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Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.

Alvin Lawrence GILCRIST, Appellant.

No. 6877-6-I.

Feb. 4, 1980.

Defendant was convicted of escape by the Snohomish County Court, John E. Rutter, Jr., J., and was subsequently adjudged an habitual criminal based upon findings made during his first trial for escape and upon the fact that he had been adjudged an habitual criminal by a jury verdict entered following a conviction for first-degree assault, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Williams, J., held that: (1) trial court properly instructed jury that defense of involuntary intoxication must be established by preponderance of the evidence, and (2) Court of Appeals would not consider defendant's claim that it was error to adjudge him an habitual criminal based upon findings entered in previous proceedings, where defendant's status as habitual criminal had already been decided and affirmed by Supreme Court.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes

[1] Escape 6

151k6 Most Cited Cases

Since escape is general intent crime, temporary insanity caused by involuntary intoxication is complete defense. RCWA 9.31.010 (Repealed).

[2] Criminal Law 570(2)

110k570(2) Most Cited Cases

It is proper to require defendant to prove by preponderance of the evidence that his temporary insanity resulted from involuntary intoxication. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.

[3] Constitutional Law 266(7)

92k266(7) Most Cited Cases

Allocation to defendant of burden to prove by preponderance of the evidence that his temporary insanity resulted from involuntary intoxication presents due process problem only if absence of essential element of crime charged is an affirmative defense. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.

[4] Escape 1

151k1 Most Cited Cases

Absence of involuntary intoxication is not an essential element of crime of escape. RCWA 9.31.010 (Repealed).

[5] Judgment 751

228k751 Most Cited Cases

Where defendant had been adjudged habitual criminal during collateral proceeding in which he was charged and convicted of first-degree assault, and where such adjudication had been affirmed by Supreme Court, defendant's status as habitual criminal had been decided, and Court of Appeals would not consider defendant's claim that trial court erred in adjudging him habitual criminal based upon findings entered in such prior proceedings.

*328 **717 David C. Mitchell, Kafer, Good & St. Mary, Everett (Court-appointed), for appellant.

James B. Roche, Deputy Pros. Atty., Everett, for respondent.

WILLIAMS, Judge.

In 1975, Alvin Gilcrist was convicted of escape, RCW 9.31.010, and subsequently adjudged a habitual criminal. The escape conviction was reversed in State v. Gilcrist, 15 Wash.App. 892, 552 P.2d 690 (1976), and a new trial granted. On retrial, Gilcrist was again convicted. Thereafter, the trial court adjudged Gilcrist a habitual criminal based upon findings made during his first trial and upon the fact that he had been adjudged a habitual criminal by a jury verdict entered following a conviction for first-degree assault in 1977. [FN1]

FN1. That conviction and the habitual criminal determination were affirmed in State v. Gilcrist, 91 Wash.2d 603, 590 P.2d 809 (1979), but were on appeal when the trial court relied upon the findings entered therein.

Gilcrist first contends that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's instruction to the jury that "(t)he defense of involuntary intoxication must be established by a preponderance of the evidence."

[1][2][3][4] Escape as defined in RCW 9.31.010 is a general intent crime, thus, temporary insanity caused by involuntary intoxication is a complete defense. State v. Mriglot, 88 Wash.2d 573, 564 P.2d 784 (1977). The defendant has the burden of establishing the insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence. That burden of proof is consistent with due process. State v. McDonald, 89 Wash.2d 256, 271-72, 571 P.2d 930 (1977). It is, therefore, proper to require the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the temporary insanity resulted from involuntary intoxication. This allocation of the burden of proof presents a due process problem only if the absence of an essential element of the crime charged is an affirmative defense. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, 292 (1977). The absence of involuntary *329 intoxication is not an essential element of the crime of escape. RCW 9.31.010. The trial court properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof.

[5] Gilcrist also contends that it was error to adjudge him a habitual criminal based upon findings entered in the previous proceedings. This contention is without merit.

(O)nce the status of habitual criminal under the second classification has attached to a person, successive determinations for the same person are meaningless unless the governor has pardoned him. This is because the status once determined can be utilized thereafter by the sentencing court, upon receipt of proof of such status, in establishing the appropriate sentence for an habitual criminal convicted of another crime.

(Footnotes omitted.) State v. Ogle, 3 Wash.App. 549, 550-51, 475 P.2d 913, 915 (1970). In 1977, Gilcrist had been adjudged a habitual criminal during a collateral proceeding in which he was charged and convicted of first-degree assault. That adjudication has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. State v. Gilcrist, supra. Because Gilcrist's status as a habitual criminal has been decided, we need not consider it on this appeal. State v. Ogle, supra.

Affirmed.

RINGOLD and DORE, JJ., concur.

25 Wash.App. 327, 606 P.2d 716



2003 WL 21540414 (Tex.App.-Dallas)
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

SEE TX R RAP RULE 47.2 FOR DESIGNATION AND SIGNING OF OPINIONS.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. 47

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Dallas.

Andrea Lynn STAMPER, Appellant,

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 05-02-01730-CR.

July 9, 2003.

Insanity caused by involuntary intoxication is an affirmative defense to prosecution if, at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental defect caused by involuntary intoxication, did not know that his conduct was wrong. Mendenhall v. State, 77 S.W.3d 815, 818 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).

_______________________________________________________________________

276 Cal.Rptr. 517
Ordered Not Published
Previously published at: 226 Cal.App.3d 403
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 976, 977, 979)

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Alejandro GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. D010682.

Dec. 19, 1990.

Certified for Partial Publication

Relying on the evidence that he took a prescription drug and possibly suffered unintended side effects from it, Garcia contends the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the defenses of involuntary intoxication and unconsciousness. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the contention has merit.
[1][2][3] Generally, an accused may be completely relieved of criminal responsibility if, because of involuntary intoxication, [FN3] he was temporarily rendered legally insane or temporarily deprived of his mental capacity at the time he committed the offense. (Annot., When Intoxication Deemed Involuntary so as to Constitute a Defense to Criminal Charge (1976) 73 A.L.R.3d 195, 199.) Generally, courts have considered one to be involuntarily intoxicated when he has become intoxicated through the fault of another, by accident, inadvertence, or mistake on his own part. (Ibid.) In other words, involuntary intoxication encompasses those instances where the defendant's intoxication was not culpable. When intoxication results from medicine taken as prescribed, it is generally considered involuntary intoxication because a patient is entitled to assume that an intoxicating dose would not be prescribed by a physician. (Perkins v. United States (4th Cir.1915) 228 F. 408, 415.)


FN3. Whether intoxication results from alcohol or drugs is immaterial. (People v. Baker (1954) 42 Cal.2d 550, 268 P.2d 705.)



In California, involuntary intoxication comes within the unconsciousness defense, codified in section 26, subdivision Four. [FN4] "Unconsciousness due to involuntary intoxication is recognized as a complete defense to a criminal charge." (People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 330, 147 Cal.Rptr. 740.) "An unconscious act within the contemplation of the Penal Code is one committed by a person who because of somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause is not conscious of acting and whose act therefore cannot be deemed volitional. [Citation.]" (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913, overruled on other grounds in People *521 v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685, fn. 12, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) [FN5]
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77 S.W.3d 815
Briefs and Other Related Documents

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Craig Emmett MENDENHALL, Appellant,

v.

The STATE of Texas.

No. 1089-00.

June 12, 2002.

From 1974 to 1983, Texas Penal Code § 8.01(a) provided that "[i]t is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of mental disease or defect, either did not know that his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated." In Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), we held that the defense of insanity due to involuntary intoxication was "implicit" in the language of § 8.01(a). [FN2] In other words, we held that, under § 8.01(a), it was an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant, as a result of a mental defect caused by involuntary intoxication, either did not know that his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated. We further held that, for the purposes of § 8.01(a), intoxication was "involuntary" if the defendant "exercised no independent judgment or volition in taking the intoxicant."

FN3. But see Annot., When Intoxication Deemed Involuntary so as to Constitute a Defense to Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 195, 199 (1976)("[T]he courts have considered one to be involuntarily intoxicated when he has become intoxicated through the fault of another, by accident, inadvertence,

or mistake on his part, or because of a physiological or psychological condition beyond his control.").

810 A.2d 698, 2002 PA Super 344
Briefs and Other Related Documents

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee,

v.

Jennie COLLINS, Appellant.

Submitted Aug. 26, 2002.

Filed Nov. 4, 2002.

Jury instruction

2) The defense of involuntary intoxication is available to a person if at the time of committing an act, the person's faculties were so impaired as the result of involuntary intoxication, unable to understand the nature and quality of his or her act or to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to the act--in other words either unable to know what he or she was doing or to judge that it was wrong.

_______________________________________________________________________

470 N.E.2d 63

Supreme Court of Indiana.

James H. HEYWARD, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 1283S454.

Nov. 2, 1984

At trial, Appellant presented a witness whose testimony suggested that Appellant was involuntarily intoxicated when the instant crime was committed. Specifically, Robert Evans Walker testified that during the late afternoon hours of July 29, 1982, he "dropped three LSD pills" into Appellant's can of beer hoping to intoxicate Appellant such that he could steal Appellant's money. Appellant tendered to the trial court a proposed instruction to inform the jury that involuntary intoxication operates as a "complete defense to any crime." The trial court combined Appellant's proposal with one of the State's tendered instructions, however, and gave the following final instruction 6:
"It is a defense that the defendant committed the crime charged while intoxicated, if the intoxication resulted from the introduction of a substance into his body:
(1) without his consent; or
(2) when he did not know that the substance might cause intoxication.
This is called the defense of involuntary intoxication and it operates as a complete defense to any crime. Involuntary intoxication may result from involuntary introduction of alcohol or any other drug into the body.
Involuntary intoxication is a defense to a crime if the intoxication rises to the level that a defendant lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."
[1] [2] Appellant is correct that the defense of involuntary intoxication may afford a complete defense which excuses the criminality of an act. Ind.Code § 35-41-3-5(a) (Burns 1979). To operate as a complete defense, however, the intoxication must be shown to have been of such a degree as to have deprived the accused of the power to deliberate or form the necessary design or guilty intent. Jackson v. State, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 685. This is to say that the intoxication must have at least temporarily put the accused into a state of mind which resembled insanity. For this reason, the trial court was correct to modify Appellant's proposed instruction by adding the language taken verbatim from Ind.Code § 35-41-3-6(a) (Burns 1979), Indiana's insanity defense statute. The language taken from the statute and incorporated into the instruction was: "lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the [his] conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." We do not find that the trial court misstated the law by its instruction 6. Accordingly, we find no error.