the road," he said.

Every day, however, there are reminders that the job is far from over.

Just two weeks after the Memorial Day checkpoint, Darby was sitting in the parking lot of the Virginia Credit Union on U.S. 360 when he saw a man run his pickup truck into the curb of the ATM lane and pull past the machine.

The man then got of the truck, opened the hatch to the gas tank and removed the cap.

"He was trying to figure out where the nozzle was on the ATM," said Darby, recalling the incident. 3 times the limit, he was DUI.

 

Prosecutor busted for DWI

Assistant Hamilton County Prosecutor Richard Guinan was one of eight people arrested Saturday in a DUI checkpoint on Dixie Highway near Woodridge Boulevard in Fairfield.

Guinan, 36, of Mount Washington, was arrested at 12:45 a.m. on a misdemeanor charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and a minor misdemeanor traffic charge of failing to drive within marked lanes, according to a Butler County Sheriff's Office report.

The report did not specify his blood-alcohol level or whether he was tested.

Guinan was released on bond from the Butler County Jail at 6 a.m., according to jail records. He'll next have to appear in Fairfield Municipal Court.

Guinan works in the prosecutor's office's felony division. In the past, drunken driving cases were among the cases he prosecuted.

Hamilton County Prosecutor Joe Deters declined comment until he has more information.

Fairfield Police, the Ohio Highway Patrol and the Butler County Sheriff's Office conducted the checkpoint.

A total of 688 vehicles were checked. Authorities issued 25 seat belt citations, three citations for driving under suspended licenses, four for driving with no license and 14 unspecified citations.

Saturday, June 16, 2007

 

DUI suspect faces Murder charge

June 15, 2007

LANCASTER

A former County emergency services director, accused of driving a county vehicle while intoxicated and allegedly causing a collision that killed a Parksville man, has been indicted on a murder charge.

Kentucky State Police would not say what Dwayne Nave's blood-alcohol level allegedly was when his vehicle crossed the center line on U.S. 27 near Bryantsville and slammed into a pickup about 1:15 a.m. April 29. Because it's an open / Murder investigation, the state police can't release that.

William L. Quinn, 43, who was trapped inside the pickup, was killed. Kevin L. Reed, a passenger in Quinn's truck, was injured.

No charges had been filed in the case until yesterday, when the Garrard County grand jury indicted Nave on murder and first-degree assault charges. He will be arraigned next month. State police plan to arrest Nave, 42. He presumably will be received in the Boyle County jail on a $100,000 bond.

 

Actress Vivica A. Fox was charged with California DUI

Actress Vivica A. Fox was charged with a California DUI.

Vivica A. Fox was at the 34th Annual Daytime Emmy Awards in Los Angeles, on Friday, June 15, 2007. It was a huge learning lesson. She won't ever make that mistake again. She was a presenter for the Daytime Emmy Awards. Trust her. She's going to hire a driver next time.

Fox indicated she is in the process of trying to resolve her California DUI problems.

She doesn't think it's worth what you go through for getting a DUI.

Fox was arrested after passing a patrol car on the Hollywood Freeway at 80 mph and subsequently failing a field sobriety test, the California Highway Patrol said.

Breath tests indicated her blood-alcohol level was greater than .08 percent, California's legal limit for a driver.

Fox indicated she empathized with Paris Hilton, who is serving jail time for violating probation in an alcohol-related reckless driving case.

"We are not above the law," Fox indicated about celebrities. "She (Paris Hilton) is going to get more coverage when her butt gets out of jail. It's going to be a special alert and we all are going to watch (Paris Hilton), right?"

Fox, a star contestant on last year's "Dancing with the Stars," has appeared as an actress in such good films as "Kill Bill: Vol. 1," "Soul Food" and "Independence Day."

 

New laws tougher on DUI

June 15, 2007

CHEYENNE, Wyoming - DUI laws go into effect July 1, 2007 making it tougher on DUI drivers and making it illegal to have open containers of alcohol in moving vehicles.

Wyoming Highway Patrol reports that it handled 59 crashes involving drugs or alcohol last year. Those crashes resulted in 66 deaths. They issued more than 1,300 citations for DUI in 2006.

The Wyoming Attorney General's office says outlawing open containers of alcohol in moving vehicles is an important step for the state. If people can drive around with open containers, it increases the number who are going to go over the legal limit.

Effective July 1st, also, is a new imposing jail terms of up to a year on a first conviction of DUI with a child passenger. A second DUI conviction could mean up to five years in prison.

Another law authorizes felony charges for drunk drivers who severely injure a person in a DUI collison.

 

DUI driver takes out electricity power

A Bristol motor-vehicle accident in which an alleged intoxicated motorist's vehicle struck a utility pole, knocking it down, caused area homes and businesses to lose power early Friday morning.

As a result of the damage to the pole, which did not have a transformer box on it, power outages extended beyond the immediate area to as far west as King Street, police said.
Traffic Lt. Kevin Morrell said the accident occurred shortly after midnight Friday, when the vehicle Celine P. Ratte, 27, of Unionville was driving northbound on Stafford Avenue veered off the right side of the road and struck the utility pole, snapping it at the base.
Responding officers determined that Ratte, who according to reports was the sole occupant of the vehicle and did not complain of injuries, was allegedly DUI or intoxicated at the time of the accident.
Though the utility pole did not fall across the roadway, police had to close Stafford Avenue between Bel Air Road and Jewell Street until CL&P crews could repair the damaged pole.
About an hour later, according to Morrell, Jeffrey Cameron, 29, of 65 Mark St. attempted to make his own detour around the scene by driving his vehicle off the side of the road and up onto the curb and sidewalk lining that area of Stafford Avenue. He then drove around the police cruiser and traffic cones set up to block the road.
The officer on scene at the time was able to stop Cameron, and after determining that he too was intoxicated, arrested him for DUI.

 

Senate Candidate with DUI conviction calls for stiffer drunk driving laws

State Senate candidate Terry Thomas called for stiffer drunken driving penalties during a televised forum Wednesday, though he was convicted for a 1988 DUI.

He maintains the police stop leading to his arrest was unfounded, though he accepted the conviction.

"If that's the only thing I've done wrong, that's fine," he said. "I never had a problem before, never after."

His record with the State Law Enforcement Division lists no other arrests in the state. Detailed records of the incident could not be obtained at press time from the North Myrtle Beach Public Safety Division.

Thomas said he stood by his comment on toughening DUI penalties. In his case, he paid a $268 fine, according to his state record. He also was required to take a course and attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, he added.

His opponents, Republican Rep. Catherine Ceips of Beaufort and Libertarian Greg Graziani of Hilton Head Island, have no records of arrest in the state.

 

The Fight Continues to Keep Mandatory Ignition Interlock for DUI

June 15, 2007

PHOENIX, AZ - Will there be mandatory ignition interlocks for all drunk drivers?

The fight is on.

Senators are willing to accept a partial repeal of a month-old law which says anyone convicted of even a single DUI can only operate a motor vehicle with an interlock for one year. These devices prevent a vehicle from starting if the motorist has had more than just a minimal amount of alcohol.

The House gave final approval to legislation making several changes in drunk driving laws. SB 1582 even allows a judge to order those who arraigned on drunk driving charges not to drink while awaiting trial, and require them to wear a device that monitors sweat to ensure compliance.But the House version of SB 1582 also repeals a law signed by the governor earlier this year expanding the use of interlocks.

Law mandates interlocks for years for those convicted of "extreme'' DUI - meaning a blood-alcohol content of at least 0.15 - and those who are repeat offenders. But the law signed last month says all convicted of even a single offense of driving with a BAC of at least 0.08, the legal limit, must install devices on any vehicle..

The offer would require interlocks only for those whose BAC reaches 0.10. That eliminates those who while intoxicated - and still breaking the law and facing other punishment - are just slightly over the legal limit.

Gov. Janet Napolitano indicates she is unwilling to undo the provisions a bill she just signed.

One representative wants to give judges the option to order installation of interlocks rather than make it a mandate.

Efforts to make a compromise are also endangered by some on the other side of the issue who want to keep the original law intact.

Will this soften DUI laws? We'll see. The battle continues.

 

Highly Motiviated DUI Cop Fired

San Diego California DUI Lawyer news:


June 16, 2007


TAMPA - A top DUI deputy for making Drunk Driving arrests was fired last month after an internal investigation found he might have sent innocent people to jail.

What effect will Daniel Brock's dismissal have on any resolved or pending DUI cases he was involved with? It is presently unknown.

But if the former deputy was the prosecution's sole witness, it could be a handicap.

None of the DUI defendants arrested by Brock had as yet contacted the state attorney's office about dismissing their charges or having their convictions overturned. It is unknown how many of Brock's cases are still pending.

Much of Brock's personnel file at the sheriff's office is thick with commendations. He has earned awards for vigilance in removing impaired drivers from the roads. Supervisors praised Brock, 38, in annual performance reviews, calling him highly motivated, a leader in DUI arrests.

The most recent addition to the file was a dismissal form ending his 15 years on the job May 24. His written appeal was denied the next day.

Officials said Brock ignored the agency's standard operating procedures by not turning in DUI reports at the end of his shift, by writing the reports days afterward from memory rather than using field notes, and by conducting DUI investigations while having another suspect in his patrol car.

From October 2005 to October 2006, Brock arrested 313 motorists for allegedly driving while impaired, officials said. In 40 percent of those instances, he did not use his in-car video camera.

Even when he did record a video, his report sometimes conflicted with evidence on the tape, officials said.

On Oct. 25, 2005, Brock noted that a defendant with a .01 percent blood alcohol content had trouble walking, lost her balance and could not perform field sobriety tests adequately.

The video of the arrest showed differently, officials said. The woman did not lose her balance and did not show signs of impairment.

In Florida, a driver is considered to be impaired with a blood alcohol content of .08 or higher.

He apparently didn't prescribe to the theory that you have to be .08 to be drunk or impaired.

Brock denied to investigators that he was trying to boost his arrest totals.

The case was dropped by prosecutors after lab tests found no evidence of drugs in the woman's system.

Sheriff's Chief Deputy Jose Docobo said that although Brock's termination is embarrassing, the important thing to realize is that the agency acted quickly to investigate and resolve the issue, and that it is not evidence of any systemic problem with department policies or procedures.

Brock was hired in 1992 as a detention deputy. He has been a patrol deputy since 1996 and joined the agency's DUI enforcement unit four years ago, quickly becoming the highest producer of DUI arrests.

Last year, a Hillsborough County mother filed a federal lawsuit against Brock, alleging he used excessive force in arresting her in 2002 after arresting her teenage son. Her petition said that after she cursed at him and another deputy, Brock threatened to arrest her and then forced his way into her house, shoved her down and pepper-sprayed her.

The recent criminal investigation against Brock was launched when an assistant prosecutor with State Attorney Ober's office wrote a letter to the sheriff's office in October saying they no longer would accept testimony from Brock as a witness. Brock gained a reputation among prosecutors for providing weak cases with little or conflicting evidence.

At least once, he wrote two versions of the same DUI arrest report, officials said. He sent prosecutors the second version, written from memory and without getting the approval of his supervisor. It constituted a misdemeanor for falsifying records.

Prosecutors elected to forgo a criminal charge in lieu of the sheriff's administrative action.

Initially, the sheriff's office planned to suspend him for seven days over the double-report matter. His removal as a potential witness in criminal cases, though, resulted in his being unable to perform the duties of a deputy and led to his firing, according to documents.

After receiving the letter, sheriff's detectives audited a year's worth of Brock's DUI arrests - 313 cases - and the results alarmed them.

In 58 arrests, the defendant blew a blood alcohol content below .08 percent. In 41 of those cases, no urine sample was drawn, despite agency policy.

Brock told investigators he was like most deputies who often wrote affidavits while off duty or from memory, rather than at the end of a shift. He said he saw nothing wrong with that and said his arrests were legitimate.

His goal was to go there, process the person and be gone, out to the next DUI driver. Standard operating procedure of the sheriff's office, however, directs deputies to file reports by the end of a shift.

Anybody who felt wrongfully arrested by Brock for DUI but was later convicted has few options to get the case overturned. To open up a case that's already convicted is going to be very hard for people to actually do.

 

Paris Hilton in San Diego?

Paris Hilton's return to jail after a a legal tangle between the judge who sentenced her and the Los Angeles County sheriff has been the talk of the media, blogs and San Diego's legal community.

Would the Hilton fiasco have possibly happened in San Diego?

Those apparently in the know say inmates are routinely released after serving a fraction of their jail terms, and you don't have to be a pampered “celebutante” to be placed under house arrest.

It happens in San Diego for the same reason it happens in Los Angeles: overcrowded county jails. The topic provokes tension between judges who feel their decisions are being undermined and county sheriffs who are responsible for keeping a handle on the jail population.

Rarely in San Diego, according to those who work in the system, does a judge override the sheriff's decision to release an inmate, as Judge Michael T. Sauer did after Hilton was placed under house arrest.

The flap over the 26-year-old hotel heiress – who the sheriff said was moved for medical reasons – has ratcheted up the discussion locally about who ultimately gets to determine how long an inmate spends behind bars.

The San Diego County Sheriff's Department can use several methods to reduce the time inmates spend in jail and alleviate overcrowding. In addition to crediting time for good behavior, the sheriff can shave off 10 percent or more of a sentence under two court orders imposed after lawsuits were filed more than a decade ago.

Generally speaking, a man sentenced to a year in jail typically would serve about six months, authorities said. The term could be shorter for women.
Judges understand the challenges sheriffs face, but some say they are frustrated that their sentences can be altered drastically. The judges say they typically don't know perpetrators are out until someone – often the victim – sees them on the street.

Regardless of the sentence, the sheriff determines where defendants serve their time.

The Sheriff's Department's detention services bureau, said San Diego's jail population overall exceeds the bed capacity allowed by the state by 7 percent.

Based on the latest numbers, four of seven local jails are over capacity. The worst is the Las Colinas Detention Facility in Santee, where the female inmate population has reached 144 percent of the state-rated cap.

State law allows the Sheriff's Department to determine where defendants sentenced to county jail – not prison – will be housed. In San Diego County, the Probation Department administers the Electronic Surveillance Program, also known as house arrest or home detention, an alternative to jail.

But judges still have their say.

The law allows judges, during sentencing, to “restrict or deny” a defendant's option to be in a home-detention program, which is what the judge in the Hilton case did when he ordered her to serve 45 days in jail for violating probation on a reckless-driving conviction.

Hilton was locked up for only three days before Sheriff Lee Baca placed her under house arrest at her Hollywood Hills home. Baca said the move was prompted by Hilton's medical condition, which he didn't disclose.

Sauer, who was outraged by Hilton's release, ordered her back to court and then back to jail.

“I at no time condoned the actions of the sheriff and at no time told him I approved the action,” the judge said at the time. “At no time did I approve the defendant being released from custody to her home on Kings Road.”

Although Hilton protested, she said she won't appeal.

A similar situation happened last month in San Diego, when a Superior Court judge ordered that a Poway man who had been placed on home detention be sent back to jail.

In February, the Judge sentenced the man to a year in jail for stealing bathing-suit photos of his fiancee's sister and posting them on pornographic Web sites. When the victim learned he was out of jail, monitored by an electronic ankle bracelet, she alerted prosecutors.

The controversy over the Hilton case – whether she got special treatment or harsher treatment – has judges and the Sheriff's Department doing some self-examination.

Most judges do not view home detention as the equivalent of custody as it does not punish in the same way.

The Sheriff has to manage its population in accordance with other court orders. If every judge made that kind of order like Judge Sauer's, San Diego County's jails would probably be over populated very quickly.

Friday, June 15, 2007

 

Showing a friend's license when arrested for drunk driving

The DUI suspect, a parolee, admitted, "That's the ID. I use it to go to clubs."

Turkus wobbled on his feet and his breath smelled of an alcoholic beverage, cops allege. Police also found an empty Bud Light can in the car.

He refused to take a blood alcohol test, according to the DUI cops.

Turkus was released on parole in February, after spending seven months in state prison for two burglary convictions. He had initially been sentenced to two to six years in prison.

This time around, he's charged with drunken driving and false personation.

MORE DWI ARRESTS

Cops say an Eltingville man was drunk and high on drugs when he got into a car crash as he left the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge early Wednesday morning.

Robert Dente, 42, of the 100 block of Wainwright Avenue, had a crack pipe and a foil wrapper with white residue in his car when police found him at 2:50 a.m., according to court papers.

"I'm on morphine," Dente told cops, court papers allege. He refused to take a blood alcohol test, cops allege.

He was charged with drunken and impaired driving, and misdemeanor drug possession.

Police also arrested Robert J. Donovan, 42, of New Jersey, on the West Shore Expressway near Victory Boulevard yesterday, charging him with drunken driving after his blood alcohol level measured .116 percent, cops said. The legal limit is .08 percent.

 

Drunk Driver hits school bus

SUV driver in school bus collision faces DWI charge
San Diego DWI Attorney / San Diego California drunk driving lawyer news :


June 15, 2007

3 school children were taken to hospitals today after an 18-year-old driver crashed head-on into a school bus this morning.

Syracuse NY police say Ulysee Mallory ran off after the 2005 Mercury Mountaineer he was driving struck the bus at about 8 am.

Police say Mallory is facing charges of driving while intoxicated ( DWI ) or drunk driving, aggravated unlicensed operation and leaving the scene of a personal injury accident.

Officers found him later at a nearby house: You can run but you can't hide.

The bus driver, April Stanton, was not injured.

The bus was traveling south on Pine Street when Mallory apparently turned onto Pine off East Genesee Street and rammed the bus.

Three children -- two 7-year-olds and a 10-year-old -- were taken to hospitals as a precaution.

Neither driver reported any injuries.

 

DUI causing death? Pay $150,000 to deceased's estate

DUI news / Drunk Driving info:

June 15, 2007

A person who is convicted or pleads guilty to DUI and having caused the death of another must pay $150,000.00 to the dead person's estate, under Iowa law.

After a sixty-two year old man was struck and killed by a car another man was arrested and charged with DUI / OWI Varell Wiley of West Des Moines was charged with driving the car that allegedly struck and killed Kerry Tucker.

A West Des Moines man is facing DUI charges in connection with a deadly hit-and-run accident, and police say more charges are likely. Sixty-two-year-old Kerry Tucker was struck and killed near the intersection of 63rd Street and Clark Wednesday night.

Police found a car with a shattered windshield just a few blocks away. Fifty-one-year-old Varell Wiley of West Des Moines was behind the wheel. He's been charged with OWI. Police are hoping evidence from Wiley's car windshield will prove he hit Tucker.

 

1 year in jail for 7 time DUI person who injured parents in DUI accident

A tougher sentence was handed down for Richard Peterson of Colorado Springs, who injured Swift's parents in a 2003 DUI collision. The judge threw out a deal that would have offered him 52 months’ probation and instead sentenced him to a year in prison.

The accident happened on Sept. 26, 2003. According to reports, Peterson tried to pass several cars at once on U.S. Highway 400 and ran head-on into a car driven by Robert and Phyllis Aldrich, Swift’s parents. Phyllis Aldrich received a head injury and died a year and a half later after it worsened into progressive dementia. Robert Aldrich was badly injured and is still unable to get around easily due to the damage to his legs.

Peterson was 60 at the time of the accident. Peterson had seven instances of DUI.

 

Senator Metzen gets lenient sentence for DUI

Calififornia drunk driving attorney / San Diego California DUI lawyer news:

06/15/2007

Senate President James Metzen on Thursday pleaded guilty to drunken driving / DUI in Minnesota.


For his DUI convicdtion, Metzen, will serve one year of probation, 20 hours of community service and pay a $300 fine plus a $77 surcharge. He also will comply with the recommendations of a physiological and behavioral assessment.

After presiding over the last Senate session of the year on May 21, Metzen went out for drinks with colleagues. He had three to four mixed drinks, according to his lawyer.

A few hours later, Metzen was spotted weaving through lanes in South St. Paul and was stopped by South St. Paul police at 2:13 a.m. May 22. He blew 0.15 percent on a Breathalyzer test at 3:30 a.m. A later blood test found that his blood-alcohol level was likely 0.10 percent at the time of his arrest, said Rogosheske.

The legal threshold for driving while intoxicated is 0.08 percent.

The senator's driver's license was suspended when he was arrested. After 15 days, he was permitted a limited license that allows him to drive eight to 10 hours a day, six
days a week. Within about a month, his driving privileges will expand further.

Jo Baker, Minnesota victim impact panel coordinator for Mothers Against Drunk Driving, sat in on the Metzen hearing and suggested the senator was "getting off a little easy."

"This is a gentleman who should have known better," said Baker, whose son was killed by a drunken driver in Arizona 18 years ago. She said she attends most court appearances for drunken drivers in Dakota County in cases where the defendant is accused of seriously hurting or killing someone, was a repeat offender or, as in Metzen's case, was particularly prominent.

 

Effort to toughen DUI laws fail

June 15, 2007

California DUI Lawyer / San Diego California Drunk Driving news :


Arizona's House voted to repeal a new requirement forcing first-time DUI offenders to install breath-testing ignition interlocks on their vehicles.

The new DUI interlock requirement, signed into law nearly a month ago, hasn't started.

State law now requires repeat drunken drivers or those convicted of extreme or aggravated DUI to use interlocks when their driving privileges are restored. The devices won't allow a vehicle to start if the person's alcohol content is above a certain limit.
Some lawmakers said the interlock requirement for first-time DUI offenders needs to be removed because the financial penalties and embarrassment of a drunken driving conviction are probably enough to prevent them from making the mistake again. The new law would require the devices for at least a year after drivers get back their driving privileges.
"I don't think there's anybody in this body that wants to go soft on DUI crimes or reward people that are convicted of the crime, but I think many of us believe that we need the proper punishment to fit the crime," said Democratic Rep. Chad Campbell of Phoenix, who voted for dumping the new requirement.
The 54-1 vote by the House sends the bill to the Senate.
The DUI sentencing bill, signed by Democratic Gov. Janet Napolitano, would make Arizona the only state besides New Mexico to have an interlock requirement for first-time DUI offenders. California has their own possibilities for an IID if a first-time DUI.

 

DUI death & injury news

DUI charges after fatal wreck this morning
June 15, 2007

A driver died early today after being struck from behind by a DUI / DWI driver, state police said today in Portsmouth.

A collision occurred around 2:15 a.m. on Interstate 264 near the Greenwood Avenue exit. Jason Cooper was driving west in a 2000 Ford Expedition when he was hit by a speeding 2002 Nissan Maxima and propelled into a guardrail. State police spokesman Sgt. D.S. Carr said Cooper, 48, was not wearing a seat belt and was ejected from his car and died at the scene.

Carr said that Tucker R. Havel, 26, of Suffolk has been charged with DUI.

According to state police DUI reports, Havel struck the Expedition from behind and caused it to slam into a guardrail. The Expedition spun around and struck the guardrail again as Cooper was ejected. Carr said Havel continued up the road about a quarter-mile before he hit a guardrail at the Greenwood exit.

Carr said Havel's car caught fire, but witnesses arrived at the scene and helped him out of the car. Havel was not injured.



A DUI Hit-And-Run Sends 1 To Hospital

June 15, 2007


One man was badly hurt in what state police said was a DUI hit-and-run on the outbound side of the Parkway East, MONROEVILLE, Pa.

A state trooper found Mitchell J. Cassata lying in the right lane at about 10:20 p.m. Thursday, approximately one mile before the Monroeville exit.

Cassata, 29, of Pittsburgh, was taken to Allegheny General Hospital in critical condition. Doctors performed surgery on him early Friday morning.

Witnesses told police that a light-colored pickup truck had struck the man and left the area. A Penn Township police officer pulled over a truck matching the witness description on Sandy Creek Road in Harrison City, Westmoreland County.

The DUI driver was arrested and charged with aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI and accidents involving death or personal injury. He was held at the County Jail.

 

State cracking down on underage drinking & DUI

COLUMBIA, SC - A bill Friday aimed at cracking down on youths' access to alcohol, was signed. The General Assembly is asked to toughen South Carolina's DUI laws.

Governor Sanford's office said the signed bill increases fines and penalties for underage-drinking offenses, and will make it easier for police to find out who bought kegs at parties where underage drinking occurred, will allow minors to help police by participating in stings of bars and convenience stores, and requires repeat DUI offenders to pay for an ignition interlock device system to be installed in their cars.

However, the bill "does nothing to address the state's real problem with DUI, a loophole-ridden DUI law."

"Let's be very clear - there's much more work to be done if we're going to stop the carnage that occurs on our state's roads because of our anemic DUI laws," Gov. Sanford said. "South Carolina consistently ranks near the top in the nation for DUI deaths, and it's largely because of a DUI law that, as one solicitor has said, is tougher to prosecute than a death penalty case. The tragic reality is that there are some in the legislature who profit from the current loopholes in the system, which is why the Senate needs to follow the House's lead quickly next year in passing a bill that prevents so many from being killed on South Carolina's roads."

From 2004-2006 in SC, there were more than 1,500 crashes involving underage driver under the influence, resulting in 1,200 injuries and 150 fatalities. One alcohol-related death occurs on our nation's roads every 31 minutes, and one alcohol-related injury occurs every two minutes, according to Sanford. South Carolina ranked 7th in 2005 in vehicle deaths per 100,000 miles driven, with alcohol being a significant factor in these deaths. South Carolina is 9th in the country for the percentage of drunk drivers in fatal crashes. 40% of repeat DUI offenders in South Carolina plead guilty to lesser offenses, said the Governor.

 

MADD pushes more Ignition Interlocks for DUI offenders

San Diego DUI Attorney / San Diego Drunk Driving Lawyer news -

MADD expanding of DUI interlock program

CHARLESTON, W.Va. —

All convicted DUI drivers must have an ignition interlock device installed in their vehcile so an instant blood alcohol content check is made in West Virginia.

The idea is proposed & discussed by a special panel assembled by the state chapter of Mothers Against Drunk Driving in work on possible legislation by Judiciary Subcommittee C.

“We have some limited interlock right now,” said MADD’s executive director, Donna Hawkins, “but there is some movement across the country to expand that.

“Whether we’ll do that or not, I don’t know.”

Steve Dale, the assistant commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles, says the intent of interlock is to enable convicted motorists to regain their licenses, and is voluntary on the first offense.

“The reason why it’s mandatory on a second offense is because it’s part of the federal repeat offenders law that was passed two years ago,” Dale explained Thursday.

Under the state’s program, a DUI - convicted motorist reports to one of four locations while a third-party vendor installs the device.

“You have to blow into the device before the car will start,” Dale said.

“And it will, at various times, ask you for a test at random. The car won’t start at all if you blow a high BAC.”

One popular misconception is that a vehicle will stop automatically as soon as a high BAC is recorded. Actually, the driver is alerted by flashing lights.

“When you blow into the device while driving, it doesn’t shut the engine off immediately,” Dale said. “There is a delay built into it.”

An offender bears the entire cost, which runs about $65 monthly in addition to the $50 installation fee.

“Normally, we have about 1,000 people on the program at any one time,” Dale said.

“It’s really very technologically advanced. Our staff here in Charleston can download the activity report from each machine and be able to determine how many times an attempt was made to start a car and you blew an alcohol reading and attempted to circumvent the system.”

Each month, a driver convicted of DUI using interlock must have the device checked out and tuned up.

 

New DUI Laws in Wyoming

DUI news / Drunk Driving update:

There's nothing wrong with drinking for most people, there's nothing wrong with driving. They need to not be done at the same time, according to Wyoming officials.

New Wyoming laws making it illegal to have open containers of alcohol in moving vehicles and imposing tougher penalties on drunken drivers go into effect July first.

Officials say they expect the laws will reduce highway deaths in the state, but some say even more needs to be done to address drunken driving here.

Lt. Col. Jess Oyler, with the Wyoming Highway Patrol in Cheyenne, said his agency handled 59 crashes involving drugs or alcohol last year. Those crashes resulted in 66 deaths, of which 61 were people not wearing seat belts. He said the patrol issued 1,342 citations for driving under the influence last year.

"Often times, if there's alcohol involvement during a fatality, we see open containers sometimes at the scene of a crash," Oyler said. "Anything we can do to enhance the DUI laws to aid enforcement and provide a safer environment for highway safety, I support 100 percent." Sen. Tony Ross, R-Cheyenne, had sponsored bills seeking to ban open containers of alcohol in moving vehicles in the state for several years before finally seeing the legislation pass this spring.

"It's going to mean that we're going to see a decrease, hopefully, in alcohol-related deaths on the road," Ross said of the open-container ban.

Although some Wyoming municipalities already had outlawed open containers of alcohol by ordinance, Wyoming Attorney General Pat Crank said Ross's bill is an important step for the state.

"The open container was probably the big one, and that's just a long time coming," Crank said. "Tony Ross fought for years to get that passed, and it's a good addition to Wyoming law."

"If you can drive around with an open container, I think it just increases the number of people who are going to be over the legal limit," Crank said.

Ross also authored the law that goes into effect July 1 requiring jail terms of up to one year on a first conviction of driving under the influence with a child passenger. A second conviction could mean up to five years in prison.

"The child endangerment bill was and is a voice for those people who don't have a voice," Ross said. "We're talking about young children who are put into a vehicle and really don't have a say about that."

Ross said the child endangerment bill also can allow for intervention by the state Department of Family Services to help families troubled by alcoholism.

Another law hitting the books July 1 authorizes felony charges for drunken drivers who severely injure someone in a crash. Sen. John Hines, R-Gillette, sponsored that legislation this spring.

"Previously it was just a misdemeanor, regardless of how serious the injuries were," Hines said this March. "A person could be crippled forever, lose a limb, and it was still just a misdemeanor."

John Cox, director of the Wyoming Department of Transportation, said he supports any move to crack down on drunken driving.

Under Wyoming's previous open container law, passengers were allowed to have open containers of alcohol in moving vehicles on the state's highways, but drivers weren't. The law has been difficult for police to enforce because of the need to prove who in the vehicle had been drinking.

"My perspective is that it does take a large step forward in increasing the margin of safety," Cox said of the new open container ban. "Because it takes an open container law that was virtually unenforceable, and makes it very enforceable come July first."

In the future, Cox said he believes that Wyoming eventually will have to consider amending its seat belt law. Under the current law, police can't pull over drivers they see who aren't wearing seat belts, but can cite drivers for not wearing their belts if they're pulled over for some other offense.

"There was a time when the primary killer in Wyoming was alcohol involvement in crashes," Cox said. But he said that over the last couple of decades, the rate of alcohol-involved fatalities has dropped significantly and in some years has fallen below the national average.

"Today, the big killer on Wyoming's highways is not buckling up," Cox said.

Cox said Wyoming lawmakers are also going to have to consider what to do about people who drive while using their cell phones or sending text messages. "That's really the functional equivalent of reading a novel, and responding to it, while trying to perform the driving function," he said.

Lorrie Pozarik, facilitator for the governor's council on impaired driving, said she expects the council this summer will consider whether to recommend to Gov. Dave Freudenthal that the state enact legislation requiring drug and alcohol testing of all drivers involved in crashes that result in death or serious bodily injury.

"That's one area where we have very inconsistent data," Pozarik said. "The coroners are fairly consistent in testing the people who have died. However, there's a lot of inconsistency in the testing of surviving drivers."

With mandatory testing, Pozarik said, "we would have a much more complete picture of the severity and the magnitude of the problem."

Pozarik said the council may also consider whether to recommend the governor endorse legislation that would allow people to be convicted of driving while intoxicated if tests find their blood-alcohol level exceeds the state limit within three hours of the time they operated a motor vehicle. A bill to do that failed this spring.

Drivers are often taken into custody in rural areas where it can take hours to transport them to testing facilities, Pozarik said. Under the current system, she said state toxicologists are required to travel around the state to testify about what a driver's blood alcohol level was at the time they were actually driving.

Pozarik said the new laws on open containers and child endangerment should heighten the public's awareness of the issue.

"Everything we can do to separate drinking from driving, those are good things to do," Pozarik said.

 

Challenged DUI breath devices can be used in Florida

Judges' ruling supports DUI breath devices used in Palm Beach County

June 15 2007


Misdemeanor drunken driving cases that previously had been in limbo now are moving forward through the Palm Beach County court system after a ruling this week from judges who refused to throw out the results of breath tests.

During a rare appearance by all seven county criminal judges in April, defense attorneys argued that the breath machine used in Florida, the Intoxilyzer 8000, could be unreliable and that they should be entitled to have access to the instrument's source code from the manufacturer. They also asked for the suppression of breath tests on behalf of eight defendants, which, if granted, could have led to the suppression of hundreds of pending cases and appeals from hundreds of other cases.



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In a ruling Monday, the judges found unanimously that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement had sufficiently shown the device was now functioning in compliance with existing rules. They also said that none of the defendants was affected by a programming glitch identified last fall that resulted in the dismissal of 224 cases statewide.

"The results for any breath test instrument used in Palm Beach County are accurate, they are reliable and they are admissible in trial in any DUI prosecution," said prosecutor Elizabeth Parker, chief of the County Court division. "This is a very important opinion that will be distributed throughout the state of Florida, and hopefully other jurisdictions will follow."

Defense attorney Fred Susaneck, one of several lawyers mounting the challenge to the Intoxilyzer 8000, said he wasn't surprised.

"It's a mystery to me why the state of Florida doesn't want to know how this thing works," Susaneck said. "What are they afraid to find out?"

Susaneck said state officials have put their trust in the manufacturer of the device, which has refused, based on trade-secret grounds, to reveal the source code.

FDLE officials have conceded there was previously a software issue but maintained that the version now being used by law enforcement officers statewide is functioning correctly and provides accurate and scientific results.

Susaneck and defense attorneys throughout the state aren't so sure, given that the glitch in the way alcohol was measured was discovered by defense attorneys, he said.

"My gut feeling is there must be something wrong," he added.

This week's ruling means that the state can continue to prosecute about 500 cases that were on hold pending the judges' order, Parker said.

"One of the biggest problems when the defense files motions like this is that it clogs up the dockets because no DUI case can proceed at that point," she said.

 

After making San Diego County DUI arrest, CHP officer pushes drunk driver to the ground, then pleads guilty to assault

San Diego DUI Attorney / San Diego California DUI lawyer news:

San Diego County CHP officer pleads guilty to assault of DUI suspect


June 15, 2007

VISTA – A California Highway Patrol officer pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges in Vista Superior Court yesterday for pushing a man suspected of San Diego County drunk driving in handcuffs to the ground and manhandling him.

Brian David Kennedy faces up to 60 days in jail and an unspecified term of probation under a plea agreement approved by Judge Aaron Katz, said Paul Levikow, a spokesman for the District Attorney's Office. The judge set a sentencing hearing for July 25.
Kennedy, 44, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges of assault under color of authority and filing a false report, Levikow said.

In exchange for the plea, Deputy District Attorney Robert Kearney agreed to dismiss a misdemeanor battery charge and reduce what had been felony charges against Kennedy to misdemeanors, Levikow said.

Kennedy, who was on administrative leave with pay while his case was pending, agreed to resign from the CHP as part of his plea agreement.

A 16-year CHP veteran, Kennedy was working overtime on the Fourth of July holiday in 2006 when he arrested Andrew Chase, 23, of Encinitas on suspicion of driving under the influence.

Kennedy drove Chase to the Vista jail, where the two men exchanged words outside the patrol car. Kennedy pushed Chase to the ground while Chase's hands were handcuffed behind his back. He then lifted Chase and forcibly placed him on a nearby bench. The incident was recorded by a video camera at the jail.

Kennedy was characterized as a good officer who had a momentary lapse in judgment.

 

Former Washington D.C. Mayor Marion Barry acquitted of drunk driving

Marion Barry acquitted of drunk driving

Former Washington D.C. Mayor Marion Barry, was acquitted Wednesday of drunken driving and other offenses stemming from his arrest last year near the White House.

Barry, now a District of Columbia Council member, had been charged with driving under the influence, operating a vehicle while impaired, driving an unregistered vehicle and misuse of temporary tags.

Secret Service agents stopped Barry's car early Sept. 10, 2006, and said he stopped at a green light and drove through a red one. The agents testified that Barry smelled of alcohol, was stumbling and had red eyes and slurred speech.

D.C. Superior Court Judge Richard Ringell ruled that he could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Barry was intoxicated. He noted that a breath test later in the evening registered a blood-alcohol content of .02 percent, well below the legal limit of .08 percent.

Barry signed autographs and shook hands with supporters as he left the courthouse.

"First of all, let me thank God for this decision," Barry said. "I wasn't doing anything illegal, anything improper, anything wrong."

The 71-year-old council member, who served six months in prison after he was videotaped smoking crack in a 1990 FBI sting during his third term as mayor, testified in his own defense Wednesday.

"I had only one glass of wine, and there weren't chemicals in my body," he told the judge. He said he was taking at least five medications for his diabetes, high blood pressure and knee problems. "I don't think I was impaired or under the influence."

His attorney, Frederick Cooke, said Barry's stumbling and failure of a field sobriety test before his arrest were the result of his age and medications he was taking.

Barry said he tries not to drink at all during his recovery from substance abuse. But he said was having a celebratory drink that night with an Oklahoma state senator after learning he would receive an award from the Congressional Black Caucus.

Barry refused a urine test after passing the breath test, and prosecutors argued his refusal implied a consciousness of guilt. Officers suspected Barry was impaired with another drug, in addition to alcohol, prosecutor Kara Preissel said.

Ringell said that all the officers' actions were proper, but that their finding of his impairment met a standard different from what he must use in a court of law.

In a separate case, Barry remains charged with driving an unregistered vehicle in December 2006. Ringell set an Aug. 22 trial date on that count.

 

Man gets 16th DUI arrest

Jun 14 2007

California DUI / Drunk Driving news:

How do you get a man with the worst driving record in the state off North Dakota roads? No sentence can keep Craig Irwin off the streets for a long period of time.

Just since 1991 Irwin has 16 DUI arrests on his record.

He has over 30 cases of driving without a license.

And Burleigh County Authorities arrested Irwin again yesterday.

A deputy saw Irwin driving south of town and pulled him over because he knew Irwin had no license.

Irwin also failed the breathalizer test for drunk driving.

Irwin's license has been revoked for so long he will never legally drive again.

It's suspended until at least 2065.

The maximum sentence for driving without a license is one year. |

Thursday, June 14, 2007

 

Fake teen police officer set up his own DUI breath-testing roadblock

Fake teen police officer owns up

14 June 2007

A Hamilton, New Zealand teenager who set up his own breath-testing road block has admitted charges of impersonating a police officer.

Andrew Brian Browne, 18, pleaded guilty to more than a dozen charges at the Hamilton District Court yesterday, including stealing a high-visibility jacket and a breath-testing machine from the Hamilton Central police station after being picked up earlier for a driving offence.

His masquerade came to an end when one of the cars he stopped turned out to be a police patrol car. Browne, who was also charged with burglary, wilful damage and giving a false name to police on a separate occasion, grinned as he stepped up to the dock yesterday.

However, defense lawyer Bruce Hesketh said the prospect of a prison sentence could be a sobering wake-up call for Browne, who was a "bit of a larrikin".

Browne has been remanded in custody until he is sentenced on July 16.


Security around New Zealand's Police Stations is not all that high (not generally having an armed populace) so it wouldn't have been particularly hard for him to grab the vest and tester on his way out the door.

Got to admire his nerve! The tester was probably an Alcotech
AR1005, soon to be redundant and they are looking at the IR "shine a light
through your finger" system at present as a replacement.

In an unrelated case, a woman with one of the highest breath test readings ever recorded in NZ was stopped by members of the public because of her extreme driving on a busy city road. She may have had a young child in her car. She was somewhere between an 0.4 and a 0.5 I think and was on her way to meet her alcohol abuse counsellor.

The outcome? She pleaded guilty and was fined $1500 (US$2050) and
disqualified from driving for 12 months. there were no other penalties or
consequences, though her car insurance costs will rise for sure (if she was
even insured, it is not compulsory).

NZ may be green, and safe, and not have George Bush, Al Gore or Al-Qaeda to
worry about, but you'd never make a living in New Zealand defending DUIs.

 

"Lots of crap thrown up on the wall is still crap" says Super DUI Lawyer Randy Moore in defense victory

California DUI lawyer / top California DUI attorney Randy Moore:

"Lots of crap thrown up on the wall is still crap"

Teen convicted of 3 misdemeanors in crash that killed Tongan royals

June 14, 2007


REDWOOD CITY, California

A Redwood City teenager charged with killing two members of the Tongan royal family and their driver in a freeway crash was convicted today of three misdemeanors, a verdict that will spare her from state prison.

Edith Delgado, 19, turned to her attorney and quietly began weeping when the verdicts convicting her of three misdemeanor counts of vehicular manslaughter were read in a packed courtroom in San Mateo County Superior Court.

Afterward, outside the courtroom, Delgado's family hugged and wiped back tears. Her father leaned his head against the wall and cried.

"I'm just happy," he said. "I can't say anything more."

Delgado had been facing up to eight years in state prison if convicted as charged of felony manslaughter in the July 5 deaths of Tongan Prince Tu'ipelehake, 55, his wife, Princess Kaimana Aleamotu'a Tuku'aho, 46, and their driver, East Palo Alto resident Vinisia Hefa, 36. The jury acquitted her of the felony counts.

Delgado now faces no more than three years in county jail when she is sentenced Aug. 24. Unable to post $1 million in bail, she has remained in jail for almost a year since the crash.

After the verdicts were announced, Judge John Runde lowered Delgado's bail to $40,000.

"We're going to go get her out right now," said her brother, Juan Delgado, 29. "But this is not a win-win situation. It's a tragedy what happened. We're glad that she got out, but we'll always pray for the other people and their families and their loved ones."

Delgado never contested in court that she had sideswiped the Ford Explorer carrying the three victims on Highway 101 in Menlo Park. The collision caused Hefa to lose control of the SUV, which flipped multiple times. Delgado and her passenger were unhurt.

The case hinged on whether Delgado's conduct amounted to gross negligence -- acting in a way that a reasonable person would know created a high risk of death or great bodily injury. The jury needed to make that finding in order to convict her of the felony charges.

The deliberations over 2Â 1/2 days were heated, with one juror storming into the bathroom and letting out a scream before returning, said Frank Johnson III, the jury foreman.

"It was very tense in there," Johnson said outside the courtroom after the verdicts were read. "Yesterday I went home thinking there was no way it was not going to be a hung jury."

Jurors initially split 7-5 in favor of conviction on the felony charges, but when they stacked all the evidence up in a side-by-side comparison, the panel eventually decided that prosecutors had proved only that Delgado committed the misdemeanors, Johnson said.

Lots of crap thrown up on the wall is still crap:

Prosecutors said Delgado had a pattern of driving dangerously, and had been warned by officials at the continuation high school she attended that she needed to slow down in the school's parking lot.

Lots of crap thrown up on the wall is still crap:

Prosecutor Aaron Fitzgerald argued that Delgado had been racing a Cadillac Escalade in her Ford Mustang, weaving recklessly through traffic at high speed, when she sideswiped the Ford Explorer.

Lots of crap thrown up on the wall is still crap:

Delgado changed her story several times, but told investigators that she had made at least five lane changes and admitted to speeding, ultimately allowing that she could have been going up to 80 mph, Fitzgerald said during his closing argument. Some witnesses put Delgado's speed around 90 mph.

Lots of crap thrown up on the wall is still crap:

"She was flying. Her driving was obscene,'' Fitzgerald told jurors in his closing argument. "She was using whatever lane she wanted. It was her playground.''

Lots of crap thrown up on the wall is still crap!

Delgado's attorney, Randy Moore, countered that the eyewitnesses were unreliable. The Escalade was never found, and a defense accident reconstruction expert put Delgado's speed at about 70 mph when she sideswiped the Explorer.

"They haven't proven she was racing," Moore told jurors in his closing argument. "The way it's being presented to you really isn't the way it happened."

Moore also took aim at the assertion that officials at Redwood High School had warned Delgado about her driving, noting that the principal couldn't remember actually meeting with the teen and that a teacher had disputed that Delgado had "peeled out" in the school parking lot.

"It's not quite true that she got a warning, a warning, a warning," Moore said. He derided the prosecution's case as "lots of nothing."

"Lots of crap thrown up on the wall is still crap," Moore said.

Moore acknowledged that Delgado's driving was to blame for the crash, but likened her sideswipe of the Explorer to a bad decision by an inexperienced driver, not something that rose to the level of a felony.

The Tongan prince's sons, Vakafuhu Tu'ifua, 12, and Osaiasi Tu'ipulotu, 34, have sued Ford Motor Co. in Santa Clara County Superior Court, claiming that the company knew its Explorers were prone to rollovers. The suit also names Delgado.

www.google.com
www.yahoo.com

 

Bariatric surgery can make people more sensitive to alcohol, making it easier to get a California DUI

San Diego California DUI news / San Diego California Drunk Driving Lawyer

Stanford California

June 14, 2007

STANFORD, Calif. - An Oprah Winfrey-inspired study done by researchers at the Stanford University School of Medicine has found that patients who undergo gastric bypass surgery to lose weight will get drunk faster and take longer to get sober.

"It may sound strange, but Oprah really did inspire this study," said John Morton, MD, MPH, assistant professor of surgery and senior author of the study, which will be presented June 14 at the annual meeting of the American Society for Bariatric Surgery. Referring to an episode of The Oprah Winfrey Show, Morton said, "After the Oprah show 'Suddenly Skinny' aired in October 2006, I got question after question from patients asking, 'What happens when I drink alcohol'."

Morton has performed more than 1,000 gastric bypass surgeries and routinely warns patients to be cautious when drinking alcohol after the surgery. But following the Oprah episode, which explored possible dangerous effects of alcohol on post-surgery gastric bypass patients, the overwhelming concern from his patients motivated Morton to research the scientific data on the topic. When he couldn't find much data, he decided to conduct a study with Stanford medical student Judith Hagedorn, who is the first author of the study. The study will be published in the official journal of the American Society for Bariatric Surgery, SOARD (Surgery for Obesity and Related Diseases).

"I've heard the anecdotes of a patient who will drink one glass of wine and get a DUI, but I wanted to know if there is really a difference before and after surgery," Morton said. "It's an important question for patients."

The study shows scientific evidence that supports cause for concern, Morton said. To measure the effects of alcohol, researchers gave 19 post-operative gastric bypass patients and 17 control subjects 5 ounces each of red wine. They were told to drink their wine within 15 minutes. Each subject then had their breath-alcohol level measured every five minutes until levels reached zero.

The gastric bypass patients reached a breath-alcohol peak of 0.08 percent vs. the control group's peak breath-alcohol level of 0.05 percent. The bypass patients also took significantly longer to return to zero, averaging 108 minutes vs. 72 minutes for the control subjects.

"The bypass patients have a fundamentally altered alcohol metabolism," Morton said. "They reach a higher peak more quickly and take a longer time to return to zero. Also, the patients aren't really aware of this. The Oprah show did us a favor by pointing it out."

About 150,000 Americans a year will undergo gastric bypass surgery, which can be a lifesaving procedure for morbidly obese people who are 100 pounds or more overweight. The surgery reduces the stomach to the size of a walnut so that patients can't eat as much and feel full after about an ounce of food.

The episode of the Oprah show discussed how patients feel faster alcohol absorption after gastric bypass because of their smaller stomachs. This physiological change could also contribute to a psychological problem referred to as "addiction transfer." In the case of gastric bypass patients, the addiction of binge eating, an issue for many morbidly obese patients, can be "transferred" into an alcohol addiction.

Gastric bypass alters a number of physiological functions in the body that may explain this change, in particular a decrease in the enzyme alcohol dehydrogenase, which is most responsible for alcohol metabolism and is also most present in the liver and the stomach.

Another cause for concern, Morton pointed out, is that not only do patients get more relaxed socially from drinking alcohol, but this relaxation also happens inside the body. The lower esophageal sphincter tone decreases and gastric emptying increases when alcohol is consumed, potentially allowing patients to eat more food.

"Patients have to be careful with alcohol," Morton said. "They'll become tipsy a lot easier. Please don't ever drive after drinking. Also, they need to know the potential for weight gain from alcohol."


In addition to the alcohol study, Morton will be presenting the results of a second gastric bypass study that found an improvement in cardiac risk factors in adolescents after gastric bypass surgery. The second presentation will be made June 13 at the same meeting in San Diego.

Stanford University Medical Center integrates research, medical education and patient care at its three institutions - Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford Hospital & Clinics and Lucile Packard Children's Hospital at Stanford. For more information, please visit the Web site of the medical center's Office of Communication & Public Affairs at http://mednews.stanford.edu.

 

Paris Hilton gets more jail than most people

San Diego California DUI lawyer / California drunk driving attorney news:

June 14, 2007


Paris Hilton will serve more time in jail than the vast majority of inmates sent to L.A. County Jail for similar offenses.*

Did Paris Hilton receive special treatment from the Sheriff's Department? This has been debated after Sheriff Lee Baca allowed Paris Hilton to do home confinement after less than four full days in jail, despite a promise that she would serve 23 days of a 45-day sentence.

2 million jail releases and found 1,500 cases since July 2002 that — as had Paris Hilton's — involved defendants who had been arrested for California DUI and later sentenced to jail after a probation violation or driving without a license. If Paris Hilton left jail for good after four days, her jail time would have been similar to those served by 60% of those inmates.

But after a judge sent her back to jail Friday, Hilton's attorney announced that she would serve the full 23 days. That means that Hilton will end up serving more time than 80% of other people in similar situations.

The findings came as some critics accused Baca of showing favoritism to Hilton and as the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors launched an investigation into whether the multimillionaire received special treatment because of her wealth and fame.

The data also underscore the profound effect of the Sheriff's Department's early-release program, which sets inmates free before their sentences are up to ease overcrowding.

Before the early-release program began in 2002, inmates with cases similar to Hilton's were sentenced to terms that amounted to an average of 23 days, the same as Hilton is expected to serve. They actually served 20 days. After the program began, the average term was 14 days, with inmates actually serving an average of four days.

Because of the high media interest, Hilton was one of only a few inmates whose premature release received publicity — and the judge who originally sentenced her noticed. She is believed to be the first inmate in years who actually was sent back to jail to serve more of her term.

The Sheriff's early release of Paris Hilton because of undisclosed medical problems touched off a storm of protest. Last year, the department released only three inmates on medical grounds.

One of the most vocal critics, civil rights activist Najee Ali, said Wednesday that Hilton ought to be released if inmates sentenced for similar crimes were serving less time. He continued to criticize Baca's decision to cite medical problems for the release, but added that only dangerous offenders should serve their full sentences given the jail's need to limit overcrowding.

Twenty-three days would be considerably more than the average person given her sentence would actually serve. The jails are so overcrowded that even though overcrowding is not the reason for her release, it colors every release decision from the jails system. Clearly, her violation is not as serious, so she should be released. The rules of fairness should be applied equally.

Paris Hilton was sentenced to 45 days for violating probation on alcohol-related, reckless-driving charges from an incident in September. Police stopped her while she was driving during the period that her license was suspended.

If Hilton does serve 23 days in jail, she will have done about the same amount of time as 4,000 inmates who since 2002 had been charged with assaults, as well as more than 1,800 charged with burglary, more than 2,600 charged with domestic violence and nearly 11,000 charged with drug violations.

Over the last five years, more than 200,000 inmates have been released early. Baca started the releases during a budget crunch that he said left him no choice but to shut large portions of the nation's largest county correctional system. Though economic times have since improved, a federal court has ordered his department to reduce chronic overcrowding in the jails, hampering efforts to keep inmates longer.

More than 60% of those with cases similar to Hilton's walked free after serving less than half their time. Under the department's current guidelines, Hilton probably would have served even less time. Most nonviolent female offenders sentenced to less than 90 days are released immediately.

The only special treatment she got — she got more time in jail, Baca said.

Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Michael T. Sauer made it clear when he sentenced Hilton that she was not to be released early. His comments were included in commitment papers the court sent to the jail.





(* according to studies by the LA Times)

Wednesday, June 13, 2007

 

Man gets 2 DUI's in same day from same cop

Man Gets 2 DUI's in Day From Same Cop
Montana Man Cited for Drunken Driving Twice in One Day by the Same OfficerThe

A man was cited for drunken driving twice in the same day, by the same officer, and jailed after authorities said he showed up drunk for his arraignment.

Court records said Adam T. Lundgren, 42, was cited for misdemeanor drunken driving after being spotted driving erratically at 5:30 p.m. Monday.

He was later released to a sober friend, but jumped from the friend's car and returned to downtown Missoula, where he continued drinking, court records said.

At about 10 p.m., Lundgren drove into a bridge railing and started to run away. Witnesses captured him and held him until police arrived.

Officer Cody Lanier of the Missoula Police Department again cited Lundgren for drunken driving, along with reckless driving and failing to heed a stop sign.

Lundgren posted $700 bail later Monday night, but was jailed Tuesday afternoon after showing up drunk for his Municipal Court arraignment, court records said.

Saturday, June 09, 2007

 

San Diego California DUI breath test machine: battle over Intoximeter machine overseas

Neutral Citation Number: [2006] EWHC 32 (Admin)
Case No: CO/6299/2004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT


Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
19th January 2006


B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE LAWS
MR JUSTICE OUSELEY
____________________

Between:
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Appellant

- and -


DEBRA JANE WOOD
Respondent

- AND -


DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Appellant

-and-


MICHAEL McGILLICUDDY
Respondent


____________________

(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of
Smith Bernal WordWave Limited
190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7421 4040 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

____________________

Mr J McGuinness QC and Ms A Power on behalf of the DPP in Wood
Mr J McGuinness QC and Ms D Chanteau on behalf of the DPP in McGillicuddy
Mr A Bright QC and Mr P Lucas instructed by Mark and Co Solicitors on behalf of Wood
Mr A Bright QC and Mr P Lucas appointed by the Attorney General as friends of the Court in McGillicuddy
____________________

JUDGMENT
____________________


The Honourable Mr Justice Ouseley:

The facts

These two appeals by way of case stated raise issues relating to disclosure obligations and the stay of proceedings as an abuse of process. Both relate to the disclosure of material concerning Intoximeters used for testing alcohol on the breath. They are brought by the DPP against the decisions of District Judges. The same broad issues were raised by the same solicitors in the two otherwise unrelated cases and have been pursued here. As the Respondent McGillicuddy has disappeared, the Attorney General has appointed Mr Andrew Bright QC to make submissions as a friend of the Court on any separate issues affecting McGillicuddy. We are grateful to him.

Each Respondent was charged with driving having consumed alcohol so that the proportion of it in the breath exceeded the prescribed limit of 35mg in 100ml of breath, contrary to s5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. This proportion had been measured in each case by a breath test consisting of two specimens of breath analysed on an Intoximeter, which the Crown contended was "a device of a type approved by the Secretary of State"; s7(1)(a) and s11 (2) of the RTA 1988. In Wood's case the proportion in the lower specimen was alleged to be 136 mg: 100ml and in McGilllicuddy's, 61mg:100ml. Blood or urine specimens were not taken. S16 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 made the statement automatically produced by the device admissible in evidence. S15 RTOA created a statutory assumption that the proportion of alcohol to breath was not less than the specimen thus evidenced. There is a common law presumption that the breath test device, if type approved, is reliable.

The device used in each case was an Intoximeter EC/IR, which received type approval under the Breath Analysis Devices (No.2) Approval 1998. The type approved in the Schedule was:

"The device known as the Intoximeter EC/IR, manufactured by Intoximeters Inc. of Saint Louis Missouri, composed of the Intoximeter EC/IR, the Intoximeter EC/TR Gas Delivery System and software version EC/IR – UK 5.23."
The device at Worthing police station was used in Wood's case and the device at Wandsworth Police Station in McGillicuddy's.

In Wood's case, the information was laid on 13th January 2003. Following primary disclosure on 4th February 2003, and the service of a Defence Statement in April 2003, which raised issues about type approval and reliability but said nothing about post driving drinking, there was further disclosure of material related to the device. Then a further defence statement was served and further disclosure related to the device, described as "further primary disclosure", was provided. The material thus disclosed covered the service history of the machine, engineer's reports for the relevant period, calibration certificates, and correspondence between Intoximeters UK Ltd and the Home Office/Forensic Science Service relating to type approval. A third Defence Statement, which expressly superseded the earlier ones, was served on 14th March 2004 for the purposes of an application for disclosure under s8 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.

This third Defence Statement did not pursue the previous claim that the particular device in question was unreliable and raised for the first time the defence that the alcohol consumed before driving would not have led to an excess reading and, by implication from the accompanying letter, post driving consumption (approximately 2 bottles of wine) was relied on. But this Statement did retain the contention that the Worthing device was no longer type approved because it had been changed without the prior consent of the Secretary of State in its F11 settings (unspecified save for the slope parameters), a Pinning adjustment, fuel cell shunt, RTC Board, IR Detector and other unspecified components. The facts of these changes and the absence of approval save in relation to the RTC Board, were said to be supported by evidence given on behalf of the Crown in other cases. Calibrations were said to have been carried out in a way in which they should not have been. This led to a contested application under S8 CPIA 1996 for disclosure of a range of material, heard by District Judge Tain in Worthing on 15th April 2004.

Disclosure was ordered by DJ Tain of: unedited F11 printouts for the machine until the first printout after the date of the offence, all engineer's reports, service and calibration sheets, and a copy of the maintenance log. There is no record of that decision or its reasoning. But in the Case Stated, DJ Tain says that he ordered disclosure of all information about the machine, its settings and the F11 settings in particular, its service history and related documents.

The CPS contacted Intoximeters UK Ltd asking for the material so as to comply with the order. This led to further disclosure of earlier calibration certificates and engineer's reports together with an edited version of the F11 printouts for the same period, edited to show only the slope parameters, and the software name as EC/IR-UK 5.23. Intoximeters UK declined to provide unedited printouts because they were commercially confidential, would not be understood without more material which would in its turn be confidential, and the checklist used by engineers also contained passwords which could not be disclosed. The defence was on a fishing expedition. The CPS then applied to the DJ for a variation of the disclosure order on the grounds that it could not supply more and that R v Alibhai [2004] EWCA Crim 681 had clarified the disclosure duties in relation to material in the hands of third parties such as Intoximeters UK was contended to be. The Respondent met that with an application for a stay of proceedings on the ground that in the absence of such material the trial would be an abuse of process.

On 13th September 2004, DJ Tain held that there was a contract between Intoximeters UK Ltd to supply these devices to certain police forces, and that in the absence of other contractual information being provided by the Crown, Intoximeters UK was "part of the investigating authority" and therefore non-compliance with his Order was non-compliance by the "team" of police and prosecution. The information had been legitimately required in the light of errors on the machine both before and after this case. (This must relate to his experience of other cases, but it is not specified.) Alibhai was distinguishable as involving an independent victim and not someone with a contractual relationship with the state or prosecutors. There had been a fundamental breach of a Court Order. The case could not fairly be tried without such information; the prosecution was based entirely on the reading from a machine which had a significant potential for inaccuracy which the Respondent should have the right to investigate, and without which investigation it would be unfair for her to stand trial, nor could she receive a fair trial. Trial could not remedy the defects in a case in which the reading was so fundamental.

Accordingly, DJ Tain ruled that proceedings should be stayed as an abuse of process. It appears to have been common ground that the outstanding undisclosed material was in the possession of Intoximeters UK and not in the possession of the police or CPS.

McGillicuddy was charged on 8th June 2003. On 23rd June 2003, the CPS sent him a letter saying that "there was no prosecution material which requires disclosure to you" pursuant to s3 CPIA 1996. Disclosure, it said, would be reviewed in the light of a written defence statement. On 17th September 2003, a schedule of unused material was sent by the CPS and nine days later the Defence Statement was provided. This timetable led to the arguments in this case about whether the secondary disclosure obligations under the CPIA ever arose.

On 10th June 2004, DJ Grant at South Western Magistrates' Court heard preliminary arguments about the adequacy of the Defence Statement in relation to a s8 CPIA application and whether the Defence Statement was out of time, as time for its service ran from 23rd June 2003 rather than 17th September 2003. No application had been made to extend time within fourteen days from 23rd June 2003. He ruled that the Defence Statement was not out of time, as time did not start to run until service of the schedule of unused material.

The DJ must have regarded it as an adequate Defence Statement, but it was silent as to whether the Respondent took issue with driving or with having consumed alcohol at all or when, or whether there was any reason for mouth alcohol to have been present at the time of the test, e.g. regurgitation. It alleged that the Wandsworth machine was not reliable for five reasons: certain components performed unreliably, there was a high incidence of failures with the EC/IR device generally, it did not reliably detect mouth alcohol, it had been modified in a way which made it unreliable, and dry gas was used to calibrate the fuel cell. The device now fell outside its type approval because of changes made without the consent of the Secretary of State: manual as opposed to factory calibration, and the use of dry gas to calibrate the fuel cell.

On 12th July 2004, DJ Bayne, in the substantive application under s8 CPIA 1996, ordered the CPS to disclose four items: complete and unedited printouts for the Wandsworth machine, the calibration and service sheets, engineer's reports and the machine's history. The CPS disclosed the engineer's reports, and calibration certificates, and obtained F11 printouts similarly edited as in the case of Wood. The request for the history of the device was abandoned.

On 14th October 2004, DJ Bayne ordered that the unedited printouts should be provided. She held that Intoximeters UK was not a third party but was instead "part and parcel" of the prosecution; there were contractual relations. Alterations could take a device out of type approval or make it unreliable. She said that there was evidence that the software had been amended, which the Case Stated says was conceded by the Prosecution, so the unedited printouts were relevant to that argument. She took the view that the full printouts would enable it be seen whether there were changes to the approved parameters of a nature which took the device outside the scope of the type approval. Intoximeters UK retained material on behalf of the police and could not itself decide on what to make available nor could it do so by reference to commercial confidentiality.

The CPS asked Intoximeters UK for the full printouts and its reply echoed that summarised in the Wood case.

On 4th November 2004, DJ Grant heard an application that the case be stayed as an abuse of process following non-compliance with the Order of DJ Bayne. He held that it should be stayed, because the failure of the CPS to disclose the full printouts meant that McGillicuddy could not receive a fair trial. There would be prejudice so serious that a fair trial could not take place. Commercial confidentiality could not provide a basis for refusing disclosure. He granted the stay. As in Wood's case, Intoximeters UK had possession of the printouts at issue, not the police or CPS.

Was there a defence statement at all in McGillicuddy's case ?

I deal first with the DPP's argument in McGillicuddy's case that there was no defence statement within the provisions of CPIA 1996 so as to enable an application for disclosure to be made under s8. This involved two aspects: the lateness of service of the statement and its inadequacy to justify the disclosure ordered by reference to the defence issues raised in it. These issues could have arisen on the facts in Wood's case as well

The duty of primary disclosure is set out in s3(1). The prosecutor must:

"(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed to the accused and which in the prosecutor's opinion might undermine the case for the prosecution against the accused, or
(b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material of a description mentioned in paragraph (a)."
S8(1) CPIA 1996, in its form before amendment by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and as applicable here, permits an application for disclosure by an accused where he "gives a defence statement under section 5 or 6 and the prosecutor complies with section 7 or purports to comply with it or fails to comply with it." S8(2) requires the defendant to have reasonable cause to believe that there is "prosecution material" "which might reasonably be expected to assist the accused's defence as disclosed by the defence statement given under section 5…" in order to make the application for disclosure. This part of the DPP's argument was concerned with the second part of that provision.

Compulsory disclosure by an accused is provided for in s5(1) CPIA 1996, where the prosecutor complies with his duties of primary disclosure "or purports to comply with it." S5 (6) governs the content of the written defence statement. It must set out in general terms the nature of the defence, indicate the matters on which the accused takes issue with the prosecution, and for each such issue, why he does so. S5(9), s 12 and the CPIA 1996 (Defence Disclosure Time Limits) Regulations 1997 No.1997/684, provide for 14 days from compliance or purported compliance by the prosecutor with the duty of primary disclosure for the service of the defence statement. Time can only be extended by an application made within that period. S7 deals with secondary disclosure by the prosecution where a defence statement is given under s5.

The consequences of an accused not providing a defence statement or providing late or inconsistent ones are set out in s11. S11(1)(a) brings the absence of a statement within the scope of the section and (b) covers:

" a defence statement under [section 5] but [given] after the end of the period which, by virtue of section 12, is the relevant period for section 5."
Other subsections deal with inconsistent statements and so on. Similar language appears in relation to a statement under s 6 which is provided outside the time limits.

First, I reject the contention put forward by Mr Bright, in support of the DJ, that primary disclosure did not take place until the service of the schedule of unused material and that time for service of the defence statement therefore ran from that date. I am alive to the possibility that a prosecutor might send out a pro forma letter without applying his mind to the issue directed by s3. But I do not think that that possibility can be remedied by treating s3 as applying only when the schedule of unused material is served. The wording of s3 is too clear, and the very provision for the s5 obligation to be triggered by service of what purports to be in compliance with either limb of s3 shows Mr Bright's argument to be wrong. The CPS letter of 23rd June 2003 is quite obviously a written statement that there is no relevant material, or at least it purports to be, and that is all that is required for s5 to be triggered, and for time to start running. The significance of the schedule of unused material is dealt with in s4 and s24(3). Mr McGuinness QC was right to submit on behalf of the DPP that the effect of those provisions is that it is only where the prosecutor has the schedule of unused non-sensitive material when primary disclosure occurs, that it must be sent to the defendant at the same time. The schedule is not itself a necessary component of nor the mark of primary disclosure. Accordingly, the DJ was wrong to reject the prosecution argument that the defence statement was out of time.

But, second, I reject Mr McGuiness' submission, which he made in the end rather tentatively having drawn s11 to our attention, that the defence statement was not a defence statement given "under" s5 or s6 because it was given late. That submission is at odds with the language of s11 which describes a defence statement as given "under" s5 or s6 even when given late. It can still be used to damage a defence case. The concept of a statement given "under" s5 or s6 must be the same for the purpose of applying s8. I find it also difficult to see that the late provision of such a statement could deprive a DJ of jurisdiction to hear a s8 application, in the light of R v Sekhon and Others [2002] EWCA Crim 2954, [2003 1 WLR 1655 and R v Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2005] 3 WLR 303.

Third, the prosecutor's next argument, also rejected by the DJ, was that the defendant could not make a s8 application because the defence statement was not in substance a defence statement because it did not comply with the requirements of s5(6). Of course there can be so-called defence statements which are so deficient in their fulfilment of the requirements of s5(6) that they cannot properly be termed defence statements at all, but such "statements" would probably fall foul of s11(1)(a) and, say, (d), with the consequences which then follow. But there are real dangers of injustice in treating deficient written defence statements as so wholly ineffective as to be non-existent in reality and thus to remove the DJ's jurisdiction to make a s8 order.

The problem of deficiencies in a defence statement used to ground an application for disclosure under s8, can usually be resolved within the disclosure process. One of the chief purposes of the defence statement is to provide the basis for further disclosure and R v Tibbs [2002] 2 Cr App R 309 at p315A-C emphasises the obligation to comply with all three components of s5(6)-(8). Likewise, Lord Bingham in R v H and C [2004] UKHL 3, [2004] 2 AC 134 at paragraph 35, whilst pointing to the need to avoid a restrictive analysis of such statements, said that they had to be carefully analysed to ascertain the specific grounds on which the charges are resisted:

"The trial process is not well served if the defence are permitted to make general and unspecified allegations and then seek far-reaching disclosure in the hope that material may turn up to make them good."
The allegations in the McGillicuddy defence statement about the reliability of the device and its type approval, whatever the disputed basis for making them or their limitations in founding a defence in law when analysed, went beyond the general allegations to which Lord Bingham referred. But disclosure of the material ordered by the DJ, if otherwise justified, should have been refused on the grounds that the defence statement, which was silent as to whether the defendant was the driver or had consumed alcohol or enough to be in excess of the prescribed limits, did not raise an issue to which reliability or type approval was relevant. Those matters had no free-standing relevance. The request for disclosure did not satisfy s8(2)(a).

That does not involve too restrictive a reading of the statement in this case, and any problem could readily have been solved by a further statement. In a case of this sort, the issue is often only that the amount of alcohol consumed could not have put the defendant over the limit and it is no great burden to require that to be stated if this sort of disclosure is sought. The other arguments against the adequacy of the defence statement are really facets of the argument that disclosure was not warranted because the attack was essentially on type approval which it was argued could not found a defence in law, to which I now turn. But disclosure should have been refused in McGillicuddy's case because the defence statement raised no issue to which the items of which disclosure was sought could be relevant

The relevance of the material ordered to be disclosed

Mr McGuinness next submitted that the material ultimately not disclosed could not be relevant to any defence because it went to type approval and not to the reliability of the device, however the argument for its disclosure might have been expressed. The lawfulness of type approval was not a matter which could be raised as a defence to an excess alcohol charge in the criminal courts.

I accept that as the starting point; it has been made clear in DPP v Memery [2002] EWHC Admin 1720, [2003] RTR 18, paragraphs 74-76 where the possible effect of Boddington v BTC [1999] 2 AC 143 on the earlier decisions in R v Skegness Magistrates Court ex p Cardy [1985] RTR 49, DPP v Browne and DPP v Teixeira [2002] RTR 395 and Brown v Procurator Fiscal [2003] RTR 239 was rejected. It was recognised in Cardy that machines or software are altered to improve performance; or it can happen e.g. simply for force name changes. It has to be shown for disclosure purposes that the alterations which are said to have occurred could mean that the device is no longer type approved. As Stanley Burnton J said in Richardson v DPP [2003] EWHC Admin 359, paragraph 6, type approval is confined to the components specified in the Schedule to the Type Approval Order, excluding the manufacturer's name, and for these purposes any alteration to the components of the type approval had to be such that the description in the Schedule no longer applied to it. Not every alteration would be capable of taking a machine out of type approval.

This means that the contention that the type approved cannot measure mouth alcohol accurately and that the reading is therefore not from a reliable or legally approved device cannot provide a defence or justify disclosure. But that is not the same at all as saying that modifications are irrelevant simply because they may have been made to all or most devices. Conversely, a contention that the accused is only concerned with the performance of a particular device does not mean that the contention does not go to type approval.

Where the contention is that the device which was originally type approved has been altered without the Secretary of State's written consent in such a way as to take it out of type approval, and disclosure is sought to further that contention, the DJ will require more than the asserted fact of unapproved modification to justify disclosure. There will have to be some material which explains how the alteration could go to loss of type approval in the Schedule and how disclosure could advance that point. A change to a parameter in the software which is still described as UK5.23 would not be such a change. Here the edited printouts still showed that the software was UK5.23 so the unedited ones would still show that the software was UK.5.23. There was nothing to suggest a change to the gas delivery system which took it out of type approval. It is difficult to see how allegedly defective maintenance practices could cause a device to lose its type approval, but they would have to be potentially of that gravity before becoming relevant to a loss of type approval argument.

Wood and McGillicuddy explicitly raised an argument about the loss of type approval. In Wood's case, it is difficult to see from the Case Stated and the note of the abuse ruling how it was thought that the allegations went to loss of type approval and how the material, at lease that at issue by the time of the abuse hearing, could advance a loss of type approval defence. The McGillicuddy Case Stated, read with the written reasons of the DJ on disclosure, states that it was conceded that the Wandsworth device had been altered but it is clear that there was an issue about whether those changes were so fundamental as to be capable of removing the device from type approval. The unedited printouts were held to be necessary for the resolution of that issue. I cannot detect from the material how it was thought that the changes, agreed or asserted in relation to type approval, were capable of meeting the test as to their fundamental significance which DJ Bayne correctly identified, nor how the material at issue by the time of the abuse hearing could help to answer that point. I cannot see how the DJs' disclosure orders were justified when measured against the defences advanced and the stringent test required to show loss of type approval. Wood's case appears to have been that the high excess was caused by post driving drinking. McGillicuddy never said whether he had been drinking and if so how much.

Only McGillicuddy explicitly raised issues which went to the reliability of the particular device even if they might affect all machines which were type approved. These are not irrelevant arguments simply because they might be applicable generally. But their relationship to type approval arguments needs careful scrutiny in view of the irrelevance of arguments which in effect contend that the machine should not have been approved.

The McGillicuddy arguments about reliability which went to the ability of the device to detect mouth alcohol are clearly general and go to the approval of this type of device; disclosure based on those arguments should have been rejected. It is difficult in any event to see how they could justify disclosure in relation to a particular machine in the absence of any evidence that mouth alcohol was a problem through the manner of consumption, regurgitation or testing, and that the alcohol reading might have been so wrong as to show an excess where there might have in reality have been none on the Respondent's case as to his consumption. There was no explanation of how the other alleged defects could have caused the excess reading to the extent that there might have been no prosecutable excess at all, or how the disputed and ultimately undisclosed items from Intoximeters UK might have advanced that point. That should have been very clear in view of the stay for abuse of process.

I emphasise that the material of which disclosure is sought must have some potential for bearing on the issue in respect of which is raised. The nature and degree of an alleged unreliability has to be such that it might be able to throw doubt on the excess in the reading to such an extent that the level of alcohol in the breath might have been below the level at which a prosecution would have been instituted. If on any view there would still be an excess leading to prosecution it is difficult to see how that could justify disclosure of the material sought to make an irrelevant point about reliability. This is where the nature of the defence claims as to what alcohol had been consumed, and when, may matter. In considering disclosure applications based on a claim about a particular machine's unreliability, and its possible basis for a defence, the DJ needs explicitly to consider the effect of the safeguards provided by the taking of two specimens, the intervening clearances of the device and the evidential use of the lower specimen of the two, together with the opportunity to give specimens of blood or urine and the fact that there is leeway above the breath limit before prosecution takes place. They are relevant to whether the alleged unreliability could possibly advance the stated defence. Similarly the nature and extent of the possible changes to type had to be so fundamental that it could no longer be said that this was a type approved machine; that was the issue to which the disclosure material had to be addressed.

Although Mr Bright made pleas to equality of arms and to the limited opportunities open to defendants to challenge the output of the breathalyser devices, Mr McGuinness' submissions about the safeguards in the legislation and in practice persuade me that there is no unfairness which requires to be remedied by taking an unduly broad approach to disclosure.




"Prosecution material" and third parties

I turn next to the main issue which the two cases have in common: whether, if otherwise justified, disclosure should have been ordered of the material at issue which was all in the hands of Intoximeters UK. It was the non-disclosure of this material which led to the stay in proceedings. The issue is whether the material was "prosecution material" within s8(3) and (4) CPIA 1996. The DJs accepted arguments to the effect that the disclosure obligations in the CPIA applied to this material because Intoximeters UK was part of the police or prosecution or investigating team, in part at least because of the contractual relationship which existed between the police and Intoximeters UK.

I reject the analysis which underlay the DJs' conclusions. They were not empowered under s8 CPIA 1996 to order the disclosure of material in the hands of Intoximeters UK. Mr Bright rightly recognised the difficulties.

The relevant statutory provisions are those in the CPIA 1996, s21 of which makes it clear that the statutory disclosure provisions for summary trials contained in the Act displace completely the common law provisions for disclosure. S8(3) and (4) provide:

"(3) For the purposes of this section prosecution material is material –
(a) which is in the Prosecutor's possession and came into his possession in connection with the case for the prosecution against the accused,
(b) which, in pursuance of a code operative under Part II, he has inspected in connection with the case for he prosecution against the accused, or
(c) which falls within sub-section (4).
(4) Material falls within this sub-section if in pursuance of a code operative under Part II the prosecutor must, if he asks for the material, be given a copy of it or be allowed to inspect it in connection with the case for the prosecution against the accused."
S2(3) defines the Prosecutor: "references to the Prosecutor are "to any person acting as a prosecutor, whether an individual or a body"".

The structure of s8(3)(a), which is the provision upon which the DJs relied, requires that the material of which disclosure is to be ordered be in the possession of the prosecutor and that it came into his possession in connection with the case for the prosecution against the accused.

It was never contended that the material ultimately at issue in the abuse proceedings was in the possession of the CPS. The only basis upon which it could be said that the material in question satisfied the requirement that it be in the possession of the prosecutor, was if the prosecutor was or at least included Intoximeters UK. That is an impossible contention. The prosecutor was the CPS. Intoximeters UK is not part of the CPS. There are other provisions which deal with material in the hands of those who are not the prosecutors, and the police and other third parties are dealt with differently. Intoximeters UK is not part of the prosecution team, a concept which itself is misleading and irrelevant in the light of the other specific provisions for disclosure. Intoximeters UK does not become part of the CPS because it has supplied the device to the police force and has certain continuing obligations to the police under that contract. The DJs have lumped together the CPS, the police and third parties who provide and maintain devices for the police to use in the investigation and proof of offences in a way which simply fails to respect the facts or the statutory provisions.

There are differences between the position of Intoximeters UK in this case and Microsoft Inc in Alibhai , but those differences do not justify the conclusion reached here about what constituted the prosecutor. The fact that upon request Intoximeters UK provided certain material voluntarily in these cases did not alter the relationship which it had with the CPS. The fact that it relied on commercial sensitivity and its view as to the application being a fishing expedition explained its unwillingness to do more voluntarily but could not be a matter which meant that it was part of the prosecutor. That is a matter to which I shall return when dealing with other limbs of s8(3), and (4).

There was a contract in respect of each device between the relevant police force and Intoximeter Inc which was made on the terms agreed between Intoximeter Inc and the Secretary of State for the Home Department in a Framework Arrangement of 1998. It governed the supply of the device and related services, including maintenance. The terms provided that after calibration repairs or regular service visits, a certificate of approval had to be left with the police force; and engineers' service reports had to be left after other visits. These all had to be kept by the police with the device. This material was disclosed. A metrological log book which held details of service visits and repairs had to be held with the equipment by the police. This was not sought and would give rise to different issues. A record of repairs or calibrations had to be kept by Intoximeters UK and were open to inspection by specified people which did not include the CPS or police. The contract provided for expert evidence for the prosecution to be given, if required, about the design or function of and data stored within the device or its software. It also appears that, for obvious reasons, when a service or calibration visit took place, the device's memory would be downloaded on to a printout and cleared, and the printout would be sent to the police. The police could access data in the device's memory. There is nothing in that relationship which could justify the conclusion that Intoximeters UK or Inc was part of the CPS, any more than the close co-operation between the CPS and Microsoft turned Microsoft into part of the CPS in Alibhai, where extensive information was disclosed by Microsoft to the Crown and defence.

S8(3)(b) would not have assisted the Respondents' applications either. There are three specific limitations which have to be satisfied before material becomes prosecution material under that provision. First, it must actually have been inspected by the prosecution. Second, any inspection must have been in pursuance of the CPIA Code and, third, the inspection must have been in connection with the prosecution case against the accused.

The Code provisions emphasise, in distinguishing between the "Investigator", the "Disclosure Officer" and the "Prosecutor" the different roles which have to be performed and point away from the elision of them which in part underlay the DJs' reasoning. The Code definition of "prosecutor" is: "the authority responsible for the conduct of criminal proceedings on behalf of the Crown. Particular duties may in practice fall to individuals acting on behalf of the prosecuting authority". This again shows that Intoximeters UK cannot be the prosecutor or part of it.

The Code provisions for disclosure of material which has been inspected are:

"7.4 If the Prosecutor asks to inspect material which has not already been copied to him, the Disclosure Officer must allow him to inspect it. If the Prosecutor asks for a copy of material which has not already been copied to him, the Disclosure Officer must give him a copy. However, this does not apply where the Disclosure Officer believes having consulted the officer in charge of the investigation, that the material is too sensitive to be copied and can only be inspected.
10.1 If material has not already been copied to the Prosecutor, and he requests its disclosure to the accused on the ground that
- it falls within the test for primary or secondary disclosure, or
- the Court has ordered its disclosure after considering an application from the accused,
- the Disclosure Officer must disclose it to the accused."
(The operative Code was the 1997 Code, although there is nothing in the 2005 which would have made a difference to this case).

I accept Mr McGuinness' submissions that the material could not fall in either case within the scope of "prosecution material", because it had not been inspected by the prosecutor, nor was it material which the Disclosure Officer could disclose to the prosecutor. S8 (3)(b) and the related provisions of the Code are plainly drafted on the basis that the Disclosure Officer has possession of the material. The provisions are simply unintelligible or unworkable otherwise. They reflect the function of the Disclosure Officer as the person responsible for examining material retained by the police during the investigation, revealing it to the prosecutor and disclosing it to the accused at the request of the prosecutor. Intoximeters UK could not be a Disclosure Officer.

Mr Bright then developed an argument not addressed to the DJs which sought to justify their disclosure rulings, by reference to s8(4) CPIA 1996. This treats as "prosecution material" that which the prosecutor must be given a copy of or allowed to inspect in connection with the prosecution case against the accused pursuant to the Code, if he asks for it. Mr Bright argued that there was a duty on the prosecutor to examine the Intoximeters UK printouts and not to delegate the assessment of their relevance to Intoximeters UK. Paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5 of the Code require an investigator to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, and if he believes that other persons have material relevant to the investigation which has not been obtained, the Disclosure Officer should be asked to invite them to retain it in case they receive a request for its disclosure. The Code also required the investigator to retain material which might be relevant to the investigation, paragraph 5; to list on sensitive and non-sensitive schedules, the potentially relevant retained material which the prosecution would not use, paragraph 6; and to provide those to the prosecutor, drawing attention to any other material which had been retained which might fall within the scope of the primary disclosure obligations, paragraph 7. The full unedited Intoximeters printouts became "prosecution material" once they were on the Schedule of material given to the prosecution or ought to have been. (Mr Bright drew attention to the description of some of the Wood case Intoximeters UK material as "further primary disclosure". But that obvious casual misdescription cannot assist him). This material should have been listed, it was potentially relevant, the Disclosure Officer had asked for it to be retained because he had asked for it to be provided. The question was whether the contract between the police and Intoximeters UK, as summarised above, entitled the CPS or the police to access it. If this were not done there would be an inequality of arms in an Intoximeter case.

Mr Bright drew upon an analogy with the way in which prosecution experts must disclose, even in the absence of a defence request, tests or documentation which would assist the defence or undermine the conclusions to which they have come. The prosecution had to make inquiries of forensic experts to see if there was discoverable material; Archbold 10-68. The expert was analogous to the Intoximeter device.

I was not persuaded by these arguments. Intoximeters UK is not the CPS or part of it; neither is it a Disclosure Officer nor is it part of the police. Nothing in the contract lends support to that view. It provides a support service which means that certain documents are left with the police as operators of the device, which may be disclosable in any individual case. Intoximeters UK had no say over the disclosure of any of those which were in the possession of the police and did not try to affect their disclosure. It was a third party in relation to the material which it alone retained in its possession.

There is no provision in the contract between the police and Intoximeters Inc. giving the police or CPS any general right to inspect Intoximeters Inc or UK records, whether commercially confidential or not. The notion that the CPS or police somehow had a right to do so, or to do so in connection with a prosecution and that therefore one or other of them was in "constructive possession" of the records is wholly wrong. The record of calibration and repair is open to inspection by the Home Secretary and certain other bodies, but these do not include the CPS or police.

The potential role which Intoximeters UK might be asked to play in giving evidence cannot make it part of the prosecutor or investigator and to that extent the analogy with experts is misplaced. If it were to give evidence as an expert that might affect what it was obliged to disclose; but the prosecution was not obliged to make inquiries of it or to call evidence from it on the basis of the material provided by the Respondents here.

The CPIA and the Code are not directed to creating duties for third parties to follow and Intoximeters UK is a third party. The disclosure duties are created in respect of material which, put shortly, the CPS or the police have and which the CPS has inspected or must be allowed to inspect. The Code reflects that position. Paragraphs 7.4 and 10.1 clearly contemplate that this disclosure comes from material held by the investigator or by the Disclosure Officer. Material is not "prosecution material" within s8 (4) unless it is so held. Paragraphs 5 and 6, which lead to the obligations in paragraphs 7 and 10, are plainly directed to the retention and listing of material which the investigator or Disclosure Officer holds. There is no provision in the Code which imposes any obligation on third parties nor sensibly could there be. Paragraph 3 deals with how the investigator should approach third parties and "invite" them to retain material.

The Attorney-General's Guidelines of 2000 (and the 2005 Guidelines do not materially alter the position) deal with the obligations on the prosecutor and investigator in relation to third party material in a way which again makes it clear that third party material is not "prosecution material" within the scope of the CPIA or Code. Under the heading "Material held by other agencies" i.e. non-government departments or other Crown bodies, paragraph 30 provides that where, say, a provider of forensic services has material which might be disclosable were it in the hands of the prosecution, and the material is likely to be relevant, steps should be taken by the prosecution to obtain the material. If the third party refuses to disclose it, and its production is still thought reasonable and the statutory requirements of the relevant Act are met, here s97 Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, the prosecutor should seek a witness summons for its production.

For the purposes of Mr Bright's argument, the significance of this analysis is that it shows that the approach which he urges in relation to third party material is contradicted by the provisions upon which he founds it. It ignores the language and structure of the Code and the Guidelines which differentiate between the prosecutor, police and third parties and do not create any obligation through the mechanisms he relied on. There is a mechanism which can be used in the right case for obtaining relevant material in the hands of third parties who are unwilling to make it available.

Accordingly, the material was not material which the Disclosure Officer was obliged to allow the prosecutor to inspect or copy. He did not have it in order to allow that obligation to arise. He was in fact never asked for it. No request could have been made which was pursuant to the Code.

This means that much of the disclosure should not have been ordered in the first place and the orders should have been varied as sought by the CPS. Inevitably it also means that the stays of proceedings were unjustified, since the very basis for their grants did not exist. There had been no unjustifiable failure to comply with the Courts' Orders.

Abuse of process

Mr McGuinness advanced broader submissions about what the DJs had done on the assumption that the material was relevant to an issue in the defence statement and was available to Intoximeters UK. Both stayed proceedings on the ground that the Respondents could not receive a fair trial and DJ Tain stayed the Wood case also on the grounds that it would not be fair to try Wood because of the disobedience of the prosecutor to the Court's Order.

Mr McGuinness submitted that the DJs, before ordering a stay because Intoximeters UK had refused to disclose all that was ordered, should have considered whether or not the prosecutors should have sought or yet should seek witness summonses under s97 MCA 1980. The circumstances in which a failure to pursue a witness summons could ground an abuse claim are considered in Alibhai, which I would summarise as follows from paragraphs 55-65: the material has to be of significance in relation to a real issue, damaging to the prosecution case or helpful to the defence; the fact that material could not be obtained by the prosecutor from a third party did not show dishonourable conduct or abuse of power by the prosecutor as it was not under an absolute obligation to secure disclosure of the material; it would have to be shown that it had not acted in accordance within the permissible limits of the Attorney-General guidelines; there might be the possibility of an extreme case in which the refusal of co-operation by a third party would require proceedings to be stayed even if there had been no prosecutorial misconduct. The Court does not hold that any failure to comply with the Attorney-General Guidelines would of itself justify a stay. Rather, it would still have to be shown that the consequence of any failure was that the very strict test for a stay had been satisfied. In any event, the ability of the Respondents themselves to seek a summons would affect the extent to which any failure of the CPS to comply with the Attorney-General Guidelines could lead to a stay.

Neither DJ considered whether the prosecutor had failed to comply with any Attorney-General Guideline obligation to seek a witness summons, although the CPS raised the point that this was the correct question. Neither Respondent ever sought to argue such a point or to seek a summons themselves. This was the mechanism for obtaining material in the hands of a third party. Had such an application been made, it would have had the effect of permitting the interests of the third party in the confidentiality of the material to be raised as a reason for the refusal of the summons or as a "just excuse" and the true materiality of the documents in question to be more fully explained. It would have been quite wrong simply to say that commercial confidentiality was irrelevant to ordering disclosure of material in the hands of a third party. If the DJ accepted that, the DJ would then have had to take a view about whether or not a fair trial was possible. The basis for any decision on the fairness of trial would have been rather different from that upon which the two decisions at issues were reached.

The DJs were wrong in my judgment to find an abuse of process and to stay proceedings because a fair trial was impossible. They should each have considered the need for the prosecutor to use and the value in its using s97 MCA 1980.

Even if relevant material could not be obtained in that way, that would not have meant of itself that a fair trial could not be possible. The significance of the material withheld by the third party would have had to be set against a proper appreciation of the defence, other evidence as to the reliability of the device and the legal position about arguments over type approval. I do not accept Mr Bright's submission that a reliability issue could not in reality be raised without access to the material which was not disclosed here, not least because the DJs do not explain clearly how the material actually sought could show unreliability of the degree necessary here to give rise to a defence, given that none of the material actually disclosed did.

DJ Tain also concluded that it would not be fair to try Wood. Mr McGuinness submitted that Wood's case did not pass the very high threshold set in cases such as R vHorseferry Road Magistrates Court ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, R v Letif and Shahzed [1996]1WLR 104 and R (Ebrahim) v Feltham Magistrates Court [2001] 1 WLR 1293. The CPS on any view had tried albeit unsuccessfully to obtain from Intoximeters UK the material ordered. Mr Bright submitted that the DJ knew how these machines worked and was not irrational. In reality this is all part of the consequence of the DJ's erroneous view that Intoximeters UK was part of the prosecutor. This criticism of the DJ proceeds on the basis that there was no deliberate breach of an order and that the CPS tried its best to comply with the order, whereas the DJ treated Intoximeters UK's failure as that of the CPS. It is unnecessary to express a view about what the position would have been had the CPS failed in its disclosure duties but that would have been a very different basis from that upon which this argument proceeded before us. The fact is that there was no abuse of process because no proper order was breached.

In McGillicuddy, I would answer the 6 questions posed in the stated case as follows:

a) Did the Court err in law in ruling that, for the purposes of serving a Defence Case Statement within the time constraints laid down by the CPIA, disclosure was only effected on the date of service of the schedule of unused material as opposed to the date on which the CPIA letter was served? Yes.
b) If it is accepted that no document which was in fact a DCS under s.5 CPIA was ever served did the court exceed its jurisdiction by ordering a disclosure? This did not arise in the way assumed by the question. The Defence Case Statement did not raise issues justifying the disclosure sought.
c) Was the court Wednesbury unreasonable to hold that Intoximeter UK Ltd is "the Prosecutor" for the purposes of sections 7 and 8 of the Act and therefore required to disclose material in their possession? Yes and it involved misinterpretation of CPIA 1996.
d) Alternatively if the court was correct in holding that Intoximeter UK is "the Prosecutor" for the purposes of those sections, did it err in going on to find that the company is not entitled to make decisions about disclosure of material in its possession? This does not arise.
e) Was the court entitled to rule that the material which it ordered to be disclosed could reasonably be expected to assist the Respondent's case as set out in the DCS? No.
f) Was the court in any event entitled to rule that the non disclosure of the material resulted in an abuse of process such that the Respondent was denied a fair trial? No.
In Wood, I would answer the 4 questions posed in the stated case as follows:

a) Is Intoximeter UK a "third party" as far as this criminal case is concerned? Yes.
b) Was the section 8 order on disclosure of material in possession of Intoximeters UK wrong in law? Yes.
c) Was the court's refusal of the prosecution application to vary wrong in law? Yes
d) Was the decision to stay proceedings wrong in law? Yes.
I would therefore allow these appeals and remit the cases for hearing, before DJs other than DJs Tain, Bayne and Grant

Lord Justice Laws: I agree.





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Paris Hilton release from jail pretty unusual for California Drunk Driving / DUI cases

San Diego California DUI news / San Diego California Drunk Driving news:

Hilton release unusual, California Drunk Driving / California DUI lawyers say

Criminal defense lawyers said Thursday that it was unusual and even "extraordinary" for the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to have released Paris Hilton to home confinement because of a medical condition.

"There are people in custody who have cancer and AIDS and severe heart problems, and they remain in custody," said criminal defense lawyer Darren Kavinoky, whose practice is based in Woodland Hills.

Hilton left jail after three days to serve the rest of her sentence at home under electronic monitoring. Jail officials said she had an undisclosed medical condition.

Kavinoky said he once had a client in jail for a relatively minor offense who suffered severe heart problems. So the lawyer went before a judge and was able to get him released to home confinement.

"But it is really an extraordinary situation," Kavinoky said.

Inmates who are released to home confinement typically complete their full sentences. Those in jail generally serve only a portion of their sentences, lawyers said.

To relieve jail overcrowding, the Sheriff's Department offers inmates home confinement after they have been behind bars for a while, lawyers said.

But moving from jail to electronic monitoring at home because of a medical condition is highly unusual.

"It is out of the norm for 99.99% of the people who are in custody," said Mary Carey, a Contra Costa County public defender for 18 years who is now in private practice in Walnut Creek, Calif.

Scott Spindel, a criminal defense lawyer who specializes in drunk driving cases, called Hilton's transfer to home confinement "specialized treatment."

Several lawyers said it would be particularly "extraordinary" to release an inmate to home confinement because of psychiatric problems.

"Virtually everyone who goes to jail finds it's traumatic and they are depressed and angry," said Neil Shouse, a former prosecutor and now a Los Angeles criminal defense lawyer.

"I have seen judges let people out of jail for open-heart surgery or a kidney transplant," but never for emotional problems, Carey said.

To be sent home after incarceration, "it has to be a legitimate physical ailment that cannot be treated at the facility," Shouse said.

Angela Berry-Jacoby, a criminal defense lawyer in Encino, said she tried to get home confinement for a client who was convicted of an offense related to drug sales because he was extremely anxious and had been raped in the past. The judge refused.

But 20 days into his 120-day sentence, the Sheriff's Department offered to let him serve the rest of his sentence at home because of jail overcrowding. She said she advised the client to hang on until he was "kicked out" to make room for more serious offenders, ending his term.

"But he couldn't handle it any more so he just did house arrest," Berry-Jacoby said.

Hilton probably will be watched closely during her confinement, Berry-Jacoby said.

"I am sure they would love to catch her not obeying the electronic monitoring agreement," she said.

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Thursday, June 07, 2007

 

International Standards of Drug Evaluation ( San Diego California DUI / Drunk Driving news )

The International Standards
of the Drug Evaluation and
Classification Program
A Product of
The DEC Standards Revision Subcommittee
of the Technical Advisory Panel
of the IACP Highway Safety Committee
Revised June 2, 1999
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
DEFINITIONS 4
STANDARDS FOR THE DRUG EVALUATION
AND CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM 8
Standards for Certification as a Drug
Recognition Expert 8
Standards for Certification as Drug
Recognition Expert Instructor 15
Standards for Recertification 19
Standards for Decertification of DREs
and Instructors 21
Standards for Reinstatement of a Decertified
Drug Recognition Expert 23
Standards for Agency Participation 24
ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES 28
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since 1984, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has supported the Drug
Evaluation and Classification Program. The program which was initially developed by the Los Angeles,
California, Police Department, was validated through both laboratory and field studies conducted by
Johns Hopkins University. In 1987, the Highway Safety Committee of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP) was requested by NHTSA to participate in the development and national
expansion of the program. As the program grew, it became apparent that in order to ensure continued
success, nationally accepted standards needed to be established. These standards, which establish
criteria for the selection, training and certification of drug recognition experts, helped to ensure the
continued high level of performance of the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program. In 1988,
NHTSA asked the IACP and its Highway Safety Committee to develop this system of nationally
accepted standards.
In March of 1989, the IACP and NHTSA sponsored a meeting at the Transportation Safety Institute in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Persons invited to this meeting included experienced drug recognition
experts, instructors, curriculum specialists, toxicologists, prosecutors and training administrators. The
participants met in working groups to reach consensus concerning the many issues relating to the Drug
Evaluation and Classification Program and to develop recommended minimum standards to the
Highway Safety Committee. The standards were drafted and presented to the committee for review at
its mid-year meeting in June 1989. In addition, the committee agreed to name a Drug Evaluation and
Classification Technical Advisory Panel to assist and advise the committee concerning technical aspects
relating to the operation of the program.
The Highway Safety Committee, by resolution, adopted the Interim National Standards of the Drug
Evaluation and Classification Program. The standards were subsequently approved by the voting
membership of the IACP. The standards were adopted on an interim basis pending the outcome of an
evaluation of the effectiveness of the program to be performed by NHTSA. In October 1992, the
standards were officially approved and adopted. Revisions and updates are periodically made to the
standards.
Presented in this document are standards specifying the requirements for certification and
recertification of DREs and DRE instructors; standards for decertification and reinstatement; and
standards for agency participation. Also, for those agencies participating in the program, a set of
administrative guidelines is provided.
These standards, when adopted by other countries, will be administered pursuant to their political
structure.
4
DEFINITIONS
ASSOCIATE INSTRUCTOR:
Persons not certified as DREs but who possess knowledge, expertise or credentials deemed
valuable to the program may be designated as associate instructors for the Drug Evaluation and
Classification Program.
BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION (BAC):
A person's blood alcohol concentration indicates the grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood. For example, a BAC of 0.10% means that there is one-tenth of a gram of alcohol in 100
milliliters of the person's blood.
CANDIDATE DRE:
An individual in the process of achieving certification as a drug recognition expert. To achieve
certification, a person must successfully complete a training program consisting of
An IACP/NHTSA-approved SFST training course of instruction
A two-day IACP/NHTSA-approved DRE preschool
A seven-day IACP/NHTSA-approved DRE school
On-the-job field certification
CANDIDATE DRE INSTRUCTOR:
An individual in the process of achieving certification as a DRE instructor. To achieve
certification, a DRE must successfully complete the IACP/NHTSA-approved DRE instructor
training, conduct a minimum of two hours of DRE training, and witness two drug evaluations.
COURSE MANAGER:
An individual who ensures that each training event follows the standardized curriculum and
evaluates the training event to identify ways to improve it. The course manager represents the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the International Association of Chiefs of
Police and resolves issues with the content and/or delivery of the training.
DRE COORDINATOR:
The appropriate DRE coordinator will be one of the following:
Agency Coordinator: The person designated within each department or agency responsible
for maintaining program records, ensuring maintenance of program standards and conducting
training and certification sessions within the agency. Responsibility for this function may rest
with one individual, in the case of a small or closely coordinated effort, or may be decentralized
among several people throughout the agency. If there is no designated agency coordinator, the
appropriate DRE coordinator shall be the state coordinator.
5
State Coordinator: In each of the states in which the Drug Evaluation and Classification
Program has been implemented under the auspices of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, an individual has been designated to act as the statewide coordinator for the
DEC Program. The duties of the position generally include but are not limited to
1. Acting as an information clearinghouse and central communication
point for the program within the state.
2. Assisting in coordinating training and other support activities for all
agencies participating in the program within the state.
3. Coordinating the assignment of instructors in response to requests for
service from federal and other sources.
The Governor’s Office of Highway Safety shall be responsible for designating the state
coordinator. If there is no designated state coordinator, the appropriate DRE coordinator shall
be the TAP regional coordinator, who shall assume the duties and responsibilities as described
above.
TAP Regional Coordinator: One DRE from each of the four regions, as established by the
Division of State and Provincial Police, is appointed by the IACP Highway Safety Committee
Chair to serve on the Technical Advisory Panel.
DRE INSTRUCTOR:
Individuals who, having been trained and certified as drug recognition experts, receive further
training and experience instructing within the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program.
Certified instructors will usually be certified DREs with experience in performing drug
evaluations and in providing testimony in court in the area of drug recognition. Certified
instructors are responsible for observing, evaluating and verifying the performance of candidate
DREs.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY:
For purposes of these standards, a criminal justice agency is any organization, funded by public
monies, that is involved in the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication of public miscreants; or
in the incarceration, detention, supervision or control of said miscreants following
apprehension, prosecution and/or adjudication.
DRUG:
For purposes of the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program, a drug is any substance that,
when taken into the human body, can impair the ability to operate a motor vehicle safely. Note
that this is not necessarily a strict medical definition.
DRUG EVALUATION:
A process of systematically examining a person suspected of being under the influence of a
6
drug, for the purpose of ascertaining what category of drugs (or combination of categories) is
causing the person's impairment. A trained DRE can identify, with a high degree of reliability,
the distinguishing signs and symptoms of seven broad categories of drugs.
DRUG EVALUATION AND CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL ADVISORY PANEL:
This group was formed to assist the Highway Safety Committee of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police on specific matters relating to the Drug Evaluation and
Classification Program. These matters include the revision of the approved training curriculum,
review and approval of proposed alternative training programs, and other matters relating to
the technical aspects of the DEC Program.
DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERT (DRE):
An individual who has successfully completed all phases of training requirements for
certification established by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
HIGHWAY SAFETY COMMITTEE:
A standing committee of the IACP that addresses highway safety issues.
HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS (HGN):
A loss of the normal control of the eyes observed as an involuntary jerking occurring when a
person attempts to follow as stimulus with the eyes and/or looks to the left or right side.
IMPAIRMENT:
One of the several terms used to describe the degradation of mental and/or motor abilities
necessary for safely operating a motor vehicle.
IMPLIED CONSENT:
Every state has enacted a version of an Implied Consent law, which serves to encourage
persons arrested for DWI to submit to a chemical test to determine blood alcohol content.
Many states also allow for the testing of blood, breath or urine for the presence of drugs and/or
alcohol. The concept of implied consent is that the state views the suspect as already having
agreed to take the test, as a condition of operating a vehicle in the state. The typical wording of
an implied consent law is as follows: AAny person who operates a motor vehicle upon the
public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test or tests
for the purpose of determining the alcohol (or drug) content of his or her blood, when arrested
for any act alleged to have been committed while the person was operating a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol (or any drug).@
The law further provides that, if the arrestee nevertheless refuses to submit to the chemical test,
he or she will not be forced to submit, but the driver's license will be suspended or revoked.
7
IACP STAFF:
With grant assistance from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Division of
State and Provincial Police of the IACP has agreed to develop standards and assist in managing
the certification process for the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program. As part of this
agreement, the IACP will perform necessary staff and coordination functions for the program.
The staff of the Division of State and Provincial Police is responsible for maintaining records
for the program and will coordinate certification and recertification processes.
INSTRUCTOR TRAINER:
An experienced DRE instructor who conducts instructor training courses and who must be
knowledgeable of and have audited all phases of the Drug Evaluation and Classification
training program and must be fully conversant with the student and instructor manuals.
INTOXICATION:
One of the several terms used to describe the degradation of mental and/or motor skills and
other faculties due to ingestion of alcohol or other drugs.
NHTSA:
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, within the United States Department of
Transportation that exercises primary responsibility for coordinating federal efforts to ensure
the safe design and operation of motor vehicles.
STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS:
The Standardized Field Sobriety Tests include three tests that were developed and validated
through a series of controlled experiments supported by research grants from NHTSA. The
three tests include Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN); Walk and Turn (WAT); and One Leg
Stand (OLS).
The HGN test is described elsewhere in these definitions.
Walk and Turn and One Leg Stand are divided attention tests. As such, they require the
suspect to concentrate on more than one thing at a time.
The training course developed by IACP and NHTSA, “DWI Detection and Standardized Field
Sobriety Testing,” is a program designed to train traffic enforcement officers to administer the
sobriety tests. The training includes two approved alcohol workshops. During these
workshops, students practice administering the test battery. In order to complete the course
satisfactorily, students must pass a written examination and demonstrate proficiency in
administering the field sobriety test battery.
8
I. STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION AS A DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERT
The standards in this section specify the criteria that must be met prior to an individual's being certified
as a drug recognition expert (DRE). These criteria outline the knowledge and skills required to be
considered for training, as well as the knowledge and proficiencies required for final certification.
The currently approved curriculum involves a three-phase training process. Prior to beginning the
training program, students are required to be trained in and demonstrate proficiency in the use of the
IACP/NHTSA-approved standardized field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test.
Phase I of the drug recognition training consists of a two-day (16-hour) preschool. During this
preschool, students are taught the definition of the term “drug” as it is used in the Drug Evaluation and
Classification Program, and become familiar with the techniques of the drug evaluation. Students also
begin to learn the techniques and procedures for evaluating persons suspected of drug impairment.
Phase II of training is a seven-day (56-hour) classroom program during which students receive detailed
instruction in the techniques of the drug evaluation examination as well as in physiology, the effects of
drugs and legal considerations. Upon completion of this phase of training, the student must pass a
comprehensive written examination before proceeding to Phase III of training, the field certification.
The field certification portion of training follows completion of the classroom training and is conducted
at periodic intervals for the next sixty to ninety days. During this portion of the training, students, under
the direction of certified instructors, evaluate subjects suspected of being impaired by drugs other than
alcohol. After participating in and documenting the results of at least twelve drug evaluations and
completing a comprehensive examination, the student is certified as a drug recognition expert.
1.1 In order to be considered for certification as a drug recognition expert, a person shall be in the
employ and under the direct control of a public criminal justice agency or institution involved in
providing training services to officers of law enforcement agencies.
Commentary: At the discretion of the agency head or administrator, and with the consent of the
training body, other persons may audit or observe any or all portions of the DRE training. Persons
attending the course as auditors or observers shall not be eligible for certification.
Persons pursuing certification as drug recognition experts for the purpose of instructing in the Drug
Evaluation and Classification Program must meet all requirements for certification and recertification in
order to maintain their standing as DREs or DRE instructors.
9
1.2 The candidate DRE must have experience in preparing comprehensive investigative reports and in
providing detailed court testimony.
Commentary: The technical nature of the drug evaluation process and the need to provide detailed
and accurate documentation of findings and conclusions requires proficiency in preparing reports.
Candidate DREs should have demonstrated the ability to investigate, document and prepare detailed
reports of incidents such as major traffic crashes or criminal violations. In addition, DREs must be able
to provide court testimony concerning their methods and results, as well as their training and
qualifications.
1.3 All DRE candidates must attend and complete the IACP/NHTSA-approved course of instruction
in Standardized Field Sobriety Testing, or an equivalent curriculum approved by the IACP Highway
Safety Committee and Technical Advisory Panel. They shall demonstrate proficiency in the use of
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests, to the satisfaction of a DRE instructor, by the conclusion of the
IACP/NHTSA DRE Pre-school or a school meeting Standard 1.2 above.
Commentary: The drug evaluation process requires that the contribution of alcohol to observed
impairment be determined. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has developed, and
the IACP has adopted, the Standardized Field Sobriety Test procedure in conjunction with immediate
breath testing, as a means of identifying the alcohol-impaired driver. If the effects of alcohol are
determined not to be the sole cause of impairment, the officer can begin the evaluation process to
determine what other causes may be responsible.
In order to conform to the IACP/NHTSA model curriculum, SFST training must contain the specified
number of hours and include at least two approved alcohol workshops. In addition, the training must
instruct students in the administration of the horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and turn, and one leg
stand tests.
Each agency should ensure that candidates submitted for DRE training have had adequate time prior to
beginning the training program to develop and to demonstrate proficiency in the use of SFST/HGN or
allow for refresher training in these techniques as necessary.
1.4 All DRE candidates must attend and complete the IACP/NHTSA DRE Pre-school or an IACPrecognized
equivalent prior to progressing to Phase II, the DRE School.
1.5 Prior to attending phase II of the DRE training, the candidate shall have met the learning objectives
for phase I of the training program, the IACP/NHTSA-approved DRE preschool. The candidate shall
be able to
1. Define the term “drug” as it is used in the DEC Program;
10
2. Name the seven drug categories identified in the DRE training program;
3. Measure vital signs, including blood pressure, pulse and body temperature;
4. Show familiarity with the 12-step drug recognition evaluation process;
5. Demonstrate proficiency in the administration of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests,
including Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus;
6. Show familiarity with the administration of the eye examinations, including pupil size,
vertical nystagmus and lack of convergence.
These learning objectives are generally met through completion of Phase I, the DRE preschool.
However, agencies have the latitude to determine the best means of ensuring that candidate DREs
meet the prerequisites. The agency must verify, through the application process to the instructor
responsible for delivering the training, that a candidate meets all requirements. Each candidate DRE
will be required to demonstrate the knowledge and skills outlined.
Administrative guidelines and suggested application forms containing the necessary information will be
provided by IACP staff to agencies and training institutions.
1.6 The candidate DRE shall complete an approved classroom training course which shall, at
minimum, achieve the learning objectives as stated in the IACP-approved training curriculum.
Commentary: The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the International Association
of Chiefs of Police have developed a classroom training course that, when completed, qualifies the
student to proceed to the field certification portion of the training program. Because of differences in
the type and level of training for officers in the detection of the impaired subject, agencies should
determine the most effective means of providing classroom training in drug recognition. However, in
order to maintain the credibility and integrity of the certification program, agencies that use a training
program other than that currently approved by the IACP, must have the alternative curriculum
approved by the IACP Technical Advisory Panel as meeting learning objectives. In addition, the
Technical Advisory Panel will be responsible for providing periodic updates and modifications to the
IACP training curriculum.
1.7 All candidate DREs shall attend and complete all classroom portions of an approved DRE
curriculum prior to progressing to Phase III (the field certification phase) of the training. This shall
include satisfactorily completing all assignments and required examinations. Students shall not be permitted
to “test out” of portions of the training, nor shall they be permitted to attend only those classes
that they have not previously completed.
Commentary: Class sessions missed should be made up prior to the final exam.
11
1.8 In order to complete satisfactorily the classroom portion of the training and proceed to field
certification, candidate DREs must complete an IACP-approved final examination with a score of not
less than eighty percent (80%). Candidates scoring less than 80% on the final examination may be
retested one time, under the supervision of a certified DRE instructor. The retest shall be completed
not less than fifteen nor more than thirty days following the completion of the classroom training.
Commentary: Upon satisfactory completion of the examination, the candidate may then proceed to
field certification. The examination used to retest the candidate shall be an IACP-approved examination
and shall not have been administered to the candidate previously. If the candidate does not achieve a
passing score on reexamination, the candidate must retake the classroom portion of the training and
pass the knowledge examination before proceeding further in the certification process.
1.9 Upon completion of the field certification phase of training, the candidate must demonstrate the
ability to conduct a complete drug evaluation in an approved sequence and appropriately document
and interpret the results. The candidate must also be able to document the findings of the evaluation
and demonstrate proficiency in interviewing techniques.
Commentary: One of the primary factors in the success of the Drug Evaluation and Classification
Program has been the emphasis upon a standardized approach to the drug recognition process. The
training stresses the importance of a systematic, structured approach to performing the drug evaluation.
This includes completing all portions of the evaluation in the appropriate sequence. Upon conclusion of
an evaluation the DRE reviews the results of all tests, examinations and observations; documents the
findings; and draws a conclusion based on the totality of the evidence.
1.10 To be considered for certification as a drug recognition expert, the candidate must satisfactorily
complete a minimum of twelve (12) drug evaluations, during which the candidate must encounter and
identify subjects under the influence of at least three of the drug categories as described in the DRE
training program. All three drug categories must be supported by toxicology.
Of the evaluations required for certification, the candidate shall administer at least six evaluations. The
candidate may observe the remaining evaluations. Certification training evaluations will be conducted in
accordance with the current procedures and guidelines established in the DECP training curricula.
All evaluations, either administered or observed, and documented for certification purposes, shall be
observed and supervised by at least one certified DRE instructor.
12
Commentary: Ideally, a drug evaluation will be performed by no more than two persons: the
evaluator and one observer. At no time should more than four persons participate in an evaluation, as
the results of the evaluation may be influenced by the distraction caused by a large number of persons
observing the process.
1.11 Prior to completing the certification phase of training, the candidate DRE must demonstrate the
ability to draw correct conclusions consistent with observed physiological signs and symptoms. In
addition, the conclusions must be supported by the findings of a forensic toxicology laboratory. No
candidate DRE shall be certified as a drug recognition expert unless blood, urine, or other appropriate
biological samples are obtained and submitted from at least nine (9) subjects whom the candidate DRE
has examined for certification purposes. These may include subjects for whom the candidate DRE
served as the examination recorder or observer as well as those subjects directly evaluated by the
candidate DRE. Further, the candidate DRE cannot be certified unless the opinion concerning the drug
category or categories affecting the subject is supported by forensic toxicological analysis seventy-five
percent (75%) of the time, or in at least seven (7) of the nine (9) samples submitted for certification
purposes. For purposes of this standard, a candidate DRE’s opinion is supported if the toxicological
analysis discloses the presence of at least one drug category named by the candidate DRE. In the event
that the candidate DRE has concluded that three or more categories of drugs are involved, at least two
categories must be supported by toxicology results.
Commentary: Successful and uniform application of this standard places important forensic toxicological
requirements on the program. First, the blood or urine specimen must be obtained as soon as
possible after the arrest so that the contents of the sample refer to the subject's status at the time of the
offense. Second, the sample must be properly sealed, stored, transported to the forensic toxicology
laboratory and analyzed in a timely fashion to maintain the integrity of the specimen. Third, the drug
recognition examination should be conducted as soon as possible after the offense so that the results of
the evaluation accurately refer to the subject's status at the time of the offense. Fourth, the laboratory
should use its full powers of analysis and detection to attempt to identify each category named by a
candidate DRE; in some cases this may require the laboratory to modify its routine screening and
confirmation procedures. Finally, the laboratory must complete its report on the samples as soon as
possible and provide a copy of the report to the arresting officer, DRE or candidate DRE submitting
the sample. It is the submitting officer's responsibility to provide a report to each DRE or candidate
DRE who participated in the evaluation.
Although the candidate DRE must complete a minimum of twelve (12) drug evaluations (standard
1.10), standard 1.11 requires only 75 percent of those to include a biological sample. This allows for
those cases in which a biological sample is unavailable, such as when a subject refuses or cannot
provide one. In those cases when an evaluation is not supported by forensic toxicology, a certified
DRE instructor should ensure that the candidate DRE’s opinion was based on observable signs and
symptoms consistent with the opinion.
13
1.12 Prior to concluding field certification training, the candidate shall satisfactorily complete an
approved “Certification Knowledge Examination.” The examination shall be administered and the
results reviewed by at least one certified instructor. The examination shall only be administered after
the candidate has completed not less than three drug evaluations.
Commentary: The “Certification Knowledge Examination” consists of a comprehensive written
examination followed by a detailed interview with the reviewing instructor(s). As stated previously,
certification is based on the evaluation by the instructor(s) of the skills and abilities of the candidate
rather than on the completion of a specified set of tasks. The purpose of the examination and interview
is to aid the instructor(s) in evaluating the candidate's qualifications, performance and general abilities.
The examination should be administered when, in the judgment of the reviewing instructor(s), the candidate
has demonstrated proficiency in conducting, evaluating and documenting results of the drug
evaluation process.
1.13 The candidate DRE shall complete the field certification phase of training within six months
following completion of the classroom training, unless the time limit is extended by the appropriate
DRE coordinator.
Commentary: Under normal circumstances, a candidate not completing field certification within the
prescribed time period will be dropped from the program. However, a reevaluation of the candidate's
qualifications and the reasons for non-completion may be conducted by the appropriate DRE
coordinator to determine whether or not circumstances exist that indicate that the candidate should
continue in the program.
1.14 By the time the candidate DRE has completed field certification training, the candidate shall have
prepared a résumé which shall reflect the candidate’s training and experience in drug recognition. The
résumé shall include a complete log of all evaluations in which the candidate has participated.
Commentary: In order to be accepted as a credible witness, the drug recognition expert must be able
to document and articulate a body of information concerning training, qualifications and experience in
the field of drug evaluation and classification. Toward this end, candidates are instructed in the
importance and proper preparation of a professional résumé.
1.15 When the candidate DRE has satisfactorily completed all requirements of the classroom and field
certification portions of training, at least two certified DRE instructors who have observed the
14
candidate during the field certification process will verify that the candidate meets all requirements for
certification as a drug recognition expert.
Commentary: The certification process relies in large part on the judgment of the instructor(s) as to
the abilities and performance of the candidate. Experience has shown that in many cases, particularly
those in which a candidate's qualifications may be in question, the opinion of a second instructor as to
readiness for certification is of value. In addition, the use of a second instructor to evaluate the
candidate may overcome any bias, either for or against a candidate. For these reasons, each candidate
must be evaluated by at least two instructors prior to becoming certified as a DRE.
1.16 Following completion of certification requirements, copies of all documents, including test
results, evaluation logs and drug evaluation reports shall be forwarded to the agency DRE coordinator
who shall forward all documents to the state coordinator. The state DRE coordinator shall forward the
names and copies of certification progress logs of the DREs they have certified as having successfully
completed all phases of the DRE training program. The IACP will then credential each applicant and
will register him as a certified drug recognition expert.
Commentary: The IACP staff shall maintain current listings of persons certified as drug recognition
experts. Upon notification that a person has met all requirements, staff shall complete and forward to
the state coordinator a certificate indicating that he meets all requirements of the Drug Evaluation and
Classification Program as a drug recognition expert. The state coordinator shall forward these
documents to the agency which, in turn, will present them to the DRE.
15
II. STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION AS DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERT
INSTRUCTOR
Because of the highly technical nature of the functions performed by the drug recognition expert, only
persons experienced in the techniques of drug evaluation should instruct in the Drug Evaluation and
Classification Program. In general, these instructors will be certified drug recognition experts with
experience in performing drug evaluations and in providing testimony in court in the area of drug
recognition. However, persons who possess specialized skills or credentials may be utilized to teach
certain parts of the training course as associate instructors. Dedicated, qualified instructors are critical
to the continued success of the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program.
Certified instructors are responsible for observing, evaluating and verifying the performance of
candidate DREs throughout the training and certification process. In addition, certified instructors must
provide periodic update training to DREs already certified.
Also addressed in this section are standards for the use of instructor trainers in the program. These
individuals are responsible for the training of DRE instructors.
2.1 Only persons certified as drug recognition experts may be certified as DRE instructors.
Commentary: Persons not certified as DREs but who possess knowledge, expertise or credentials
deemed valuable to the program may be designated as associate instructors for the Drug Evaluation
and Classification Program. Persons who might be considered for such designation may include medical
professionals, attorneys and others who possess knowledge in a designated field of expertise.
Associate instructors must be familiar with the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program and fully
conversant with the lesson plans for their assigned blocks of instruction. Classes taught by associate
instructors shall be taught in cooperation with certified DRE instructors to ensure consistency.
Each associate instructor should provide to the state coordinator a biographical sketch to be included
in the file of approved instructional staff. The biographical sketch shall include those segments of the
training curricula that the associate instructor is qualified to teach.
2.2 A DRE desiring to become an instructor in the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program shall
make written application to the agency coordinator. The agency coordinator will ensure that the
candidate meets all requirements to become an instructor and will refer the application to the state
coordinator.
Commentary: The agency head shall verify to the training provider that a candidate instructor meets
all prerequisites to enter DRE instructor training. Prerequisites may also include any state, local or
agency requirements specified for instructors within the jurisdiction. The state coordinator shall provide
16
to requesting agencies the administrative guide and sample application forms for candidate instructors.
2.3 The candidate shall satisfactorily complete the IACP/NHTSA-approved Drug Evaluation and
Classification Instructor Training Program, or an approved equivalent, which shall include both
knowledge and practical examination of candidate instructors.
Commentary: This requirement does not preclude states or local jurisdictions from placing additional
requirements on persons wishing to teach in the local law enforcement community.
2.4 Upon satisfactory completion of the IACP-approved classroom portion of training or completion
of an equivalent program, the student shall be designated as a candidate instructor for purposes of
completing instructor certification. To complete instructor certification, the candidate instructor must
· teach for a minimum of two hours in the classroom portion of an approved
drug recognition training program; and
· supervise the administration of not less than two drug evaluations performed by
candidate DREs during certification training.
The candidate instructor’s progress shall be monitored and evaluated by at least one certified DRE
instructor.
Commentary: The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the IACP have developed a
training curriculum for instructors in the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program. The learning
objectives for this program emphasize specific techniques for teaching the specialized information
contained in the drug recognition training program.
The Technical Advisory Panel shall be responsible for reviewing and evaluating alternative training
programs submitted by agencies. Those programs meeting or exceeding the approved learning
objectives for instructor training shall be deemed “equivalent.” This does not preclude agencies or
states from adopting more stringent standards.
2.5 Upon satisfactory completion of instructor training, copies of all documentation, including
instructor progress logs, examination scores and instructor evaluations, shall be forwarded to the
appropriate DRE coordinator. The agency DRE coordinator will forward these documents to the state
coordinator who shall certify that they have successfully completed all phases of DRE instructor
training. The IACP will then credential each applicant and will register him as a certified DRE
instructor.
17
Commentary: The IACP staff will maintain a current register of persons certified as instructors in the
Drug Evaluation and Classification Program. Upon notification that a person has met all requirements,
the staff shall complete and forward to the state coordinator a certificate indicating that he/she meets all
requirements as a DRE instructor. The state coordinator shall forward these documents to the agency
who, in turn, will present them to the DRE instructor.
The administrative guidelines shall provide sample forms for necessary progress logs and certification
documents.
2.6 To ensure the proper conduct and delivery of the approved curriculum, all training sessions
conducted as part of the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program shall be coordinated by a certified
DRE instructor who has previously instructed. All classes taught by associate or candidate instructors
shall be supervised directly by a certified DRE instructor.
Commentary: To ensure that all training classes are conducted in accordance with applicable
standards, it is recommended that the instructor coordinating the training program have a minimum of
one-year experience as a drug recognition expert instructor.
2.7 An instructor trainer shall have demonstrated proficiency as an instructor.
2.8 An instructor trainer must be knowledgeable of and have audited all phases of the Drug Evaluation
and Classification training program and must be fully conversant with the student and instructor
manuals.
Commentary: An instructor trainer must present evidence of the satisfactory completion of the
NHTSA/IACP Instructor's Development Course or equivalent. Instructor trainers must be familiar with
the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program and fully conversant with the lesson plans for their
assigned blocks of instruction. To ensure consistency, classes taught by instructor trainers shall be
taught in cooperation with certified DRE instructors.
Each instructor trainer shall provide to the appropriate DRE coordinator a biographical sketch to be
included in the file of approved instructional staff. The biographical sketch shall include those segments
of the training curricula that the instructor trainer is qualified to teach.
The state coordinator should maintain a record of persons qualified as instructor trainers in the Drug
Evaluation and Classification Program.
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2.9 The course manager shall perform four duties: planning and preparation, on-scene course
management, data collection, and reporting. These responsibilities involve the following:
1. Assigning instructors, and verifing in advance that the training is conducted in the
standardized manner and that it is properly evaluated;
2. Ensuring at the training site that all necessary conditions exist to maximize the students’
ability to learn;
3. Collecting certain data following every training event and forwarding it to the host state
coordinator; and
4. Preparing a comprehensive report following every training event.
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III. STANDARDS FOR RECERTIFICATION
Recertification is necessary to ensure that DREs and DRE instructors maintain proficiency. Just as the
standards in the previous sections have outlined the criteria for original certification, the standards
outlined in this section are required to ensure that professional integrity is maintained throughout the
recertification process.
3.1 The following records concerning certification and recertification shall be maintained:
Individual DRE/ Copies of all drug evaluations
DRE Instructor Evaluation logs
Resume
Certification and recertification progress logs
Certificates
Agency DRE Coordinator Copies of evaluation logs
Certification progress logs
Copies of certificates
Instructor ratings and summaries of student critiques
Records of classes taught by each instructor
State DRE Coordinator and/or Copies of evaluation logs (optional)
IACP Staff Certification progress logs
File of certified DREs and instructors
Recertification information
Commentary: Guidelines for the retention of pertinent records concerning the program operation
help to ensure integrity of the program and provide valuable information for purposes of statistics and
court verification of training. Other records as deemed appropriate by local agencies or certification
commissions may be required of the individual DRE or the appropriate DRE coordinator.
3.2 DREs shall be required to renew their certificates of continuing proficiency every two years.
A one-year grace period following the lapse of certification may be allowed for those not meeting
recertification standards. During the grace period, the DRE may be recertified without having to
repeat the original certification process.
3.3 The state coordinator shall be notified of those DREs in need of recertification at least six months
prior to the expiration of the certificates. The state DRE coordinator shall forward to the IACP staff
20
required documentation indicating the completion of recertification requirements. The staff will issue
new cards when requirements are met.
Commentary: In the absence of a state coordinator, the TAP regional coordinator will perform these
functions.
3.4 A DRE shall demonstrate continuing proficiency by
• Performing a minimum of four (4) acceptable evaluations since the date of last certification,
all of which shall be reviewed and approved by a certified DRE instructor and one (1) of which
shall be witnessed by a certified DRE instructor. These evaluations may be performed on
subjects suspected of drug and/or alcohol impairment or during classroom simulations; and
• Completing a minimum of eight hours of recertification training since the date of the DRE's
most recent certification, which may alternatively be presented in two sessions of no less than
four hours, and which shall be consistent with any IACP standards for such training; and
• Presenting an updated resume and rolling log to the appropriate coordinator or his/her
designee for review.
Commentary: All coordinators are responsible for maintaining the integrity of the program, and the
appropriate coordinator, consistent with this responsibility, is encouraged to withhold recertification
for, or refer for remediation, any DRE whose rolling log indicates an unacceptable level of accurate
evaluations, as indicated by toxicology results.
3.5 When a DRE has completed all requirements for recertification, a certified DRE instructor shall
verify to the appropriate DRE coordinator that minimum recertification requirements have been met.
3.6 A certified instructor shall maintain instructor certification so long as DRE certification is
maintained.
Commentary: An instructor may be decertified for cause, such as for conducting substandard
instructional programs, and still maintain certification as a DRE.
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IV. STANDARDS FOR DECERTIFICATION OF DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERTS
AND INSTRUCTORS
The standards in this section outline the circumstances and procedures for decertifying individual DREs
or DRE instructors. In order to ensure that standards of performance are maintained, a means is
needed for removing from the roles of the program those persons unable to meet the criteria of
competence and professionalism. The responsibility for maintaining program standards lies with the
agency and the appropriate DRE coordinator. It shall be incumbent upon all DRE coordinators to
ensure that certified DREs meet approved standards for conduct and qualifications.
4.1 Decertification shall occur when a DRE or DRE instructor fails to meet minimum standards and
requirements for certification or recertification, or demonstrates evidence of
· poor performance,
· inconsistent findings, or
· other substantiated acts on the part of the DRE that reflect discredit upon the Drug
Evaluation and Classification Program.
Commentary: All DREs are responsible for maintaining and forwarding to the appropriate DRE
coordinator information regarding required training or experience. If such information is not provided
in a timely manner, certification will lapse.
Local agencies and licensing/certification bodies may, at their discretion, establish certification and
decertification criteria to conform to local laws or rules. Nothing in these standards should be construed
to overrule local authority in establishing standards no less stringent for the performance of
officers in this area or to prevent an agency from following internal disciplinary or administrative
personnel procedures.
4.1.1 Before decertification is finalized, a DRE or DRE instructor will be given written notice by the
initiating DRE coordinator of the reasons for decertification. The subject of the action shall have the
opportunity for a written or an oral response to the initiating DRE coordinator.
4.2 Requests for voluntary decertification will be honored when submitted by a DRE or DRE
instructor to the section IACP staff and with approval of the agency appropriate DRE coordinator.
4.3 Cases involving poor performance or inconsistent findings shall be referred to the agency
appropriate DRE coordinator for investigation, recommendation and action.
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4.4 Certification of a DRE shall not terminate as long as the DRE meets the requirements of Standards
1.1 and 4.1.
4.5 The state DRE coordinator, upon the recommendation of the agency DRE coordinator or based on
substantiated independent knowledge shall initiate the decertification process against a DRE or DRE
instructor. The state coordinator shall inform the IACP staff of all decertification actions. In instances
where these complaints have not been resolved by the appropriate coordinator, these complaints will be
referred to the state’s Governor’s Office of Highway Safety for resolution.
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V. STANDARDS FOR REINSTATEMENT OF A DECERTIFIED DRUG
RECOGNITION EXPERT
The standards in this section outline the procedures for reinstating a previously decertified DRE and/or
DRE instructor.
5.1 An individual can be reinstated as a DRE when the following conditions are met:
(1) The applicant must pass the 100-item exam (same as that given at the end of the DRE
school, or the make-up exam) as witnessed by a certified DRE instructor, with a score of at
least 80%.
(2) The applicant must complete four (4) hands-on drug evaluations within a one-year period
from the date of request to be reinstated.
(3) The applicant’s eligibility and reinstatement as a DRE is reviewed and approved by the
DRE’s agency and the agency, state, and TAP regional DRE coordinators, where
applicable.
5.2 An individual can be reinstated as a DRE instructor when the following conditions are met:
(1) The applicant meets conditions 5.1 and is reinstated as a DRE.
(2) The applicant’s eligibility and reinstatement as a DRE instructor is reviewed and approved
by the DRE’s agency and the agency, state, and TAP regional DRE coordinators, where
applicable.
Commentary: In many instances, a DRE certification lapses through no fault of the DRE due to
transfers, promotions, etc., and recertification requirements have not been met. In many cases a DRE
may want to reapply DRE skills with a new assignment. IACP suggests that a written request for
reinstatement to the program come from the applicant to the appropriate coordinator, through the
proper agency channels. A form is provided by the IACP to DEC state and TAP regional coordinators
for the purpose of reinstatement. All coordinators are cautioned to conduct a thorough check on the
cause of the applicant’s decertification and reason for application for reinstatement.
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VI. STANDARDS FOR AGENCY PARTICIPATION
Since 1986, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has endeavored to expand the Drug
Evaluation and Classification Program. In an effort to contain costs, ensure the most efficient use of
resources and maintain a high probability of program success, NHTSA developed site selection criteria
to be used in assessing potential suitability of sites. Factors such as demographics, favorable legislation,
agency operations and system support for the program are considered in evaluating potential sites for
the implementation of the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program.
It is recognized that law enforcement agencies, in considering the implementation of new traffic
enforcement programs, must be aware of both short- and long-term costs that are involved. In order
for the program to achieve maximum results, the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program requires
that agencies commit considerable resources long term to the detection and apprehension of the
drug-impaired driver.
6.1. A DEC Program site should be a state, a political subdivision of a state, or a group of subdivisions.
Commentary: Experience has shown that a DEC Program will take firm root only if the resources to
support the program are concentrated in a relatively small geographical area, such as a major city or
county. Given that these new sites will begin operations with a small cadre of DREs, a
community-focused DEC Program will allow the DREs to respond quickly to the location(s) where
drug-impaired drivers might be taken for processing. By concentrating its forces, the program can
ensure that a qualified DRE is available at any time or place needed. The concentrated focus of a
community-based program allows the DREs ample opportunity to conduct evaluations and maintain
skills at peak proficiency.
6.2 A proposed program site should be able to produce enough drug-impaired driving arrests to (1)
justify the expense of training the DREs, and (2) provide enough evaluation opportunities for DREs to
maintain proficiency.
Commentary: Studies indicate that up to 40 percent of the persons arrested for impaired driving are
actually under the influence of drugs, either alone or in combination with alcohol. Thus, a site should
produce an adequate number of DUI arrests annually per DRE to provide ample drug evaluation
opportunities.
6.3 Prior to implementation of a DEC Program, a site should be located in a state with an implied
consent law that
25
• Explicitly allows the chemical test sample to be analyzed to determine the presence and/or
concentration of drugs other than alcohol;
• Explicitly indicates that the “consent” applies to multiple tests, i.e., that the person is
“deemed to have given consent to a test or tests of blood, breath or urine”; and
• Empowers the arresting officer and/or the law enforcement agency to select the types of
chemical tests to be taken, rather than giving the suspect the option of choosing the tests.
In the absence of an implied consent law, a site must certify that the above three criteria are met and
apply to the Technical Advisory Panel for consideration for acceptance to the program.
Commentary: It is pointless to evaluate drivers for drug-induced impairment unless those found to be
so impaired can be prosecuted successfully. The requirements for multiple chemical tests are essential
because both a breath test and blood or urine tests are integral components of the drug recognition
process. In addition to implied consent legislation, the effectiveness of DEC programs is greatly
enhanced by legislation that
• Allows the fact of a suspect’s refusal to submit to the chemical test to be introduced as
evidence in court; and
• Makes it an offense to drive under the influence of any drug.
6.4. At least eighty percent (80%) of a participating agency’s traffic law enforcement officers must be
fully trained and proficient in the use of the IACP/NHTSA-approved standardized field sobriety tests,
including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test.
Commentary: It is recommended that the agency’s SFST training program is consistent with the
IACP/NHTSA model curriculum. In particular, the training must contain the specified number of hours
and include at least two approved alcohol workshops.
6.5 Participating agencies must maintain accurate and timely records of
· Alcohol and drug-related arrests and convictions;
· Alcohol and drug offense processing time;
· All toxicological examinations; and
· All drug recognition evaluations to include documenting and collecting of basic data which
includes, but is not limited to, the name and age of arrestee, date of arrest, sex, the DRE
opinion, and the name of evaluator.
Commentary: In order to evaluate critically the effectiveness of the Drug Evaluation and Classification
Program, it is necessary that, at a minimum, the above records be maintained. In addition to
26
evaluation purposes, the records may prove beneficial in establishing program validity for court
purposes. The IACP and NHTSA has endorsed a data collection software program which DECP states
are encouraged to use.
6.6 Participating agencies should have the capability to establish centralized booking or processing of
all DUI arrestees.
Commentary: The ideal situation is one in which all persons arrested for DUI are taken to a single
location for processing. One or two DREs could then be stationed at that location to ensure prompt
access to all suspects apprehended for drug-impaired driving. However, it is feasible for a jurisdiction
to have a few centralized processing facilities as long as there are enough DREs to staff them adequately
and enough DUI arrests to ensure that the DREs conduct frequent evaluations.
6.7 Each location where DRE evaluations are conducted must have adequate facilities, including
• A room sufficiently large to permit unobstructed administration of the Standardized Field
Sobriety Tests;
• A separate room that can be completely darkened for the eye examination;
• Storage space for test data forms, reference documents, blood pressure kits, etc;
• Access to breath testing equipment producing on-the-spot results; and
• Facilities and materials for collecting blood and/or urine samples.
Commentary: Because of the unique requirements of the DEC Program, it is sometimes more
economical for several agencies within a site to share DUI processing facilities. Other desirable characteristics
for a DUI processing facility include
• Adequate holding cells for arrestees;
• Separate interrogation and report writing areas that provide privacy from the general
prisoner population; and
• Testing facilities that are out of main traffic patterns and allow the drug evaluation process
to be performed without interruption or distraction.
6.8 Participating agencies must have access to laboratories that are capable of identifying the presence
of the most commonly abused drugs when these drugs are present in sufficient concentrations to
produce impairment.
27
Commentary: Ideally, the laboratories will also be able to identify the concentration of these drugs. In
any case, the accuracy of the chemical analysis should be consistent with state-of-the-art drug testing.
In other words, screening tests are not sufficient; a jurisdiction should be able to produce a confirmatory
analysis. Although either blood or urine samples are acceptable, it is best if the jurisdiction has the
ability to test both.
6.9 All agencies and states interested in participating in a Drug Evaluation and Classification Program
must have the following endorsements:
• The state governor’s representative for highway safety;
• The chief elected official of each political subdivision to be included in the site;
• The commanding officer of each participating law enforcement agency;
• The administrative judge of each court that tries people arrested for DUI within the
jurisdiction;
• The chief prosecuting attorney for each court in the jurisdiction; and
• Representatives of any other agencies that would be involved in covering the costs of
developing and sustaining the DEC Program.
28
DRUG EVALUATION AND CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM
ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
With grant assistance from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the
International Association of Chiefs of Police has developed certification standards and administers the
Drug Evaluation and Classification Program. Under these administrative guidelines, it will be the
responsibility of the individual and all coordinators to ensure that specific requirements of the standards
are met. The staff at the IACP will be responsible for maintaining records, issuing certificates of
completion, coordinating certain training-related events and maintaining and updating training materials
as required.
The following procedures have been developed by the staff of the International Association of Chiefs
of Police for use by agencies participating in the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program and
wishing to certify drug recognition experts and instructors in their employ.
Obtaining certification as a drug recognition expert or DRE instructor ensures that an individual meets
minimum requirements for training and experience as established by the IACP and the IACP Technical
Advisory Panel. The Drug Evaluation and Classification Administrative Guidelines accompany the
International Standards of the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program.
For the certification process to operate efficiently, it is recommended that coordinators at the agency,
and state, and regional levels be identified. The responsibilities of the coordinators may include
reviewing the qualifications of the candidate DREs, supplying required documentation that minimum
standards have been met, and maintaining individual and program records. The coordination functions
may be performed by one person or may be divided among several persons, as operational needs
demand.
1. NOTIFICATION OF CANDIDATE DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERTS
When an individual has completed all agency application requirements for admission for training as a
drug recognition expert, the agency shall provide the following information to the appropriate
coordinator:
1. Candidate's name
2. Mailing address
3. Sponsoring agency
4. Social security number
5. Verification that candidate has satisfactorily completed a NHTSA/IACP-approved
course in Standardized Field Sobriety Testing
29
In addition, the appropriate DRE coordinator shall provide the above information to the agency or
individual responsible for providing training to ensure that all students meet prerequisites prior to the
beginning of the training phase:
State program coordinators shall forward to the IACP staff the above information on all candidate
DREs at the following address:
International Association of Chiefs of Police
Division of State and Provincial Police
515 North Washington Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
2. OBTAINING CERTIFICATION AS A DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERT
All candidates for certification under the International Drug Evaluation and Certification Program must
demonstrate completion of all requirements specified in Section I of the International Standards of the
Drug Evaluation and Classification Program. Each candidate's progress toward meeting certification
requirements shall be documented on the “Certification Progress Log,” which shall be supplied to all
appropriate DRE coordinators by the IACP staff. Each candidate shall be responsible for maintaining a
certification progress log.
Completion of each step in the certification process shall be verified by the signature of at least one
certified DRE instructor. Final recommendation for certification must be verified by the signatures of
two certified instructors. Upon completion of all certification requirements, copies of the certification
progress log shall be forwarded to the agency DRE coordinator and to the state coordinator. The state
coordinator shall verify all information on the certification progress log and ensure that all entries are
correct. The state coordinator shall forward to the IACP staff a copy of each candidate's completed
certification progress log.
Upon receipt of the completed certification progress log, the IACP staff shall ensure that all necessary
information is complete. Upon verifying that the information is complete, the IACP staff shall forward
to the DRE state or TAP regional coordinator a certificate of completion and an identification card
signifying that the candidate has met or exceeded all requirements for certification as a drug recognition
expert. In the event that proper documentation is not provided, notification will be sent to the state
coordinator indicating the specific reasons(s) for non-qualification.
The IACP staff shall maintain records of all certified DREs. Each record will contain the following
information:
1. Name
2. Social Security Number
3. Department/agency
30
4. Mailing address
5. Telephone number
6. Dates of all events specified on the progress log
7. Name(s) of instructors verifying completion of training events
8. Date certificate is awarded
9. Date certification expires
3. OBTAINING CERTIFICATION AS DRE INSTRUCTOR
Candidates for certification as DRE instructors must demonstrate that they meet all requirements
specified in Section II of the International Standards of the Drug Evaluation and Classification
Program. The candidate instructor’s progress toward completing certification requirements shall be
documented on the form, “DRE Instructor’s Certification Progress Log,” which shall be supplied by
IACP staff to all appropriate DRE coordinators. The individual candidate DRE instructor shall be
responsible for maintaining the log.
Completion of each step in the instructor certification phase shall be verified by at least one certified
DRE instructor. Upon completion of all certification requirements, copies of the DRE instructor's
certification progress log shall be forwarded to the agency DRE coordinator and to the state DRE
coordinator. The state DRE coordinator, after verifying that all information on the logs is complete and
accurate, shall forward copies of all completed instructors' certification progress logs to the IACP staff.
Upon receipt of the instructor certification progress log, the IACP staff shall verify that all information
on the log is complete. Upon verification, the IACP staff shall forward to the state coordinator a
certificate of completion signifying that the candidate meets or exceeds all requirements of the Drug
Evaluation and Classification Program as a DRE instructor. The IACP staff shall send notification to
the state coordinators that the instructor has been certified. In the event that the instructor does not
meet all requirements for certification, notification will be sent to the state coordinators indicating the
specific reason(s) for non-qualification.
The IACP staff will maintain records of all certified DRE instructors. Each record will contain the
following information:
1. Name
2. Social Security Number
3. Department/agency
4. Mailing address
5. Telephone number
6. Dates of all training events specified in the progress log
7. Name(s) of instructors verifying completion of training events
8. Date certificate was awarded
9. All pertinent information relating to the instructor’s experience and
31
credentials
Drug recognition expert instructors shall maintain certification as long as DRE certification is maintained.
State coordinators will maintain a list of persons designated as associate instructors or as
instructor trainers for the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program. In order that the list for
instructors and associate instructors may be kept current and, therefore, of use to the participants,
agencies hosting DRE training events (pre-schools, DRE training, instructor schools) should provide
the state coordinator a list of all instructors and their instruction assignments.
4. PROCEDURES FOR RECERTIFICATION OF DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERTS
AND DRE INSTRUCTORS
As specified in Section III of the International Standards of the Drug Evaluation and Classification
Program, all drug recognition experts must be recertified every two years following original certification.
DRE instructors shall maintain their instructor certification as long as DRE certification
remains in effect. All applicable recertification standards for DREs shall apply to DRE instructors.
The following process will be utilized to ensure timely notification and compliance with recertification
requirements:
1. Eighteen (18) months following the date of original certification, the IACP will
send a renewal advisory notice to state DRE coordinators.
2. The DRE shall forward to his state coordinator evidence of completion of all
recertification requirements as well as a recertification form signed by his
agency coordinator. The state coordinator, after signing the recertification
form, will forward a copy to IACP staff.
3. Upon notification that a person has met all requirements under section III of
the International Standards of the Drug Evaluation and Classification
Program, IACP staff shall issue a card recertifying the DRE for a period of two
years.
In the event that information verifying completion of recertification requirements is not received by the
IACP staff prior to the expiration of certification, the IACP staff will notify the state coordinators that
certification has expired. Following expiration of certification, the DRE may renew certification
without penalty for a period of one year by providing proof of completion of recertification
requirements. A decertified DRE wishing to be reinstated following the expiration of the one-year
grace period must complete all training and certification requirements enumerated in Section V of the
International Standards of the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program.
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5. DECERTIFICATION OF DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERTS
Decertification of a drug recognition expert may take place if one or more of the following conditions
exist:
1. The requirements as enumerated in Section III of the International Standards
of the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program are not met by the individual
DRE, allowing certification to lapse.
2. A DRE voluntarily requests decertification.
3. There is evidence of poor performance, inconsistent findings, or other acts on
the part of the DRE that reflect discredit upon the Drug Evaluation and
Classification Program.
In the case of a lapse of certification, the procedures in Section 4 of the Administrative Procedures shall
be followed.
A DRE wishing to be decertified shall submit a written request through the appropriate agency and
state coordinators to the IACP staff. Upon receipt of approval of the request by the state DRE
coordinator, IACP staff shall remove the name of the individual from the list of certified DREs.
Agency DRE coordinators shall monitor the performance of DREs within their agencies and shall
investigate complaints arising from their activities in the drug evaluation area. When, in the opinion of
the agency coordinator, and with the approval of the agency head or his designee, a DRE’s actions
warrant decertification, the agency shall notify the state coordinator that the DRE is no longer certified
within that agency.
Nothing in this procedure should be construed as to prevent an agency from following internal
disciplinary or administrative personnel procedures. The IACP staff will maintain records of all
decertified DREs and the reason(s) for decertification.
6. APPROVAL OF DRUG RECOGNITION TRAINING CURRICULA
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP) have developed a course of instruction to train police officers in the techniques
of drug recognition. This course of training has been adopted by the IACP as the minimum training
requirement for certification for DREs and DRE instructors. NHTSA and IACP are responsible for
revising and updating the DRE training curricula.
33
The course of instruction adopted by the IACP requires a total of seventy-two hours of classroom
instruction followed by field certification during which a candidate must participate in a minimum of
twelve drug evaluations. In the course of the required drug evaluations, a candidate must encounter
and correctly identify subjects under the influence of at least three different categories of drugs. The
complete requirements for certification as a DRE are enumerated in Section I of the International
Standards of the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program.
In recent years, several training programs have been developed by police agencies and commercial
training institutions with the aim of training individuals to detect persons impaired by drugs. A number
of agencies currently utilize portions of the NHTSA/IACP approved program or variations of it in
teaching officers the techniques of detecting the drug-impaired driver.
Section I of the International Standards of the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program requires
that a candidate for certification complete “...an approved classroom training course which shall, at
minimum, achieve the learning objectives as stated in the IACP approved training curriculum.” The
Highway Safety Committee of the IACP is charged with overseeing the operation and development of
the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program. In order to maintain the high standards of the
program, the committee has established the Technical Advisory Panel. Responsibilities of this panel,
appointed by the IACP Highway Safety Committee, include the review of proposed alternative training
programs to determine whether or not course content and learning objectives are consistent with
approved standards.
Organizations wishing to submit proposed training curricula for review and approval as equivalent
programs for the purpose of certifying individuals as drug recognition experts shall submit lesson
plans, visual aids and any other required materials to the IACP staff. The IACP staff will submit
the proposed course to the Technical Advisory Panel for evaluation. Courses that meet applicable
standards and learning objectives shall be termed as equivalent courses. Completion of said
courses shall qualify the candidate for certification as a DRE.

http://www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com

 

San Diego California DUI / Drug Evaluation - Ocular Program

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Published in the Journal of the American Optometric Association 1998. 69(4):211-27.
The Drug Evaluation Classification Program: Using ocular and
other signs to detect drug intoxication
Edward M. Kosnoski, B.S.a
Robert L. Yolton, Ph.D., O.D.a
Karl Citek, O.D., Ph.D.a
Charles E. Hayes, Lieutenant, Oregon State Policeb
Richard B. Evans, Senior Trooper, Oregon State Policec
Abstract
Background: A systematic approach to determining drug intoxication has been developed for use by police
officers. By considering specific physiological signs, trained officers can detect the effects of seven major drug
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types.
Methods: Officers follow a 12 step testing sequence and evaluate signs such as pupil sizes and responses, eye
movements, heart rate, body temperature, mental timing, and balance. A matrix is then used to compare the
subject's signs to those that would be produced by the seven types of drugs. If a pattern match is found, the
officer concludes that the subject is under the influence of a drug and specifies the drug type.
Results: Several field and laboratory validation studies have been conducted using these procedures. In
general, officers were 70 to 90% accurate in determining intoxication status and drug classification, but
poly-drug use and drug rebound effects can sometimes cause problems in interpretation.
Conclusion: Ocular and other physiological signs can be used to detect drug intoxication and classify the type
of drug taken. Knowledge of the procedures used in the Drug Recognition Program can enable optometrists to
serve as consultants to the police and as expert witnesses in cases involving the use of ocular signs that
indicate illicit drug use.
Key Words: Eyes, police, law enforcement, pupils, nystagmus, drugs, intoxication, horizontal gaze nystagmus,
drug recognition expert, vision, optometry, alcohol
Introduction
Consider the following scenario. A police officer on patrol observes a car weaving within it's lane, crossing the
yellow line, and changing speed for no apparent reason. At this point the officer has probable cause to make a
traffic stop and does so. During the stop, the officer observes the suspect's behavior, checks for the presence
of drugsd or alcohol in the vehicle, and can perform standard field sobriety tests, if appropriate. Then, if the
officer is satisfied that the suspect is intoxicated or impaired, constitutional rights are read, an arrest is made,
and the person is transported to a police station. At the station, the option of providing or refusing a breath
sample that can be used to determine blood alcohol level is presented. If the suspect refuses, penalties can
include loss of driving privileges for an extended period. If a breath sample is provided and it indicates a blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) above the legal level, usually 0.08 or 0.10 mg/ml depending on state law, the
suspect is charged with driving while intoxicated and is taken to jail to await release to a responsible person.
This scenario changes somewhat if the suspect appears to be impaired or intoxicated but has a BAC below the
legal limit. At this point there is a strong possibility of intoxication with a drug other than or in addition to
alcohol. In Oregon, a person arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) is required to
provide a urine specimen that can be analyzed for metabolites of various drugs.1 Unfortunately, even if the
analysis is positive for metabolites of illegal or intoxicating drugs, it might be insufficient evidence to obtain a
conviction for DUII.
In theory, and perhaps in practice, a defense attorney could concede that the suspect had taken a drug, for
example cocaine, but could also argue that the presence of metabolites in the urine did not mean that the
suspect was under the influence of the drug at the time of arrest. This is a viable defense in Oregon because it
is currently not illegal to be under the influence of a drug; it is only illegal to possess or sell a drug, or to
operate a vehicle under its influence.2 The problem for the police is then to convince a judge or jury that the
suspect was indeed under the influence of the drug at the time of arrest. To address this and related problems,
the Drug Evaluation Classification Program (DECP), also know as the Drug Recognition Expert (DRE)
program, has evolved.e,3
The Drug Evaluation Classification Program
In over half of the states and several foreign countries, selected police officers have been trained as Drug
Recognition Experts (DREs). Training includes 72 hours of formal classroom education, a certification phase
during which officers evaluate a minimum of six drug-intoxicated subjects, assist in the evaluation of six more,
and take a comprehensive written examination.4
DREs are called upon to examine suspects who are believed to be under the influence of drugs, but who do
not have sufficiently high BACs to justify a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. DREs observe
and quantify a variety of physiological and psychological signs to determine if the suspect was under the
influence of a drug at the time of arrest and to determine what type of drug(s) the suspect had taken.
Testimony by the DRE based on these signs is usually sufficient to establish the suspect's intoxication status,
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but credibility of the testimony is enhanced when the laboratory tests of urine metabolites correspond to the
DRE's determination of what type of drug(s) the suspect had taken.
In this paper, the most commonly abused drugs will be described and the methods used by DREs to detect
their use will be presented. Emphasis will be placed on ocular signs that aid DREs in making their
determinations. Material that is not otherwise referenced is drawn from personal observations of the authors
and from the Instructors' Version of the manual used to teach the DRE training course.3
Commonly Abused Drugs
DREs are trained to detect the effects of seven drug categories. A brief summary of the effects produced by
these drugs is shown in Tables 1 and 2. Table 3 shows the street names and approximate costs for several of
the commonly abused drugs.
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Central Nervous System Depressants
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Typical agents
Alcohol (ETOH) is probably the most commonly abused central nervous system (CNS) depressant. Other
drugs in this class include barbiturates, e.g., phenobarbital; non-barbiturates, e.g., chloral hydrate,
methaqualone (Quaalude), and carisoprodal (Soma); anti-anxiety agents (e.g., benzodiazepines such as
diazepam (Valium), lorazepam (Ativan), triazolam (Halcion), and alprazolam (Xanax); antidepressants, e.g.,
amitriptyline (Elavil), doxepin (Sinequan), fluoxetine (Prozac), and imipramine (Tofranil), and similar drugs
that can act as CNS depressants when taken in large quantities; anti-psychotic agents, e.g., chlorpromazine
(Thorazine), haloperidol (Haldol), and lithium; and combination drugs.3
Most of the drugs in this category can be consumed by mouth as capsules, tablets, or liquids. Some can also be
taken rectally to avoid destruction in the digestive system and/or rapid breakdown by the liver. Drugs taken in
this way reach the brain via the circulatory system without first passing through the liver as would happen if
they were taken orally.
The barbiturates are typically taken either orally or injected intravenously. Because of the large gauge needle
required to inject the barbiturate solution and its high alkalinity, injections produce significant areas of skin
swelling and possible necrosis up to several centimeters in diameter.
The effects of drugs in this category can be additive. For example, the combination of relatively small
quantities of alcohol with other CNS depressants (including prescription and non-prescription drugs, such as
antihistamines, taken in recommended amounts) might create intoxication and driving impairment which can
justify arrest and conviction.
Mode of action
In general, CNS depressants other than the benzodiazepines are non-selective in action and depend on the
dose taken as well as the situation and mood of the user.4 Most of these drugs seem to act with varying
potency at different neuronal sites by inhibiting neurotransmission at synapses mediated by
gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA), whereas benzodiazepines specifically potentiate the neural inhibition
mediated by GABA.4
The half-life of a drug provides an indication of the length of time that a drug is active, specifically how long it
takes for 50% of the drug to be eliminated. The half-lifes of CNS depressants vary greatly from as little as two
hours for triazolam (Halcion) to as much as 120 hours for phenobarbital.4
As compared to several other abused drugs, CNS depressants have relatively little direct effect on the
autonomic nervous system. For this reason, most do not produce significant pupillary miosis or mydriasis.
However, these drugs can have deleterious effects on the suspect's smooth pursuit eye movement system.
The systems that control smooth pursuits and saccades have common final pathways (extraocular muscles and
their related nuclei), but they have separate control centers at the brainstem and cerebellar levels.5-7 These
control centers appear to be differentially sensitive to the effects of certain drugs, such as depressants, with the
smooth pursuit centers being the most sensitive. When the smooth pursuit system is compromised, persons
lose their ability to track a slowly moving stimulus and smooth pursuits deteriorate into a series of catch-up
saccades. Additionally, in eccentric gaze if the smooth pursuit system cannot make small refixation movements
to compensate for drifts back toward center, the drifts become so large that they must be compensated for by
saccades. The lack of ability to make smooth pursuits and the drift-saccade refixation motions made in lateral
gaze are used by police officers to detect the influence of depressant drugs. Along with a distinct and
prolonged endpoint nystagmus, they form the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN).8,9
Behavioral and Physiological Effects
When used at therapeutic levels, the body and brain are calmed, slowed, and relaxed by these drugs. At abuse
levels, some of the drugs produce an initial state of excitement followed by reduced social inhibitions, slowed
reflexes, possible euphoria, and reduced ability to divide attention between multiple tasks. Persons who take
these drugs at abuse levels look, act, and feel drunk.
The CNS depressants slow many aspects of the body's physiology which results in decreased core
temperature, respiration rate, blood pressure, and heart rate. Death can occur from severe CNS depressant
overdose.
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Specific effects on eyes and vision
Persons intoxicated with CNS depressants will typically show bilateral ptosis, difficulty converging,
exaggerated end-point nystagmus, failure of smooth pursuit, lateral gaze nystagmus, and occasional diplopia.
Those who have consumed very high levels might also show vertical gaze nystagmus. Pupil size and action will
be normal except if the person has taken an overdose of methaqualone (Quaalude) or carisoprodal (Soma) in
which case the pupils might be dilated.3 Reasons for this dilation are not well understood.
Central Nervous System Stimulants
Typical Agents
CNS stimulants can de divided into three sub-categories: cocaine, amphetamines, and other substances.3
Cocaine is derived from an evergreen plant native to South America and has been used by natives of that area
for centuries. In the United States, cocaine supposedly enjoyed a short period of popularity during the early
1900s as one of Coca Cola's ingredients, but has more recently become a major illicit drug worldwide. Cocaine
can be taken orally, smoked (when a "rock" of cocaine is smoked in a pipe by heating it with a cigarette
lighter, it makes a crackling sound, hence the term "crack cocaine"), snorted into the nose as a powder, or
injected intravenously. Especially when injected, there is an initial intense rush of euphoria and excitement.
These feelings continue for up to several hours after which there can be a rebound depression of CNS activity.
Partly because the effects of cocaine use are short-lived, some users have progressed on to the amphetamines,
especially methamphetamine, because its effects last much longer. In some regions of the United States (e.g.,
Oregon), methamphetamine abuse has become almost epidemic. Like cocaine, methamphetamine can be taken
orally, snorted, injected, or smoked. The form prepared for smoking looks like clear crystals and carries the
street name "ice." Effects of methamphetamine are similar to those produced by cocaine except that they are
initially somewhat less intense and can last for up to eight hours.
Other abused CNS stimulants include methylphenidate (Ritalin) and pemoline (Cylert) which are prescribed for
attention/hyperactivity problems, and several drugs such as
phenmetrazine (Preludin) that are prescribed for weight control.
Mode of action
Cocaine stimulates the CNS in general, presumably by selectively depressing the activity of inhibitory neurons.
Organs that are innervated by the sympathetic nervous system show potentiated responses to direct
stimulation, to norepinephrine, and to epinephrine, because cocaine blocks the uptake of catecholamines at
nerve endings that would otherwise terminate neural activity.10
Amphetamines and other drugs produce general stimulation of the CNS by potentiating the release of
neurotransmitters such as norepinephrine from nerve terminals.11 These drugs have varying effects on
peripheral organs, but many of the effects are consistent with an increase in sympathetic nervous system
activity.
The half-lifes of most CNS stimulants are generally short, usually about one to two hours, although certain
drugs may have half-lifes of several hours.
Behavioral and Physiological Effects
CNS stimulants accelerate most of the body's functions including heart rate, blood pressure, and respiration
rate. Core body temperature is also increased, and body tremors are often present. Persons under the influence
of stimulants tend to be very talkative, euphoric, and restless. Chronic users will often show signs of nasal
irritation if the drugs are snorted and flattened teeth caused by bruxism.3
Speed of mental processing is usually increased so that estimates of time and distance can be significantly
inaccurate. When asked to estimate 30 seconds mentally, "speeders" might actually estimate the passage of 30
seconds in less than 10 seconds. This effect is well known to many stimulant users so when asked by an officer
to estimate 30 seconds, they sometimes count what they believe to be 30 seconds three or four times
consecutively.
Because of unpleasant sensations that occur as the drug level drops in the body (rebound effects), the
temptation to take more of the drug is strong and many users binge on stimulants for several days at a time.
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Specific effects on eyes and vision
The muscle tremors evident in persons who are abusing CNS stimulants are also seen in the eyelids, especially
when the lids are partially closed. Convergence abilities, smooth pursuits and the ability to hold the eyes in
lateral gaze appear relatively normal, but the classic ocular sign of stimulant use is dilated pupils that react
slowly to light. This is due to the sympathetic nervous system effects of the drugs.3 Because of the mydriasis
produced by stimulants, it is common for users to wear sunglasses even in dim light situations.
Hallucinogens (Psychedelics)
Typical Agents
Many substances can produce hallucinations. These include natural materials such as mescaline (derived from
the peyote cactus), psilocybin (derived from mushrooms), nutmeg, morning glory seeds, Jimson weed, and
bufotenine produced by skin glands of certain toads. Perhaps more well known are the synthetic substances
including lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), ecstasy (also known as MDMA -
methylenedioxymethamphetamine), and STP (also known as DOM - dimethoxylamphetamine). The latter two
substances are known as psychedelic amphetamines and produce effects that combine those of the
hallucinogens and CNS stimulants.3
Mode of action
LSD and related drugs are active throughout the CNS but their specific effects are not yet well understood.
Some research suggests that LSD has agonist effects at presynaptic receptors for a specific inhibitory
neurotransmitter 5-HT in the midbrain, and this results in reduced neural firing rates.12
No specific effects on the autonomic nervous system have been documented for the natural psychedelics, but
"bad trips" and other psychological consequences of intoxication with these drugs can produce abnormal
autonomic activity. The psychedelic amphetamines affect the sympathetic nervous system and can cause pupil
dilation.3
The half-life of most hallucinogens is about three hours.12
Behavioral and Physiological Effects
Agents in this category can significantly distort sensory inputs to the brain and produce mental perceptions not
related to reality. Another common effect is synesthesia which involves a combining of sensory perceptions,
e.g., sounds can take on chromatic characteristics or aromas.
The ability to perform skilled tasks is significantly diminished for persons under the influence of hallucinogens
because they produce distractions that prevent concentration on the task. With the psychedelic amphetamines,
blood pressure, pulse rate, and body temperature are typically elevated. Body muscle tremors and uncontrolled
movements might also be evident.3
Specific effects on eyes and vision
Aside from synesthesia, the psychedelic amphetamines can produce pupillary dilation via presumed effects on
the autonomic nervous system.12 Convergence, smooth pursuit, and lateral gaze will appear normal for
persons who have taken drugs in this classification.
Dissociative Anesthetics (PCP and Analogs)
Typical Agents
Substances in this category include phenylcyclohexyl piperidine, usually called phencyclidine or PCP, and an
analog called ketamine. Ketamine is currently used as a veterinary anesthetic under the trade names Ketalar,
Vetalar, and Ketaject.3 This has made some veterinarian offices the subject of thieves looking for ketamine.
PCP and its analogs have been termed dissociative anesthetics because they seem to dissociate the brain from
pain sensations. They originally showed promise as anesthetics that could leave patients conscious but not
responsive to pain during surgery. Unfortunately, a number of "bad trips" during and after surgery caused the
manufacturer to remove the drug from human clinical use in the late 1970s.
PCP is most commonly used by mixing it with marijuana or tobacco and smoking it. Because PCP burns at
very high temperatures, some users prefer to smoke it with mentholated tobacco or chew mint leaves while
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smoking. Besides smoking, PCP can be taken orally, snorted, or injected. Depending on the amount taken and
mode of administration, effects of PCP last from several hours to a day or two.
Mode of action
The specific modes of action for the dissociative anesthetics have not yet been completely defined.12 It is
believed that PCP inhibits the uptake of the neurotransmitter dopamine and this suggests that the drug might
temporarily mimic the mental illness schizophrenia.13 In both PCP users and schizophrenics, cognitive deficits
and abnormal dopamine levels in certain brain nuclei can be detected.
No specific autonomic nervous system effects are known to occur as a result of PCP use, but the effects on
smooth pursuit eye movements are similar to those produced by depressants.
Behavioral and Physiological Effects
Because PCP renders a person insensitive to pain, individuals under its influence can be quite dangerous.
Anecdotal stories abound regarding persons high on PCP having multiple limbs broken or being shot several
times and still continuing to fight police officers. It is an understatement to note that the police treat suspected
PCP users with a considerable degree of caution.
Psychologically, PCP seems to produce a combination of CNS stimulation and depression along with
hallucinations. Physiologically, there is increased muscle tone along with elevated pulse rate, blood pressure,
and body temperature.3 Because of this increased temperature, it is not uncommon for PCP users to remove
their clothing or to break through windows because of their resemblance to the surface of water.
Specific effects on eyes and vision
Because PCP mimics some aspects of CNS depressants, persons who have taken PCP will experience
convergence problems, exaggerated end-point nystagmus, failure of smooth pursuit, lateral gaze nystagmus,
and possibly diplopia. Typically, the onset of lateral gaze nystagmus will occur at less than 30 degrees and
there will be up-beating vertical gaze nystagmus. Pupil size and action will typically be normal.3
Narcotic Analgesics (Opioids)
Typical Agents
These drugs are either natural alkaloids derived from opium or synthetic substances. They are used to reduce
the brain's perception of pain and should not be confused with dissociative anesthetics which seem to actually
block the pain information.
Natural alkaloids include powdered opium, morphine, codeine, and heroin which is the most commonly abused
of these substances. Natural alkaloids formulated as prescription drugs include hydromorphine (Dilaudid),
hydrocodone (Hycodan), and oxycodone (Percodan). Synthetics include meperidine (Demerol), a family of
substances known as fentalyls, and methadone which is used to treat heroin addicts. Methadone is a synthetic
narcotic analgesic that does not provide the intense CNS response associated with heroin. Its effects last long
enough so that it can be taken once a day to prevent or reduce the withdrawal symptoms.3
Drugs in this class can be taken orally, smoked, or injected. Intravenous injection is a common mode of heroin
use, and the resultant needle tracks on the arms, legs, and other sites indicate the extent of drug use.
Mode of Action
Depending on the site of administration, narcotic analgesics produce their effects by inhibiting pain neurons in
the spinal cord and elsewhere within the CNS.12 Analgesia results from inhibition of the release of
neurotransmitters by primary afferent neurons.12
The half-lifes of natural alkaloids, such as morphine and heroin, may be as short as one-half to two hours,
whereas synthetics such as methadone can have half-lifes as long as 40 hours.12
Behavioral and Physiological Effects
Use of narcotic analgesics produces a dreamy, euphoric state with a reduction in pain sensation. A major
problem for persons who abuse this class of drugs is that tolerance builds rapidly and increasingly large
amounts must be taken to achieve the pleasant effects - or prevent the extremely unpleasant effects of
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withdrawal. Because withdrawal is so unpleasant, some abusers reach a point at which they take just enough
of the drug to prevent withdrawal and can function at a relatively normal level, or they become involved in a
methadone maintenance program.
Persons under the influence of narcotic analgesics usually have droopy eyelids and appear to drop off to sleep
frequently. However, they are not truly asleep because they respond to verbal commands and other sensory
stimuli. This condition is referred to as being "on the nod." Other body processes are slowed; blood pressure,
heart rate, and core temperature are all decreased from normal values.3
Typically, the pleasant effects of these agents last up to six hours, but influenza-like rebound effects including
chills, elevated body temperature, and cramps can occur one to two days after drug use.
Specific effects on eyes and vision
The hallmark visual effects of narcotic analgesics are constricted pupils (often less than 3.0 mm in the dark)
and droopy eye lids (ptosis). Typically, no abnormal horizontal or vertical nystagmus is noted, and the ability
to converge is not affected. During the rebound phase as the drug effects wear off, excessive pupillary hippus
will sometimes be noted; during withdrawal from prolonged drug use, mydriasis is also possible.3
Inhalants
Typical Agents
Substances that are inhaled include chemicals such as acetone, toluene, benzene, gasoline, and kerosene. These
and other substances are obtained from dry cleaning fluids, model airplane cement, paints, fingernail polish
remover, etc.3
Persons also inhale propellants from aerosol containers that contain cooking sprays, paints, insecticides, hairs
spray, etc. The propellants include various hydrocarbons, all of which are relatively toxic. Abuse of inhalants
seems to be more common among children in poor areas because of the easy accessibility of aerosol
containers. Beyond the effects of the propellants, the materials, such as paint pigments also contained in the
aerosol sprays are capable of causing significant damage to the body.
Another class of abused inhalants are the anesthetic gases. These include ether, chloroform, nitrous oxide, and
amyl nitrate. Nitrous oxide is an especially interesting inhalant because it is used as a propellant in several
brands of aerosol whipped cream containers and is available over-the-counter in small cartridges termed
"whippets" for home or commercial whipped cream production.
Inhalants are often taken by soaking rags with the materials and/or concentrating the gases in bags or balloons.
The gases are then inhaled or "huffed." Typically, the onset of effects produced by inhalants is immediate with
the CNS effects lasting from less than five minutes to several hours or more.
Mode of Action
In general, inhalants produce depression of the CNS, resulting in disinhibition. The exact neural effects are
uncertain for most substances because of their complex chemistries.12 No specific autonomic nervous system
effects are known to occur as a result of inhalant use, but the effects on smooth pursuit eye movements are
similar to those produced by depressants.
Behavioral and Physiological Effects
The effects of inhalants vary somewhat depending on what substance was inhaled, but they typically involve
euphoria, feelings of grandiosity, bizarre thoughts, and distorted perceptions of time and space.
Many of the abused inhalants can have severe long- and short-term effects on the body by producing damage
to the brain, respiratory system, liver, kidneys, and bone marrow. Physiological addiction to inhalants is rare,
but psychological habituation is possible.
Because of the many substances that can be abused, it is difficult to make generalizations about their effects on
blood pressure or body temperature. However, pulse rate is typically increased.3
Specific effects on eyes and vision
Like the CNS depressants and PCP, inhalants can produce exaggerated end-point nystagmus, failure of
smooth pursuit, lateral gaze nystagmus, and, for high doses, vertical nystagmus. Persons intoxicated with these
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agents can have difficulty with convergence and may have normal or slightly dilated pupils.
Because many of the inhalants are irritating to the eyes, conjunctival injection (hyperemia) and watering will
often be seen for a period of time after use.
Cannabis
Typical Agents
Marijuana and related products are derived from various species of the cannabis plant. The primary active
ingredient is delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), but there are many other substances in the plant that also
have physiological and/or psychological activity.
Typically the leaves and flowers of the plant are dried and smoked or eaten, but they can also be crushed and
boiled to create hashish which can then be pressed to produce hashish oil.3
Synthetic THC is also available as Marinol or Nabilone and can be prescribed for cancer or AIDS patients to
reduce vomiting and stimulate the appetite.
Mode of Action
The exact neural effects of cannabinoids are uncertain, but they probably act at multiple receptor sites within
the CNS. In addition, physiological effects and patterns of action vary depending on the agent used.12
Behavioral and Physiological Effects
Cannabis is most commonly taken by smoking the plant leaves and flowers, or by adding hashish to other
substances. Cannabis produces a pleasant, euphoric state in which visual and other stimuli can become more
vivid. In the intoxicated state, short-term memory and attentional processes are impaired. Depending on the
mode of ingestion, the effects of cannabis occur within a few minutes and can last several hours.
If cannabis has been smoked recently, it is common to find bits of plant material in the mouth, the back of the
tongue might have a greenish coating, and the taste buds can be raised.
Specific effects on eyes and vision
Cannabis will typically not produce exaggerated end-point nystagmus, failure of smooth pursuit, lateral gaze
nystagmus, or vertical nystagmus. However, persons who have ingested cannabis can show significantly
injected conjunctival vessels, problems with convergence, possibly dilated pupils, tremors when the lids are
partially closed, and pupils that exhibit rebound dilation.3
Rebound dilation can be demonstrated by dark adapting the suspect for at least 90 sec and then illuminating
the eye directly with a penlight. Normally the pupil will constrict and stay constricted as long as the light is on.
But, with rebound dilation, the pupil will initially constrict, then it will open slightly, constrict again, open
more, constrict again, etc. for several cycles. Rebound dilation can be differentiated from hippus because with
rebound dilation the pupil gets larger on each cycle whereas with hippus the oscillation is around a constant
pupil diameter.
Twelve Step DRE Evaluation Process
Suspects are evaluated by DREs using a standardized 12 step procedure.3 This standardization assures that no
important sign will be missed, allows comparison of results from one police jurisdiction to another, and assists
the DRE in establishing credibility in court.
Step 1. Determination of Blood Alcohol Concentration
The initial test involves determining whether the suspect has a BAC above the legal limit for driving in the
particular jurisdiction where the arrest was made. Typical BAC limits range from 0.08 to 0.10 mg/ml. If the
suspect is over the legal limit, the DRE evaluation procedure normally stops because a legally sufficient reason
for the suspect's impaired driving has been established.
Step 2. Interview of the Arresting Officer
If the suspect's BAC is below the jurisdiction's legal limit or is not consistent with the observed impairment,
the DRE then interviews the arresting officer to obtain information about driving, statements the suspect has
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made, whether any paraphernalia or actual drugs were found, etc.
Step 3. Preliminary Evaluation
Preliminary evaluation of the suspect by the DRE consists of a brief interview, assessment of speech ability and
content, and a determination of whether the suspect might be sick or injured. Questions include those related
to diabetes, epilepsy, any other medical or visual problems, whether the suspect is under the current care of a
physician or dentist, and whether any prescription medications are being taken. If medical problems are
detected, the DRE will refer the suspect for the proper care.
During this phase of the evaluation, the suspect's pulse rate is measured. Pulse rate will then be measured two
more times during the DRE's testing to assess any trends, i.e., is the drug effect becoming stronger or wearing
off during the course of testing. DRE protocols set normal pulse rate limits of between 60 and 90 beats per
minute.
Step 4. Eye Movement Evaluation
The suspect is next asked to remove any eyeglasses, and the DRE assesses the ability of the eyes to track an
object (e.g., finger, penlight, or other suitable stimulus) held at approximately 15 inches from the suspect's face
and moved horizontally. If the suspect cannot track or if some other problem is noted (e.g., the suspect has an
artificial eye), this part of the test battery is usually omitted and a notation is made on the DRE's evaluation
form.
Assuming that the suspect can track with both eyes moving symmetrically, the HGN testing sequence is
started. The first step involves assessing the ability to track an object moving about 120 degrees from left to
right in four seconds and then back the other way. If the pursuit system is intact, tracking will be smooth and
accurate. If the system is compromised, tracking will be inaccurate with eyes frequently falling behind or
jumping ahead of the target as saccades are used to compensate for differences between eye and target
positions. This will be perceived by the DRE as lack of smooth pursuit. (Figure 1)
Figure 1. Administration of the HGN test.
The second test in the HGN battery involves assessing eye movements at the full extent of lateral gaze. Most
normal persons will have a few "jerks" when the eyes are moved to this position, but intoxicated persons will
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have distinct jerking that persists for at least four seconds.
The third test begins with the eyes in the straight ahead position and fixated on the DRE's stimulus which is
positioned about 15 inches from the suspect's nose. The target is moved slowly to the side and the eyes are
observed for evidence of nystagmus. If it is detected, the angle of onset is noted.
There is a tendency for the eyes to drift back toward the primary position from a lateral gaze position, but in
non-intoxicated persons this drift is compensated for by tiny refixation movements that might involve the
smooth pursuit system. In intoxicated persons, the drift becomes considerably larger before the system initiates
a compensatory movement. This is seen as a nystagmus with the slow phase drift toward the nose and a
temporal fast phase jerk.
The extent of lateral gaze required to produce nystagmus is generally related to the degree of intoxication.
DREs regard nystagmus with an onset of between zero and 30 degrees as having an immediate onset which
indicates significant intoxication. Onsets from 30 to 45 degrees can also indicate intoxication.
If the suspect is intoxicated with alcohol alone, a 40 to 45 degree angle of onset typically indicates a BAC of
between 0.05 and 0.10. When other drugs are present, an accurate BAC cannot be determined from the onset
angle, but smaller angles usually indicate greater intoxication.
Scoring of the HGN battery gives one point per eye for failure of smooth pursuit, distinct and sustained
end-point nystagmus, and nystagmus with an onset of 45 degrees temporal gaze or less. Of the six possible
points, four or more are considered to be indicative of intoxication.
Suspects are also checked for the occurrence of vertical nystagmus by moving a stimulus to the upper limit of
gaze and holding it there for four seconds. Finally, the ability of the suspect to converge is evaluated by
moving a stimulus in a 12 inch diameter circle 15 inches from the nose to establish tracking and then moving it
to the bridge of the nose. Using DRE protocols, the suspect has "lack of convergence" if both eyes cannot
track the stimulus to the nose.
Step 5. Divided Attention/Psychophysical Tasks
Even non-intoxicated persons have a limited ability to process sensory information and focus attention on
multiple tasks simultaneously. For intoxicated persons, this is more of a problem because abnormal vestibular
signals and slowed reaction times produce balance difficulties which must be compensated for. Altered mental
states (e.g., hallucinations) also consume attentional resources.
Four specific tests are performed by the DRE as part of this battery. The first involves having the suspect stand
with feet together, tip the head back slightly, close the eyes, and mentally estimate the passage of 30 seconds.
Significant sway and/or inaccurate time estimates are indicators of drug intoxication. Suspects who have taken
stimulants and whose "mental clocks" are running too fast will often estimate 30 seconds to take less than 10
seconds. Those who have taken depressants or narcotics will have slowed mental clock speeds, and those who
have taken hallucinogens can lose track of the task and never reach 30 seconds. DRE protocol limits for
normal responses are 30 seconds plus or minus five seconds.
Next, the person is placed with one foot ahead of the other and given relatively complex instructions to walk
nine paces heel to toe, make a turn as indicated by the officer, and walk back nine paces. Inability to follow
instructions, sway, and mis-steps count against the suspect. Then the suspect is asked to stand for 30 seconds
with one foot at a time elevated. The fourth task involves having the suspect touch the nose with the tip of the
finger on command. Inability to do these tasks correctly suggests impairment.
Step 6. Vital Signs
During this phase of testing, DREs measure pulse rate for the second time. They also determine blood pressure
and body temperature (sublingually) using standard clinical techniques. DRE protocol limits for normal blood
pressure are 120 to 140 mmHg systolic and 70 to 90 mmHg diastolic. Body temperature protocol limits are
98.6° F plus or minus 1.0° F.
Step 7. Dark-Room Evaluation
During this phase of the examination, the suspect is taken into a room that can be darkened. Pupil sizes are
measured in normal room light and after 90 seconds of total darkness (using the minimum light required to see
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the pupils). They are also measured with indirect light supplied by a penlight held tangent to the front of the
eye and with the penlight directed straight into the eye. To make these measurements, DREs use a
pupillometer which consists of a three inch by five inch card on which are printed black circles with diameters
ranging from 1.0 to 9.0 mm in 0.5 mm steps. This card is held along the suspect's face next to the eye and
comparisons are made between the pupils and the black circles on the card. (Figure 2)
Figure 2. Use of the DRE Pupillometer to measure the diameter of a suspect's pupils.
Reaction of the pupil to a bright light is also determined with special emphasis on rate of constriction, degree
of hippus, and length of time the pupil stays constricted with the light on. In the case of intoxication with
marijuana, rebound dilation might be seen. Using DRE protocols, abnormal pupil sizes are defined as those
under 3.0 mm or over 6.5 mm for any of the measurement conditions.
In the dark-room, the inside of the nose is evaluated for evidence of drugs, irritation, lack of nose hairs, or
other evidence of drug use. The mouth is also examined for damage caused by smoking drugs like crack
cocaine that burn at high temperatures, drug residue (especially from marijuana), and a green coating on the
tongue which is also consistent with smoking marijuana. (Figure 3)
Figure 3. Green coating on the rear portion of the tongue similar to that which might be seen with some
suspects who have recently smoked marijuana.
Step 8. Muscle Tone
Tone is evaluated by palpating the left bicep and forearm down to the wrist. Tone will be increased by
stimulant drugs and reduced by depressants or narcotics.
Step 9 Injection Sites
Many persons use drugs by injecting them into the veins ("shooting"), under the skin ("skin popping"), or into
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the muscles ("muscling"). The fastest drug rush can be obtained by intravenous injection, but certain drugs are
very toxic to the veins so some users prefer to skin pop or muscle them and thus experience a less intense but
more prolonged high. Chronic users have numerous scars, puncture marks, or bruises on their arms, legs,
neck, etc. (Figure 4) Some who have destroyed the easily accessible veins or who want to conceal their drug
use will inject into the veins under the tongue, into the vascular beds under the finger nails, or into other areas
not readily observable by an officer.
Figure 4. Needle tracks on the arm of a long-term heroin user.
Step 10. Suspect's Statements
When presented with evidence from the DRE's examination, suspects are offered an opportunity to discuss
with the DRE what drugs had been taken and essentially confess to their use. Some will do this in hopes of
favorable treatment from the DRE or the judicial system. Statements made during this phase of the evaluation
can be used in court because the suspect was previously advised of the constitutional right not to answer any
questions.
Step 11. Expert Opinion of the DRE
Based on the signs presented by the suspect and any other information that has been obtained, the DRE
prepares a report containing information on the testing procedures used, the results, and an opinion regarding
whether or not the suspect was under the influence of a drug at the time of testing. Further, the DRE identifies
the category of drug(s) affecting the suspect and makes a statement about the ability of the suspect to safely
operate a vehicle.
Step 12. Toxicological Examination
In states such as Oregon, Implied Consent Laws provide that suspects must furnish a breath, blood, or urine
specimen if arrested for driving while intoxicated or impaired. Failure to provide these specimens can result in
a lengthy suspension of driving privileges.
If a specimen is obtained, it is sent to a toxicology lab for analysis of drug metabolites. Results of these
analyses can then be used in court along with the DRE's report.
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Poly-Drug Use and Drug Rebound Effects
If all suspects had taken only one class of drug, and if the DRE could be sure when the drug was taken,
evaluation would be relatively simple. Unfortunately, many or most drug users take multiple drugs with
unknown purities and often are not sure when they took them. Poly-drug use can produce a conflicting set of
signs that must be carefully evaluated.3 Poly-drug effects can be "null" meaning that the drugs taken do not
affect the sign being evaluated, "overlapping" meaning that one of the drugs affects the sign but others do not,
"additive" meaning that several of the drugs produce the same effect on the sign, or "antagonistic" meaning
that some of the drugs produce one effect and others produce the opposite effect. Antagonistic effects are
often most problematic because if they are equal and opposite, the sign can appear normal.
An example of antagonistic effects occurs with suspects who have taken "speedballs" which are typically
mixtures of heroin and cocaine. Because the effects of cocaine are quick and intense, the initial reaction of the
pupil is dilation, but after an hour or so the cocaine and heroin are in balance and the pupil might appear
normal. Finally, after several hours, heroin is the predominant drug and the pupils constrict.
A further complication for DRE evaluations arises because the body attempts to resist the artificially altered
state caused by drug use and tries to return to a condition of homeostasis. Typically, this involves activation of
the sympathetic or parasympathetic components of the autonomic nervous system depending on what type of
drug was taken. Because the autonomic activity can last longer than the drug effects, it is common for rebound
effects to occur that are opposite to the effects produced by the drug itself.
A good example is the depression and "down" effects that occur after cocaine or methamphetamine wears off.
To return to euphoria, the suspect needs to take more of the drug, but if none is available (e.g., the person is in
police custody), several of the signs that DREs evaluate can be consistent with the use of a CNS depressant or
a narcotic analgesic. To avoid being confused by drug rebound effects, DREs consider the half-life of the drug
in the body (short for drugs like cocaine), how long the person has been in custody (i.e., how long since the
person could have last taken a drug), trends in the three pulse rate measures that could indicate changing drug
levels in the body, and other information about what drug was taken.
Validity of DRE Evaluations
DRE opinions are not yet accepted as evidence in all states, partially because case law (i.e., cases in which
judges have set precedent by allowing DRE opinions to be used as expert testimony) has not been established.
When DRE opinions have been introduced as evidence, defense attorneys have raised questions concerning the
validity of DRE testing procedures and conclusions.
DRE program validity can be demonstrated in several ways. First, the majority of signs that DREs evaluate are
also evaluated in medical examinations of drug overdose patients. Miosis produced by narcotics and mydriasis
produced by stimulants, along with the effects of drugs on heart rate, blood pressure, and body temperature
are well known and documented in the medical literature.
Second, there are laboratory and field studies that demonstrate the validity of DRE evaluations.
LAPD Field Study
In 1986 study, subjects who had been arrested for DUII were evaluated by selected senior DREs from the Los
Angeles Police Department.14 If the DRE determined that the subject was under the influence of a drug other
than alcohol, a classification of not intoxicated, opiate, sedative, stimulant, or marijuana was made. A blood
sample was then requested; 173 suspects provided samples.
Laboratory tests indicated that 47 of the suspects had taken a single drug and 125 had taken multiple drugs.
PCP was the most commonly detected drug, followed by alcohol and marijuana.
When the DREs' determinations were compared to laboratory results, their determinations were entirely
correct for 49% of the suspects and partially correct for an additional 38%. They were entirely incorrect for
13% of the suspects; most of these errors occurred for suspects who had taken multiple drugs. Accuracy rates
ranged from 92% for correct detection of PCP to 33% for cocaine.
Johns Hopkins Study
A laboratory validation study of DRE procedures was conducted by Bigelow, et al. in 1985 at the Johns
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Hopkins University School of Medicine.15 Four DREs evaluated subjects who had been administered one of
the following: marijuana (12 puffs of 1.3% or 2.8% THC cigarettes), diazepam (Valium) (15 or 30 mg),
secobarbital (300 mg), or d-Amphetamine (15 or 30 mg). Placebos were also given. DREs were informed that
no drug combinations, alcohol, PCP, or LSD had been given, but were not told about what other drugs might
have been used. Their task was to place the subject into one of 5 categories: not intoxicated, opiate (none was
actually given), sedative (diazepam or secobarbital), stimulant (d-Amphetamine), or marijuana.
They rated the placebo cases as not intoxicated with 95% accuracy, but they also rated 45% of cases in which
drugs had actually been given as not intoxicated. These results suggest that either the officers set their criteria
levels for determining intoxication excessively high, or that some of the drug levels used in the study were too
low to affect the subjects in a detectable manner.
When the DREs determined that a drug had been given, they divided their responses between the stimulant,
depressant, and marijuana categories. Their classifications were correct for 92% of the cases.
Arizona Study
A more recent study was conducted using State of Arizona records covering a 53 month period from
1989-93.16 Suspects were arrested for DUII (presumably based on failure of the standard field sobriety tests),
had an evaluation done by a certified DRE, and provided a biological specimen (urine). Sixty-eight subjects
had no drug detectable in the urine, 153 had evidence of only one drug, and 253 had evidence of multiple
drugs.
For the 68 subjects with no drugs detected in the urine, DREs concluded that 62% of them were under the
influence of a drug.
They concluded that 190 of the suspects had taken only one type of drug. Drug classifications were correct
(based on DRE criteria) 76% of the time. For 24% of the suspects, the DRE incorrectly classified the drug
present.
There were 268 suspects for whom the DREs found evidence of multiple drug use. At least one of the drugs
was classified correctly for 87% of these suspects. However, the DREs were correct in specifying all of the
drugs in the systems for only 18% of the suspects. This is not surprising because of the complex drug
interactions that can occur with poly-drug use.
Summary of Validation Studies
In evaluating the results of these studies, it is important to remember that parts of the 12 step evaluation
process involve examination of any drugs or paraphernalia in possession of the subject. In addition, DREs
attempt to solicit confessions from suspects and use this information in making their determinations. Although
confessions can be misleading, they are more commonly accurate for depressant or narcotic users who are
often familiar with the criminal justice system. These confessions can increase the accuracy of DRE
evaluations. For example, in the Arizona field study, 93% of the suspects who tested positive for narcotics
admitted using these drugs, as did 85% of depressant users, and 59% of the marijuana users. It should not be
assumed, however, that just because a confession is obtained, the DRE would not have reached the same
conclusion based only on the suspect's signs.
The degree to which suspect admissions, mannerisms, possessions, and communications are used by the DRE
to determine which drugs might have been taken is indicated by a study in which DREs examined subjects
dosed with various levels of alcohol, cocaine, or marijuana.17 The DREs were not allowed to question
subjects about recent drug use or solicit admissions of drug use. and omitted other aspects of the 12 step
process. In this somewhat artificial situation, the DRE's predictions of drug type were accurate only 44% of
the time. Although other factors might account for this seemingly low percentage, it could also indicate that
the higher accuracy levels reported in prior studies resulted in significant part from confessions, observations
of behavior, and conversations with the suspects (or because vital information is lost if the entire 12 step
process is not used).
Summary
Except for simple curiosity about drug abuse, why should the DRE program be of interest to optometrists?
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The reasons are multiple. First, driving while under the influence of drugs poses a threat to everyone. If a set
of valid procedures can be found to aid in convicting persons driving under the influence, all of society should
be interested.
On a more specific level, many or most optometrists have probably examined patients under the influence of
drugs without knowing it. Abused drugs can affect many aspects of the test findings and intoxication can lead
to incorrect diagnoses being made for the patient. Based on a knowledge of DRE test procedures, an
optometrist should be able to conduct a few simple tests and detect drug intoxication in many cases. The
optometrist can then act accordingly by re-interpreting vision test findings, counseling with the patient, or
making a police report if driving or other dangerous activities are involved (with due regard to patient
confidentiality).
Optometrists also have an opportunity to participate directly in their state's drug evaluation program. Many of
the DRE procedures evaluate ocular signs and this is a field of obvious optometric expertise. Participation in
DRE training programs can sometimes be arranged for optometrists, and ride-alongs with DRE officers can
provide an opportunity to observe DRE procedures first hand. For those who want to become even more
involved, teaching and expert witness opportunities exist. This is a program that benefits society and it
warrants optometric support.
Footnotes
a. Pacific University College of Optometry, Forest Grove OR, 97116
b. Oregon State Police, Salem OR. Oregon State DECP Coordinator and Certified DRE Instructor
c. Oregon State Police, Medford OR. Certified DRE Instructor
d. The term "drug" can be used in several contexts. From a medical perspective, a drug is typically thought of
as a substance used to diagnose, prevent, or treat disease. Substances as airplane glue or paint would not be
considered drugs using this definition. However, from a traffic law enforcement perspective, a drug is often
defined as any material which impairs the ability to operate a motor vehicle. Many in the medical community
would prefer that the term "substance" be used instead of "drug" in this context, especially since the abused
materials include glue, paint, insecticides, etc. This would help to make clear the obvious differences between
the beneficial effects of "drugs" and the deleterious abuse of "substances." However, because of the orientation
of this paper, the law enforcement definition of "drug" will be used.
e. In some states the program is referred to as the Drug Recognition Expert Program and officers are referred
to as Drug Recognition Experts. In other states, case law does not allow the word "expert" to be used and the
program is referred to as the Drug Evaluation Classification Program.
References
1. Oregon Revised Statutes 813.100.
2. Oregon Criminal Code 475.992 section 4.
3. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration drug evaluation and classification training "The drug
recognition expert school" instructors manual. Oklahoma City: United States Department of Transportation,
1993; publication HS 172 R4/93.
4. Rall TW. Hypnotics and sedatives: ethanol. In: Gilman AG, Rall TW, Nies AS, Taylor P, eds. The
pharmacological basis of therapeutics, vol 8. New York:Pergamon Press, 1990:345-82.
5. Feldon SE, Burde RM. The oculomotor system: section 2. In Hart WM, ed. Physiology of the eye, 9th ed.
St Louis:Mosby, 1992:134-97.
6. Dell'osso DF, Daroff RB, Troost BF. Nystagmus and saccadic intrusions and oscillations, chapter 11. In
Tasman W, Jaeger EA, eds. Duane's clinical ophthalmology, vol 2. Philadelphia:Lippincott, 1995:1-30.
7. Leigh JR. Pathophysiological approach to the diagnosis of acquired nystagmus.
[http://mediswww.meds.cwru.edu/
dept/neurology/ocular/full003.html] Dec 1996.
8. Halperin, E, Yolton, RL. Is the driver drunk? oculomotor sobriety testing. J Amer Optom Assoc 1987
57(9):654-7.
9. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration DWI detection and standardized field sobriety testing
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instructors manual. Oklahoma City: United States Department of Transportation, 1990; publication HS 178.
10. Ritchie JM, Greene NM. Local anesthetics. In: Gilman AG, Rall TW, Nies AS, Taylor P, eds. The
pharmacological basis of therapeutics, vol 8. New York:Pergamon Press, 1990:311-31.
11. Hoffman BB, Lefkowitz RJ. Catecholamines and sympathomimetic drugs. In: Gilman AG, Rall TW, Nies
AS, Taylor P, eds. The pharmacological basis of therapeutics, vol 8. New York:Pergamon Press,
1990:187-220.
12. Jaffe JH. Drug addiction and drug abuse. In: Gilman AG, Rall TW, Nies AS, Taylor P, eds. The
pharmacological basis of therapeutics, vol 8. New York:Pergamon Press, 1990:522-74.
13. Pennisi E. Schizophrenia clues from monkeys. Science 1997; 227(5328):900.
14. Compton RP. Field evaluation of the Los Angeles Police Department drug detection procedure.
Washington DC: United States Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Technical Report, National Technical Information Service 1986; publication HS 807 012.
15. Bigelow GE, Bickel WE, Roache JD, Liebson IA, Nowowieski, P. Identifying types of drug intoxication:
laboratory evaluation of a subject-examination procedure. Washington DC: United States Department of
Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Technical Report, National Technical
Information Service 1985; publication HS 806 753.
16. Adler EV, Burns M. Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) validation study. Final Report to Arizona
Governor's Office of Highway Safety 1994.
17. Heishman SJ, Singleton EG, Crouch DJ. Laboratory validation study of Drug Evaluation and Classification
Program: ethanol, cocaine, and marijuana. J Anal Toxicology 1996 (20):468-83.
Corresponding Author:
Robert L. Yolton, PhD,OD
Pacific University
College of Optometry
2043 College Way
Forest Grove OR 97116


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San Diego California DUI / Drunk Driving Jail Facility conditions for San Diego California Women

San Diego California DUI / Drunk Driving news:

San Diego County California DUI Facility for women: Las Colinas -

A strongly worded report by San Diego County's civil grand jury urged the tearing down and rebuilding of Las Colinas, San Diego California DUI / Drunk Driving county's jail for women. Last fall, the grand jury—an advisory board tasked with evaluating county operations—toured the Santee facility and was "surprised and appalled," the report said, by conditions there: buildings in disrepair, overcrowding (the jail holds roughly 300 more women than it should), limited toilet and shower facilities. Living conditions in the jail, the report said, are "borderline humane."

Here's how some folks feel about conditions in San Diego California DUI / Drunk Driving County jail:

"Do these people think a county jail should be like the Bellagio in Las Vegas?"

"Life is supposed to be rough in prison isn't it?"

One San Diego California DUI arrestee spent three months at Las Colinas recently for a felony DUI. "Obviously, it's not meant to be a hotel," "Yes, I did break the law. Yes, I did need to be incarcerated. However, I did not need to be degraded, provoked."

A 40-something nurse prior to returning to graduate school for a doctorate degree in literature, part of the nursing job had her working with inmates in Northern California.

"The years that I worked as a psychiatric nurse, to me, the ultimate violation is taking someone's dignity," she said, "and the minute you walk in—well, the minute I walked in [to Las Colinas]—90 percent of the deputies were intentionally provocative."

There were small things, like a deputy who told her to stop using "big words" (her use of "surreptitiously" set him off) to a female guard who wouldn't give her water to take her medication. For two weeks, two of the three toilets used by the four-dozen women in her unit—some of whom were pregnant—were broken and had overflowed. Another time a deputy told the women that they'd used their allocation of toilet paper the day before and wouldn't be getting any that day. She reminded him that that was a violation of the health-and-safety code.

"Yeah, we're in jail. Yes, we've broken the law. That doesn't negate our human rights," she said. Some of her fellow inmates warned her to shut up, but she got the unit its toilet paper. "The deputies were so mad," she laughs. "They went in and opened the cell and said, ‘Here's your fucking toilet paper.' Boom! And they threw it right at me."

The San Diego chapter of the California Coalition for Women Prisoners holds a vigil outside Las Colinas three or four times a year and regularly hears complaints from families of inmates, said CCWP outreach coordinator Janice Jordan. "The number one complaint is medical abuse," she said. "Women denied sanitary pads while on their menstrual cycle, denied asthma medicine and denied mental health medication."

The Sheriff's Office has been asked for records of inmate complaints but said that complaints to a law-enforcement agency are exempt under the California Public Records Act.

"They can build a $500 billion new facility, but that's not going to make a difference because of the behavior that goes on." "It's essentially going to be abuse, mistreatment, degradation in a clean place."

Jodie Lawston, a professor of sociology at California State University San Marcos, has focused her research on incarcerated women. California's female prison population, she said, is already a vulnerable group.

"They're predominantly women of color…. About 80 percent of them have been physically, sexually or mentally abused, much of that was prior to age 18," she explained. "They're also impoverished. Almost 50 percent of them have not graduated high school. When I go in and work with them and interview them, they have no self-esteem, they don't have the skills they'll need when they get out to actually go out and find a job, which is nearly impossible, anyway, because people don't hire former felons. So it's just this cycle. They go right back out into the situation they were in, and they end up back inside."

Lawston pointed out that the California Department of Corrections recently added "and Rehabilitation" to the end of its name. Jails are county-run facilities in which stays are short-term—up to a year—so there's little emphasis on rehabilitation. Some of her fellow inmates were hungry to better themselves. They dubbed her "Professor" and asked about her studies. She encouraged the women to write.

"I gave reading lessons to this one little girl," she said—a 19-year-old who was illiterate. "She was just the toughest gang member you could ever see. She came up to me one time when no one was around and said, "Hey, Professor, you think you could teach me how to read?"

She's out of work: the community colleges she was teaching at don't employ felons—and stuck with an ankle bracelet set to monitor her skin perspiration for alcohol consumption, even though her driver's license has been taken away. When someone commented that it sounds like she had an impact on some women's lives while at Las Colinas, she cried.

The terms of her probation forbid her to have contact with anyone at the jail. Ouch.


San Diego California DUI / Drunk Driving news:

San Diego County California DUI Facility for women: Las Colinas

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San Diego DUI Lawyer - San Diego Attorney Drunk Driving / San Diego DWI Lawyer can help you beat the charge: http://www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com .



Saturday, June 02, 2007

 

Laker Owner Buss should have taken the bus (California DUI / Drunk Driving news www.google.com)

Lakers Owner Arrested On DUI Suspicion

LOS ANGELES to SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA DUI / DRUNK DRIVING NEWS --

Los Angeles Lakers owner Jerry Buss was arrested on San Diego California DUI charges or suspicion of San Diego California drunken driving early Tuesday morning.

The San Diego Union Tribune reported the 74-year-old gentleman known as Buss was arrested after being pulled over by police for driving the wrong way on a downtown street in Carlsbad shortly after midnight Tuesday morning.

Buss reportedly spent eight hours in San Diego DUI jail and had a blood alcohol level of more than .08.

"Although I was driving only a short distance, it was a bad decision and I was wrong to do it," the weathly & handsome Buss said in a statement released by the Lakers. "It was a mistake I will not make again."

Kobe could not be reached for comment.

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Friday, June 01, 2007

 

Lindsay Lohan has been charged with driving under the influence & drugs (California DUI / Drunk Driving news) www.google.com

Lindsay Lohan has been charged with driving under the influence after crashing her car in Hollywood.

Police also say they found a "usuable amount" of cocaine in the 20-year-old's car when it was searched following the incident on Sunset Blvd.

According to reports the actress had crashed five blocks from her house at 5:30am after being dropped off by her bodyguard following a night of partying at SkyBar and Les Deux.

There were two other adults in the car at the time of crash, with Lohan said to have suffered "minor injuries".

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San Diego California DUI answer: What if you have a pending San Diego California DUI & wish to go to Canada?

San Diego California DUI News & San Diego California Drunk Driving information:

How serious is a San Diego California DUI arrest?

Immigration and Citizenship book:

"Individuals may be...refused entry to...Canada on the following grounds:
criminality, including conviction for an offence or commission of a criminal act..."

If there is an entry for an arrest on a person's record, that he or she will be denied entry, he or she should contact the Canadian Consulate General to find out.

It is a five to ten year rehabilitation period before admission.

How serious is a San Diego California DUI or drunk driving conviction?

It can get you barred from entering a number of countries, including Canada.

Under Canada’s laws (Section 19(2)(a.1) of the Immigration Act), anyone who has been convicted of drunk driving is a member of an “Inadmissible Class” and his entry into the country would be a criminal and deportable offense.

This is a lifetime ban for a San Diego California DUI conviction.

However, Canadian law permits a person with a San Diego California DUI on his or her record to be admitted into Canada if he has been successfully “rehabilitated”.

This requires applying for, and being granted, a “Minister’s Permit of Rehabilitation” from the government — but not until five years after all of the terms of the sentence have been completed (if there is a three-year probation, as is common, then it will take at least eight years).

The government reviews the application, along with accompanying evidence, and applies a “rehab checklist” in deciding whether the individual has truly rehabilitated himself or herself and should be permited to enter the country. This checklist includes evidence of genuine remorse, acceptance of responsibility, change in lifestyle, and stability in employment and family life.

As for US President George W. Bush’s DUI conviction, when W. wanted to meet with the Prime Minister, the Canadian government decided to bypass all of this and simply granted him a special “pardon” permitting this unrehabilitated drunk driver into Canada for a short period of time.

San Diego California DUI convictions won't get the Bush treatment.


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San Diego California Drunk Driving : The Bad thing about hitting a San Diego County police car

San Diego California DUI / San Diego California Drunk Driving Attorney

Encinitas, San Diego California --

A San Diego County Sheriff's Department deputy, a DUI suspect and the suspect's passenger all escaped injury Friday when a hit-and-run driver slammed a pickup truck into the deputy's cruiser on a North County roadway, authorities said.

The crash in the 700 block of South Vulcan Avenue occurred about 1:10 a.m. while Deputy David Toner was administering a field sobriety test to a suspected drunken driver, according to the Sheriff's Department.

When Toner noticed a white pickup truck heading straight for the rear of his patrol car, he darted out of harm's way, pulling the suspect with him, Lt. William Donahue said.


The truck slammed into the cruiser, which then lurched forward into the Ford Mustang the suspect had been driving, Donahue said, adding that a passenger who was sitting in the Mustang was not injured.

As the patrol car continued moving, striking a sign, the pickup's driver fled the scene, according to Donahue.

Additional deputies dispatched to the scene later found the truck over an embankment in the 800 block of Vulcan, Donahue said, but the driver was not found.
Simply complete the Free San Diego California DUI Evaluation at http://www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/survey.html for your best San Diego California DUI defense attorney strategy and to vigorously protect your important driving privilege, as has been done for many good people who necessarily become San Diego California DUI Clients.



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California USA DUI / Drunk Driving Experts

San Diego California DUI / Drunk Driving update:

Top Forensic / Expert Witnesses for DUI/Drunk Driving Cases

1. Mary McMurray. The Best. Blue Mounds, WI. Chemistry degree. Previously worked for Wisconsin State Patrol on Intoxilyzer 5000 as instructor and maintenance tech. Extensive experience with BAC Datamaster, Intoximeter EC-IR and Draeger 7410 & 7110. Expert on preliminary breath testing devices. Expert on software applications for breath instruments. Also former SFST instructor in 1980s and early 1990s. Mary’s e-mail: ethosinc@aol.com and home phone: 608-437-5344; cell: 608-772-1055.

2. Jay Zager of Ft. Lauderdale, FL. Ex-cop in Broward County. Medical retirement after 15 years. CMI factory trained on BOTH the Intoxilyzer 8000 and 5000. Repair technician approved by factory. Also, NHTSA SFST Instructor. E-mail: JayHZager@aol.com. Phone: 954-341-9774; FAX (954) 752-9788.

3. Robert (Bob) LaPier, (208) 754-4632, (800) 257-4643, SFST Instructor. Ex-cop who has trained thousands of cops on SFSTs. DRE instructor. Accident reconstruction. Intoxilyzer 5000 maintenance and instructor certified. www.LaPier.com.

4. Steve Rubenzer, Houston, TX; E-Mail: srubenzer@houston.rr.com; website is www.SteveRubenzerPhD.com; 11914 Astoria, Suite 490, Houston, TX 77089; Ph: 281-481-5715, Fax: 281-922-5903. Bachelors of Science, Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh, 1981; Master of Science, Clinical Psychology, University of Houston, 1984; Doctor of Philosophy, Clinical Psychology, University of Houston, 1990; Licensed Psychologist in Texas since 1992. SFST Instructor, plus has taken special courses on eye movements at the University of Houston College of Optometry that enable him to testify about HGN and similar eye movements. ABPP Diplomate in Forensic Psychology (one of 220 in USA), American Board of Professional Psychology.

5. Walden, Platt & Associates – Bryan, TX - Two Master Police Trainers (Troy Walden and Lance Platt) with Ph.D. degrees; retired from police work as NHTSA & IACP DRE and SFST trainers of the trainers; also handle in-depth police investigation and analysis of DUI/DWI case files and are available for testimony in court proceedings. www.waldenplatt.com. (979) 822-3060; fax: (979) 822-3061. troy@waldenplatt.com or lance@waldenplatt.com. Supervise SFST Student and Instructor Courses across the USA.

6. Bob Awtrey – LaGrange, Georgia; Accident Reconstruction Specialist, 706-645-1643 or 706-773-5250 [cell]; 706-663-4081 [fax]; 706-663-4018 [home] (former mathematics teacher and then 20 years with Georgia state patrol; taught reconstruction for Georgia officers in statewide program). Website address: www.southeasternsafetyassociates.com; E-mail: bawtrey@bellsouth.net

7. Stefan Rose, MD, Physician trained in General Psychiatry, Clinical Pathology and Forensic Toxicology, 10130 Northlake Blvd., Suite 214, #300, West Palm Beach, FL 33412, 561-795-4452, fax 561-795-4768, pager 800-555-6449; toxdoc1@bellsouth.net; expertise in drugs, especially cocaine, plus expert on Intoxilyzer 5000, drug dog expert.

8. David Stafford, Ph.D. Memphis, TN; Toxicologist (formerly with University of Tennessee Medical School over 30 years, now retired); Breath, Blood, Urine, SFST. Drugs, alcohol, arson investigation. Call at home 901-726-4876.

9. Pat Demers, Retired Pharmacist and Masters in Forensic Science. Formerly ran crime lab in Massachusetts. Currently resides in Maine. Phone 207-636-2908; Cell 207-459-0981; E-mail pmdemers@earthlink.net; 124 10th Street, Acton, ME 04001 (207) 636-7840

10. Rick Swope – Davie, FL- SFSTs, Accident Reconstruction, Engineer - 8211 SW 28 Street, Davie, FL 33328 Office: (954) 476-7640; Fax: 954-476-9224 . Masters Degree, Engineering; ex-cop and ex-DUI task force officer. SFST Master Instructor. swprcn@aol.com; www.swoperecon.com.

11. Edward F. Fitzgerald, JD, Mesa, AZ; wrote book on Intoxication Test Evidence, 480-699-9334; 480-688-0831, general information on breath test principles and blood/urine testing. E-mail at: ed@edwardffitzgerald.com. www.edwardffitzgerald.com.

12. Dr. Michael Hlastala, Ph.D., breath testing device expert, Professor of Lung Physiology and Biophysics and of Medicine, Seattle, Washington, (206) 543-3166; fax: (206) 685-8673; voice message (206)-685-8436; mphlastala@comcast.net; home: (425) 742-7811 (425) 280-7319 (cell). Practicing since 1969, with over 350 published articles or books. www.mphlastala.com.

13. Dr. James Woodford, Ph.D., Chemistry, Chattanooga, TN; jameswoodford@comcast.net or woodford@mindspring.com, 423-821-1146 or 423-432-2606 (cell); breath, blood, urine, drugs or alcohol. Also, attended my first SFST student course in 1994. http://www.mindspring.com/~woodford

14. Harvey Cohen, Ph.D, C.I.H., Cambridge Technical Associates, PO Box 920113, Needham, MA 02492, (781) 449-4335, fax# (781) 449-1539, Co-Author of Harvey M. Cohen & Joseph B. Green, APPREHENDING AND PROSECUTING THE DRUNK DRIVER (Matthew Bender 2002). harveycohen@alum.mit.edu.

15. Dr. Robert Middleberg, Pharm. D., Ph.D., 3701 Welsh Road, Willow Grove, PA, 215-657-4900; fax: 215-657-2972. Intoxilyzer 5000; pharmacology issues, toxicology. He currently directs the Forensic Toxicology unit of National Medical Services, as well as serving as a laboratory director. He previously served as the Director of Expert Services for NMS, and coordinated medico-legal issues for courts, attorneys, etc.

16. Charles E. Smith, DUI Consultant, Ex-cop (23 years) with Factory Maintenance and Repair Training by CMI (40 hours); over 30 years of O-T-J training; SFST Instructor; DRE Instructor; plus has been court qualified to do retrograde work as a toxicologist in Florida (from job training, not educational degrees). SFST Instructor Training in 1983, plus has taught DRE course; 772-286-5761 & 772-286-6732 (fax); duiexpt@bellsouth.net.


17. Francis Gengo, Pharm.D, Ph.D., Pharmacology; Toxicology; 64 Dan Troy Dr., Williamsville, NY 14221-3550, (716) 634-0915. See web information at http://www.dentinstitute.com/document_26_4.html. Dr. Gengo currently serves as an Associate Professor of Pharmacy and Neurology and a Clinical Assistant Professor of Neurosurgery at the SUNYAB School of Medicine.

18. Steven W. Rickard, Accident Reconstruction Expert & Animation of Accidents, Prior PA State Trooper with over 30 years total experience; 1644 Whitley Drive, Harrisburg, PA 17111, (717) 540-3451 or 3457.

19. William C. Fischer, Endicott, NY, 607-785-5766; fax: 607-748-8404, Accident Reconstruction and Vehicle Fault Expert.

20. David Sweeney, Conway, SC; Pharmacokinetics, Pharmacology, Infrared Breath Testing (BAC Datamaster and basic issues for Intoxilyzer 5000); effects of EITHER alcohol or drugs-- prescribed and non-prescribed (contraband) – 843-241-3108 (cell); 843-347-0352 (work); 843-365-7201 (home). E-mail: davenorm1945@aol.com

21. Tony Corroto, 17 years of police work with Atlanta PD – Master Instructor of Instructors in BOTH SFSTs and DREs – Oversaw breath test program & ran over 10,000 Intoxilyzer 5000 breath tests – Web site: http://www.duiexpertwitness.com; E-mail: tcorroto@comcast.net; Phone: (404) 906-2153; Fax: (770) 693-9852.

22. Lawrence Masten, Ph.D in Toxicology, Board Certified in Toxicology; 873 West Bay Drive, 186, Largo, FL 33770, 727-595-6575; fax: 727-595-0785; toll free: 866-329-9262; lwten@sprintmail.com. Handles collection, transport, storage, and analysis of legal and hospital blood for BACs & the interpretation of BACs and factors that affect BAC readings and/or blood/urine drug levels. 33 years experience.

23. Dominick A. Labianca, Ph.D., Department of Chemistry, Brooklyn College of The City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY 11210; 718-951-5458 or home: 516-489-3247. Expert in blood, urine, proper testing, conversion from serum to whole blood.

24. Dr. Alfred E. Staubus, Pharm.D., Ph.D., (614) 451-1406 (phone), (614) 451-1407 (fax) (Alcohol and drug issues; blood, breath or urine testing). E-mail: staubus.2@osu.edu. 1015 Kenway Court, Columbus, OH 43220.

25. Dr. David Schneider, Pharm D., BA in Biology; Practicing Pharmacologist for 30+ years, Royal Oak, MI; 313-577-1579; fax: 810-545-2475

26. William Giguiere; B.S. in Zoology, with minors in chemistry and political science; grad studies in marine biology; masters in secondary education to teach biological and physical sciences; graduate studies in toxicology, pulmonary functioning and respiratory therapy and in alcohol studies; presently works at Park-Gilman Clinics, Inc. Burlingame, CA 94010; 650-259-7564 or fax: 650-259-7952.

27. David (Dave) Fries – Live Oak, FL; Intoxilyzer 5000, SFST Field Testing (Instructor) - 386-344-1770 cell; 386-658-3464 work; 386-658-2687 fax; fries@alltel.net. Ex-cop with extensive experience on the Intoxilyzer 5000.

28. Kenneth Glaza, K & R’s Recording Studio, Inc., http://www.knr.net/, V:(248)557-8276 F:(248)557-0441, forensic audio or video enhancement or filtering, plus other engineering services. See vita: http://www.knr.net/vita2.htm

29. Bill Taylor – Standardized and Non-Standardized Field Testing and Intoxilyzer 5000- 770-534-1501. E-mail: taylorbm@aol.com. Ex-cop (27+ years) who has trained in excess of 3000 instructors and students on SFSTs. Retired Police Captain, in charge of the DUI task force. Formerly headed up State of Georgia original training on NHTSA SFSTs & alcohol/drug training for 3 years, after retirement as cop in 1991.

30. Dr. Terry Martinez, Toxicologic Associates Inc., 6614 Clayton Road, #107 Richmond Heights, Mo 63117; Ph: (618)- 345-0786; (618) 367-8700; ext. 1404. Holds Ph.D. in Pharmacology. He is also an expert on methamphetamine manufacture cases.

31. Jerry W. Bush, MD, medical degree, University of Alabama; B.S. in Pharmacy, Auburn University (1st in Class); Board Certified in Internal Medicine; background in pharmaceutical research; certified independent medical examiner; presently in private medical practice south of Atlanta; P.O. Box 39, Williamson, GA 30292;

32. Gil Snowden, Brick, NJ; snowden@home.com; Phone: 732-458-4014; fax: 732-458-3449; former New Jersey State Police Breath Test Coordinator/Instructor and DWI/SFST instructor, now expert for breath testing and SFSTs.

33. Mike McDermott, Forensic Audio & Tape Expert, Great Falls, VA; 703-757-0103; fax: 703-757-0262; E-mail: mike@mcdltd.com.

34. Dr. David Benjamin,Ph. D., www.DoctorBenjamin.com; 77 Florence Street, Suite 107, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, Telephone: 617-969-1393, Fax: 617-969-4285. Alcohol or drugs are within his realm of expertise.

35. Joe Citron, MD, JD (board-certified ophthalmologist for 30+ years), Atlanta, GA – HGN guru (from both medical standpoint and SFST training) and other SFSTs (certified); Intox 5000 (factory certified instructor); medical testimony such as symptoms that mimic alcohol impairment after traffic accident; medical degree, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, NY; residency at Mayo Clinic, Rochester, MN - 404-261-2911 or 404-386-1100 or 404-784-5297. e-mail: joecitron@aol.com

36. Dr. Richard Saferstein, Ph.D., 20 Forrest Court, Mount Laurel, NJ 08054, (856) 234-7134 voice, (856) 778-4841 fax.Ph.D. in Chemistry. Noted author of books on Forensic Science. Former Chief Chemist for the State of New Jersey.

37. Stan Alari, Radar and Laser Expert, 412 North Pacific Coast Hwy #237, Laguna Beach CA 92651, 1- 877- SOX RADAR Cell: 562- 682- 5372 Fax: 760- 406- 6222 stanley.alari@verizon.net. Stanley Alari & Associates. http://www.stantheradarman.com/

38. Joseph William Huff, Ph.D. in Physiology from Medical College of Georgia, Masters in Pharmacology from University of Georgia, B.S. in Chemistry with minors in Biology and Mathematics from West Georgia College, 118 Lyle Way, Carrollton, GA 30117, CEO, Materials and Surfaces, Ltd; Adjunct Professor, State University of West Georgia; 770-834-8611; fax: 770-832-1028; josephhuff@netzero.net. Previously worked as Assistant Professor teaching Ophthalmology at the Bethesda Eye Institute.

39. Dr. Spurgeon Cole, Ph.D., Psychology (formerly with Clemson University); Expert in Psychophysical Testing protocol and devastating witness regarding the lack of scientific method in implementation of SFSTs and “Validation Studies”; 1040 McNutt Crossing, Bogart, GA 30622, (864) 710-1293 (cell), 706-208-8167 (home), cspurg@bellsouth.net

40. Dr. Ronald Nowaczyk, Ph.D., received BA from Northwestern University, MA and Ph.D. Miami University (Ohio), Associate Vice Chancellor for Economic and Community Development, Head of Department, Professor of Psychology, Office of Economic and Community Development, 300 E. First Street, 301 Willis Building, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858; Phone: (252) 328-6650 ext. 231, Fax: (252) 328-4356, email address: nowaczykr@mail.ecu.edu

41. Gil Sapir, Forensic Science Consultant, undergrad degree in Microbiology and Biology, Colorado State University, Master of Science in Criminalistics, University of Illinois-Chicago; JD degree, Chicago-Kent College of Law; extensive publications and law review articles on breath testing deficiencies and SFST unreliability; has taken factory training on most breath testing devices, including EC-IR, DataMaster, Intoximeter 3000. SFST trained. gsapir@interaccess.com; P.O. Box 6950, Chicago, IL 60680; 312-458-0665.

42. Ron Lloyd, Villa Rica, GA; former Georgia State Trooper for 13 years; NHTSA SFST Instructor; DRE Instructor; Top Instructor in Georgia when he departed to be a private investigator and expert in DUI cases; Intoxilyzer 5000 operator trained (as a cop), but not a factory ‘technician”. (770) 463-8823 Business; (770) 463-8813 Fax; (404) 822-4003 cell; 12 North Alexander Creek Road, Newnan, GA 30263. E-mail: duiinv@aol.com

43. James Johnson, Polygraph Expert, Former Chief Polygrapher for U. S. Air Force (Europe), 11 Deerwood Drive, Litchfield, NH 03052-8004, 603-424-6365

44. Lonny E. Horowitz, MD – Was an EMT prior to attending medical school; worked for 4 years during residency and internship in trauma units in NY and NJ area; can provide expert testimony about symptoms of traumatic head injury mimicking alcohol intoxication; also expert in diabetes, hypoglycemia and high protein diet issues for breath test interference defense. No training on breath testing devices, but can explain how ketone conversion to isopropyl alcohol may be misread by an infrared device as ethyl alcohol. 770-393-3438. Woodstock, GA location. dietmd@bariatrics.com

45. Forensic Gait Analysis Group, Two podiatrists [Dr. Clark D. Miller and Dr. Paul N. Greenberg] provide medical and scientific review of DUI-DWI suspects regarding foot function and “gait” analysis. Use computer technology to quantitatively measure and analyze gait patterns for purposes of refuting police claims of impairment as shown through field sobriety testing procedures. 212-794-2060 (NY) or 973-379-4965 (NJ). www.forensicgait.com and E-mail at: Forensic.Gait@verizon.net .


46. Ronald Henson, Ph.D. Peoria, IL (309) 360-5614; website: www.beron.us P.O. Box 10706, Peoria, IL 61612-0706. Ph.D. (Dissertation: Workplace Drug & Alcohol Testing), M.P.A., B.S. Ex-police officer and previously worked for State of Illinois as an Instructor for Breath, Blood, and Urine Alcohol Testing and SFSTs. Expert experience with the Intoximeter EC/IR, Intoximeter 3000, AlcoSensor Models III & RBT IV, Intoxilyzer 5000 & 4011s, BAC Verifier, BAC DataMaster, portable breath test devices, and related physiology and pharmacology principles associated with alcohol testing.

47. Dr. Gerald P. Simpson, Ph.D., 846 Woodlawn Dr, Thousand Oaks, CA 91360, home number is 805-495-3652.

48. Jan Semenoff, a factory certified instructor for the Intoxilyzer 5000, and a former Canadian police officer. E-mail: info@itd2.com; Web site: http://www.itd2.com; offers breath training course for Intoxilyzer 5000.

49. J. Robert Zettl, Forensic Toxicologist (Bachelor of Science in Bacteriology with minor in Physical Chemistry; Masters in Public Administration), (Intoxilyzer 5000, blood tests; urine tests) Littleton, CO, Voice/cell 720-363-9900; Fax 303-795-1654; Home 303-795-9271; JRZETTL1@msn.com; formerly with State of Colorado Alcohol Program for over 25 years.

50. JoAnn Samson, Ph.D., Toxicologist/Physiologist, NHTSA Certified Instructor, Breath, Blood and Urine Expert, 17 Princeton Street, Concord, NH 03301, (603) 229-0073; Fax: (603) 224-6933, jsamson1126@aol.com [Former State Toxicologist]

51. Thomas E. Workman, Esq., - Patent Attorney with 30+ years in high-level computer software, firmware and hardware development; understands “Source Code” issues and can analyze code and can testify about flaws in programs running breath computers; www.computers-forensic-expert.com. 41 Harrison Street, Taunton, MA 02780; 508-822-7777; Fax: 508-824-2420; E-mail: tom@computers-forensic-expert.com.

52. Wanda Marley, RN, BSN, CRNA, MS, PhD., Fort Collins, CO. Worked as emergency room and intensive care nurse, then certified registered nurse anesthetist (CRNA) in operating room for total of 16 years. Trained at Mayo Clinic in anesthesia, and got a masters degree at the University of Kansas, which stressed primarily pharmacology and toxicology. Taught physiology and pharmacology at Colorado State University for 7 years, after earning a doctoral degree there, in physiology. Worked for 19 months as Senior Scientist at Rocky Mountain Instrumental Laboratory, then opened medical-legal consulting business. Testifies on DUI and DUID cases; particularly when the client has some medical problem or takes prescription meds which contribute some degree of psychomotor impairment. Website: www.rockymedleg.com; E-mail: medleg@cowisp.net; Phone: (970) 224-4587; Fax: (970) 224-1194



53. Gary Lage, Ph.D, Toxicologist; can handle alcohol or drugs with blood tests, pharmacology issues; ToxLogics, Inc., 22 Bernard Street, Ewing, NJ 08628; (606) 883-9077; FAX: 609-883-9044; E-Mail: glage@comcast.net; Website: www.rtctox.com/lage.htm

54. John Woodward, Utica Toxicology Services, 737 3rd Avenue, #E, Chula Vista, CA 91910, has been an expert for state in more than 2500 cases prior to moving over to independent lab work in criminal and civil cases. Phone: 619-420-8388; Fax: 619-420-4128; E-mail: Utica@cts.com

55. Barry S. Reiss, Ph.D., 8006 Bellafiore Way, Boynton Beach, FL 33437, 561 733 7916 (Phone), 917 838 2095 (Mobile), E-mail: breiss@nycap.rr.com; pharmacology expert witness for civil, DUI, DWI, and federal pharmacy law. Licensed in Florida and New York. Twenty-five years of experience in providing pharmacology expert witness testimony. Author of three books on Pharmacology; former pharmacology professor.


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