San Diego DUI sweep news

May 31, 2008

San Diego area DUI Officers from a number of local and state law enforcement agencies conducted a sweep through Encinitas, Solana Beach and Del Mar looking for alcohol-related violations early Saturday, arresting 18 people.

Of those arrested, 12 were taken in for being drunk in public and the other six were busted for San Diego DUI - drunk driving, according to San Diego DUI lawyers.

Five people were cited for various offenses and four juveniles were contacted for curfew violations, San Diego DUI attorneys hear.

The San Diego DUI sweep, dubbed "Operation Tidal Wave," ran from 9 p.m. Friday to 2:45 a.m. Saturday morning, and included sheriff's San Diego DUI deputies; San Diego DUI police officers from Carlsbad, Chula Vista, Coronado, Escondido, La Mesa and UC San Diego; California Highway Patrol San Diego DUI officers, county Probation Department officers, agents from the state Department of Alcohol Beverage Control and employees of the county Parks and Recreation Department, San Diego DUI criminal attorneys report.

SanDiegoDUI.com

Legendary Drunk Driving Inquiry?

May 30, 2008

On July 18, 1969 came what has ever since been known as the Chappaquiddick Incident and the death of Mary Jo Kopechne, a former campaign worker for Robert Kennedy whose dead body was discovered inside an overturned car belonging to Ted Kennedy in a channel on a small island adjoining Martha’s Vineyard.

No satisfactory answer has ever been supplied by Kennedy or his supporters for the tragedy. An unconscionable delay in reporting the accident caused Kopechne’s death. Kennedy passed four homes with telephones after the accident and didn’t call the police until the next morning, the 19th. In the meanwhile, the overturnbed car was found in the pond by two fishermen who called police. A diver was sent down and discovered Kopechne’s body. At the inquest, the diver, John Farrar, testified that Kopechne’s body was pressed up in the car in the spot where an air bubble had been presumably formed. The inquest said the bubble could have allowed her to breathe for two hours afer the accident. Farrar testified: “Had I received a call within five to ten minutes of trhe accident…and was able as I was the following morning to be at the victim’s side within 25 minutes of receiving the call…there is a strong possibility that she would have been alive on removal from the submerged car.” Kennedy’s dithering, cowardice and emotional paralysis…fear of political retribution…led to the stall, most say. Mary Jo had an estimated two hours, trapped in the upturned car, to contemplate: max. The Only Possible Answer. Not long ago, a friend of mine told me a very interesting thing. He is now a prominent educator at Harvard, tenured, fashionably liberal, in his 60s-and in 1968 he was a young staffer to Bobby Kennedy…a close friend of the “Boiler Room Girls,” the females who worked Kennedy campaigns with single-minded dedication. He then served as a staffer to Ted Kennedy. He dated Mary Jo Kopechne. He filled in a blank space on that episode that makes sense. Relatively few know the Kennedy background that this balding professor know…and we spent a good deal of time as he worked through with me his conjecture on how Chappaquiddick happened. Understand, he was not present at the July 18, 1969 reunion of six women known as the “boiler-room girls” who had served in Robert’s 1968 presidential campaign-but his theory seems to me to be water-tight if you’ll pardon the implication. First let’s review the facts: The party was held at a borrowed facility, Lawrence Cottage, on Chappaquiddick island, adjoining Martha’s Vineyard and connected to it by ferry. Present were the six women, Ted Kennedy, Joesph Gargan, his cousin, Paul Markham, a friend of Gargan’s who would become U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts, Charles Tretter, an attorney and John Crimmins, Ted’s part-time driver. Kennedy was competing in the Edgartown Yacht Club Regatta, a sailing competition which was taking place over several days. Among the women present was Kopechne. Rumors have been flying around ever since the incident that she was a sexual playmate of Ted. Not so, says my friend who had dated her casually. In point of fact, Mary Jo was the opposite of a sex object, a kind of ever-loyal female nerd, the opposite of a vamp, who hardly dated, never had a romance (my friend’s association with her was platonic), who was ever-loyal and ready to do the grunt work. She was kind of like everyone’s kid sister. My friend makes no bones about that. She was the kind of girl who ran around in a circle-not a high cheek-boned beauty but a gawky, freckle-faced kid sister everyone sort of protected. While the others were distinctively party-girls, Mary Jo was not. She would take one drink, maybe a watered down cocktail or a glass of 3.2 beer…and as the party would liven up, she would kind of slip out and get in the back of a car owned by the one who brought her, curl up, dose and wait for the driver to come back to take her home. Not that she objected to the liveliness of a party but that she was kind of an oldish young girl, not endowed with looks or charm but just a loyal, dependable type, a kind of younger sister to the boiler-room girls. She came to the party in Ted Kennedy’s car, along with a number of other girls, most of whom were attracted to the Kennedys, especially the senator and who were quite used to the ways of the world with the family, he says: Kopechne being the only odd-exception. There was no doubt that there was ribaldry, drinking and joshing of a sexual innuendo nature that went on…as well as promiscuity… between the men and the attractive young women of the world, he says-as he had been with them at other outings in the company of the Kennedys. According to testimony of the other party-goers, Kennedy left the party at about 11:15 or 11:30 and Kopechne asked for a ride back to her hotel. At this point, my friend, who talked extensively with other party members following the inquest has an important amendment. As was her style, Kopechne had one drink and slipped out to take her accustomed spot, curled up in the back seat of Kennedy’s car, his mother’s 1967 Oldsmobile Delmont 88. Kennedy was feeling no pain nor was his female escort. They gabbed a lot as the half-inebriated senator maneuvered the car, evidently planning a tryst for himself and the girl with Kopechne knowing about the possibility or asleep. Here I stopped him. I asked: Planning a tryst with Mary Jo in the car? He said: “You don’t understand how Bachannalian the Kennedys were, from the old man, who brought Gloria Swanson on the Queen Mary to Europe with him while he traveled with Rose, to John who fooled around with Jackie’s press secretary, Pamela Turnure and scores, literally scores, of others whom Jackie had to know about.” He is right. All you have to do is to read Sally Bedell Smith’s “Grace and Power: The Private World of the Kennedy White House,” a book notable for its explicitness but also its annotation, one that has been cited by most scholars as revisionist-authentic. Kennedy men were reared to be womanizers in imitation of Old Joe-and John Kennedy was one of the worst, often disappearing in social events with a young woman for hours at a time while Jacqueline, as Ethel Kennedy had counseled, was expected to understand. Bobby was less so; Ted was more so. Back to the Chappaquiddick incident as reported by my friend-again, who was not there but whose close acquaintance with those who were has given him a special insight. He added: “Knowing about the possibility was de rigeur with boiler-room girls who protected-and sometimes participated in--the Kennedys’ vaunted womanizing…with the exception of Mary Jo who wasn’t interested, nor were the Kennedys attracted to her. But she was expected to `understand’ the promiscuity and sexual indulgence that would go on. The Kennedys behaved like British kings from the time of Henry VIII. Everyone knew who the concubines were and assented as did Mary Jo.” The story resumes. Inebriated, Kennedy was searching for a place to conduct the tryst with his attractive and willing female companion in the front seat while Mary Jo, curled up in the back seat, understood the drill from many other occasions with both Bobby and Ted. Both Kennedy and his tryst-object were so tanked-and Mary Jo on many other occasions like this one, so silent and acquiescent-they forgot she was present. Kennedy was trying to find a place for seclusion with the female companion. A deputy sheriff testified at the inquest that he saw Kennedy’s car on Dyke Road at 12:40 a.m. and that the driver sped off when he approached it. Now as all agree, Kennedy made a wrong turn onto an unlit dirt road that led to Dyke Bridge, a wooden bridge angled obliquely to the road with no guardrail, and drove over its side. The car plunged into tide-swept Poucha Pond and came to rest upside down under water. Kennedy and his front-seat boiler-girl companion were able to swim free of the vehicle and both were immensely relieved to have escaped death, forgetting in their alcoholic haze about Mary Jo in the back seat. Still inebriated they decided to get out of there, believing that while they were the worse for wear, they had survived. Kennedy claimed at the inquest that he called Kopechne’s name several times from the shore, then tried to swim down to reach her seven or eight times-doubted by my friend. His story is he then rested on the bank for several minutes before walking back alone to Lawrence Cottage where others of the party was still feting. My friend says the two of them walked back to the Cottage. Their walk took them past at least four houses which had telephones where he could have summoned help-but no call was made. His story is that he summoned Markham and Gargan to come to the pond to help him. Both reported they tried to dive into the water to save Kopechne many times. Then, Kennedy’s story continues, when the diving attempts failed, he told them to return to the college, “take care of the girls and I will take care of the accident.” It is their story that they assumed Kennedy would inform authorities once he returned to Edgartown and so they did not do so themselves. My friend’s story makes more sense. Kennedy and the boiler-girl escort who had been seated next to him in the front seat of the car, zapped out of their minds with booze, managed to escape from the overturned car in the pond and stumbled back to Lawrence Cottage, completely forgetting Mary Jo’s having been in the back seat-understandable since her and others’ presence at romantic rendezvous and trysts were always understood-and at the time, dismissed. In fact, Kopechne’s presence was blotted out for a time since the harrowing episode almost cost their own lives. To them, not remembering Mary Jo’s presence, since they had escaped, the event was merely an automobile accident-something that could be reported the next day rather than in the middle of the night to police. When they got back to the Cottage, they told the group and only then somebody said, “where was Mary Jo?” Kennedy and the boiler-room girl both said almost at once: “GOD! She was with us! We remember now!” The boiler-room girl dissolved in tears. The other girls hugged themselves and sobbed at the grisly thought of Mary Jo, trapped in the car and dying. Finally Gargan shouted to them: “Stop it! Stop it now! We can’t help her. We’ve got to protect the senator!” They all agreed. What to do now? A curtain of silence was imposed on the group by Kennedy and the two other men. Boiler-room people had long appreciated that confidentiality was mandated for Kennedy activities. A huddle was called between the three men and a rough plan detailed. By now Kennedy and his boiler-girl escort remembered firmly--Mary Jo had indeed been in the car. But now it was adjudged now too late to save her: the crucial thing was to save Kennedy from embarrassment and prosecution which would end the Kennedy idyll. They never could settle on a plan. It was too complicated. . There was an argumentative struggle over whether or not someone else should take the blame in order to protect Kennedy: but since this would mean prosecution, no one volunteered. But all agreed that the police should be notified. Who would do it? Kennedy insisted that one or the other of the two men do it-he was vociferous that he should not do the reporting. Neither of the two men, understandably, wanted to report something they had nothing to do with. This much they agreed to: Kennedy would go back to his hotel in Edgartown and call the police from there. Some discussion ensued as to whether or not it might be possible to suggest that Mary Jo had taken his keys and had driven his car, overturning it in the pond-but that was vetoed. There was no semblance of a general agreement on how to handle the problem. Obviously it was too late…and all were in too bad a shape…to reach a coherent strategy. What they did agree to was that Kennedy should get the hell out of there and go to the hotel in Edgartown. The girls went home and Kennedy was driven by Gargan and Markham to the Edgartown-Chappaquiddick ferry which connects Chappaquiddick to the rest of the island. But once there, more complications. The ferry was down for the night. As the three stood there wondering what to do, Kennedy said he would at least solve this dilemma. He swam the 500-foot channel back to Edgartown, went to his room, got into dry clothes and fell asleep on his bed at about 2 p.m. The two other men left. There always was the question whether he took off his shoes for the swim. Of course: he would have to. But strangely, that detail was not remembered when my friend questioned around. At the hotel, Kennedy didn’t call authorities about the accident as he had indicated he would do. Instead, he decided he had to invent a scenario that would say he was at the hotel that night. So at 2:55 a.m. he went downstairs, presented himself to the hotel clerk and others and complained that he had been awakened by a noisy party. This was to certify that he was in the hotel. He returned to his room, stayed awake for a time, then dozed. Then at 7:30 in the morning he made it a point to talk casually to the winner of the previous day’s sailing race-again as to establish his whereabouts. Still no phone call. But by then, unknown to him and the others, two fishermen had discovered the upturned car in the pond and called authorities. A diver was sent out to discover if anyone was in the car. Back in Edgartown, at 8 a.m. Gargan and Markham came to the hotel and were astounded to discover that Kennedy still had not notified the police. They got into a heated conversation over why he had not done so-and what to do now. Then all three of them took the ferry to Chappaquiddick, where at a pay phone near the dock Kennedy made a series of phone calls to some friends asking for advice and to Kopechne’s parents reporting her likely death. Now events that were clearly out of control had taken over the operation.A diver, John Farrar, was sent down and discovered Kopechne’s body. He testified at the inquest that her body was pressed up in the car in the spot where an air bubble would have formed. He later concluded that “had I received a call within five to ten minutes of the accident occurring and was able, as I was the following morning, to be at the victim’s side within 25 minutes of receiving the call, in such event there is a strong possibility that she would have been alive on removal from the submerged car.” The car was hauled up and the license plate was identified as belonging to Rose Kennedy-but, of course, a follow-up showed it was driven the night before by Ted Kennedy. When Kennedy finished making his phone calls, he was informed that the car was hauled up and the body discovered, he crossed back to Edgartown and went to the police station to report the accident. The Kennedy scenario was that Gargan then told the boiler-room girls what had happened: my friend says they knew what happened when Kennedy had returned from the accident. Kopechne’s parents did not allow an autopsy to be performed on their daughter. They did not bring any legal action against Kennedy but did receive a payment for $90,904 from him personally and $50,000 from his insurance company-pretty paltry pickings for the enormity of the tragedy that happened to them by Kennedy’s taking the life of their daughter. The Kopechnes later explained “we figured that people would think we were looking for blood money.” Their attitude changed later. There were public recriminations by them. Then they shut up. My friend says they were…let us say…adequately dealt with. The vast Kennedy crisis machine swung into action. On July 25, seven days after the incident Kennedy entered a plea of guilty to a charge of leaving the scene of an accident after causing injury. He wore a neck brace, worn on orders of his lawyers, my friend says, to show he was injured in a serious way-a public relations symbol of a sort to ward off belief that he had not suffered. The Kennedy clout fixed the verdict so that he received a sentence of two months in jail-suspended-and lost his driver’s license for a year. Later on TV he announced it was “indefensible that I had not reported the incident to the police immediately.” He said “I was overcome, I’m frank to say, by a jumble of emotions-grief, fear, doubt, exhaustion, panic, confusion and shock.” He denied he had been engaged in “immoral conduct” with Kopechne or that he had been driving drunk. District Attorney Edmund Denis was granted a hearing on petition for exhumation of Kopechne’s body based on the funeral director’s claim that blood was found on the body and clothing. But there is little evidence to corroborate and the finding is uncertain as to whether she was injured in the crash or in a frenetic struggle within the car. An inquest into her death took plce in Edgartown in January, 1970. Kennedy’s legal team got the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial court to order it be conducted in secret. A 793-page transcript was released four months later. Judge Boyle concluded that Kennedy and Kopechne did not intend to return to Edgartown when they left the party, that Kennedy did not intend to drive to the ferry slip and that Kennedy’s turn onto Dike Road was intentional. He said “negligent driving appears to have contributed to the death of Mary Jo Kopechne.” While under Massachusetts law, Boyle could have ordered Kennedy’s arrest, he did not. Denis chose not to pursue Kennedy for manslaughter despite Boyle’s findings. Do you think anyone but a Kennedy would get off this lightly? And, while we are not given to judge, it is mark of singular good fortune to him that Ted Kennedy will have time to ruminate about the things he did, both good and bad, in his political and private life… …as well as contemplate the lesson his Church has always taught about the purpose of life-specially the folly of elevating fame, riches and political power so as to disvalue the pursuit of holiness. Hang in there, Senator Ted. In more ways that men can count, you’ve been and are a lucky man.

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San Diego DUI criminal defense attorney news

May 30, 2008 14:41 hours

A San Diego county man pleaded guilty May 21 to running down a female cyclist in Solana Beach while San Diego DUI - under the influence of alcohol.

Brian Stephen Carnes, 42, pleaded guilty to a single count of hit-and-run with death and vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, both felonies, stemming from the March 16, 2007, death of Jeannie Franklin, San Diego DUI attorneys understand.

In lieu of his San Diego DUI plea, Carnes faces up to 16 years in prison when he is sentenced Aug. 22.

Franklin, who had been wearing a helmet, was riding home on South Highway 101 in the bike lane from a Cardiff-by-the-Sea market when Carnes struck her. Authorities believe Carnes had a blood alcohol level of .26 at the time of the San Diego DUI incident.

According to San Diego DUI lawyer authorities, all the evidence in the roadway — bicycle and vehicle parts as well as scuffs and gouges in the road — were located inside the bike lane.

When Carnes was arrested a couple of hours after the 11:45 a.m. incident, San Diego Sheriff’s Deputies found two pints, one empty and the other nearly finished, of 100 proof Yukon Jack in the driver’s cab of his Toyota 4Runner, two new headlights and carwash tokens, San Diego DUI court documents show.

Further San Diego DUI investigation revealed that at least one of the pints of liquor had been purchased earlier that morning just minutes after Carnes had gotten off work and that the new headlights were purchased just shortly after the accident.

Further, it appeared to deputies that Carnes’ SUV had just been washed, according to San Diego DUI court records.

Carnes had been driving on a suspended license stemming from a 1997 DUI / driving under the influence conviction, according to San Diego DUI attorneys.

SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/blog

DUI / DWI criminal defense news

Man wonders how he got under influence, points to dog for DWI

May 30, 2008

A man who was arrested for drunk driving / DWI - driving while intoxicated apparently took his dog's pills by mistake.

Drunk driving / DWI authorities say that Clarence Fenton had phenobarbital in his system when he crashed his sport utility vehicle into a utility pole last November. It took several months for the results of the drunk driving / DWI blood tests that showed the drug in Fenton's system.

Police say they found a bottle of pills prescribed for "Saturn" at the scene. They say Fenton admitted taking pills and that "Saturn" is his dog.

Phenobarbital is a drug used to control seizures in people and pets.

Fenton appeared in drunk driving / DWI court on Thursday.

He says he didn't remember taking the pills but did take a newly prescribed antidepressant the day of the drunk driving / DWI crash.

DWI officials with the Iowa Statewide Poison Control Center say people taking their pet's medicine by mistake is more common that one might think. They say the center has taken about three similar calls this year.

www.SanDiegoDUIlawyer.com/blog

DUI defense lawyer news

May 31, 2008

The day after a magistrate threw out a DUI case against state Sen. Randy Scott, Dorchester County Sheriff Ray Nash called the ruling "outrageous" and defended the arrest video that led Magistrate Phillip Newsome to dismiss the case.

On Friday, Nash and 7th Circuit Deputy Solicitor Barry Barnette played the segment of video that Newsome said was missing a minute and 10 seconds of audio.

While the video played on a screen, Barnette pointed to icons that he said showed that the arresting officer's microphone was on at all times. He also pointed out background noise during the segment, such as the deputy's radio, that he said showed the microphone was working.

"There's no glitch," Barnette said. "There's no gap. There is nothing but continuous feed from the microphone," Barnette said, adding that the ruling could affect every DUI case in the state. "It's a huge problem. We're getting more DUI cases thrown out in pre-trial motions than are getting to the jury."

Nash also produced a letter from the president of the company that makes the ICOP video system attesting that the video, audio or other data can't be tampered with after it's shot.

Barnette said he will appeal the case so a jury can decide if Scott was intoxicated when he was arrested April 19.

Scott, his campaign manager Rod Shealy, and his law firm did not return messages left for them Friday.

A day after the judge's decision, it remained unclear how the ruling would affect Scott's June 10 primary battle against fellow Republican challenger Mike Rose and whether it also could alter an equally heated sheriff's race.

College of Charleston political science professor Bill Moore said the expected appeal of Newsome's ruling "keeps a cloud over Scott as long as that issue is not resolved prior to the primary. It does remain a high-profile part of that campaign."

Dorchester County GOP chairman Arthur Bryngleson agreed. "There's still a stigma or a question of guilt or innocence that has yet to be decided, although it is more positive for Randy than negative," he said.

Moore said the arrest saga also could affect the hotly contested sheriff's primary, even though Nash isn't on the ballot.

Scott maintained that the arrest was set up to hurt his chances against Rose, and he has said Nash had it in for him because Scott backed L.C. Knight, Nash's opponent when Nash originally was planning to run for re-election. Nash later dropped out of the race after an audit showed missing money at the jail. Scott had pushed for the audit.

After Scott was arrested, he told deputies they would lose their jobs when Knight was elected.

Nash has endorsed Folly Beach Public Safety Director Terry Boatwright in the race against Knight. Nash declined to speculate Friday on how Scott's trial might affect the sheriff's race. "I'm not politically astute," Nash said. "I'll leave that to the political speculators."

Bryngleson said the arrest wouldn't factor into the sheriff's race, but Moore said, "Obviously, the Scott arrest and subsequent events will play into the sheriff's race and could impact how a good number of voters vote."

Rose said while Scott avoided the jury's verdict, he won't avoid the voters.

Rose has focused less on the DUI arrest itself than on the tape recordings that the Dorchester County jail made of Scott talking by phone with his wife immediately after the arrest. In them, Scott seeks help from magistrates, whom he has a hand in appointing, to get out of jail. Scott later apologized.

"This dismissal is absolutely not an exoneration or vindication of Senator Scott. It absolutely does not conclude whether he was driving under the influence," Rose said. "Whether he was or he wasn't, it's clear he was abusing his position as a senator.

"Even handing a Senate card with his driver's license was wrong. If I was arrested, there's only three things I would have said, and that's 'Yes sir,' 'No sir,' and 'There's no excuse sir.' "

District 38 covers much of Dorchester County and a slice of Charleston County near Ladson and Ravenel. Charleston County GOP chairman Lin Bennett said she thinks Scott's actions recorded on tape, perhaps more than the DUI charge itself, could sway voters.

"Voters don't like that. They want elected officials to be regular people. They don't want them to appear like they're above everything," she said.



A minute gap in the audio portion of the videotape of the arrest of state Senator Randy Scott has led a judge to drop a DUI charge against the lawmaker.

The Post and Courier of Charleston reports that magistrate Phillip Newsome said yesterday state law requires a sworn statement explaining any problems with the videotape of a DUI arrest and authorities did not provide an explanation.

The Summerville Republican was set to stand trial when the ruling was issued.

Prosecutors say they will ask the judge to reconsider his ruling and likely appeal if he refuses.

sandiegodui.com

California drunk driving attorney news

May 29, 2008

When is one drink too many? That is what many should worry about after an evening of fun with friends or family before deciding if it’s safe to get behind the wheel of a 4,000-pound battering ram.

Extreme California drunk driving drivers, because of either addiction or apathy, don’t care about the law or about the safety of fellow motorists. While drinking alcohol impairs one’s judgment, intoxication is neither an excuse for stupidity — nor a license for murder.

Current California drunk driving law says a driver found to have a .08 percent blood-alcohol content or greater faces charges of California drunk driving - driving under the influence that for first-time offenders could result in at least a six-month suspension of their driver’s license, up to three year’s probation and fines, court costs and related fees of up to nearly $10,000. This BAC can occur after as little as two or three drinks, depending on sex and body size.

But a California drunk driving driver found to have a BAC of .20 or higher faces charges of ‘extreme’ California drunk driving - drunken driving, and may face even harsher punishment – including mandatory installation in their cars of cell phone-sized devices that prohibit the car from starting if .03 percent alcohol is detected.

It takes most men and women five or more drinks to qualify as ‘extreme’ drunken drivers. Between 2001 and 2003, nearly 2,200 Californians were killed in California drunk driving crashes involving extreme levels of alcohol of .20 or higher.

Experts say such extreme California drunk driving drivers are at least 20 times more likely to be involved in a fatal crash than a sober driver. California’s current threshold to be declared an extreme California drunk driving - drunken driver is as lenient as only four other states that define extreme drunk driving as .20, according to California drunk driving law experts.

If approved, California drunk driving judges would be required to give greater consideration to first-time extreme California drunk driving - DUI offenders to have breathalyzers installed in every car they drive.

Records show vehicle California drunk driving breathalyzers can dramatically reduce the number of drunk drivers on the road. In three states and two countries that installed breathalyzers in the cars of first-time offenders, recidivism dropped by more than half, some as much as a life-saving 77 percent.

SB 1190 has received unanimous, bipartisan support in two Senate committee hearings, and a 37-0 vote May 22 on the Senate floor. There would be no significant state costs, and my measure has already gained the endorsement of Mothers against Drunk Driving and the Association of California Insurance Companies.

• A DUI Driver who pled guilty last month to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and drunken driving causing injury, now faces a lengthy prison term.

• If he had a breathalyzer installed on his pickup last January, a victim's four children might still have a father.


www.Sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net/articles

California DUI / Drunk Driving Law enforcement from all over Kern worked hard to catch drunk drivers over Memorial Day weekend.

The Kern California DUI / Drunk Driving Law Task Force held a California DUI / Drunk Driving Law checkpoint on Main Street in Lamont and increased their presence in Bakersfield and Shafter.

In Lamont, fifty California DUI / Drunk Driving Law officers checked 745 cars over the weekend, resulting in 5 California DUI / Drunk Driving Law arrests and 43 impounded cars.

In Shafter and Bakersfield, they pulled over 50 cars and conducted 17 California DUI / Drunk Driving field sobriety tests. Also, eight people were arrested for California DUI / Drunk Driving's and 43 cars were impounded, according to California DUI / Drunk Driving lawyers.

California DUI / Drunk Driving Law Police will also beef up their presence during Independence Day and Labor Day weekend.

California DUI / Drunk Driving Law Police said the summer is the deadliest time, and motorists are urged to call 911 to report California DUI / drunk drivers.

“BUI?”

May 28, 2008 9:00 a.m.

With summer upon us, many people will be taking advantage of the warm weather and sunshine by going boating, water skiing, jet skiing, and sailing.

Be aware of “BUI” laws. While everyone knows that it is illegal to drive while “under the influence” of alcohol and/or drugs, many may not be aware that similar laws apply on the water. That is, it is illegal in the State of California to engage in “Boating Under the Influence.”

California Harbors and Navigation Code section 655 provides as follows:

(b) No person shall operate any vessel or manipulate water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, any drug, or the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and any drug.

(c) No person shall operate any recreational vessel or manipulate any water skis, aquaplane, or similar device if the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more in his or her blood.

“BUI” is a misdemeanor crime and can be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for up to six months, and/or by a fine of up to $1,000.00. (Harb. & Nav. Code, § 668, subd. (d).)

If you have been cited or arrested for “BUI,” you need an aggressive California DUI / drunk driving defense law firm to represent you in your BUI case: www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net

San Diego DUI Help

San Diego DUI attorney news

May 27, 2008 18:00 p.m.

San Diego DUI attorneys report that 3 people were killed in traffic accidents in San Diego County during the Memorial Day weekend, the California Highway Patrol said Tuesday in its final statistics for the three-day holiday period.

San Diego DUI / drunk driving statistics were recorded from 6 p.m. Friday to midnight Monday.

The San Diego DUI attorney tally also shows that 108 people were arrested in the county on suspicion of San Diego DUI / drunk driving / dwi - driving while intoxicated, compared to 155 arrests during the holiday period a year ago.


Statewide, San Diego DUI attorneys said 30 people were killed in traffic accidents during the holiday weekend, compared to 32 a year ago, and there were 1,445 DUI arrests, compared to 1,614 a year ago. San Diego DUI .com

California Drunk Boating BUI DUI in a boat defense attorney news

May 27, 2008

Sonora, CA -- 22 year old Hughson firefighter Cole J. Periera was arrested by the Tuolumne County Sheriff Office's Boat Patrol Sunday evening for allegedly operating his watercraft while under-the-influence: California Drunk Boating BUI DUI in a boat, California defense lawyers are told.

California Drunk Boating BUI Deputies responded to a 6:48pm call of a boat collision on Lake Don Pedro. Deputies learned that two crafts were involved; a 2002 Malibu boat and a 2002 blue Fineline ski boat.

Periera was allegedly operating the Malibu boat when it struck the Fineline at an approximate speed of 10-15mph. Individuals on the struck boat allegedly told deputies that they had stopped to allow occupants to urinate into the lake.

One of the individuals on the Fineline was an 18 year old female from Elk Grove who was reportedly injured and transported to Sonora Regional Medical Center with non-life threatening injuries, according to lawyers.

Periera allegedly showed signs of intoxication and was arrested for California Drunk Boating BUI DUI in a boat and booked into the County Jail, attorneys are told.

NICKELBACK frontman CHAD KROEGER has appealed his recent drunk driving conviction.
In his appeal, Chad is arguing that the breathalyzer test he was forced to take when he was pulled over for speeding in 2006 violated his rights.

Chad's lawyer says the breathalyzer results, which showed that the singer had nearly double the legal limit of alchol in his blood, should have been excluded from evidence because the arresting officer didn't have any "reasonable suspicion" that Chad was drunk.

San Diego DUI attorney news

May 27, 2008

A San Bruno police officer was offered a large stack of money to let a suspected drunk driver go, according to prosecutors who charged the vehicle’s passenger with felony bribery.


After the officer declined and called for back-up to handle the alleged bribe, the driver was let go — ironically, because he passed both the field sobriety test and a Breathalyzer.


Kelvin Hua, 26, however, was arrested and is now scheduled for jury trial June 23. Hua returns to court this afternoon for a pretrial conference at which he could settle the case or confirm the jury trial with the possibility of three years in prison if convicted.


Hua has been out of custody on $20,000 bail posted after his Sept. 29, 2007 arrest.


According to the District Attorney’s Office, the vehicle carrying Hua was stopped on El Camino Real in San Bruno for suspicion of drunk driving. While the officer interviewed the driver, Hua reportedly approached the officer asked if they could be released because they lived just down the street. The officer declined and Hua reportedly showed him the stack of money and said he would place it in the patrol car if they were let go.


After another officer was called to witness the event and noted Hua’s money, he was arrested. The police discovered $1,400 in his wallet and pocket.


“I’m not sure how much of that he offered the officer but it was in the hundreds,” said Chief Deputy District Attorney Steve Wagstaffe.


The driver then passed the field sobriety test and a blood alcohol test showed a legal amount of .06.


www.sandiegodrunkdrivingattorney.net

California's San Diego DUI lawyer news

A 19-year-old alleged San Diego DUI drunk driver going the wrong way on Olympic Parkway in Chula Vista struck a sport utility vehicle head-on Sunday, injuring herself and eight people in the SUV, San Diego DUI lawyers said.

Jennifer Deugan, who was alone in her vehicle, was arrested at a hospital following the roughly 3:25 a.m. wreck on Olympic Parkway near Interstate 805, San Diego DUI attorneys report. Deugan's injuries were described as serious, San Diego Drunk driving attorneys said.

Information about injuries to the occupants of the SUV was unavailable, but San Diego DUI police said they were taken to hospitals and we hope they get better.

SanDiegoDUIhelp.com

San Diego DUI Help Attorney news

The South Lake Tahoe Police Department will be conducting a DUI check point on June 18th from 10:00 PM to 2:00 AM on Lake Tahoe Blvd near Fairway Ave. Officers will be randomly screening drivers for signs of impairment. This will be a combined effort between the South Lake Tahoe Police Department and the California Highway Patrol. The number one cause of injury traffic collisions in South Lake Tahoe so far for 2008 is driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. We will be conducting a strong summer campaign to combat this trend with a zero tolerance. “Over the Limit, Under Arrest”.

Funding for this program was provided by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety, through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

San Diego DUI Help Attorney news

The South Lake Tahoe Police Department will be conducting a DUI check point on June 18th from 10:00 PM to 2:00 AM on Lake Tahoe Blvd near Fairway Ave. Officers will be randomly screening drivers for signs of impairment. This will be a combined effort between the South Lake Tahoe Police Department and the California Highway Patrol. The number one cause of injury traffic collisions in South Lake Tahoe so far for 2008 is driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. We will be conducting a strong summer campaign to combat this trend with a zero tolerance. “Over the Limit, Under Arrest”.

Funding for this program was provided by a grant from the California Office of Traffic Safety, through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Bribery of DUI cop not a good idea

May 26, 2008 19:30 p.m.

A man arrested for DUI / drunk driving faces a felony charge after he allegedly offered a DUI officer $50.

Court documents show 23-year-old Scott M. Hayward faces a felony count of bribery of municipal or county officers after he allegedly offered the money in his pocket to a DUI arresting officer.

Hayward was arrested early Friday morning on misdemeanor charges of allegedly DWI / driving while intoxicated and possession of marijuana. DUI Reports indicate Hayward was placed in a patrol car where he allegedly offered $50 to a DWI officer.

A hearing is scheduled June 4. If convicted, Hayward faces up to 14 years in prison.

www.SanDiegoDrunkDrivingAttorney.net/articles

San Diego DUI criminal defense attorney news

May 25, 2008 19:25 pm

A DUI / drunk driver called 9-1-1 to report himself, DUI police said.

When the dispatcher asked what the man was reporting, he said, “I just don't know if I'm safe to be driving.”

“Why wouldn't you be safe?” the dispatcher asked.

“I'm pretty drunk,” the man answered.

The DUI / drunk driver made that call while driving north on Interstate 5 last week.

The dispatcher was able to talk the DUI / drunk man into pulling off the road.

DUI / drunk driving police said his breath alcohol level was .18 – more than twice the legal limit, according to DUI / drunk driving lawyers in San Diego.

SanDiegoDUIhelp.com

Good news out of San Diego

May 25, 2008

CHP: Less San Diego DUI / Drunk Driving arrests, wrecks this weekend

Fewer drivers are being arrested for San Diego DUI / Drunk Driving - driving under the influence this Memorial Day weekend on San Diego County's freeways. More good news is that no one has been killed.

This year, CHP officers have taken 65 people into custody for San Diego DUI / Drunk Driving between 6 p.m. Friday and 6 a.m. Sunday, San Diego DUI / Drunk Driving lawyers reported.

At this point last year, CHP officers arrested 103 passengers for San Diego DUI / Drunk Driving during the same time period, San Diego DUI / Drunk Driving attorneys note.

Statewide, California DUI / Drunk Driving arrest numbers are also down about 10 percent compared to last year, while there are 12 fatalities this year, three less than in 2007.

All in all a good weekend. www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com

California DUI - DMV defense attorney caselaw update

1
Filed 5/22/08 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----
PAUL DYER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
Defendant and Appellant.
C054971
(Super. Ct. No. TCV1113)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Placer
County, Trilla E. Bahrke, Court Commissioner. Reversed.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Jacob A.
Appelsmith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Vincent J.
Scally, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Barbara A.
Morris, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Appellant.
Barry W. Jones for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following his arrest for driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI), the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended
plaintiff Paul Dyer’s driver’s license under the “administrative
per se” statutes. (See Veh. Code, §§ 13353.2, 13353.3,
2
23158.5.)1 After an administrative hearing, the DMV upheld the
suspension.
Dyer then filed a petition for writ of administrative
mandate in superior court. (Veh. Code, § 13559, subd. (a); Code
Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) Citing Vehicle Code section 40800, the
court granted the petition on the sole ground that the arrest
was unlawful because the officer who pulled Dyer over on
suspicion of DUI was driving an unmarked patrol vehicle.
On this appeal by the DMV, we shall reverse the judgment of
the trial court. There was no evidentiary basis to support a
finding that Vehicle Code section 40800 was violated and even if
there was, the fact that the detaining officer was driving an
unmarked vehicle did not render the subsequent arrest unlawful.
We also reject Dyer’s argument that the arrest was invalid
because another officer, who placed him under arrest, did not
personally observe him driving under the influence. (Pen. Code,
§ 836.)
Because the trial court relied on a legally infirm ground
for granting the petition and failed to conduct an independent
review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the DMV’s
factual findings, we shall vacate and remand for a new hearing.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code in
effect at the time of the February 2006 incident.
3
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2
Just after midnight on February 9, 2006, Sergeant Jess
Phariss, who was on uniformed duty in an unmarked Placer County
Sheriff’s Department vehicle, was traveling southbound on state
highway 267. The weather was clear and road conditions were
good.
Sergeant Phariss spotted a Jeep Cherokee that was traveling
southbound at 35 miles per hour in a 55-miles-per-hour zone.
The Jeep sped up to 60 miles per hour as Sergeant Phariss caught
up to it, then slowed to 40. Subsequently, Sergeant Phariss saw
the Jeep cross over both the solid double yellow and/or the
broken single yellow center line at least 10 times. On three of
those occasions, the Jeep crossed completely into the northbound
lane of traffic and then abruptly returned to the southbound
lane.
At 12:24 a.m., Sergeant Phariss requested that Deputy
Robert Griggs proceed towards the location of the Jeep. Phariss
activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop of
the Jeep. Griggs arrived to assist as Phariss approached the
driver, later identified as Dyer, and asked him why he appeared
unable to keep his vehicle within his lane of traffic. Dyer
answered, “Uh . . . I didn’t know I was in the other lane.”
Phariss then asked if there was anything mechanically wrong with
the Jeep, to which Dyer answered negatively. During the
2 Our factual summary is taken from the administrative record in
this case.
4
encounter, Sergeant Phariss noticed objective symptoms of
intoxication, including a moderate odor of alcohol on Dyer’s
breath, confusion, unsteady balance, slow, slurred speech, and
red eyes.
Sergeant Phariss directed Dyer to step out of the Jeep and
go to the rear of the vehicle where Deputy Griggs was standing.
Dyer stumbled out of the Jeep and Griggs administered a series
of field sobriety tests, which Dyer performed very poorly.
Griggs then tried to obtain a breath sample. Dyer put his lips
to the mouthpiece several times but did not breathe into it.
Finally, he gave a “quick ‘puff’” of air into the mouthpiece,
which registered an “inconclusive” 0.072 blood-alcohol content
(BAC). Based on Dyer’s poor performance on the sobriety tests
and the observations of Phariss and Griggs, Griggs placed Dyer
under arrest for DUI.
During an inventory search of the Jeep, Sergeant Phariss
found an opened, partially consumed bottle of vodka under the
driver’s front seat, a glass pipe associated with smoking
marijuana and a film canister containing marijuana.
Dyer was transported to the county jail for booking, where
Deputy Griggs administered two Intoxilyzer breath tests at 1:07
a.m., some 30 minutes after the arrest. The two breath samples
each registered 0.11 BAC.
5
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Based on the investigation reports of Deputy Griggs and
Sergeant Phariss and the results of the Intoxilyzer test, the
DMV suspended Dyer’s driver’s license under section 13353.2.
Dyer requested an administrative hearing. After an evidentiary
hearing, the appointed DMV hearing officer found that the
requirements of section 13353.2 had been met, and she upheld the
suspension.
Dyer then filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior
court. (See § 13559, subd. (a).) Although the court’s initial
ruling was to deny the writ, it ultimately reversed itself upon
receipt of supplemental briefing. The trial judge determined
that because Sergeant Phariss was driving an unmarked patrol car
and not wearing a uniform in violation of section 40800, Dyer
was not “lawfully arrested” and therefore the license suspension
was improper. The DMV appeals from the judgment granting the
writ of mandate.
DISCUSSION
I. General Principles
“It is a criminal offense to drive while under the
influence of alcohol or a drug, or to drive with 0.08 percent or
more, by weight, of alcohol in the blood. [Citations.] In
addition to criminal sanctions, the Legislature has established
administrative procedures whereby the DMV may suspend a person’s
driver’s license for driving under the influence or with a
specified blood-alcohol level. [¶] The DMV has long been
6
authorized to suspend drivers’ licenses of persons convicted of
specified alcohol related driving offenses, or of persons who
refused to submit to a chemical test to determine their bloodalcohol
level. [Citations.] At issue here is legislation
enacted in 1989, operative July 1, 1990, designed to allow
suspension of drivers’ licenses before conviction for driving
with a blood-alcohol level of [0.08 percent].” (Gikas v. Zolin
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 846 (Gikas), fn. omitted.)
Under the administrative per se statutes, “when a person is
arrested for driving under the influence and is determined to
have a prohibited blood-alcohol level, the arresting officer or
the DMV serves the person with a ‘notice of the order of
suspension.’ (§ 13353.2, subds. (b) & (c), 23158.5, subds. (a)
& (b).) The notice informs the person that his or her driver’s
license will be suspended 45 days from the date of service,
states the reason and statutory grounds for the suspension, and
explains the person’s right to seek an administrative hearing.
(§§ 13353.2, subd. (c), 13353.3, subd. (a).)” (Gikas, supra,
6 Cal.4th at p. 846.) “The DMV automatically reviews the
suspension order to determine, by a preponderance of the
evidence, whether: (1) the arresting officer had reasonable
cause to believe the person was driving in violation of section
23152 or section 23153; (2) the person was placed under arrest;
and (3) the person was driving with 0.08 percent or more, by
weight, of alcohol in the blood. (§ 13557.) The determination
is based upon the officer’s report and any evidence accompanying
7
the report. (§ 13557, subd. (a).) The person may request a
hearing with the DMV limited to these issues, at which
additional evidence may be presented.” (Gikas, at pp. 846-847.)
A person whose license suspension is upheld may seek
judicial review of an adverse decision by way of petition for
writ of administrative mandate. (Veh. Code, § 13559, subd. (a);
Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) Review is strictly limited to the
record of the administrative hearing; the trial court may not
consider any other evidence. (§ 13559, subd. (a).) “The
superior court uses its independent judgment to review DMV
hearing decisions which suspend driver’s licenses. [Citation.]
Under this standard of review, the court must independently
weigh the evidence and may make its own findings. [Citation.]
It must set aside the administrative decision where the agency’s
findings are not supported ‘by the weight of the evidence.’
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).)” (Ocheltree v. Gourley
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1017 (Ocheltree).)
On appeal, our task ordinarily is limited to ascertaining
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
findings. (Coombs v. Pierce (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 568, 576
(Coombs).) However, the application of an interpreted statute
to undisputed facts is subject to our independent review.
(Hoschler v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 258, 262; see Villalobos v. Zolin (1995)
35 Cal.App.4th 556, 558.)
8
II. Lawfulness of the Arrest
The trial court’s decision to annul the DMV suspension
turns exclusively on the lawfulness of Dyer’s arrest. The
following facts are undisputed: (1) Sergeant Phariss was on
uniformed3 patrol in an unmarked sheriff’s department vehicle
when he observed Dyer driving erratically, radically changing
speeds and crossing over the double yellow line multiple times;
(2) Phariss summoned Deputy Griggs to assist him with the
contact; (3) Phariss pulled over Dyer’s vehicle and observed
obvious signs of intoxication; (4) Griggs arrived and
administered field sobriety tests, on which Dyer performed very
poorly; (5) Griggs placed Dyer under arrest for drunk driving
and Phariss recovered an open, partially consumed bottle of
vodka under the driver’s seat; (6) about 30 minutes after the
arrest, Dyer gave two breath samples at the county jail, each of
which registered a BAC reading of 0.11 percent.
Under the administrative per se statutes, in order for the
DMV to validly suspend a person’s driver’s license, “the
underlying arrest must have been lawful.” (Gikas, supra,
6 Cal.4th at p. 847; see also Mercer v. Department of Motor
Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 760 (Mercer).)
3 The trial court’s finding that Sergeant Phariss was not
wearing a uniform finds no support in the record. Phariss’s
report states unequivocally, “I was on uniformed patrol in an
unmarked Placer County Sheriff’s Department vehicle.” (Italics
added.)
9
“A law enforcement officer may legally stop a motorist if
the facts and circumstances known to the officer support a
reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle
Code or some other law.” (People v. Hardacre (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1300 (Hardacre).) No claim is made that
Sergeant Phariss lacked reasonable cause to pull Dyer over on
suspicion of DUI. The pivotal question is whether Dyer’s arrest
was unlawful because Sergeant Phariss was driving in an unmarked
vehicle when he effectuated the traffic stop.
The parties spend a significant portion of their briefs
discussing the question of who has the burden of proof with
respect to whether Sergeant Phariss complied with section 40800.
The parties apparently focused on the final sentence of the
trial court’s decision, which states: “The record was devoid of
any proof that would allow the Court to make a finding that the
Officer was exempt from the requirements of Vehicle Code
[section] 40800.” (Italics added.) However, it is unnecessary
to resolve the burden of proof dispute because, as we shall
show, section 40800 has no relevance to this case.
A. No Evidence That Section 40800 Was Violated
Former section 40800 provided, in relevant part: “Every
traffic officer on duty for the exclusive or main purpose of
enforcing the provisions of Division 10 or 11 of this code
[traffic safety laws] shall wear a full distinctive uniform, and
if the officer while so on duty uses a motor vehicle, it must be
10
painted a distinctive color specified by the commissioner.”4
(Stats. 1961, ch. 202, § 2, p. 1212, italics added.)
Section 40800 is included in a chapter of the Vehicle Code
dealing with speed traps. Speed trap laws have been on the
books in California since 1923. (Hardacre, supra,
116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1296; People v. Sullivan (1991)
234 Cal.App.3d 56, 58.) In the words of an early California
Supreme Court case, speed trap laws reflect a legislative
determination that “‘“the presence of traffic officers actually
patrolling the highways dressed in distinctive uniforms and in
plain sight of all travelers on the highways would have a most
salutary effect in securing the observance of each and all of
the regulations imposed upon drivers of vehicles upon the public
highways.”’” (Fleming v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 344,
349.) Commentators have also suggested that the Legislature was
“motivated by a desire to eliminate clandestine methods of
traffic enforcement designed to augment local revenues through
exorbitant fines.” (Sullivan, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 58.)
Regardless of its purpose section 40800, by its plain
language, applies only to “traffic officer[s]” whose “exclusive
or main purpose” is to enforce traffic laws on the public
highways. In his report, Sergeant Phariss states only that he
4 Section 40800 was subdivided and rewritten in 2007, after the
proceedings in this case. The amendments did not affect the
substance of the statute at issue here. (See Stats. 2007, ch.
682, § 18.)
11
was on “uniformed patrol in an unmarked Placer County Sheriff’s
Department vehicle.” There is no evidence in the administrative
record that Sergeant Phariss was a “traffic officer” or that his
main duties consisted of traffic enforcement. On the contrary,
Phariss appeared to be exercising supervisory duties on the
night in question: Rather than make the arrest himself, he
requested that Deputy Griggs, “the deputy assigned to the King’s
Beach area,” assist him at the scene; and it was Griggs who
conducted the sobriety tests and placed Dyer under formal
arrest.
The trial court was not permitted to grant the writ based
on speculation or assumptions about the nature and scope of
Sergeant Phariss’s duties. Without any evidence in the record
that Phariss was a traffic officer whose exclusive or primary
duty consisted of traffic enforcement, a necessary predicate for
the applicability of section 40800 was lacking.
B. A Section 40800 Violation Does Not Render a Subsequent Arrest Unlawful
Even assuming that Sergeant Phariss qualified as a “traffic
officer” and that his traveling in an unmarked vehicle failed to
comply with the directive of section 40800, the violation would
not have invalidated Dyer’s arrest.
Normally, the issue of what consequence to attach to a
violation of a statute would depend on whether we interpreted
the enactment as “directory” or “mandatory.” (See, e.g., Cox v.
California Highway Patrol (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1586-
1587.) That inquiry is unnecessary here, however, because the
12
Legislature has clearly spelled out what sanctions should follow
from a violation of section 40800.
Former section 40804 provided, in relevant part, “(a) In
any prosecution under this code upon a charge involving the
speed of a vehicle, any officer or other person shall be
incompetent as a witness if the testimony is based upon or
obtained from or by the maintenance or use of a speed trap. [¶]
(b) Every officer arresting, or participating or assisting in
the arrest of, a person so charged while on duty for the
exclusive or main purpose of enforcing the provisions of
Divisions 10 and 11 is incompetent as a witness if at the time
of such arrest he was not wearing a distinctive uniform, or was
using a motor vehicle not painted the distinctive color
specified by the commissioner.”5 (Stats. 1978, ch. 84, § 1,
p. 219, italics added.)
Likewise, section 40805 of the speed trap law provides:
“Every court shall be without jurisdiction to render a judgment
of conviction against any person for a violation of this code
involving the speed of a vehicle if the court admits any
evidence or testimony secured in violation of, or which is
inadmissible under this article.” (Italics added.)
The import of these sections is unmistakable. In any
prosecution of a person charged with an offense “involving the
5 Section 40804 was rewritten in 2007, after the proceedings in
this case. The amendments did not affect the substance of the
statute discussed here. (See Stats. 2007, ch. 682, § 19.)
13
speed of a vehicle,” the testimony of the arresting officer is
inadmissible unless that officer was in uniform and driving a
marked patrol car. The Legislature has thus created a specific
and limited remedy for a violation of section 40800--the
exclusion of the noncomplying officer’s testimony in a
prosecution for speed-related offenses. These sanctions
further the chief goal of speed trap legislation, i.e., to
restrict clandestine enforcement of the speed laws by officers
not clearly identified as law enforcement personnel.
The offense of driving under the influence does not
“involve the speed of a vehicle” as defined in section 40805.
(See Hardacre, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1299.) Thus, where
the driver is detained or arrested on a charge of DUI, the
exclusionary provisions of sections 40804 and 40805 are
inapplicable. (Hardacre, at p. 1299.)
The case of People v. Tuck (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 639 (Tuck)
illustrates this point. There, Tuck was a passenger in a car
pulled over for speeding by two plainclothes officers traveling
in an unmarked vehicle. The officers found contraband in the
vehicle and Tuck was later convicted of its possession. On
appeal, Tuck claimed the trial court should have granted his
motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the officers’
violation of section 40800 rendered the vehicle stop illegal.
(Tuck, at pp. 642-643.)
The appellate court disagreed. It first pointed out, as we
just did, that the statute only applies to traffic officers
14
whose main duties were traffic enforcement. Secondly, section
40800 does not prohibit an officer in an unmarked patrol car
from detaining a vehicle where he has reasonable cause to
believe the driver has committed a traffic offense; rather, it
simply renders inadmissible the officer’s testimony in a
prosecution for a speed-related violation. (Tuck, supra,
75 Cal.App.3d at pp. 643-644.) Since Tuck was not prosecuted
for a speed offense, the conviction was affirmed. (Ibid.)
Tuck’s analysis applies here. Since the Legislature has
authorized no sanction for section 40800 violations other than
as set forth in sections 40804 and 40805, the trial court erred
in fashioning its own remedy by declaring the arrest unlawful.6
(See People ex rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enterprises,
Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 328, 333.) “[I]t is the role of the
judiciary to simply ascertain and declare what is in terms or in
substance contained in the statute, not to insert what has been
omitted or omit what has been included. In other words, the
courts ‘may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite the
6 We are unable to discern the basis for Dyer’s and the trial
court’s fixation on Mercer, supra, 53 Cal.3d 753. Mercer held
merely that the Vehicle Code and Penal Code statutes as then
written rendered unlawful the arrest of a person for drunk
driving unless the arresting officer actually saw the volitional
movement of the vehicle--regardless of whether the driver could
be convicted in a criminal court of drunk driving. (Mercer, at
pp. 757-758, 768-769.) Our analysis, like that in Mercer, rests
solely on statutory construction. Because the sanctions for a
section 40800 violation are expressly set forth in the Vehicle
Code, there is no need to resort to criminal case law regarding
suppression of evidence.
15
law or give the words an effect different from the plain and
direct import of the terms used.’” (People v. Massicot (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 920, 925.)
C. Penal Code Section 836
Relying on Penal Code section 836, Dyer claims that his
arrest by Deputy Griggs was unlawful because only Sergeant
Phariss, not Griggs, observed the conduct that formed the basis
for the arrest, i.e., drunk driving.
Penal Code section 836 provides that a peace officer may
make an arrest without a warrant whenever he has “probable cause
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public
offense in the officer’s presence.” (Pen. Code, § 836, subd.
(a)(1), italics added.) Dyer claims the judgment should be
affirmed on the alternative ground that the arresting officer,
Deputy Griggs, did not personally observe him committing a
misdemeanor DUI.
The argument lacks merit.7 The California Supreme Court
case of Freeman v. Dept. Motor Vehicles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 235
(Freeman) is on point and dispositive. In Freeman, Deputy
Sheriff Fowler observed Freeman driving in an apparent state of
intoxication and stopped his vehicle. He then summoned the
assistance of Highway Patrol Officer Byrd, who made the arrest.
7 Although the trial court never reached this contention
because it granted the writ on a different ground, we will
resolve it, since it raises a pure question of law under an
undisputed set of facts.
16
When the defendant refused to submit to a chemical sobriety
test, his license was suspended by the DMV. (Id. at pp. 235-
236.)
Freeman challenged the license suspension on the ground
that his arrest was unlawful because Officer Byrd did not see
him commit the misdemeanor of drunk driving. The state Supreme
Court framed the question as follows: “If a peace officer
‘stops’ a motor vehicle driver for an alleged misdemeanor
traffic offense committed in his presence, may a valid arrest be
made by another peace officer who was summoned by the first
peace officer but did not see the driver commit the alleged
offense?” (Freeman, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 236-237.)
The court answered this question affirmatively, stating in
part: “Officer Byrd was not the sole arresting officer. Deputy
Sheriff Fowler, by ‘stopping’ plaintiff for the alleged offense
and detaining him pending arrival of an officer of the highway
patrol, initiated, and thereby participated in, the arrest.
(See Pen. Code, §§ 834, 835.) Deputy Sheriff Fowler did not
himself complete the arrest, but it was completed by a person he
had summoned to aid him in making the arrest, as he was entitled
to do under section 839 of the Penal Code. That section reads:
‘Any person making an arrest may orally summon as many persons
as he deems necessary to aid him therein.’” (Freeman, supra,
70 Cal.2d at p. 237, fn. omitted, italics added.) Inasmuch as
Deputy Sheriff Fowler personally observed the conduct and
related his observations to Highway Patrol Officer Byrd, who
17
assisted Fowler by making the arrest, the court held that the
requirements of Penal Code section 836 were satisfied.
(Freeman, at pp. 237-238.)
The actions of Sergeant Phariss and Deputy Griggs were
precisely analogous to those of Deputy Sheriff Fowler and
Highway Patrol Officer Byrd in Freeman. After observing Dyer’s
erratic driving, Phariss summoned Griggs to assist him with the
traffic stop. Although it was Griggs who formally placed Dyer
under arrest, both officers participated actively therein.
Where one officer has reasonable suspicion, based on
personal observation, that a suspect may be driving while
intoxicated, he may summon another officer to assist him in
making the arrest. (Pen. Code, § 839.) Because both officers
participated in arresting Dyer for DUI, his arrest complied with
Penal Code section 836. (See also Johanson v. Department of
Motor Vehicles (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1216-1217 [where
parking attendant could have made a citizen’s arrest for DUI,
licensee’s subsequent arrest by an officer he summoned did not
violate Pen. Code, § 836].)
We reject Dyer’s argument that the later enactment of
Vehicle Code section 40300.5 rendered Freeman obsolete as
authority. That section merely provides exceptions to the
requirement that misdemeanor drunk driving must occur in the
arresting officer’s presence.8 It does not vitiate Freeman’s
8 Vehicle Code section 40300.5 provides that a peace officer
may, notwithstanding the “presence” requirement of Penal Code
18
conclusion that Penal Code section 836 is not violated when the
officer who observes drunk driving behavior summons another to
assist him in making the arrest.
III. Whether Dyer Was Driving with a BAC of 0.08 Percent or Above
As a final ground for affirmance, Dyer contends there was
no substantial evidence that he drove with a BAC level of at
least 0.08 percent. Acknowledging that the trial court made no
finding on this issue, on appeal Dyer relies on the doctrine
that a judgment will be affirmed if correct on any ground,
regardless of the reasons the trial court advanced to support
its ruling.
The record shows that Dyer performed extremely poorly on
the field sobriety tests. Only after several attempts did he
muster enough breath to record a reading on the mouthpiece of
the PAS (preliminary alcohol screening) device, which was an
“inconclusive” 0.072 percent BAC. Two Intoxilyzer tests
administered 30 minutes after his arrest registered a BAC
reading of 0.11 percent, well over the legal limit.
The administrative hearing officer found, based on the
evidence, that Dyer drove with a BAC of at least 0.08 percent.
On a petition for administrative mandate, the trial court was
required to exercise its independent judgment to determine
section 836, make a warrantless drunk driving arrest under
certain exigent circumstances. Because we uphold the arrest on
other grounds, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the
instant arrest fell within any of these exceptions.
19
whether this finding was supported “‘by the weight of the
evidence.’” (Ocheltree, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.)
The appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination
under the substantial evidence test. (Coombs, supra,
1 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
Owing to its erroneous legal conclusion that the arrest of
Dyer was unlawful, the trial court failed to decide whether the
weight of the evidence supported the administrative hearing
officer’s finding that Dyer drove with a BAC in excess of the
legal limit. Because the trial court failed to perform this
essential function, it is impossible to review its determination
for substantial evidence and the matter must be remanded for a
new hearing. (Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com. (1996)
45 Cal.App.4th 652, 659-660.) “A trial court abuses its
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standards applicable
to the issue at hand.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 68, 85.) Where the trial court decides the case
by employing an incorrect legal analysis, reversal is required
regardless of whether substantial evidence supports the
judgment. (See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429,
436.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views
20
stated herein. The DMV shall recover its costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).) (CERTIFIED FOR
PUBLICATION.)
BUTZ , J.
We concur:
RAYE , Acting P.J.
MORRISON , J.

Since 1923, California has outlawed the police tactics upon which many other states rely to conduct speed traps. One key provision of this statute prohibits traffic police from using any vehicle not distinctively marked. In most cases, this means the traditional black and white design. In her ruling last week, Justice M. Kathleen Butz cited a 1991 decision explaining the legislature was "motivated by a desire to eliminate clandestine methods of traffic enforcement designed to augment local revenues through exorbitant fines."


California DUI lawyers note a problem is that the court wrongly declares that 40800 is in a chapter called "Speed Traps".

This is not so, 40800 is found in a chapter labeled "Illegal Evidence" and thereafter each sub-chapter is labeled appropriately. The sub-chapter of 40800 was in fact specifically titled by the legislators as "Vehicle and Uniform Used by Officers".

This is goes directly against the Dyer's Court's holding, they say one thing and do the opposite:


“[I]t is the role of the judiciary to simply ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained in the statute, not to insert what has been
omitted or omit what has been included. In other words, the
courts ‘may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite the
law or give the words an effect different from the plain and
direct import of the terms used.’” (People v. Massicot (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 920, 925.)

The legislature specifically labeled each of these Titles and Subtitles in accordance with their meaning. And so while you must show that the officer must be on for the exclusive purpose of enforcing the traffic laws, one can viably argue the claim of the court that the law is limited to speed violations - when not in proper uniform.

California Criminal Defense Lawyer may continue to pursue any argument that fits under those facts when cop not in uniform or marked unit - even for non-speeding offenses.

San Diego DUI defense attorney news

www.SanDiegoDUI.com

May 25, 2008 10:30 a.m.

DUI Car and Truck Ignition InterLocks Could be Coming to California

A vote on DUI ignition interlock devices goes before the Assembly in Sacramento this week. The special DUI breathalyzers are nothing new in other states, but if passed this week in the Assembly, and approved by the Governor, it's a first for California.

The executive director of California's Mothers Against Drunk Driving says there are too many DUI related accidents resulting in death: "It is preventable, we can use research and technology to make this work, and that's the logic behind it," San Diego DUI lawyers hear.

However, The American Beverage Institute views the DUI locks much differently.

"Once these are in all cars they're going to be set much, much lower than .08, so it is going to effectively eliminate somebody's ability to have a glass of wine with dinner, or a beer at a ball game and then drive home," said Sarah Longwell, managing director of the ABI.

Assembly Bill 2784 would require all convicted California DUI - drunk drivers, including those facing their first DUI conviction, to install an interlock on their vehicle for a specified period of time in order to have their license reinstated.

www.SanDiegoDUIhelp.com

May 24, 2008

Will convicted California DUI - drunk drivers be forced to pass an alcohol breath test before starting their cars?

For more than 20 years, special California DUI breathalyzers -- hard-wired to a car's ignition to prevent the vehicle from starting if alcohol is detected -- have been installed under judicial order in the cars of repeat, or especially egregious, alcohol offenders. But in the last few years, six states have passed laws that require the devices, called ignition interlocks, in the cars of everyone convicted of California DUI - driving under the influence.

California is considering making interlocks mandatory for all California DUI offenders. A bill could pass the state Assembly next week. And a group of automakers has launched a major project with the federal government to develop advanced technologies that could someday make alcohol detectors a standard feature in all cars.

Advocates of interlocks, particularly Mothers Against Drunk Driving, say the devices could reduce the nation's estimated 17,000 annual alcohol-related automotive fatalities, and thereby ease the burden that California DUI drunk driving places on the nation's criminal justice system.

Critics, led by the American Beverage Institute and lawyers specializing in California DUI defense, contend that ignition interlocks aren't as effective as claimed and are a burdensome invasion of privacy.

This month, the beverage institute ran full-page ads in USA Today and the New York Times showing mug shots of celebrities convicted of drunk driving, including Lindsay Lohan and Kiefer Sutherland, saying that interlocks should be used only for "hard-core drunk drivers."

Her group worries that laws requiring the devices for all convicted California DUI drunk drivers would discourage consumers from having a drink at dinner, costing the restaurant industry untold sums of money.

The Driver Alcohol Detection System for Safety, a five-year, $10-million project funded by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and automakers including Toyota Motor Corp. and General Motors Corp., said the research could very well mean alcohol detectors will become a standard option in every car.

No country has a universal ignition interlock mandate, and Sweden, the only one to attempt such a law, seems unlikely to get permission from the European Union.

Instead, as-yet-undeveloped technologies, which could use retina scans or skin spectrometry, would be the kind of thing carmakers install as a non-mandated safety feature, like side air bags, and would be unnoticeable to the driver. However, once such a device is installed, its use probably would not be optional.

In the past, the public has been resistant to laws that require some safety equipment. In 1973, NHTSA promulgated a rule requiring the use of devices that would prevent cars from starting if the driver's seat belt was not engaged. It was revoked amid public protest.

Last year Nissan Motor Co. revealed a concept car that incorporated an arrangement of alcohol sensors, including one built into the gearshift.

At the moment, that's far from the case. As of August, there were 134,000 ignition interlocks employed in 45 states, a number that's grown substantially since 2005, when New Mexico passed the first law mandating interlocks for first offenders.

The devices, manufactured by fewer than a dozen companies, are installed at the user's expense and must be breathed into before the car can start.

The user leases the device for a monthly fee, typically about $65, and must take it to a technician every two months to get it recalibrated. The blood-alcohol sensitivity is generally set around 0.03%. That's well below the legal limit of 0.08%; convicted drunk drivers are prohibited from driving with any alcohol in their blood.

If users don't come in for device calibration, their car will eventually cease to start, even if they blow into the machine stone sober, said Corey Hickok, owner of ACS Interlock, a Santa Ana business that services the interlocks for about 300 customers every two months. And newer generations of interlocks prevent boozing on the road (or keeping the car idling in a bar parking lot) by requiring California DUI probationers to blow into the device at random times.

Smart Start Inc., which leases 30,000 interlock devices at a time, had a new model that takes pictures of the driver breathing into the machine, saving the information on a chip, to prevent cheating. He estimates that the number of interlocks in the country could grow to 750,000 should all 50 states adopt laws requiring them for all DUI offenders.

California's proposed California DUI law, which unanimously passed the Assembly Appropriations Committee on Thursday, is aimed at reducing the 1,300 alcohol-related fatalities on the state's roads each year. It's considered likely to pass the full chamber next week.

Joshua Dale, executive director of the California DUI Lawyers Association, points out the statistics are far from clear on whether laws that require interlocks for first time California DUI offenders actually reduce fatalities. "We're probably going to see that cellphones cause more deaths than drunk drivers," the prominent California DUI lawyer maintains.

www.sandiegodui.com/penalties

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N THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-873 / 07-0824
Filed January 16, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
RICHARD STEVEN WILKES,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cass County, Timothy O’Grady, Judge.
In this discretionary appeal, the State seeks to reverse the district court’s ruling suppressing evidence. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, and Daniel Feistner, County Attorney, for appellant.
Leslie G. Peters, Avoca, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
2
EISENHAUER, J.
The State appeals from the trial court’s suppression of sobriety tests conducted by Atlantic police officer Paul Wood on defendant Richard Steven Wilkes. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
Around midnight on January 11, 2007, Officer Wood was driving his police car on a routine patrol accompanied by a reserve officer. While passing a former quarry, he saw a pickup truck parked in the quarry’s parking area. The former quarry is now owned by the city of Atlantic. The pickup was facing towards the quarry with its engine running and its lights on. Officer Wood turned into the only entrance/exit for the quarry and, without activating his lights or using his siren, drove to a point ten to fifteen feet behind the pickup and parked while leaving his headlights focused on the truck. Officer Wood got out and approached the truck on the driver’s side while the reserve officer approached from the passenger side. Wilkes was the driver and he had a female passenger.
When Officer Wood reached the driver’s door, Wilkes rolled down his window. Officer Wood asked Wilkes what was going on and Wilkes replied he was looking for a fishing spot. Officer Wood asked for driver’s licenses from both parties, returned to his car and ran them through dispatch.
At some point, Officer Wood noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from Wilkes and when he returned with the licenses he asked Wilkes to get out of the truck to perform field sobriety tests. Eventually, Wilkes was arrested and charged with operating while intoxicated, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (Iowa 2007). Wilkes filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence
3
gathered by Officer Wood and the trial court granted his motion. In May 2007, the State applied for discretionary review, which was granted.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Because this case concerns the constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures; our review of the district court’s suppression ruling is de novo. State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Iowa 2002). We independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances shown by the entire record. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001).
III. LEGALITY OF SEIZURE.
Police officers are allowed to stop and briefly detain “an individual or vehicle for investigatory purposes based on a reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring.” Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 641. To meet the reasonable cause standard the police officer “must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v. Haviland, 532 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Iowa 1995).
Officer Wood testified he was approaching the truck to see what was going on but he had no suspicion of any wrongdoing. Instead, he was doing a welfare check and was “going to make sure everything was okay with the people in the vehicle.” There was no evidence the quarry was a high crime area and there was no evidence of recent criminal activities at the quarry itself. The circumstances here do not support a valid investigatory stop under Haviland: “a lone vehicle idling in a darkened parking lot at 12:30 a.m. does not, without more, support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. at 769.
4
However, police questioning by itself is generally not a seizure. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d at 82. Rather, “[a] seizure occurs when an officer by means of physical force or show of authority in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen.” State v. Pickett, 573 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Iowa 1997). Courts examine whether the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d at 82.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion “the more credible evidence shows Wilkes was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Officer Wood parked his marked patrol car ten to fifteen feet behind Wilkes’s truck and left his headlights shining directly on the truck. Officer Wood was in uniform as he approached the driver’s side of the truck and at the same time the reserve officer approached the passenger side of the truck. Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not have believed he was free to leave. See id.
The State argues Officer Wood’s seizure is valid because he was engaged in a “bona fide community caretaking activity justifying the intrusion.” See State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 543 (Iowa 2003). This exception has been applied where an officer stopped a car with a burned-out taillight; where an officer stopped a vehicle whose speeding posed a danger to park campers; where an officer helped with a flat tire; and where an officer opened a car door to check on a driver slumped over the wheel. Id. The intrusion here by Office Wood did not occur under similar circumstances and we agree with the district court:
There was no evidence that Wilkes needed assistance. His vehicle was running. His headlights were on. There was no evidence of a crash, a mechanical breakdown or some other problem. There were no emergency flashers in use. Unlike other caretaker cases, Wilkes was not slumped over or showing other signs of distress. No evidence was presented to show a factual basis for Wood’s
5
belief that Wilkes was in need of assistance. The community caretaking exception is not applicable.

May 23,2008

San Diego DUI lawyers warn: Attention all motorists. Consider curbing your need for speed this Memorial Day weekend as Solano roadways will be swarming with law enforcement officers on the lookout for traffic and California DUI offenders.

The California DUI California Highway Patrol announced this week that it will be patrolling en masse from 6 p.m. today through midnight Monday.

The CHP's focus - seat belt violators, speeders and motorists who drink and drive, California DUI lawyers understand.

Also on alert will be the Solano County AVOID Task Force, one of several throughout the Bay Area scheduled to host California DUI checkpoints and conduct California DUI strike forces.

The California DUI enforcement, California DUI attorneys said, is to detect and remove impaired drivers from the roadway.

Memorial Day is traditionally the start of the summer season and the end of the school year, California DUI officials said, factors which contribute to it being among the deadliest weekend holidays.

Which is why law enforcement agencies throughout the Bay Area will make every effort, officials said, to remove California DUI drivers from the roadway before they hurt or kill themselves, or worse, an innocent victim, California DUI lawyers are told.

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May 24, 2008

Shirley DUI case not to be dismissed by pretrial DUI motion:

Defensive tackle Jason Shirley, the Bengals' fifth-round draft pick, was not at the OTA practice Thursday. He was in Fresno County Superior Court, where his California DUI lawyer asked for his California DUI / Drunk Driving case to be dismissed on grounds the district attorney did not legally obtain Shirley’s medical records and are using them, San Diego DUI lawyers learned.

A judge denied the motion so a California DUI jury trial could start immediately. Shirley faces misdemeanor charges for California DUI - driving under the influence, driving with a blood-alcohol content of .08 or higher, hit-and-run driving and driving with a suspended license and expired registration for two separate incidents last fall, California DUI attorneys hear.

Bengals rookie, defensive tackle Jason Shirley, will likely stay in Fresno after his latest motion to have his case dismissed was rejected. Shirley will now face a jury trial with selection beginning Tuesday (government is off on Monday) at 9 a.m. in front of Judge Mark Snauffer at the Superior Court of Fresno County. Opening arguments open Wednesday and closing arguments could be heard as soon as Friday -- Shirley will miss three practices during that time.

Shirley faces a DUI, a hit-and-run and driving with a suspended license. It would seem that Shirley, if convicted of all charges, could perhap face up alot of time in jail. At the lowest, he could pay a lot of money and face probation, etc.

The maximum penalty under California law for the first offense of a DUI is six months in jail, $1,000 fine plus substantial penalty assessments set by statute, restitution fines, and 120-day suspension of driver's license. A hit-and-run (only property damage, no injuries) carries a maximum of one-year in jail and could be as high as $10,000. Driving under a suspended license, Shirley could face up to five days in county jail. If a second offense is found guilty, Shirley could face up to a year in jail.

SanDiegoDUI.com